Notices. Notice of Public Hearing and Commission Meeting

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BILLING CODE 7590-01-P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations I. Background Pursuant to section 189a.

(2)of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person. This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from October 25, 2007, to November 7, 2007. The last biweekly notice was published on November 6, 2007 (72 FR 62685). Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not

(1)involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

(2)create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

(3)involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below. The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or the notice period, it will publish in the **Federal Register** a notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently. Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking, Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of this **Federal Register** notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, person(s) may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request via electronic submission through the NRC E-Filing system for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's “Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings” in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested person(s) should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/.* If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed within 60 days, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order. As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following general requirements:

(1)The name, address, and telephone number of the requestor or petitioner;

(2)the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding;

(3)the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and

(4)the possible effect of any decision or order, which may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor seeks to have litigated at the proceeding. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion, which supports the contention and on which the petitioner/requestor intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner/requestor intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/requestor who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party. Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing. If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment. A request for hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule, which the NRC promulgated in August 28, 2007 (72 FR 49139). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit and serve documents over the internet or in some cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek a waiver in accordance with the procedures described below. To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least five

(5)days prior to the filing deadline, the petitioner/requestor must contact the Office of the Secretary by e-mail at *HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV,* or by calling

(301)415-1677, to request

(1)a digital ID certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and/or

(2)creation of an electronic docket for the proceeding (even in instances in which the petitioner/requestor (or its counsel or representative) already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate). Each petitioner/requestor will need to download the Workplace Forms Viewer TM to access the Electronic Information Exchange (EIE), a component of the E-Filing system. The Workplace Forms Viewer TM is free and is available at *http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/install-viewer.html.* Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is available on NRC's public Web site at *http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html.* Once a petitioner/requestor has obtained a digital ID certificate, had a docket created, and downloaded the EIE viewer, it can then submit a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in Portable Document Format

(PDF)in accordance with NRC guidance available on the NRC public Web site at *http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.* A filing is considered complete at the time the filer submits its documents through EIE. To be timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the EIE system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends the submitter an e-mail notice confirming receipt of the document. The EIE system also distributes an e-mail notice that provides access to the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document via the E-Filing system. A person filing electronically may seek assistance through the “Contact Us” link located on the NRC Web site at *http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html* or by calling the NRC technical help line, which is available between 8:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Eastern Time, Monday through Friday. The help line number is

(800)397-4209 or locally,

(301)415-4737. Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not submitting documents electronically must file a motion, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such filings must be submitted by:

(1)First class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or

(2)courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the provider of the service. Non-timely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted and/or the contentions should be admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii). To be timely, filings must be submitted no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in NRC's electronic hearing docket, which is available to the public at *http://ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp,* unless excluded pursuant to an order of the Commission, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, or a presiding officer. Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in their submission. Non-timely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition, request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(a)(1)(i)-(viii). For further details with respect to this amendment action, see the application for amendment, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.* If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1

(800)397-4209,

(301)415-4737 or by e-mail to *pdr@nrc.gov.* Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert County, Maryland. *Date of amendments request:* October 17, 2007. *Description of amendments request:* The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specifications

(TS)to establish more effective and appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative requirements related to the inoperability of snubbers in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved TS Task Force

(TSTF)change traveler TSTF-372-A, Revision 4. Specifically, the proposed amendment would add Limiting Condition for Operation

(LCO)3.0.8. The NRC staff issued a “Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding the Addition of LCO 3.0.8 on the Inoperability of Snubbers Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process” in the **Federal Register** on November 24, 2004 (69 FR 68412). The notice included a model safety evaluation

(SE)and a model no-significant-hazards-consideration

(NSHC)determination. The NRC staff issued a “Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding the Addition of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.8 on the Inoperability of Snubbers Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process” in the **Federal Register** on May 4, 2005 (70 FR 23252). The notice included a model application, including a revised model SE. In its application dated October 17, 2007, the licensee affirmed the applicability of the model NSHC determination which is presented below. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of NSHC adopted by the licensee is presented below: Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported system technical specification

(TSs)requirements related to control room envelope habitability. The proposed changes include revisions to the control room post-accident recirculation system, the instrument operating conditions for isolation functions, and a control room envelope habitability program. The changes are consistent with TS Task Force

(TSTF)Change Traveler TSTF-448-A, Revision 3, “Control Room Habitability,” except for the differential pressure surveillance requirements. The availability of this TS improvement was published in the **Federal Register** on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022). In addition to the changes related to TSTF-448-A, the proposed amendment would:

(1)Align TS with those delineated in NUREG-1431, Revision 3, “Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants,” to the extent necessary to adopt TSTF-448-A, including the adoption of the necessary portions of TSTF-51-A, Revision 2, “Revise Containment Requirements During Handling of Irradiated Fuel and Core Alterations,” and TSTF-287-A, Revision 5, “Ventilation System Envelope Allowed Outage Time,”

(2)add TS for control room radiation monitor R-23 (ventilation system air monitor), and

(3)reformat or clarify current TS. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? No. The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed changes do not prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components

(SSCs)to perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. This is a revision to the TS for the control room post-accident recirculation system and control room isolation function, which are mitigation systems designed to minimize unfiltered air in-leakage into the control room envelope and to filter the control room envelope atmosphere to protect the control room envelope occupants following accidents previously analyzed. An important part of the system is the control room envelope boundary. The control room envelope post-accident recirculation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. Establishing operability requirements for SSCs, performing tests and implementing programs that verify the integrity of the control room envelope boundary and control room envelope habitability ensure that the mitigation features are capable of performing their assumed functions. Therefore, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? No. The proposed changes will not significantly change the requirements of the control room envelope ventilation system or its function during accident conditions. No new or different accidents result from performing the new surveillance or following the new program. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions including the revised gas decay tank and volume control tank rupture analysis and current plant operating practice. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? No. The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by these changes. The proposed changes will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an unacceptable period without compensatory measures. The proposed changes do not significantly affect systems that respond to safely shut down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion Resources Services, Inc., 120 Tredegar Street, Riverside 2, Richmond, VA 23219. *NRC Acting Branch Chief:* Travis L. Tate. Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Power Station, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin *Date of amendment request:* October 2, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification

(TS)Sections 3.7, “Auxiliary Electrical Systems” and 4.6, “Periodic Testing of Emergency Power System,” to change the testing requirements for ensuring operability of the remaining operable emergency diesel generator

