Notices. Final special condition; request for comments

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BILLING CODE 1505-01-D DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Parts 21 and 27 [Docket No. SW017; Special Condition No. 27-017-SC] Special Condition: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model 429 Helicopters, High Intensity Radiated Fields AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special condition; request for comments. SUMMARY: This special condition is issued for the Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopters. These helicopters will have novel or unusual design features associated with installing electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions, including an Electronic Flight Instrument System

(EFIS)and a Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards to protect systems that perform critical control functions, or provide critical displays, from the effects of high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF). This special condition contains the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to ensure that critical functions of systems will be maintained when exposed to HIRF. DATES: The effective date of this special condition is December 11, 2007. Comments must be received on or before February 11, 2008. ADDRESSES: Send comments on this special condition in duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, Attention: Rules Docket (ASW-111) Docket No. SW017, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0111, or deliver them in duplicate to the Rotorcraft Directorate at 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137. Comments must be marked: Docket No. SW017. You may inspect comments in the Docket that is maintained in Room 448 in the Rotorcraft Directorate offices at 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas, on weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carroll Wright, Electrical Flight Systems Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Rotorcraft Standards, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0110; telephone

(817)222-5120, FAX

(817)222-5961. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We have determined that notice and opportunity for prior public comment are unnecessary since the substance of this special condition has been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. Therefore, we determined that good cause exists for making this special condition effective upon issuance. Comments Invited You are invited to submit written data, views, or arguments. Your communications should include the regulatory docket or special condition number and be sent in duplicate to the address stated above. We will consider all communications received on or before the closing date and may change the special condition in light of the comments received. Interested persons may examine the Docket. We will file a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this special condition in the docket. If you wish us to acknowledge receipt of your comments, you must include a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket No. SW017.” We will date stamp the postcard and mail it to you. Background On September 13, 2004, Bell Helicopter submitted an application for a Type Certificate for the Model 429 helicopter. The Model 429 helicopter is a new design based on the existing drive train of the Bell Model 427 helicopter and a new fuselage. The Model 429 is a twin-engine, 4-bladed main and tail rotor helicopter with a maximum gross weight of 7,000 pounds, capable of carrying up to nine passengers plus a pilot. The helicopter will be designed for dual and single pilot instrument flight rules

(IFR)and Category A operations. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Bell Helicopter must show that the Model 429 helicopter meets the applicable provisions of the regulations as listed below: 14 CFR part 27, Amendment 27-0 through Amendment 27-40 dated May 9, 2001. Sections of 14 CFR part 29, Amendment 29-14 dated September 1, 1977, as listed in 14 CFR part 27 Appendix B for instrument flight rules (IFR). Sections of 14 CFR part 29 Amendment 29-0 through Amendment 29-47 dated May 9, 2001, as listed in 14 CFR part 27 Appendix C for Category A. 14 CFR part 36 Appendix H, Amendment 36-25, including FAA stage 3 noise limits for helicopters. Any special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent safety findings deemed necessary. In addition, the certification basis includes certain special conditions and equivalent safety findings that are not relevant to this special condition. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for these helicopters because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopters must comply with the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36; and the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to § 611 of Public Law 92-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.” Special conditions, as appropriate, are defined in § 11.19, and issued by following the procedures in § 11.38, and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with § 21.17(a)(2). Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of § 21.101. Novel or Unusual Design Features The Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopter will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features: Electrical, electronic, or combination of electrical electronic (electrical/electronic) systems that perform critical control functions or provide critical displays, such as electronic flight instruments that will be providing displays critical to the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter during operation in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), and Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) that will be performing engine control functions that are critical to the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter during visual flight rules

(VFR)and IFR operations. Discussion The Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopter, at the time of application, was identified as incorporating one and possibly more electrical/electronic systems, such as electronic flight instruments and FADEC. After the design is finalized, Bell Helicopter will provide the FAA with a preliminary hazard analysis that will identify any other critical functions, required for safe flight and landing, that are performed by the electrical/electronic systems. Recent advances in technology have led to the application in aircraft designs of advanced electrical/electronic systems that perform critical control functions or provide critical displays. These advanced systems respond to the transient effects of induced electrical current and voltage caused by HIRF incident on the external surface of the helicopter. These induced transient currents and voltages can degrade the performance of the electrical/electronic systems by damaging the components or by upsetting the systems' functions. Furthermore, the electromagnetic environment has undergone a transformation not envisioned by the current application of 14 CFR 27.1309(a). Higher energy levels radiate from operational transmitters currently used for radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of transmitters has increased significantly. Existing aircraft certification requirements are inappropriate in view of these technological advances. In addition, the FAA has received reports of some significant safety incidents and accidents involving military aircraft equipped with advanced electrical/electronic systems when they were exposed to electromagnetic radiation. The combined effects of the technological advances in helicopter design and the changing environment have resulted in an increased level of vulnerability of the electrical/electronic systems required for the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. Effective measures to protect these helicopters against the adverse effects of exposure to HIRF will be provided by the design and installation of these systems. The following primary factors contributed to the current conditions:

(1)Increased use of sensitive electronics that perform critical functions;

(2)reduced electromagnetic shielding afforded helicopter systems by advanced technology airframe materials;