(EDG)when the other EDG is inoperable. In addition, the proposed amendment would add a new specification when two EDGs are inoperable and revise the surveillance requirements for the EDGs. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? No. The proposed amendment would clarify testing requirements for the operable EDG, when one EDG is inoperable, and limit testing to only the intended purpose of the requirement. The intended purpose of the testing requirement is to provide reasonable assurance that when an EDG is inoperable, the opposite EDG is operable. The proposed change does not affect the initiators of analyzed events or the assumed mitigation of accident or transient events. Specifically, testing of the remaining operable diesel will still occur unless evaluation of the inoperable EDG confirms that its failure is not attributable to a common cause failure mechanism. Furthermore, the proposed change clarifies the surveillance testing necessary to give reasonable assurance of operability and restricts the amount of time to perform the testing (i.e. with two inoperable EDGs) to two hours. This ensures no significant increase in the probability of a loss-of-power during the period of the confirming surveillance concurrent with an opposite train inoperable EDG. Elimination of unnecessary testing by acceptable evaluation of the operable EDG reduces component wear and promotes overall EDG reliability and availability. Clarification of required testing and restriction in the amount of time to complete the surveillance to confirm operability, reduces the probability and significance of common mode failures. The proposed amendment would also add a new specification allowing two EDGs to be inoperable for up to two hours. This change does not significantly increase the initiators of analyzed events or the assumed mitigation of any accidents or transients. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The proposed amendment does not involve a physical alteration of the plant or a change in the methods used to respond to any evaluated plant accident. No new or different equipment is being installed and no installed equipment is being removed or operated in a different manner. Only a surveillance test clarification and limited two-hour action statement have been added to permit testing of the opposite train, operable EDG. Although the diesel generators will be tested in a different manner, the proposed changes will improve the availability and reliability of the diesel generators without creating the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Furthermore, there is no alteration to the parameters within which the plant is normally operated or in the setpoints, which initiate protective or mitigative actions. Since the diesel generators will continue to be operated in the same manner and the proposed test protocol will improve diesel generator availability and reliability, no new failure modes are introduced by the proposed amendment. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? *Response:* No. The proposed amendment would add a TS allowing two EDGs to be inoperable for up to two hours before the plant must be shut down in a controlled manner. Allowing two EDGs to be inoperable for this limited period of time, while the normal offsite power source remains available, is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 and not considered to be a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Station operations and EDG surveillance requirements are not adversely affected by the proposed change. Furthermore, the proposed amendment does not adversely impact the condition or performance of structures, systems or components relied upon for accident mitigation or any safety analysis assumptions. The proposed amendment adds provisions to reduce EDG wear and increase availability. Therefore, the proposed amendment to the KPS [Kewaunee Power Station] TS does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion Resources Services, Inc., Counsel for Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., 120 Tredegar Street, Richmond, VA 23219. *NRC Acting Branch Chief:* Travis L. Tate. Duke Power Company LLC, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee County, South Carolina *Date of amendment request:* October 16, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would revise the Technical Specifications to accommodate plant modifications that will address water hammer concerns described in Generic Letter 96-06, “Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Conditions,” dated September 30, 1996. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The requested license amendment seeks approval for the Low Pressure Service Water Reactor Building Waterhammer Prevention System that is being added to the design of the three Oconee Units and the associated revised Technical Specifications. The Low Pressure Service Water Reactor Building Waterhammer Prevention modification will provide a combination passive and automatic means to isolate the Low Pressure Service Water flow stream to the Reactor Building Cooling Units, Reactor Building Auxiliary Coolers, and Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Coolers on a loss of Low Pressure Service Water flow that can lead to a waterhammer should the Low Pressure Service Water system become depressurized. New check valves and air operated valves are added into an Engineered Safeguards flowpath. The existing Low Pressure Service Water header that discharges from the Reactor Building Cooling Units is to be modified by separating it into two headers and then joining back into a common header. Each header will contain two air operated valves. The Waterhammer Prevention System maintains the Low Pressure Service Water System inside containment water solid during a Loss of Offsite Power such that voids, which could later collapse, cannot form. The Waterhammer Prevention System will eliminate an Operable but degraded/non-conforming condition associated with waterhammers. The design of the proposed modification and its associated Technical Specifications will provide means to assure that the Low Pressure Service Water Reactor Building Waterhammer Prevention System operates at a performance level necessary to provide for safe operation of the Low Pressure Service Water system following installation on each of the three Units. The system is designed such that a single active failure will not prevent the system from preventing a waterhammer event if power is lost to the Low Pressure Service Water pumps (e.g., Loss of Offsite Power), nor will a single active failure prevent the Engineered Safeguards flowpath from being available if needed during a Loss of Coolant Accident or Main Steam Line Break. Evaluations have been performed to assure that the risk of adding new hardware is acceptable. Therefore, the addition of this modification and associated Technical Specifications does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed Low Pressure Service Water Reactor Building Waterhammer Prevention Modification and its associated Technical Specifications will provide a means to assure the mechanical and electrical components operate at a performance level necessary to provide for safe operation of the modified Low Pressure Service Water system flow to the Reactor Building Cooling Units, Reactor Building Auxiliary Coolers and Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Coolers. The change enhances the plant design by eliminating the possibility of significant waterhammers that occur on a loss of Low Pressure Service Water flow to the above components. The modification does not add any new single active failures that would prevent the Low Pressure Service Water System from supplying cooling water to the Reactor Building Cooling Units. The Reactor Building Cooling Units will be isolated briefly during an Engineered Safeguards event; however, the flow path will be restored before cooling is required following the event. Since cooling was previously not available until after power restoration following a Loss of Offsite Power, there is no change in system response regarding Low Pressure Service Water flow through the Reactor Building Cooling Units when compared to the previous design. Therefore, the proposed modification and associated Technical Specifications will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any kind of accident previously evaluated. 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change does not adversely affect any plant safety limits, setpoints, or design parameters. The change also does not adversely affect the fuel, fuel cladding, Reactor Coolant System, or Containment Operability. The Reactor Building Cooling Units will be isolated briefly during an Engineered Safeguards event; however, the flow path will be restored before cooling is required following the event. Since cooling is currently not available until after power restoration following a Loss of Offsite Power, there is no change in system response regarding Low Pressure Service Water flow through the Reactor Building Cooling Units when compared to the previous design. The modification mitigates significant waterhammers in the Low Pressure Service Water piping to the Reactor Building Cooling Units and Reactor Cooling Pump Motor Coolers. The change will maintain the ability to provide Low Pressure Service Water flow to safety related loads following Loss of Offsite Power events. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn, Associate General Counsel and Managing Attorney, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 526 South Church Street, EC07H, Charlotte, NC 28202. *NRC Branch Chief:* Evangelos C. Marinos. Duke Power Company LLC, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee County, South Carolina. *Date of amendment request:* October 22, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would revise the Technical Specifications to accommodate the use of AREVA NP Mark-B-HTP fuel. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed revisions to the technical specifications and to Duke's NRC-approved methodology reports support the use of the AREVA NP Mark-B-HTP fuel design. The methodology will be approved by the NRC prior to plant operation with the new fuel. The proposed safety limit ensures that fuel integrity will be maintained during normal operations and anticipated operational transients. The core operating limits report will be developed in accordance with the approved methodology. The proposed safety limit value does not affect the performance of any equipment used to mitigate the consequences of an analyzed accident. There is no impact on the source term or pathways assumed in accidents previously assumed. No analysis assumptions are violated and there are no adverse effects on the factors that contribute to offsite or onsite dose as the result of an accident. 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed safety limit value does not change the methods governing normal plant operation, nor are the methods utilized to respond to plant transients altered. The BHTP correlation is not an accident/event initiator. No new initiating events or transients result from the use of the BHTP correlation or the related safety limit change. 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed safety limit value has been established in accordance with the methodology for the BHTP correlation to ensure that the applicable margin of safety is maintained (i.e. there is at least 95% probability at a 95% confidence level that the hot fuel rod does not experience DNB). The other reactor core safety limits will continue to be met by analyzing the reload using NRC approved methods and incorporation of resultant operating limits into the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn, Associate General Counsel and Managing Attorney, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 526 South Church Street, EC07H, Charlotte, NC 28202. *NRC Branch Chief:* Evangelos C. Marinos. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver County, Pennsylvania *Date of amendment request:* August 30, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would modify Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and 2) Technical Specification

(TS)requirements related to control room envelope habitability in TS 3.7.10, “Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)” and TS Section 5.5, “Administrative Controls—Programs and Manuals.” This change is consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved Technical Specification Task Force

(TSTF)Change Traveler TSTF-448, Revision 3. The availability of this TS revision was announced in the **Federal Register** on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022) as part of the consolidated line item improvement process. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration adopted by the licensee is presented below: Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components

(SSCs)to perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change revises the TS for the CRE emergency ventilation system, which is a mitigation system designed to minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE emergency ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify the operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to assess and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the CRE emergency ventilation system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological consequences to CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that the CRE emergency ventilation system will perform as assumed in the consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Thus, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously Evaluated The proposed change does not impact the accident analysis. The proposed change does not alter the required mitigation capability of the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its functioning during accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No new or different accidents result from performing the new surveillance or following the new program. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed change does not alter any safety analysis assumptions and is consistent with current plant operating practice. Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The proposed change does not affect safety analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The proposed change does not adversely affect systems that respond to safely shut down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis adopted by the licensee and, based on this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* David W. Jenkins, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street, Akron, OH 44308. *NRC Branch Chief:* Mark G. Kowal. FPL Energy, Point Beach, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin *Date of amendment request:* October 1, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would revise the accident source term in the design-basis radiological consequences analyses and the associated Technical Specifications (TSs), pursuant to Section 50.67 of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.67). The proposed amendments would revise the licensing basis of Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

(PBNP)to support a full-scope application of an Alternative Source Term

(AST)methodology. The AST methodology will modify PBNP's licensing bases by:

(1)Replacing the current accident source term with an AST as described in 10 CFR 50.67 for design-basis accidents

(DBA)radiological consequences, and

(2)establishing the 10 CFR 50.67 Total Effective Dose Equivalent

(TEDE)dose limits as acceptance criteria for the radiological consequences of DBAs. TS changes associated with the AST methodology change are: TS 1.1, a reduction in the definition of the maximum allowable containment leak rate. TS 3.4.16, the specific activity of the reactor coolant is revised for dose equivalent iodine. TS 3.7.9, a new mode of operation for the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS), which will allow operation of the CREFS with filtered outside and filtered recirculated air. TS 3.7.13, the specific activity of the secondary coolant is revised for dose equivalent iodine. In addition, a modification to the residual heat removal system, containment spray and their support systems, will be made to support operation of the containment spray system during containment spray recirculation. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The results of the applicable radiological design basis accident

(DBA)re-evaluation demonstrated that, with the requested changes, the dose consequences of these limiting events are within the regulatory limits and guidance provided by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 for alternative source term