(3)adverse service experience of military aircraft using these technologies; and

(4)an increase in the number and power of radio frequency emitters and the expected increase in the future. On July 30, 2007, we issued a final HIRL rule (72 FR 44016, August 6, 2007). This rule provides standards to protect aircraft electrical and electronic systems from HIRFs. It was effective September 5, 2007. However, that rule included provisions that provide relief from the new testing requirements for equipment previously certificated under HIRF special conditions issued in accordance with 14 CFR 21.16. To obtain this relief the applicant must be able to show that—

(1)The system has previously been shown to comply with special conditions for HIRF, prescribed under § 21.16, issued before December 1, 2007;

(2)The HIRF immunity characteristics of the system have not changed since compliance with the special conditions was demonstrated; and

(3)The data used to demonstrate compliance with the HIRF special conditions is provided. The Bell 429 installations are eligible for this relief provided in 14 CFR 29.1317(d) of the final HIRF rule. However, to meet their HIRF requirements they must comply with this Special Condition, which is based on similar, historical HIRF protections requirements. Compliance with HIRF requirements will be demonstrated by tests, analysis, models' similarity with existing systems, or a combination of these methods. Service experience alone will not be acceptable since such experience in normal flight operations may not include an exposure to HIRF. Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally insufficient because all elements of a redundant system are likely to be concurrently exposed to the radiated fields. This special condition will require aircraft installed systems that perform critical control functions or provide critical displays to meet certain standards based on either a defined HIRF environment or a fixed value using laboratory tests. Control system failures and malfunctions can more directly and abruptly contribute to a catastrophic event than display system failures and malfunctions. Therefore, it is considered appropriate to require more rigorous HIRF verification methods for critical control systems than for critical display systems. The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational capabilities of the installed electrical/electronic systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to the defined HIRF test environment. We have determined that the test environment defined in Table 1 is acceptable for critical control functions in helicopters. The test environment defined in Table 2 is acceptable for critical display systems in helicopters. The applicant may also demonstrate, by a laboratory test, that the electrical/electronic systems that perform critical control functions or provide critical displays can withstand a peak electromagnetic field strength in a frequency range of 10 kHz to 18 GHz. If a laboratory test is used to show compliance with the defined HIRF environment, no credit will be given for signal attenuation due to installation. A level of 100 volts per meter (v/m) is appropriate for critical display systems. A level of 200 v/m is appropriate for critical control functions. Laboratory test levels are defined according to RTCA/DO-160D Section 20 Category W (100 v/m and 150 mA) and Category Y (200 v/m and 300 mA). As defined in DO-160D Section 20, the test levels are defined as the peak of the root means squared

(rms)envelope. As a minimum, the modulations required for RTCA/DO-160D Section 20 Categories W and Y will be used. Other modulations should be selected as the signal most likely to disrupt the operation of the system under test, based on its design characteristics. For example, flight control systems may be susceptible to 3 Hz square wave modulation while the video signals for electronic display systems may be susceptible to 400 Hz sinusoidal modulation. If the worst-case modulation is unknown or cannot be determined, default modulations may be used. Suggested default values are a 1 kHz sine wave with 80 percent depth of modulation in the frequency range from 10 kHz to 400 MHz, and 1 kHz square wave with greater than 90 percent depth of modulation from 400 MHz to 18 GHz. For frequencies where the unmodulated signal would cause deviations from normal operation, several different modulating signals with various waveforms and frequencies should be applied. Applicants must perform a preliminary hazard analysis to identify electrical/electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term “critical” means those functions whose failure would contribute to or cause an unsafe condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. The systems identified by the hazard analysis as performing critical functions are required to have HIRF protection. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions. Primary electronic flight display systems and their associated components perform critical functions such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed indications. HIRF requirements would apply only to the systems that perform critical functions, including control and display. Acceptable system performance would be attained by demonstrating that the critical function components of the system under consideration continue to perform their intended function during and after exposure to required electromagnetic fields. Deviations from system specifications may be acceptable, but must be independently assessed by the FAA on a case-by-case basis. Table 1.—Rotorcraft Critical Control Functions Field Strength Volts/Meter Frequency Peak Average 10 kHz-100 kHz 150 150 100 kHz-500 kHz 200 200 500 kHz-2 MHz 200 200 2 MHz-30 MHz 200 200 30 MHz-70 MHz 200 200 70 MHz-100 MHz 200 200 100 MHz-200 MHz 200 200 200 MHz-400 MHz 200 200 400 MHz-700 MHz 730 200 700 MHz-1 GHz 1400 240 1 GHz-2 GHz 5000 250 2 GHz-4 GHz 6000 490 4 GHz-6 GHz 7200 400 6 GHz-8 GHz 1100 170 8 GHz-12 GHz 5000 330 12 GHz-18 GHz 2000 330 18 GHz-40 GHz 1000 420 Table 2.—Rotorcraft Critical Display Functions Field Strength Volts/Meter Frequency Peak Average 10 kHz-100 kHz 50 50 100 kHz-500 kHz 50 50 500 kHz-2 MHz 50 50 2 MHz-30 MHz 100 100 30 MHz-70 MHz 50 50 70 MHz-100 MHz 50 50 100 MHz-200 MHz 100 100 200 MHz-400 MHz 100 100 400 MHz-700 MHz 700 50 700 MHz-1 GHz 700 100 1 GHz-2 GHz 2000 200 2 GHz-4 GHz 3000 200 4 GHz-6 GHz 3000 200 6 GHz-8 GHz 1000 200 8 GHz-12 GHz 3000 300 12 GHz-18 GHz 2000 200 18 GHz-40 GHz 600 200 Applicability As previously discussed, this special condition is applicable to the Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopter. Should Bell Helicopter apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special condition would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model series of helicopters. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the helicopter. The substance of this special condition has been subjected to the notice and comment period previously and is written without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained in this special condition. For this reason, we have determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary, and good cause exists for adopting this special condition upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 21 and 27 Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation safety, Rotorcraft, Safety. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701-44702, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. The Special Condition Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special condition is issued as part of the type certification basis for Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopters. Protection for Electrical and Electronic Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields 1. Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capabilities of these critical functions are not adversely affected when the helicopter is exposed to high intensity radiated fields external to the helicopter. 2. For the purpose of this special condition, critical functions are defined as those functions, whose failure would contribute to, or cause, an unsafe condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft. Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December 11, 2007. Mark R. Schilling, Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E7-25143 Filed 12-27-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM365 Special Conditions No. 25-357-SC] Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane; Systems and Data Networks Security-Protection of Airplane Systems and Data Networks from Unauthorized External Access AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. The architecture of the Boeing Model 787-8 computer systems and networks may allow access to external systems and networks, such as wireless airline operations and maintenance systems, satellite communications, electronic mail, the Internet, etc. On-board wired and wireless devices may also have access to parts of the airplane's digital systems that provide flight critical functions. These new connectivity capabilities may result in security vulnerabilities to the airplane's critical systems. For these design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for protection and security of airplane systems and data networks against unauthorized access. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing standards. Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Boeing Model 787-8 airplanes. DATES: *Effective Date:* January 28, 2008. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Will Struck, FAA, Airplane and Flight Crew Interface, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone

(425)227-2764; facsimile

(425)227-1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied for an FAA type certificate for its new Boeing Model 787-8 passenger airplane. The Boeing Model 787-8 airplane will be an all-new, two-engine jet transport airplane with a two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 476,000 pounds, with a maximum passenger count of 381 passengers. Type Certification Basis Under provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR)21.17, Boeing must show that Boeing Model 787-8 airplanes (hereafter referred to as “the 787”) meet the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-117, except §§ 25.809(a) and 25.812, which will remain at Amendment 25-115. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the 787 because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the 787 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of part 36. The FAA must also issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.” The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2). Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under § 21.101. Novel or Unusual Design Features The digital systems architecture for the 787 consists of several networks connected by electronics and embedded software. This proposed network architecture is used for a diverse set of functions, including the following. 1. Flight-safety-related control and navigation and required systems (Aircraft Control Domain). 2. Airline business and administrative support (Airline Information Domain). 3. Passenger entertainment, information, and Internet services (Passenger Information and Entertainment Domain). The proposed architecture of the 787 is different from that of existing production (and retrofitted) airplanes. It may allow connection to and access from external sources and airline operator networks to the previously isolated Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Domain. Types of connections and access from external sources may include wireless systems, satellite communications, electronic mail, the Internet, etc. The Aircraft Control Domain and the Airline Information Domain perform functions required for the safe operation of the airplane. Capability is proposed for providing electronic transmission of field-loadable software applications and databases to the aircraft. These would subsequently be loaded into systems within the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Domain. Also, it may be proposed that on-board wired and wireless devices have access to the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Domain. These new connectivity capabilities and features of the proposed design may result in security vulnerabilities from intentional or unintentional corruption of data and systems critical to the safety and maintenance of the airplane. Existing regulations and guidance material did not anticipate this type of system architecture or Internet and wireless electronic access to aircraft systems that provide flight critical functions. Furthermore, 14 CFR regulations and current system safety assessment policy and techniques do not address potential security vulnerabilities that could be caused by unauthorized external access to aircraft data buses and servers. Therefore, special conditions are proposed to ensure the security, integrity, and availability of the critical systems within the Aircraft Control Domain and the Airline Information Domain by establishing requirements for: 1. Protection of Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Domain systems, hardware, software, and databases from unauthorized access. 2. Protection of field-loadable software

(FLS)applications and databases that are electronically transmitted from external sources to the on-aircraft networks and storage devices, and used within the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Domain. 3. Test and evaluation of security protection means and change control procedures of aircraft systems, hardware, software, and databases, especially for critical systems and those areas that could affect safety of flight. Discussion Of Comments Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-07-02-SC for the 787 was published in the **Federal Register** on April 16, 2007 (72 FR 18923). Several comments were received from Airbus. • *AIRBUS General Comment 1:* In Airbus's opinion these special conditions leave too much room for interpretation, and related guidance and acceptable means of compliance should be developed in an advisory circular