(AST)methodology. The AST is an input to calculations used to evaluate the consequences of an accident and does not by itself affect the plant response or the actual pathway of the activity released from the fuel. It does, however, better represent the physical characteristics of the release such that appropriate mitigation techniques may be applied. The change from the original source term to the new proposed AST is a change in the analysis method and assumptions and has no effect on accident initiators or causal factors that contribute to the probability of occurrence of previously analyzed accidents. Use of an AST to analyze the dose effect of DBAs shows that regulatory acceptance criteria for the new methodology continues to be met. Changing the analysis methodology does not change the sequence or progression of the accident scenario. The proposed Technical Specification changes reflect the plant configuration that will support implementation of the AST analyses. The equipment affected by the proposed changes is mitigative in nature and relied upon after an accident has been initiated. The operation of various filtration systems, the residual heat removal and the containment spray system, including associated support systems, has been considered in the evaluations for these proposed changes. While the operation of these systems does change with the implementation of an AST, the affected systems are not accident initiators, and application of the AST methodology itself, is not an initiator of a design basis accident. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. As described in Item 1 above, the changes proposed in this license amendment request involve the use of a new analysis methodology and related regulatory acceptance criteria. The proposed Technical Specification changes reflect the plant configuration that will support implementation of the new methodology. No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed changes. Although the proposed changes require modifications to the control room emergency ventilation system, as well as modifications to the residual heat removal system and containment spray system, these changes will not initiate a new or different kind of accident since they are related to system capabilities that provide protection from accidents that have already occurred. As a result, no new failure modes are being introduced that could lead to different accidents. These changes do not alter the nature of events postulated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report nor do they introduce any unique precursor mechanisms. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of Safety. *Response:* No. As described in Item 1, the changes proposed in this license amendment involve the use of a new analysis methodology and related regulatory acceptance criteria. The proposed Technical Specification changes reflect the plant configuration that will support implementation of the new methodology. Safety margins and analytical conservatisms have been evaluated and have been found to be acceptable. The analyzed events have been carefully selected and, with plant modifications, margin has been retained to ensure that the analyses adequately bound postulated event scenarios. The proposed changes continue to ensure that the dose consequences of DBAs at the exclusion area and low population zone boundaries and in the control room are within the corresponding acceptance criteria presented in RG 1.183 and 10 CFR 50.67. The margin of safety for the radiological consequences of these accidents is provided by meeting the applicable regulatory limits, which are set at or below the 10 CFR 50.67 limits. An acceptable margin of safety is inherent in these limits. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Mr. Antonio Fernandez, Senior Attorney, FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420. *NRC Acting Branch Chief:* Travis L. Tate. *Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-220, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1 (NMP1), Oswego County, New York* *Date of amendment request:* September 27, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise the operability requirements contained in Technical Specification

(TS)Section 3.2.7, “Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves,” and associated requirements contained in TS Section 3.6.2, “Protective Instrumentation.” The proposed changes would modify the conditions for which reactor coolant system isolation valves (RCSIVs) and associated isolation instrumentation must be operable to include the hot shutdown reactor operating condition (i.e., when fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212 °F). In addition, new requirements are proposed to require that the RCSIVs in the shutdown cooling

(SDC)system and associated isolation instrumentation be operable during the cold shutdown reactor operating condition (fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor coolant temperature is less than or equal to 212 °F) and the refueling reactor operating condition (i.e., when fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor coolant temperature is less than 212 °F). These proposed changes will require operability of RCSIVs during conditions other than the power operating condition, and are similar in concept to primary containment isolation valve operability requirements contained in NUREG-1433, “Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/4.” Lastly, TS Section 3.6.2 (Table 3.6.2b) would be revised to delete unnecessary operability requirements for the cleanup system and SDC system high area temperature isolation instrumentation, consistent with the proposed revisions to the RCSIV operability requirements. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The proposed changes provide more stringent requirements for operation of NMP1. These include requiring operability of RCSIVs and associated isolation instrumentation during the hot shutdown condition and requiring RCSIVs in the SDC system and associated instrumentation to be operable during the cold shutdown and refueling operating conditions. Requiring RCSIV operability during the hot shutdown operating condition ensures that reactor coolant loss in the event of a rupture of a line connected to the reactor coolant system

(RCS)is minimized, and the release of radioactive material to the environment is consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for design basis accidents. Requiring operability of the RCSIVs in the SDC system during the cold shutdown and refueling operating conditions provides protection against potential draining of the reactor vessel through the SDC system during shutdown conditions, which is when the SDC system is normally operated. In addition, operability requirements for the cleanup system and SDC system high area temperature isolation instrumentation are revised to be consistent with the proposed revisions to the RCSIV operability requirements and with NUREG-1433. The high area temperature isolation instrumentation need not be operable in the cold shutdown and refueling conditions, since the probability and consequences of design basis accidents are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these operating conditions. Also, system isolation on high area temperature would likely not occur in the event of system leakage or line break since RCS temperature during the cold shutdown and refueling conditions is typically maintained below the high area temperature isolation setpoints (190°F for the cleanup system area and 170°F for the SDC system area). The revised operability requirements for the RCSIVs and associated isolation instrumentation do not result in operation that would make an accident more likely to occur and do not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of a previously evaluated accident. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The proposed changes to the TS operability requirements for the RCSIVs and associated isolation instrumentation do not alter or involve any design basis accident initiators. The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed changes do impose different RCSIV operability requirements that are more stringent than existing requirements, and incorporate RCSIV isolation instrumentation operability requirements that are consistent with the RCSIV requirements and with NUREG-1433. These changes continue to be consistent with the assumptions in the safety analyses and licensing basis. Therefore, the proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? *Response:* No. The proposed changes to the TS operability requirements for the RCSIVs and associated isolation instrumentation ensure that RCSIV closure will occur when required to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents. The proposed changes also ensure that SDC system isolation can be accomplished to protect against potential draining of the reactor vessel through the SDC system during shutdown conditions, which is when the SDC system is normally operated. The imposition of these revised RCSIV operability requirements either has no impact on or increases the margin of plant safety. The plant responses to accidents will not be adversely affected, and the accident mitigation equipment will continue to function as assumed in the accident analyses. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC)staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006. *NRC Branch Chief:* Mark G. Kowal. *Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No, 2 (NMP2), Oswego County, New York* *Date of amendment request:* September 19, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise NMP2 Limiting Condition for Operation

(LCO)3.10.1 to expand its scope to include provisions for temperature excursions greater than 200 °F as a consequence of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and as a consequence of scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, while considering operational conditions to be in Mode 4. This change is consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved Revision 0 to Technical Specification

(TS)Task Force

(TSTF)Change Traveler, TSTF-484, “Use of TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing Activities.” The availability of this TS revision was announced in the **Federal Register** on October 27, 2006 (71 FR 63050) as part of the consolidated line item improvement process. The licensee affirmed the applicability of the model no significant hazards consideration determination in its application. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration adopted by the licensee is presented below: Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated Technical Specifications currently allow for operation at greater than [200]°F while imposing MODE 4 requirements in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met. Extending the activities that can apply this allowance will not adversely impact the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Criterion 2: The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Technical Specifications currently allow for operation at greater than [200]°F while imposing MODE 4 requirements in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met. No new operational conditions beyond those currently allowed by LCO 3.10.1 are introduced. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any existing requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin of Safety Technical Specifications currently allow for operation at greater than [200]°F while imposing MODE 4 requirements in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met. Extending the activities that can apply this allowance will not adversely impact any margin of safety. Allowing completion of inspections and testing and supporting completion of scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test prior to power operation results in enhanced safe operations by eliminating unnecessary maneuvers to control reactor temperature and pressure. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis adopted by the licensee and, based on this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the request for amendments involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee* : Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006. *NRC Branch Chief:* Mark G. Kowal. Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-263, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota *Date of amendment request:* September 25, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise the MNGP licensing basis to incorporate the results of a revised small-break loss-of-coolant accident

(LOCA)analysis to determining the Low Pressure Coolant Injection

(LPCI)loop select logic minimum detectable break area. This analysis showed that a small break, rather than the current large recirculation line break LOCA, would become the limiting accident with respect to peak cladding temperature (PCT). In conjunction with this proposed new licensing basis analysis, the licensee proposed to revise the Table 3.3.5.1-1 (regarding emergency core cooling system instrumentation) of the Technical Specifications

(TS)as follows:

(1)change the allowable value from the current 24 inch water column to 100 inch water column for Function 2.j, “Recirculation Riser Differential Pressure—High (Break Detection);” and

(2)change the associated channel calibration frequency Surveillance Requirement

(SR)from a nominal 12-month to a 24-month interval. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC). The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's analysis, and has performed its own as follows: 1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? No. The proposed changes to the PCT licensing basis and the TS do not involve a physical alteration of the plant, i.e., no design change to plant system, and no new or different type of equipment will be installed. The proposed PCT change is an analysis result which is within regulatory acceptance limits, and the proposed TS changes reflect the revised analysis. Thus, the proposed changes affect only parameters assumed for certain analyses, but do not adversely affect accident initiators, precursors, plant design, configuration, or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not adversely affect the ability of structures, systems and components to perform their intended safety function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment isolation capability, or radiological consequences of any accident previously evaluated. Furthermore, the proposed changes do not increase the types and the amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released, and do not significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. 2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated? No. The proposed changes do not involve a physical altering of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in methods governing normal plant operation. The requirements in the TS will continue to assure operation of the plant within its design specifications and safety limits. Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety? No. The proposed amendment would only change the analysis of record LOCA PCT, the allowed value of an instrument function, and its associated SR frequency. There will be no modification of any TS limiting condition for operation, no change to any limit on previously analyzed accidents, no change to how previously analyzed accidents or transients would be mitigated, no change in any methodology used to evaluate consequences of accidents, and no change in any operating procedure or process. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not entail a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis, and based on its own analysis and has found that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Jonathan Rogoff, Esquire, Vice President, Counsel & Secretary, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, 700 First Street, Hudson, WI 54016. *NRC Acting Branch Chief:* Clifford G. Munson. Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska *Date of amendment request:* October 5, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment requests a change to Technical Specification 3.7(1)ci, “Emergency Power Periodic Test,” related to the surveillance testing of the Fort Calhoun Station emergency diesel generators