(AC)for use by future applicants. *FAA Response:* We agree that guidance is necessary. Detailed guidelines and criteria have been developed for this aircraft certification program, specific to this airplane's network architecture and design, providing initial guidance on an acceptable means of compliance for the 787. Additionally, the FAA intends to participate in an industry committee chartered with developing acceptable means of compliance to address aircraft network security issues, and hopes to endorse the results of the work of that committee by issuing an AC. Until such time as guidance is developed for a general means of compliance for network security protection, these special conditions and the agreed-to guidance are imposed on this specific network architecture and design. We have made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment. • *AIRBUS Comment (a):* Airbus said that the meaning of “shall ensure system security protection * * * from unauthorized external access” in the first sentence is not accurate enough. Airbus commented that this could be interpreted as a zero allowance and demonstrating compliance with such a requirement all through the aircraft's life cycle is quite impossible since security threats evolve very rapidly. The commenter maintained that the only possible solution to such a requirement would be no link and no communication at all between the aircraft and the outside world. Airbus asked, “if some residual vulnerabilities are allowed, which criteria have to be used to assess their acceptability?” *FAA Response:* The applicant is responsible for the design of the airplane network and systems architecture and for ensuring that potential security vulnerabilities of providing external access to airplane networks and systems are mitigated to an appropriate level of assurance, depending on the potential risk to the airplane and occupant safety. This responsibility is similar to that entailed in the current system safety assessment process of 14 CFR 25.1309. (See also AC 25.1309-1A and the ARAC-recommended Arsenal version of this AC, at *http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/arac/media/tae/TAE_SDA_T2.pdf* and SAE ARP 4754). These special conditions do not prescribe a specific level of assurance because assurance levels are dependent on the aircraft network architecture, specific external access points allowed, potential threats and vulnerabilities of each access, and various means of mitigating those vulnerabilities, whether by aircraft and network design features, monitoring features, operational procedures, maintenance procedures, and/or combinations thereof. Detailed compliance guidelines and criteria, specific to the 787 network architecture and design, have been developed to provide initial guidance for an acceptable means of compliance for this aircraft model. Residual vulnerabilities may have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis to ascertain whether sufficient and acceptable mitigation is provided. As mentioned earlier, the FAA intends to participate in an industry forum chartered with determining appropriate criteria and acceptable means of compliance, and hopes to endorse that guidance with an AC. We have made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment. • *AIRBUS Comment (b):* Airbus commented that external access can be interpreted in two ways: external to the aircraft, or external to the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Domain. It said that the Passenger Information and Entertainment Domain

(PIED)may be considered external and, if it is, this special condition is redundant to Proposed Special Condition 25-07-01-SC. *FAA Response:* Since these special conditions are applicable to the 787 aircraft, the interpretation of “external” means external to the 787 aircraft. Although the PIED is external to the other domains mentioned, it is “internal” to the aircraft. Special Condition 25-07-01-SC was developed to address interfaces between the PIED and the Aircraft Control and Airline Information Domains, and is therefore not redundant. We have made a minor change to these special conditions as a result of this comment. We have reworded the special conditions, changing the words “unauthorized external access” to “access by unauthorized sources external to the airplane” in order to clarify this point. • *AIRBUS Comment (c):* Airbus commented that the term “unauthorized external access” is too vague and could be interpreted in too restrictive a way, resulting in too few threats being considered. The commenter asked whether unauthorized external access encompasses physical access or unauthorized access by an authorized user and/or an unauthorized user. The commenter asked whether physical tampering has to be considered. Airbus suggested that any threats external to the aircraft be considered, and that we refer as well to the list of threats in the National Airspace System Communication System Safety Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis. *FAA Response:* The applicant is responsible for the aircraft network architecture and design, and for implementing security protection mechanisms and controls. Examples include: • defining authorized versus unauthorized users, • user authentication, • defining the scope of authorized users' access to various components connected to the airplane networks, • ensuring correct software loads are stored on appropriately secured servers, are loaded into the correct systems, are compatible with other loads, etc.; and • defining the maintenance requirements for ensuring continued operational safety of the aircraft. Operators and maintainers are responsible for performing maintenance procedures in compliance with those requirements. For maintenance tasks, however, it may be appropriate to provide some level of security protection for mechanics to ensure they are authorized for specific tasks within certain domains or systems of the aircraft for performing repairs or loading software updates, which would typically require “physical access.” With current wireless technology, actual physical access may not be necessary to perform some maintenance functions. The applicant is responsible for developing a design which complies with these special conditions and other applicable regulations. The design may include specific technology and architecture features as well as operator requirements, operational procedures and security measures, and maintenance procedures and requirements to ensure an appropriate implementation that can be properly used and maintained to ensure safe operations and continued operational safety. Applicants should define all external accesses and the scope of their aircraft network security protections. Use of the threats listed in the above-mentioned document may be appropriate for these purposes. We have made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment. • *AIRBUS Comment (d):* Airbus said that the external environment needs to be characterized in order to determine which threats the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Domain must be protected from. Questions to be answered include who can and cannot access; who is and is not trusted; and what threat source profile must be considered. The commenter asked whether only new communication media (like internet protocol