(DGs)to support a modification to the DG start circuitry. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The removal of the anticipatory (idle speed) diesel generator

(DG)start signal on a reactor protective system

(RPS)reactor trip does not adversely affect the design function of the DGs and thus is not an initiator of any previously evaluated accidents. No Updated Safety Analysis Report

(USAR)accident analyses take credit for the anticipatory (idle speed) DG start following a design basis accident (DBA). The DGs provide emergency power to their respective 4.16 KV [Kilovolt] buses and will continue to do so after the proposed modification is installed. Upon the occurrence of an undervoltage condition on the bus or an engineered safety features

(ESF)signal, the modification provides a full speed DG start to achieve rated voltage and frequency. The safety function of the DGs is not altered by the installation of the modification. The associated Technical Specification

(TS)change allows surveillance testing to reflect the way that the DGs start and load onto their respective buses following the modification. Deletion of a footnote containing historical information pertaining to a one-time surveillance interval extension and the punctuation correction are administrative changes. These administrative changes do not increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The removal of the anticipatory (idle speed) diesel generator

(DG)start signal on an RPS reactor trip does not adversely affect the design function of the DGs and thus does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. There are no USAR accident analyses which take credit for the anticipatory (idle speed) DG start following a DBA. The DGs provide emergency power to their respective 4.16 KV buses and will continue to do so after the proposed modification is installed. Upon the occurrence of an undervoltage condition on the bus or an ESF signal, the modification provides a full speed DG start to achieve rated voltage and frequency. The safety function of the DGs is not altered by the installation of this modification. The associated TS change allows surveillance testing to reflect the way that the DGs start and load onto their respective buses following the modification. Deletion of a footnote containing historical information pertaining to a one-time surveillance interval extension and the punctuation correction are administrative changes that do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? *Response:* No. The removal of the anticipatory (idle speed) diesel generator

(DG)start signal on an RPS reactor trip does not adversely affect the design function of the DGs and thus does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. There are no USAR accident analyses which take credit for the anticipatory (idle speed) DG start following a DBA. The DGs provide emergency power to their respective 4.16 KV buses and will continue to do so after installation of the proposed modification. Upon the occurrence of an undervoltage condition on the bus or an ESF signal, the modification provides a full speed DG start to achieve rated voltage and frequency. The safety function of the DGs is not altered by the installation of this modification. The associated TS change allows surveillance testing to reflect the way that the DGs will start and load onto their respective buses following the modification. Deletion of a footnote containing historical information pertaining to a one-time surveillance interval extension and the punctuation correction are administrative changes that do not reduce a margin of safety. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* James R. Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817. *NRC Branch Chief:* Thomas G. Hiltz. *Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska* *Date of amendment request:* October 12, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would modify the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 design and licensing basis to increase the shutdown cooling

(SDC)system entry temperature from 300 °F to 350 °F (cold leg), and the SDC entry pressure from 250 psia to 300 psia (indicated at the pressurizer). Additionally, the licensee proposes to change to the Updated Safety Analysis Report

(USAR)described design methodology applied to the SDC heat exchangers. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The shutdown cooling

(SDC)system provides flow to the reactor during long term cooling mode following a large break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). In addition, the SDC system can supply cooled sump water to the high pressure safety injection

(HPSI)pumps for long term core cooling. The SDC system is also designed to reduce the temperature of the reactor coolant system

(RCS)from 300 °F to refueling temperature within 24 hours and to maintain the proper RCS temperature during refueling. As such, the SDC system is not an initiator for any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change to increase the SDC entry temperature from 300 °F to 350 °F affects the inputs to the analysis of the Boron Dilution Incident. However, re-analysis of this accident with the increased temperature does not result in an increase in the probability of the accident. The proposed increase in SDC system design and operating temperature and pressure has been evaluated for affects on system piping and components using appropriate codes and standards. The proposed changes do not introduce any failure mechanisms that would initiate a previously analyzed accident. Therefore, the proposed change to uprate the SDC system entry conditions does not result in a significant increase in the probability of a previously evaluated accident. The potential effect of the proposed change on the consequences of a previously evaluated accident has been considered. Re-analysis of the Boron Dilution Incident with the proposed increased SDC entry temperature does not result in an increase in the consequences of the accident. In addition, although an increase in the SDC system leakage test pressure is proposed, the leakage test acceptance criteria (i.e., maximum permitted leakage per hour) will not be affected. Therefore, the limit on post-accident leakage to atmosphere from the SDC system is unchanged. The proposed increase in SDC system design and operating temperature and pressure does not affect the redundancy or availability of the SDC system. The design functions of the system are not affected by the proposed change. Therefore, the SDC system will still be capable of performing the safety functions needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The proposed change alters the SDC system entry conditions and increases the system leakage test pressure. In the current design, the SDC system has been excluded from consideration as a pipe rupture initiator since it is not normally in operation. It is used for plant shutdown and startup, and for accident mitigation. With the proposed change, the operating modes of the system will not be affected. The proposed change increases the RCS temperature and pressure at which the SDC system can be placed in service during shutdown (or removed from service during startup), but the RCS, SDC, and other plant systems are not operated in a different manner. The increased heat load on the component cooling water

(CCW)system resulting from normal operation of the SDC at increased SDC temperatures has been evaluated. The increased normal operating heat load has been determined to be bounded by the post-accident CCW heat load. Any adjustments to the cooldown rate needed to accommodate the increased SDC entry temperature will be performed using approved procedures consistent with current practice and would not require operating the plant in a different manner. The RCS cooldown rate limitations in the Technical Specifications

(TS)are not affected by the proposed change. In addition, adjustments of CCW heat loads to maintain required CCW inlet temperatures for the SDC (Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI)) pump coolers, when operating at the increased SDC entry temperature, will be in accordance with plant procedures and within existing system capabilities. The low temperature overpressurization

(LTOP)analysis has been revised for the proposed change. However, there are no effects on existing LTOP setpoints or operating limitations, other than the proposed change to TS 2.1.1(11)(b), which states that the unit cannot be placed on shutdown cooling until the RCS has been cooled to ≤ 350 °F. The proposed change in SDC operating limitations does not introduce the possibility of new or different equipment malfunctions or accident precursors. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? *Response:* No. The margins of safety are established through design parameters, operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions are initiated. The proposed change increases the SDC system entry conditions for plant shutdown, startup and following postulated accidents, and the SDC system leakage test pressure. However, the accident mitigation function and post-accident operation of the system is not affected. The operating limits on temperature and pressure will remain below the design temperature and pressure for the system. The time interval for operator action after a postulated boron dilution event with the SDC system in operation is reduced, however, the available time remains greater than the minimum required time interval of 15 minutes. The proposed change does not affect any design or operating parameter or setpoint used in the accident analyses to establish the margin of safety. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* James R. Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817. *NRC Branch Chief:* Thomas G. Hiltz. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County, California *Date of amendment requests:* October 15, 2007. *Description of amendment requests:* The proposed amendments would relocate all periodic surveillance frequencies from the technical specifications

(TS)and place the frequencies under licensee control in accordance with a new program, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The proposed change involves the relocation of various surveillance test intervals from TSs to a licensee-controlled program and is administrative in nature. The proposed change does not involve the modification of any plant equipment or affect basic plant operation. The proposed change will have no impact on any safety related structures, systems or components. Surveillance test intervals are not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event, nor are they assumed in the mitigation of consequences of accidents. The [Surveillance Requirements] themselves will be maintained in the TS along with the applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation

(LCOs)and Action statements. The surveillances performed at the intervals specified in the licensee-controlled program will assure that the affected system or component function is maintained, that the facility operation is within the Safety Limits, and that the LCOs are met. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The proposed change does not involve any physical alteration of plant equipment and does not change the method by which any safety-related structure, system, or component performs its function or is tested. As such, no new or different types of equipment will be installed, and the basic operation of installed equipment is unchanged. The methods governing plant operation and testing remain consistent with current safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? *Response:* No. The proposed change is administrative in nature, does not negate any existing requirement, and does not adversely affect existing plant safety margins or the reliability of the equipment assumed to operate in the safety analysis. As such, there are no changes being made to safety analysis assumptions, safety limits or safety system settings that would adversely affect plant safety as a result of the proposed change. Margins of safety are unaffected by relocation of the surveillance test intervals to a licensee-controlled program. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Jennifer Post, Esq., Pacific Gas and Electric Company, P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California 94120. *NRC Branch Chief:* Thomas G. Hiltz. R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, Docket No. 50-244, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Wayne County, New York *Date of amendments request:* October 17, 2007. *Description of amendments request:* The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specifications

(TSTF)change traveler TSTF-372-A, Revision 4. Specifically, the proposed amendment would add Limiting Condition for Operation

(SE)and a model no-significant-hazards-consideration

(NSHC)determination. The NRC staff issued a “Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding the Addition of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.8 on the Inoperability of Snubbers Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process” in the **Federal Register** on May 4, 2005 (70 FR 23252). The notice included a model application, including a revised model SE. In its application dated October 17, 2007, the licensee affirmed the applicability of the model NSHC determination which is presented below. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of NSHC adopted by the licensee is presented below: Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated. The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported system technical specification