(IP)communications) would be considered not trusted, or whether all communications, including existing communications for which no security requirements have been applied up to now, would be considered not trusted. Airbus gave ACARS (the Aeronautical Radio Incorporated Communication Addressing and Reporting System) as an example of existing communications that currently have no security requirements. *FAA Response:* Each access (or communication) from an external source and its potential vulnerabilities to threats should be evaluated. The security mitigation should provide protection to an appropriate level, whether by design, monitoring, operational procedures, or other means. The security solution could certainly consider access rights and scope, trusted versus not trusted sources and data, how reliable incoming communication data may be, and other factors, depending on the intended use and potential for presenting a security risk. We have made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment. • *AIRBUS Comment (e):* Airbus said that the characterization of the external environment must be extended to the maintenance organization, because the security objectives of these special conditions must consider maintenance activity. Proposed condition 1 requires minimizing the likelihood of reductions in safety margins or airplane functional capabilities, “* * * including those possibly caused by maintenance activity”. Airbus said that the trust level for the maintenance organization, to be defined, may significantly impact the design of the on-board security protections and the compliance demonstration. *FAA Response:* The proposed special conditions include the potential for security risks from maintenance activities. Applicants should develop a design and maintenance procedures which facilitate routine maintenance of the aircraft, networks and systems, and equipment. The design and maintenance procedures should also provide capabilities for ensuring that security features and updates can be maintained by the operators and maintenance personnel, to ensure continued airworthiness and operational safety of the aircraft for its service life. These are methods of compliance issues, and therefore we have made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment. • *AIRBUS Comment (f):* Airbus referred to wording in the second sentence of the proposed special condition : “* * * to minimize the likelihood of occurrence of each of the following conditions: * * * ” Airbus noted that the definition of likelihood of occurrence and the criteria for fulfilling the security objectives are missing. The commenter asked, “when is an identified risk considered mitigated?” Airbus also noted that the 3 conditions at the end of the special conditions are quite similar to the description of safety severity effects for a “Failure Condition classified Major” per AC 25.1309-1A (or AC/AMJ No: 25.1309). Airbus maintained that, as a result, this description can be interpreted as an allowable qualitative likelihood of occurrence corresponding to “remote” and an allowable quantitative probability corresponding to less than 10E-5. Airbus said that such a classification, if interpreted in this way, may be irrelevant in some cases, because consequences may be more severe, and only a security threat analysis process can conclude which safety effect is acceptable. The commenter said that recognizing this process as an acceptable means of compliance (through an AC) could remove any dispute about how to assess the severity and likelihood of occurrence of a threat over which the applicant has no control. *FAA Response:* We agree that a “security threat analysis process” (or other acceptable means) should be conducted to determine the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks of each airplane network access from an external source to determine appropriate security mitigation protection and procedures for the aircraft, its operations, and maintenance. The aircraft and system safety assessments (as described in AC 25.1309) should certainly consider the impact of security vulnerabilities on aircraft safety and the capabilities of the aircraft's systems to satisfy reliability and integrity requirements. Detailed guidelines and criteria, specific to the 787 network architecture and design, have been developed for this aircraft and provide some initial guidance for an acceptable means of compliance. The FAA also intends to participate in industry efforts to develop additional guidance on the scope of security assessments and a general means of addressing aircraft network security concerns. We hope to endorse the industry-developed guidance, when it has been completed, with an advisory circular. We have made some minor changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment to clarify the scope for security threat analysis. • *AIRBUS proposed text revision:* Airbus proposed the following revised wording for these special conditions. The applicant shall ensure that security threats external to the aircraft (including those possibly caused by maintenance activity) are assessed and risk mitigation strategies are implemented to protect the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Services Domain from adverse impacts reducing the aircraft safety. *FAA Response:* Airbus's comments and proposal have merit but the proposal does not address all of the FAA concerns. We have, however, adopted several aspects of the commenter's proposal into these final special conditions. We have made these wording changes for clarification, but the meaning and intent of these special conditions remain the same as originally proposed. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the 787. Should Boeing apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model on the same type certificate incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the 787. It is not a rule of general applicability. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane. The applicant shall ensure system security protection for the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Domain from access by unauthorized sources external to the airplane, including those possibly caused by maintenance activity. The applicant shall ensure that security threats are identified and assessed, and that risk mitigation strategies are implemented to protect the airplane from all adverse impacts on safety, functionality, and continued airworthiness. Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 17, 2007. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E7-25075 Filed 12-27-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM385; Special Conditions No. 25-364-SC] Special Conditions: Boeing Model 757 Series Airplanes; Seats With Non-Traditional, Large, Non-Metallic Panels AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for Boeing Model 757 Series Airplanes. These airplanes, as modified by Triad International Maintenance Company (TIMCO), will have a novel or unusual design feature(s) associated with seats that include non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels that would affect survivability during a post-crash fire event. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. DATES: Effective Date: The effective date of these special conditions is December 18, 2007. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Jacquet, FAA, Airframe/Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington, 98057-3356; telephone