(TS)when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated seismic event requiring snubbers is a low probability occurrence and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the vast majority of anticipated challenges. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased, if at all. The consequences of an accident while relying on allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.8 are no different than the consequences of an accident while relying on the TS required actions in effect without the allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.8. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). Allowing delay times for entering supported system TS when inoperability is due solely to inoperable snubbers, if risk is assessed and managed, will not introduce new failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated. Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber, if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated seismic event requiring snubbers is a low probability occurrence and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the vast majority of anticipated challenges. The risk impact of the proposed TS changes was assessed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177. A bounding risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed TS changes. This application of LCO 3.0.8 is predicated upon the licensee's assessment and management of plant risk. The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis adopted by the licensee and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendments request involves NSHC. *Attorney for licensee:* Daniel F. Stenger, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 601 13th Street, NW., Suite 1000 South, Washington, DC 20005. *NRC Branch Chief:* Mark G. Kowal. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Appling County, Georgia *Date of amendment request:* October 18, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments to Technical Specification Administrative Controls Section 5.3.1 would revise the training and qualifying education and experience eligibility requirements for certain unit staff positions to correspond to a defined training program. The training program is based on National Academy for Nuclear Training guidance documents (ACADs) as described in the licensee's October 18, 2007, application. The proposed changes will also replace a specific position title with a generic position title for the senior individual in charge of Health Physics. An application that addressed similar issues was previously submitted on October 30, 2006, and notice of that application was provided in the **Federal Register** on July 17, 2007 (72 FR 39084). Due to certain changes in the specifics of the October 18, 2007, application, from those proposed in the October 30, 2006, application, the application is being renoticed in its entirety. This notice supersedes the notice published in the **Federal Register** on July 17, 2007. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The proposed change to Technical Specifications Administrative Controls Section 5.3.1 involves the use of a more generic designation for the unit staff position responsible for Health Physics without reducing the level of authority required for that position. The proposed change also allows the flexibility to use an accredited program for qualifying personnel to fill certain unit staff positions as stipulated in Enclosure 1 [of October 18, 2007, application], which represents an acceptable alternative to the qualification requirements for these positions as currently specified in the Technical Specifications. Since the proposed changes are administrative in nature, they do not involve any physical changes to any structures, systems, or components, nor will their performance requirements be altered. The proposed changes also do not affect the operation, maintenance, or testing of the plant. Therefore, the response of the plant to previously analyzed accidents will not be affected. Consequently, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications will have no adverse impact on the overall qualification of the unit staff. The use of a more generic designation for the unit staff position responsible for Health Physics and the proposed addition [of] a statement to Section 5.3.1 that will reference this letter and the accreditation information for the positions stipulated in Enclosure 1 will allow the use of an accredited program that has been endorsed by the NRC and will ensure the educational requirements and power plant experience for each unit staff position are properly satisfied and will continue to fulfill applicable regulatory requirements. Also, since no change is being made to the design, operation, maintenance, or testing of the plant, no new methods of operation or failure modes are introduced by the proposed changes. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated is not created. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant decrease in the margin of safety? *Response:* No The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications will have no adverse impact on the onsite organizational features necessary to assure safe operation of the plant. Lines of authority for plant operation are unaffected by the proposed changes. Also, the adoption of the more generic designation of the individual responsible for Health Physics will reduce the regulatory burden of having to devote limited resources to process a license amendment whenever a title change for this position is implemented. Accordingly, this reduction in regulatory burden and the proposed addition of a statement to Section 5.3.1 that will reference this letter and the use of accreditation information provided in Enclosure 1, will allow the use of an accredited program endorsed by NRC to qualify certain unit staff positions and will improve organizational flexibility without compromising plant safety. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant decrease in the margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037. *NRC Branch Chief:* Evangelos C. Marinos. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Burke County, Georgia *Date of amendment request:* August 28, 2007, as supplemented on October 9, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would revise the “Maximum Power Level” in paragraph 2.C(1) of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Facility Operating Licenses NPF-68 and NPF-81 for Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively. In addition, the amendments would revise the definition of “Rated Thermal Power (RTP)” in Technical Specification 1.1 for both units to reflect the change to the Maximum Power Level. The proposed change increases the RTP from 3565 MWt to 3625.6 MWt, resulting in an increase of 1.7% from the current reactor output. This increase in reactor core power level is referred to as a Measurement Uncertainty Recapture

(MUR)power uprate. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Operating License—Maximum Power Level and Technical Specification 1.1—Definition of Rated Thermal Power The increase in Maximum Power Level and Rated Thermal Power

(RTP)does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because operation at the higher power level will not cause any design or analysis acceptance criteria to be exceeded. As a result, structural and functional integrity of the plant systems is maintained. Power level is an input assumption to the equipment design and accident analyses, but it is not itself an initiator for any transient. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The radiological consequences of operation at the Measurement Uncertainty Recapture

(MUR)power uprate conditions have been assessed. It was concluded that offsite dose predictions remain within the acceptance criteria for each of the accidents affected. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased. Technical Specification 1.1—Definition of Dose Equivalent Iodine The proposed change to the definition of dose equivalent iodine

(DEI)impacts the reactor coolant activity surveillance and calculations of accident consequences and makes these activities consistent with each other. Neither of these functions affects the probability of any accident previously evaluated. In order to support the MUR power uprate, the accidents previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were re-analyzed. As part of this reanalysis, the dose conversion factors

(DCFs)were reviewed, and a consistent set of DCFs was used for all re-analyses based on Federal Guidance Report No. 11, as suggested by RIS 2001-19. The results of these re-analyses continue to meet the acceptance limits as currently described in the UFSAR. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Technical Specification 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16—P-9 Setpoint The revised Power Range Neutron Flux P-9 permissive nominal setpoint and allowable value do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because operation with these revised values will not cause any design or analysis acceptance criteria to be exceeded. The structural and functional integrity of any plant system is unaffected. The P-9 permissive function is part of the transient mitigation response and is not itself an initiator for any transient. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The changes to the P-9 nominal setpoint and allowable value do not affect the integrity of the fission product barriers utilized for the mitigation of radiological dose consequences as a result of an accident. The change continues to ensure that the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) are not challenged following a turbine trip without a reactor trip which, in turn, minimizes the potential for a release. There are no offsite dose predictions for this transient. Since it has been determined that the transient results are unaffected by the change to the P-9 nominal setpoint and allowable value, it is concluded that the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated? Operating License—Maximum Power Level and Technical Specification 1.1—Definition of Rated Thermal Power The increase in Maximum Power Level and RTP does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated, because no new operating configuration is being imposed that will create a new failure scenario, and no new failure modes are being created for any plant equipment. System and component design bases have been reviewed. The proposed change does not have an adverse effect on safety-related systems or components and does not challenge the integrity of any safety-related system. Therefore, the types of accidents defined in the UFSAR continue to represent the credible spectrum of events to determine safe plant operation. Technical Specification 1.1—Definition of Dose Equivalent Iodine The proposed change to the definition of Dose Equivalent Iodine

(DEI)ensures the reactor coolant activity surveillances are consistent with the assumptions for initial conditions used in the accident analyses. The proposed change does not involve the addition or modification of any plant equipment. Neither does it alter the design, configuration or method of operation of the plant. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Technical Specification 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16—P-9 Setpoint The revised Power Range Neutron Flux P-9 permissive nominal setpoint and allowable value do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated, because these changes do not affect accident initiation sequences. No new operating configuration is being imposed by the P-9 nominal setpoint and allowable value changes that will create a new failure scenario. In addition, no new failure modes are being created for any plant equipment. Therefore, the types of accidents defined in the UFSAR continue to represent the credible spectrum of events to determine safe plant operation. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant decrease in a margin of safety? Operating License—Maximum Power Level and Technical Specification 1.1—Definition of Rated Thermal Power The increase in Maximum Power Level and RTP does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, because power level is one of the inherent assumptions that determine the safe operating range defined by the accident analyses, which are in turn protected by the Technical Specifications. The acceptance criteria for the accident analyses are conservative with respect to the operating conditions defined by the Technical Specifications. The engineering reviews performed for the MUR power uprate confirmed that the accident analyses criteria are met at the revised value of MPL and RTP. Therefore, the adequacy of the revised Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications to maintain the plant in a safe operating range is also confirmed, and the increase in MPL and RTP do not involve a significant decrease in a margin of safety. Technical Specification 1.1—Definition of Dose Equivalent Iodine The proposed change to the definition of dose equivalent iodine

(DEI)has the potential to affect the dose consequences offsite and in the control room. However, the results of the re-analyses of the accidents previously evaluated demonstrate the dose consequences at all locations remain within the regulatory acceptance limits, and the margin of safety as defined by 10 CFR 100 and GDC 19 has not been significantly reduced. Technical Specification 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16—P-9 Setpoint The change to the P-9 nominal setpoint and allowable value does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the margin of safety associated with the P-9 setpoint, as verified by the results of the applicable transient analyses, is within acceptable limits. The adequacy of the revised Technical Specification values to maintain the plant in a safe operating range has been confirmed. Therefore, the change to the P-9 nominal setpoint and allowable value does not involve a significant decrease in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* Mr. Arthur H. Domby, Troutman Sanders, NationsBank Plaza, Suite 5200, 600 Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2216. *NRC Branch Chief:* Evangelos C. Marinos. STP Nuclear Operating Company, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas *Date of amendment request:* August 27, 2007. *Description of amendment request:* The amendments would revise the licensee's fire protection program requirements as documented in the licensee's Fire Hazard's Analysis Report. Specifically, the licensee requests the use of reactor operator manual actions in lieu of meeting protection requirements of circuit separation. *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. [Do] the proposed amendment[s] involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The design function of structures, systems and component[s] are not Impacted by the proposed change. The proposed change involves operator manual actions in response to a fire and will not initiate an event. The proposed actions do not increase the probability of occurrence of a fire or any other accident previously evaluated. The proposed actions are feasible and reliable and demonstrate that the unit can be safely shutdown in the event of a fire. No significant consequences result from the performance of the proposed actions. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. [Do] the proposed amendment[s] create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? *Response:* No. The design function of structures, systems and component[s] are not impacted by the proposed amendment[s]. The proposed change involves operator manual actions in response to a fire. [It does not] involve new failure mechanisms or malfunctions that can initiate a new accident. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. [Do] the proposed amendment[s] involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? *Response:* No. Adequate time is available to perform the proposed operator manual actions to account for uncertainties in estimates of the time available and in estimates of how long it takes to diagnose and execute the actions. The actions are straightforward and do not create any significant concerns. The actions have been verified that they can be performed through demonstration and they are proceduralized. The proposed actions are feasible and reliable and demonstrate that the unit can be safely shutdown in the event of a fire. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the request for amendments involves no significant hazards consideration. *Attorney for licensee:* A. H. Gutterman, Esq., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20004. *NRC Branch Chief:* Thomas G. Hiltz. Previously Published Notices of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing The following notices were previously published as separate individual notices. The notice content was the same as above. They were published as individual notices either because time did not allow the Commission to wait for this biweekly notice or because the action involved exigent circumstances. They are repeated here because the biweekly notice lists all amendments issued or proposed to be issued involving no significant hazards consideration. For details, see the individual notice in the **Federal Register** on the day and page cited. This notice does not extend the notice period of the original notice. Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281, Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Surry County, Virginia *Date of amendment request:* October 22, 2007. *Brief description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would allow an alternate methodology from that previously approved in Topical Report DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, *GOTHIC Methodology for Analyzing the Response to Postulated Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment* , as discussed in the Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. *Date of publication of individual notice in* Federal Register : October 30, 2007 (72 FR 61406). *Expiration date of individual notice:* Public comment period expiration date, November 13, 2007; Hearing period expiration date, January 31, 2008. Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for A Hearing in connection with these actions was published in the **Federal Register** as indicated. Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.22(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated. For further details with respect to the action see

(1)the applications for amendment,

(2)the amendment, and

(3)the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the internet at the NRC web site, *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.* If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1

(800)397-4209,

(301)415-4737 or by email to *pdr@nrc.gov* . Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Power Station, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin *Date of application for amendment:* December 15, 2006. *Brief description of amendment:* The amendment incorporates changes to the technical specifications

(TSs)associated with previously-approved industry initiatives. The first change relocates the actions for a safety limit violation from the administrative controls TS section to the safety limit TS section and deletes notification requirements, as approved by TS Task Force

(TSTF)Change Traveler TSTF-05-A, “Deletion of Safety Limit Violation Notification Requirements.” The second change incorporates generic position titles, as approved by TSTF-65-A, “Use of Generic Titles for Utility Positions,” and incorporates items approved by Nuclear Regulatory Commission Administrative Letter 95-06, “Relocation of Technical Specification Administrative Controls Related to Quality Assurance.” *Date of issuance:* October 31, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days. *Amendment No.:* 193. *Facility Operating License No. DPR-43:* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications and License. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register: March 13, 2007 (72 FR 11386) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 31, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Duke Power Company LLC, et al., Docket No. 50-413, Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1, York County, South Carolina *Date of application for amendments:* November 22, 2006. *Brief description of amendments:* The amendment revises the Catawba Unit 1 Facility Operating License

(FOL)to add a license condition requiring a specific date by which the modifications to the Emergency Core Cooling Systems

(ECCS)sump in response to 2004 Generic Letter

(GL)2004-02, “Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors.” The changes add a license condition which requires that

(1)Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 will enter Mode 5 for the outage to install the sump strainer modification no later than May 19, 2008, and that

(2)the Unit 1 sump strainer modification will be completed prior to entry into Mode 4 after May 19, 2008. *Date of issuance:* October 31, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance. *Amendment No.:* 237. *Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-35:* Amendment revises the license. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register: March 13, 2007 (72 FR 11386) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 31, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-293, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth County, Massachusetts *Date of application for amendment:* January 4, 2007. *Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revised Technical Specifications

(TSs)for the Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements for Control Rod Operability, Scram Insertion Times, and Control Rod Accumulators. *Date of issuance:* November 5, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 120 days. *Amendment No.:* 230. *Facility Operating License No. DPR-35:* The amendment revised the License and TSs. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register: April 24, 2007 (72 FR 20381). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 5, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Ogle County, Illinois Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1, DeWitt County, Illinois Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, LaSalle County, Illinois Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-352 and No. 50-353, Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1 and 2, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania Exelon Generation Company, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, York and Lancaster Counties, Pennsylvania *Date of application for amendments:* April 12, 2007. *Brief description of amendments:* The amendments modify technical specification

(TS)requirements related to control room envelope habitability in accordance with TS Task Force

(TSTF)Traveler TSTF-448, Revision 2, “Control Room Habitability.” *Date of issuance:* October 31, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 180 days. *Amendment Nos.:* 150, 150, 145, 145, 178, 186, 173, 188, 149, 264, and 268. *Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72, NPF-77, NPF-62, NPF-11, NPF-18, NPF-39, NPF-85, DPR-44, and DPR-56:* The amendments revised the Technical Specifications and the Operating Licenses. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register: June 5, 2007 (72 FR 31100). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 31, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Grundy County, Illinois *Date of application for amendment:* July 10, 2007. *Brief description of amendment:* The amendments revise the value of the safety limit minimum critical power ratio for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Unit 2 technical specifications (TSs). The amendment also made conforming changes that clarify the wording of the DNPS, Unit 3 TSs. *Date of issuance:* November 6, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days. *Amendment Nos.:* 224/216. *Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25:* The amendments revised the Technical Specifications and License. *Date of initial notice* in Federal Register : July 31, 2007 (72 FR 41783), and September 5, 2007 (72 FR 50986). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 6, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois *Date of application for amendments:* November 7, 2007, as supplemented by letter dated January 24, 2007. *Brief description of amendments:* The amendments revise Technical Specification

(TS)Surveillance Requirement

(SR)3.4.3.1 to increase the allowable as-found main steam safety valve lift setpoint tolerance from ±1 percent to ±3 percent. In addition, the amendments revise TS SR 3.1.7.10 to increase the enrichment of sodium pentaborate used in the standby liquid control system from ≥30.0 atom percent boron-10 to ≥45.0 atom percent boron-10. *Date of issuance:* November 1, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to main steam safety valve testing during the next refueling outage currently scheduled for May 2009 for Unit 1 and May 2008 for Unit 2. *Amendment Nos.:* 235/230. *Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30:* The amendments revised the Technical Specifications and License. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register : January 30, 2007 (72 FR 4307) The January 24, 2007, supplement contained clarifying information and did not change the NRC staff(s initial proposed finding of no significant hazards consideration. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 1, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida. *Date of application for amendment:* October 11, 2006. *Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revised Technical Specification

(TS)3.7.7, “Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water

(SW)System,” to reduce the allowed outage time when one of the required SW heat exchangers is out of service. *Date of issuance:* October 23, 2007. *Effective date:* Date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days. *Amendment No.:* 225. *Facility Operating License No. DPR-72:* Amendment revised the TSs. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register : February 13, 2007 (72 FR 6783). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 23, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida *Date of application for amendment:* February 8, 2007, as supplemented by letter dated August 23, 2007. *Brief description of amendment:* The amendment changes the basis for protection of the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool

(SFP)in order to eliminate the Final Safety Analysis Report commitment for maintaining the SFP missile shields. *Date of issuance:* October 24, 2007. *Effective date:* Date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days. *Amendment No.:* 226. *Facility Operating License No. DPR-72:* Amendment revises the Technical Specifications. *Date of initial notice in* **Federal Register** : March 13, 2007 (72 FR 11381). The supplement dated August 23, 2007, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the **Federal Register** . The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 24, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida *Date of application for amendment:* October 5, 2006, as supplemented by letters dated April 4 and July 19, 2007. *Brief description of amendment:* The amendment changes the restrictions on fuel storage in the spent fuel pool. *Date of issuance:* October 25, 2007. *Effective date:* Date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days. *Amendment No.:* 227. *Facility Operating License No. DPR-72:* Amendment revises the Technical Specifications. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register : November 21, 2006 (71 FR 67394). The supplements dated April 4 and July 19, 2007, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the **Federal Register** . The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 25, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389, St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie County, Florida *Date of application for amendments:* April 22, 2007. *Brief description of amendments:* Amendments delete Section 3.H of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16, which require reporting of violations of the requirements of Sections 3.A, 3.D, 3.F and 3.G of the operating license. *Date of Issuance:* October 31, 2007. *Effective Date:* As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days. *Amendment Nos.:* 203 and 150. *Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16:* Amendments revised the operating license conditions and Technical Specifications. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register : June 19, 2007 (72 FR 33783). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 31, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Florida Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4, Miami-Dade County, Florida *Date of application for amendments:* May 4, 2007. *Brief description of amendments:* The proposed amendment would incorporate the administrative changes to Technical Specification

(TS)6.2.1.a, “On and Offsite Organization” and 6.8.1.a, “Procedures and Programs.” *Date of issuance:* November 2, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days. *Amendment Nos:* 236 and 231. *Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41:* Amendments revised the TSs. *Date of initial notice in* **Federal Register:** July 3, 2007 (72 FR 36522). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 2, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, Oswego County, New York *Date of application for amendment:* July 23, 2007. *Brief description of amendment:* The amendment modifies Technical Specification 3.3.2.1, “Control Rod Block Instrumentation,” to allow a new banked position withdrawal sequence for shutdown, using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process. *Date of issuance:* October 26, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 60 days. *Amendment No.:* 120. *Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69:* Amendment revised the License and Technical Specifications. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register : September 25, 2007 (72 FR 54477). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 26, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 2, Goodhue County, Minnesota *Date of application for amendments:* May 10, 2007. *Brief description of amendments:* The requested changes are a partial adoption of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-491, Revision 2, “Removal of Main Steam and Feedwater Valve Isolation Times” which was proposed by the TSTF by letter on May 18, 2006. The proposed changes revise Technical Specification

(TS)3.7.2 “Main Steam Valves Closure Times” by relocating the isolation valve closure times to a licensee-controlled document identified as a Bases reference. The proposed amendments deviate from TSTF-491 in that the current PINGP TS (3.7.3) and associated surveillance requirements for the main feedwater isolation valves do not include valve closure times, and thus, the changes to TS 3.7.3 provided for in TSTF-491 are not applicable to the PINGP TSs and are not adopted. TSTF change traveler TSTF-491, Revision 2, was announced for availability in the **Federal Register** on December 29, 2006, as part of the consolidated line item improvement process. *Date of issuance:* October 31, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days. *Amendment Nos.:* 181 and 171. *Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60:* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register : July 17, 2007 (72 FR 39083). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 31, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Southern California Edison Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, San Diego County, California. *Date of application for amendments:* April 17, 2007. *Brief description of amendments:* The amendment modified Technical Specifications requirements related to control room envelope habitability in accordance with Technical Specifications Task Force 448, Revision 3, using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process. *Date of issuance:* October 31, 2007. *Effective date:* as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance. *Amendment Nos.:* Unit 2-214; Unit 3-206. *Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-10 and NPF-15:* The amendments revised the Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register: May 22, 2007 (72 FR 28722). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 31, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Louisa County, Virginia *Date of application for amendment:* May 21, 2007, as supplemented by letter dated June 11, 2007. *Brief description of amendment:* The amendment modified the technical specification

(TS)requirements for inoperable snubbers by adding Limited Condition for Operation 3.0.8, using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process. The change is based on TS Task Force

(TSTF)TSTF-372, Revision 4. *Date of issuance:* October 17, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days from the date of issuance. *Amendment Nos.:* 251, 231. *Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7:* Amendments change the licenses and the technical specifications. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register : June 19, 2007 (72 FR 33785) The supplement dated July 11, 2007, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 17, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Louisa County, Virginia *Date of application for amendment:* May 29, 2007. *Brief description of amendment:* The amendments modify the Technical Specification requirements related to control room habitability, using the Technical Specification Task Force traveler, TSTF-448, revision 3. *Date of issuance:* October 31, 2007. *Effective date:* As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 180 days from the date of issuance. *Amendment Nos.:* 252, 232. *Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7:* Amendments change the licenses and the technical specifications. *Date of initial notice in* Federal Register: July 3, 2007 (72 FR 36523). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 31, 2007. *No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day of November 2007. For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Catherine Haney, Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. E7-22331 Filed 11-19-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [Release No. 34-56784; File No. SR-CHX-2007-25] Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change as Modified by Amendment No. 1 Thereto to Eliminate References to the ITS Plan and Other Now-Obsolete Matters November 14, 2007. Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”), 1 and Rule 19b-4 thereunder, 2 notice is hereby given that on October 17, 2007, the Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc. (“CHX” or “Exchange”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) the proposed rule change as described in Items I and II below, which Items have been substantially prepared by the CHX. On November 9, 2007, CHX filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change. CHX has designated the proposed rule change as a “non-controversial” rule change pursuant to section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act 3 and Rule 19b-4(f)(6) thereunder, 4 which renders the proposed rule change effective upon filing with the Commission. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change, as amended, from interested persons. 1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 2 17 CFR 240.19b-4. 3 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A). 4 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6). I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change The Exchange proposes to amend its rules to eliminate now-obsolete references to the Intermarket Trading System Plan (“ITS Plan”), the NMS Linkage Plan, the telephonic access requirements of the Nasdaq/UTP Plan and the compliance date for Rule 611 (“Trading Phase Date”) of Regulation NMS (“Reg NMS”). The text of the proposed rule change is available at CHX, the Commission's Public Reference Room, and *http://www.chx.com/rules/proposed_rules.htm* . II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change In its filing with the Commission, the CHX included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The CHX has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements. A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change 1. Purpose In 2006, the Exchange made a substantial number of changes to its rules in connection with its implementation of a new trading model. 5 At the time these new rules were approved, the Nasdaq/UTP Plan still required participant exchanges to provide NASD market participants with telephonic access to their quotes; the ITS Plan was still in effect and the NMS Linkage Plan had just been approved; and the Trading Phase Date was still several months away. As a result, the Exchange's rules contained references to these plans and to the way that the Exchange's rules should operate both before and after the Trading Phase Date. 6 5 *See* Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54550 (September 29, 2006), 71 FR 59563 (October 10, 2006) (approving CHX's proposed new trading model). 6 *See, e.g.* , Article 1, Rule 1(o) (defining the term NBBO both before and after the full implementation of Reg NMS); and Article 19 (containing the ITS rules). In the ensuing months, however, the ITS Plan has been eliminated; the NMS Linkage Plan has terminated; the Trading Phase Date has passed; and the access requirements of the Nasdaq/UTP Plan have changed. 7 The Exchange now proposes to update its rules to eliminate all now-outdated references to the ITS and NMS Linkage Plans, to the compliance or effective dates of any provisions of Reg NMS and to the telephonic access requirements of the Nasdaq/UTP Plan. 7 *See* Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 55397 (March 5, 2007), 72 FR 11066 (March 12, 2007) (eliminating the ITS Plan); 54551 (September 29, 2006), 71 FR 59148 (October 6, 2006) (approving the NMS Linkage Plan, with a termination date of June 30, 2007); 55160 (January 24, 2007), 72 FR 4202 (January 30, 2007) (File No. S7-10-04) (extending the Trading Phase Date from February 5, 2007 to March 5, 2007); and 54936 (December 14, 2006), 71 FR 76381 (December 20, 2006) (approving Amendment No. 18 to the Nasdaq/UTP Plan, which, in general terms, replaced the telephonic access requirements with market access requirements consistent with Rule 610). 2. Statutory Basis The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with section 6(b) of the Act, 8 in general, and furthers the objectives of section 6(b)(5) of the Act, 9 in particular, in that the proposed rule change is designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade, remove impediments to, and perfect the mechanism of, a free and open market and a national market system, and, in general, protect investors and the public interest by updating the Exchange's rules to eliminate outdated references to matters that are no longer relevant. 8 15 U.S.C. 78f(b). 9 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5). B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any burden on competition. C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change Received From Members, Participants or Others No written comments were either solicited or received. III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action Because the foregoing proposed rule change does not:

(1)Significantly affect the protection of investors or the public interest;