(425)227-2676; facsimile

(425)227-1232; electronic mail *daniel.jacquet@faa.gov.* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Future Requests for Installation of Seats with Non-Traditional, Large, Non-Metallic Panels We anticipate that seats with non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels will be installed in other makes and models of airplanes. We have made the determination to require special conditions for all applications requesting the installation of seats with non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels until the airworthiness requirements can be revised to address this issue. Having the same standards across the range of airplane makes and models will ensure a level playing field for the aviation industry. Background On July 31, 2007, Triad International Maintenance Company (TIMCO), 623 Radar Road, Greensboro, North Carolina 27410, applied for a supplemental type certificate for installing seats that include non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels in a Boeing Model 757 series airplane. The Boeing Model 757 series airplanes, currently approved under Type Certificate No. A2NM, are swept-wing, conventional tail, twin-engine, turbofan-powered, single aisle, medium-sized transport category airplanes. The applicable regulations to airplanes currently approved under Type Certificate No. A2NM do not require seats to meet the more stringent flammability standards required of large, non-metallic panels in the cabin interior. At the time the applicable rules were written, seats were designed with a metal frame covered by fabric, not with large, non-metallic panels. Seats also met the then recently adopted standards for flammability of seat cushions. With the seat design being mostly fabric and metal, the contribution to a fire in the cabin had been minimized and was not considered a threat. For these reasons, seats did not need to be tested to heat release and smoke emission requirements. Seat designs have now evolved to occasionally include non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels. Taken in total, the surface area of these panels is on the same order as the sidewall and overhead stowage bin interior panels. To provide the level of passenger protection intended by the airworthiness standards, these non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels in the cabin must meet the standards of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 25, Appendix F, parts IV and V, heat release and smoke emission requirements. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101, TIMCO must show that the Boeing Model 757 series airplanes, as changed, continue to meet the applicable provisions of the regulations incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. A2NM, or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the change. The regulations incorporated by reference in the type certificate are commonly referred to as the “original type certification basis.” The regulations incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. A2NM are as follows: • For Model 757-200 airplanes—part 25, as amended by Amendment 25-1 through Amendment 25-45. In addition, an equivalent safety finding exists with respect to § 25.853(c), Compartment interiors. • For Model 757-300 airplanes—part 25, as amended by Amendment 25-1 through Amendment 25-85 with the exception listed: Section 25.853(d)(3), Compartment interiors, at Amendment 25-72. In addition, the certification basis includes certain special conditions, exemptions, or later amended sections of the applicable part that are not relevant to these special conditions. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations ( *i.e.* , part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Boeing Model 757 series airplanes because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Boeing Model 757 series airplanes must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38 and they become part of the type certification basis under § 21.101. Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on the same type certificate to incorporate the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under § 21.101. Novel or Unusual Design Features The Boeing Model 757 series airplanes will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features: These models offer interior arrangements that include passenger seats that incorporate non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels in lieu of the traditional metal frame covered by fabric. The flammability properties of these panels have been shown to significantly affect the survivability of the cabin in the case of fire. These seats are considered a novel design for transport category airplanes that include Amendment 25-61 and Amendment 25-66 in the certification basis, and were not considered when those airworthiness standards were established. The existing regulations do not provide adequate or appropriate safety standards for seat designs that incorporate non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels in their designs. In order to provide a level of safety that is equivalent to that afforded to the balance of the cabin, additional airworthiness standards, in the form of special conditions, are necessary. These special conditions supplement § 25.853. The requirements contained in these special conditions consist of applying the identical test conditions required of all other large panels in the cabin, to seats with non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels. A non-traditional, large, non-metallic panel, in this case, is defined as a panel with exposed-surface areas greater than 1.5 square feet installed per seat place. The panel may consist of either a single component or multiple components in a concentrated area. Examples of parts of the seat where these non-traditional panels are installed include, but are not limited to: seat backs, bottoms and leg/foot rests, kick panels, back shells, credenzas and associated furniture. Examples of traditional exempted parts of the seat include: arm caps, armrest close-outs such as end bays and armrest-styled center consoles, food trays, video monitors, and shrouds. Clarification of “Exposed” “Exposed” is considered to include panels that are directly exposed to the passenger cabin in the traditional sense, and panels that are enveloped, such as by a dress cover. Traditional fabrics or leathers currently used on seats are excluded from these special conditions. These materials must still comply with § 25.853(a) and § 25.853(c) if used as a covering for a seat cushion, or § 25.853(a) if installed elsewhere on the seat. Non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels covered with traditional fabrics or leathers will be tested without their coverings or covering attachments. Discussion In the early 1980s the FAA conducted extensive research on the effects of post-crash flammability in the passenger cabin. As a result of this research and service experience, we adopted new standards for interior surfaces associated with large surface area parts. Specifically, the rules require measurement of heat release and smoke emission (part 25, Appendix F, parts IV and V) for the affected parts. Heat release has been shown to have a direct correlation with post-crash fire survival time. Materials that comply with the standards ( *i.e.* , § 25.853 entitled “Compartment interiors” as amended by Amendment 25-61 and Amendment 25-66) extend survival time by approximately 2 minutes over materials that do not comply. At the time these standards were written the potential application of the requirements of heat release and smoke emission to seats was explored. The seat frame itself was not a concern because it was primarily made of aluminum and there were only small amounts of non-metallic materials. It was determined that the overall effect on survivability was negligible, whether or not the food trays met the heat release and smoke requirements. The requirements therefore did not address seats. The preambles to both the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), Notice No. 85-10 (50 FR 15038, April 16, 1985) and the Final Rule at Amendment 25-61 (51 FR 26206, July 21, 1986), specifically note that seats were excluded “because the recently-adopted standards for flammability of seat cushions will greatly inhibit involvement of the seats.” Subsequently, the Final Rule at Amendment 25-83 (60 FR 6615, March 6, 1995) clarified the definition of minimum panel size: “It is not possible to cite a specific size that will apply in all installations; however, as a general rule, components with exposed-surface areas of one square foot or less may be considered small enough that they do not have to meet the new standards. Components with exposed-surface areas greater than two square feet may be considered large enough that they do have to meet the new standards. Those with exposed-surface areas greater than one square foot, but less than two square feet, must be considered in conjunction with the areas of the cabin in which they are installed before a determination could be made.” In the late 1990s, the FAA issued Policy Memorandum 97-112-39, *Guidance for Flammability Testing of Seat/Console Installations* , October 17, 1997 ( *http://rgl.faa.gov* ). That memo was issued when it became clear that seat designs were evolving to include large, non-metallic panels with surface areas that would impact survivability during a cabin fire event, comparable to partitions or galleys. The memo noted that large surface area panels must comply with heat release and smoke emission requirements, even if they were attached to a seat. If the FAA had not issued such policy, seat designs could have been viewed as a loophole to the airworthiness standards that would result in an unacceptable decrease in survivability during a cabin fire event. In October of 2004, an issue was raised regarding the appropriate flammability standards for passenger seats that incorporated non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels in lieu of the traditional metal covered by fabric. The Seattle Aircraft Certification Office and Transport Standards Staff reviewed this design and determined that it represented the kind and quantity of material that should be required to pass the heat release and smoke emissions requirements. We have determined that special conditions would be promulgated to apply the standards defined in § 25.853(d) to seats with large, non-metallic panels in their design. Discussion of Comments Notice of proposed special conditions No. 25-07-17-SC, pertaining to Boeing Model 757 series airplanes, was published in the **Federal Register** on November 27, 2007. No comments were received and the special conditions are adopted as proposed. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to Boeing Model 757 series airplanes. It is not our intent, however, to require seats with large, non-metallic panels to meet § 25.853, Appendix F, parts IV and V, if they are installed in cabins of airplanes that otherwise are not required to meet these standards. Because the heat release and smoke testing requirements of § 25.853 per Appendix F, parts IV and V, are not part of the type certification basis of the Model 757, these special conditions are only applicable if the Model 757 series airplanes are in 14 CFR part 121 operations. Section 121.312 requires compliance with the heat release and smoke testing requirements of § 25.853, for certain airplanes, irrespective of the type certification bases of those airplanes. For Model 757 series airplanes, these are the airplanes that would be affected by these special conditions. Should TIMCO apply at a later date for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on Type Certificate No. A2NM to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well. Effective Upon Issuance Under standard practice, the effective date of final special conditions would be 30 days after the date of publication in the **Federal Register** ; however, as the delivery date for the Boeing Model 757 series airplane modified by TIMCO is imminent, the FAA finds that good cause exists to make these special conditions effective upon issuance. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model series of airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability and it affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for Boeing Model 757 series airplanes modified by TIMCO. 1. Except as provided in paragraph 3 of these special conditions, compliance with Title 14 CFR part 25, Appendix F, parts IV and V, heat release and smoke emission, is required for seats that incorporate non-traditional, large, non-metallic panels that may either be a single component or multiple components in a concentrated area in their design. 2. The applicant may designate up to and including 1.5 square feet of non-traditional, non-metallic panel material per seat place that does not have to comply with special condition Number 1, above. A triple seat assembly may have a total of 4.5 square feet excluded on any portion of the assembly ( *e.g.* , outboard seat place 1 square foot, middle 1 square foot, and inboard 2.5 square feet). 3. Seats do not have to meet the test requirements of Title 14 CFR part 25, Appendix F, parts IV and V, when installed in compartments that are not otherwise required to meet these requirements. Examples include: a. Airplanes with passenger capacities of 19 or less, b. Airplanes that do not have § 25.853, Amendment 25-61 or later, in their certification basis and do not need to comply with the requirements of 14 CFR 121.312, and c. Airplanes exempted from § 25.853, Amendment 25-61 or later. Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 18, 2007. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E7-25077 Filed 12-27-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2007-28352; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-037-AD; Amendment 39-15309; AD 2007-26-07] RIN 2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-200B, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F Series Airplanes Equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 Engines AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive

(AD)for certain Boeing Model 747-200B, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the left- and right-hand flipper door assemblies of the engine core cowls for migrated pins and damaged flipper doors, and corrective actions if necessary. Modification of the hinge assemblies terminates the repetitive inspections. This AD results from two reports of missing flipper doors for the engine core cowls. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct migrated hinge pins and damaged flipper doors, which could allow the flipper door to fall off, resulting in the potential for an engine fire to propagate into the flammable leakage zone of the strut and for the amount of fire extinguishing agent reaching the fire to be diluted, and subsequent uncontained fire in the engine strut. DATES: This AD becomes effective February 1, 2008. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of February 1, 2008. ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http://www.regulations.gov* ; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is the Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sulmo Mariano, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone

(425)917-6501; fax

(425)917-6590. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Discussion The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM)to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to certain Boeing Model 747-200B, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F series airplanes. That NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on June 5, 2007 (72 FR 31001). That NPRM proposed to require repetitive inspections of the left- and right-hand flipper door assemblies of the engine core cowls for migrated pins and damaged flipper doors, and corrective actions if necessary. That NPRM specified that the modification of the hinge assemblies would terminate the repetitive inspections. Comments We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We have considered the comments received. Request to Clarify the Requirements Specified in Paragraph

(f)of the NPRM Boeing requests that we revise paragraph

(f)of the NPRM to clarify that the modification specified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-71-2310, dated October 13, 2005, is necessary only if hinge pins have migrated or flipper doors are damaged or missing. Boeing states that the instruction to do all applicable corrective actions could be interpreted to mean that the proposed modification is required, regardless of the inspection findings. We agree that modification is necessary only when hinge pins have migrated or the flipper doors are damaged or missing. Both Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-71-2310, and Rohr Service Bulletin TBC/80C2-NAC-71-035, dated October 10, 2005, clearly state that modification is necessary only when hinge pins have migrated or the flipper doors are damaged or missing. We have made no change to the AD in this regard. Request to Clarify the Requirements Specified in Paragraph

(g)of the NPRM Boeing requests that we revise paragraph

(g)of the NPRM to clarify that accomplishing Rohr Service Bulletin TBC/80C2-NAC-71-035, as instructed in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-71-2310, does not necessarily result in modification of the core cowl. Boeing points out that, if the hinge pin is properly installed, modification in accordance with Rohr Service Bulletin TBC/80C2-NAC-71-035 is not necessary. We agree with Boeing's comment. The actions specified in Rohr Service Bulletin TBC/80C2-NAC-71-035 do not require modification if the hinge pin has not migrated and is properly peened. We have changed paragraph

(g)of this AD to say that accomplishment of the Rohr service bulletin terminates the repetitive inspection requirements (for non-discrepant hinge pins) of paragraph

(f)of this AD. Conclusion We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received from the single commenter, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the change described previously. We also determined that this change will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of the AD. Costs of Compliance There are about 297 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The following table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to comply with this AD. Estimated Costs Action Work hours Average labor rate per hour Parts Cost per airplane Number of U.S.-registered airplanes Fleet cost Inspection of flipper door assemblies, per inspection cycle 1 $80 $0 $80, per inspection cycle 42 $3,360, per inspection cycle. Modification of hinge assemblies, if accomplished 1 80 0 80 Up to 42 Up to $3,360. Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. Regulatory Findings We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1)Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

(2)Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

(3)Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA)amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): **2007-26-07 Boeing:** Amendment 39-15309. Docket No. FAA-2007-28352; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-037-AD. Effective Date

(a)This AD becomes effective February 1, 2008. Affected ADs

(b)None. Applicability

(c)This AD applies to Boeing Model 747-200B, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F series airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 engines. Unsafe Condition

(d)This AD results from two reports of missing flipper doors for the engine core cowl. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct migrated hinge pins and damaged flipper doors, which could allow the flipper door to fall off, resulting in the potential for an engine fire to propagate into the flammable leakage zone of the strut and for the amount of fire extinguishing agent reaching the fire to be diluted, and subsequent uncontained fire in the engine strut. Compliance

(e)You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done. Inspection of the Flipper Door Assemblies

(f)Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Do a general visual inspection for migrated hinge pins and damaged flipper doors of the left- and right-hand flipper door assemblies of the engine core cowls, and do all applicable corrective actions, by accomplishing all the actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-71-2310, dated October 13, 2005. Do all applicable corrective actions before further flight. Repeat the inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 18 months for that flipper door assembly, until doing the actions specified in paragraph

(g)of this AD. Note 1: Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-71-2310, dated October 13, 2005, refers to Rohr Service Bulletin TBC/80C2-NAC-71-035, dated October 10, 2005, as an additional source of service information for accomplishing the actions specified in paragraph

(f)of this AD. Terminating Action for Repetitive Inspections

(g)Accomplishing the inspection and applicable modification of a hinge assembly of a flipper door assembly of the engine core cowl in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-71-2310, dated October 13, 2005; or Rohr Service Bulletin TBC/80C2-NAC-71-035, dated October 10, 2005; terminates the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD for that hinge assembly. Parts Installation

(h)As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install, on any airplane, a hinge assembly, part number 224-2335-69, for the flipper door of the engine core cowl unless it has been modified in accordance with the requirements of paragraph

(g)of this AD. Material Incorporated by Reference

(i)You must use Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-71-2310, dated October 13, 2005, to perform the actions that are required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this document in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: *http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.* Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 11, 2007. Michael J. Kaszycki, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E7-24520 Filed 12-27-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security 15 CFR Part 772 Definitions of Terms CFR Correction In Title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 300 to 799, revised as of January 1, 2007, on page 577, in § 772.1, in the second column, the second definition of *Production* is removed. [FR Doc. 07-55526 Filed 12-27-07; 8:45 am]

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