(2)impose any significant burden on competition; and

(3)by its terms become operative for 30 days after the date of this filing, or such shorter time as the Commission may designate if consistent with the protection of investors and the public interest, it has become effective pursuant to section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act 10 and Rule 19b-4(f)(6) thereunder. 11 As required under Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii) under the Act, the Exchange has given the Commission notice of its intent to file the proposed rule change, along with a brief description and text of the proposed rule change, at least five business days prior to the date of filing of the proposed rule change, or such shorter time as designated by the Commission. 10 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A). 11 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6). A proposed rule change filed under Rule 19b-4(f)(6) under the Act 12 normally may not become operative prior to 30 days after the date of filing. However, Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii) 13 permits the Commission to designate a shorter time if such action is consistent with the protection of investors and the public interest. CHX has requested that the Commission waive the 30-day operative delay, as specified in Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii), 14 which would make the rule change effective and operative upon filing. The Commission believes that waiving the 30-day operative delay is consistent with the protection of investors and the public interest because the proposal allows the Exchange to immediately update its rules to reflect, among other changes, the termination of the NMS Linkage Plan, the elimination of the ITS Plan, and the implementation of Reg NMS. 15 Accordingly, the Commission designates the proposed rule change operative upon filing with the Commission. 12 *Id.* 13 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6)(iii). 14 *Id.* 15 For purposes only of waiving the operative delay for this proposal, the Commission has considered the proposed rule's impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. *See* 15 U.S.C. 78c(f). At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission may summarily abrogate such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. 16 16 The effective date of the original proposed rule is October 17, 2007. The effective date of Amendment No. 1 is November 9, 2007. For purposes of calculating the 60-day period within which the Commission may summarily abrogate the proposed rule change under Section 19(b)(3)(C) of the Act, the Commission considers the period to commence on November 9, 2007, the date on which CHX submitted Amendment No. 1. *See* 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(C). IV. Solicitation of Comments Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods: Electronic comments: • Use the Commission's Internet comment form ( *http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml* ); or • Send an e-mail to *rule-comments@sec.gov* . Please include File Number SR-CHX-2007-25 on the subject line. Paper Comments • Send paper comments in triplicate to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CHX-2007-25. This file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's Internet Web site ( *http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml* ). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for inspection and copying in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the CHX. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CHX-2007-25 and should be submitted on or before December 11, 2007. For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority. 17 17 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12). Florence E. Harmon, Deputy Secretary. [FR Doc. E7-22627 Filed 11-19-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8011-01-P DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 5994] Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

(ECA)Request for Grant Proposals: Open Competition Seeking Professional Exchange Programs in Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Near East, North Africa, South Central Asia, and the Western Hemisphere *Announcement Type:* New Grant. *Funding Opportunity Number:* ECA/PE/C-08-01. *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number:* 19.415. *Key Dates:* *Application Deadline:* February 15, 2007. *Executive Summary:* The Office of Citizen Exchanges of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs announces an open competition for grants that support exchanges and build relationships between U.S. non-profit organizations and civil society and cultural groups in Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Near East, North Africa, South Central Asia and the Western Hemisphere. Pending availability of funds, it is anticipated that approximately $5,000,000 or more will be available to support this competition. ECA/PE/C expects to fund approximately 15-20 projects under this competition in FY 2008. U.S. public and non-profit organizations meeting the provisions described in Internal Revenue code section 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) may submit proposals that support the goals of The Professional Exchange Program. Projects should promote mutual understanding and partnerships between key professional and cultural groups in the United States and counterpart groups in other countries through multi-phased exchanges taking place over one to two years. Proposals should encourage citizen engagement in current issues, with a particular focus on youth and those who influence them, and promote the development of democratic societies and institutions, with a view toward creating a more stable world. To the fullest extent possible, programs should be two-way exchanges supporting roughly equal numbers of participants from the U.S. and foreign countries. Proposed projects should transform institutional and individual understanding of key issues, foster dialogue, share expertise, and develop capacity. Through these people-to-people exchanges, the Bureau seeks to break down stereotypes that divide peoples, to promote good governance and economic growth, to contribute to conflict prevention and management, and to build respect for cultural expression and identity in the world. Projects should be structured to allow American professionals and their international counterparts in eligible countries to develop a common dialogue for dealing with shared challenges and concerns. Projects should include current or potential leaders who will effect positive change in their communities. Exchange participants may include community leaders, elected and professional government officials, religious leaders, educators, and proponents of democratic ideals and institutions, including for example, the media and judiciary, or others who influence the way in which different communities approach these issues. The Bureau is especially interested in engaging socially and economically diverse groups that may not have had extensive contact with counterpart institutions in the United States and particularly seeks proposals that engage educators or other groups that directly influence youth in innovative ways. Applicants may not submit proposals that address more than one region or that include countries not eligible under a specific theme designated in the RFGP. Proposals that do so will be declared technically ineligible and will receive no further consideration in the review process. For the purposes of this competition, eligible regions are Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Near East, North Africa, South Central Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. No guarantee is made or implied that grants will be awarded in all themes and for all countries listed. I. Funding Opportunity Description II. Authority Overall grant making authority for this program is contained in the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, Public Law 87-256, as amended, also known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. The purpose of the Act is “to enable the Government of the United States to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries * * *; to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations * * * and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.” The funding authority for the program above is provided through legislation. *Purpose:* The competition is based on the premise that people-to-people exchanges encourage and strengthen understanding of democratic values, nurture the social, political, cultural, and economic development of societies and encourage a more active citizenry. Exchanges supported by institutional grants from the Bureau should operate at two levels: they should enhance partnerships between U.S. and foreign institutions, and they should establish a common language to develop practical solutions for shared problems and concerns. The Bureau is particularly interested in projects that will create mutually beneficial and self-sustaining linkages between professional communities in the U.S. and their counterpart communities in other countries. Applicants must identify the U.S. and foreign organizations and individuals with whom they are proposing to collaborate and describe previous cooperative activities, if any. Information about the mission, activities, and accomplishments of partner organizations should be included in the submission. Proposals should contain letters of commitment or support from partner organizations for the proposed project. Applicants should clearly outline and describe the role and responsibilities of all partner organizations in terms of project logistics, management and oversight. Competitive proposals will include the following: • A brief description of the issue to be addressed and how it relates to the target country or region. (Proposals that request resources for an initial needs assessment will be deemed less competitive under the review criterion Program Planning and Ability to Achieve Objectives, per item V.1 below.); • A clear, succinct statement of program objectives and expected outcomes that responds to Bureau goals for each theme in this competition. Desired outcomes should be described in qualitative and quantitative terms. (See the Program Monitoring and Evaluation section per item V.1 below, for more information on project objectives and outcomes.); • A proposed timeline, listing the optimal schedule for each program activity; • A description of participant recruitment and selection processes; • Letters of support from foreign and U.S. partners. ( *Letters from prospective partner institutions should demonstrate a capacity to arrange and conduct U.S. and overseas activities.* ); • An outline of the applicant organization's relevant expertise in the project theme and country(ies); • An outline of relevant experience managing previous exchange programs; • Resumes of experienced staff who have demonstrated a commitment to implement and monitor projects and ensure outcomes; • A comprehensive plan to evaluate whether program outcomes will achieve the specific objectives described in the narrative. (See the Program Monitoring and Evaluation section [IV.3d.d below] for further guidance on evaluation.); • A post-grant plan that demonstrates how the grantee plans to maintain contacts initiated through the program. Applicants should discuss ways that U.S. and foreign participants or host institutions will collaborate and communicate after the ECA-funded grant has concluded. (See Review Criterion #5, per item V.1 below for more information on post-grant activities.) • Successful projects will demonstrate the importance Americans place on community service as an element of active citizenship and may include ideas and projects to strengthen civil society through community service either during participants' stay in the U.S. or upon their return to their countries. • In addition to addressing the specific themes described below, proposals should develop partner organizations' capacity in such areas as strategic planning, performance management, fund raising, financial management, human resources management, and decision-making. *U.S. Embassy Involvement:* Before submitting a proposal, all applicants are *strongly* encouraged to consult with the Washington, DC-based State Department contact for the themes/regions listed in this solicitation. Applicants are also *strongly* encouraged to consult with Public Affairs Officers at U.S. Embassies in relevant countries as they develop proposals responding to this RFGP. Also, it is important that the proposal narrative clearly state the applicant's commitment to consult closely with the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in the relevant country(ies) to develop plans for project implementation and to select project participants. Proposals should also acknowledge U.S. Embassy involvement in the final selection of all participants. Applicants should state their willingness to invite representatives of the Embassy(ies) and/or consulate(s) to participate in program sessions or site visits. *ECA/DOS Acknowledgement:* Narratives should state that all material developed for the project will prominently acknowledge Department of State ECA Bureau funding for the program. *Outreach:* Applicants who receive assistance awards are encouraged to engage in outreach activities that will promote the goals of the project and increase the visibility of the project activities, including public events and appropriate media appearances. FY 2008 Thematic Topics by Region *REGION: Africa (AF):* AF: Economic Growth to Fight Poverty and Strengthen Democracy. *Program Contact:* Curtis Huff, tel:

(202)453-8159, e-mail: *HuffCE@State.gov.* *Project Goals:* ECA seeks proposals that promote entrepreneurial thinking, job creation, business planning, and management skills that will assist young African adults in launching business careers. Programs should increase understanding of the links between entrepreneurial activity and free markets as well as the importance of transparency and accountability in business and government. Proposals should also increase understanding among African and American participants of the influence of culture on business. *Audience:* Young adults, 25-32, especially women. *Eligible Countries:* Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. *Successful programs will achieve the following:* • Educate young men and women in entrepreneurial thinking, business management skills, and attracting investment, with also the ability to design training and to lead others in building these skills. • Enhance appreciation for American business practices and the role of the individual in creating growth through grassroots-focused entrepreneurial efforts. • Develop enduring professional ties between U.S. and partner organizations and expand leadership skills. • Enable participants to initiate and support development and community service activities in their home countries. *Successful applicants must demonstrate a capacity to conduct the following activities:*

(1)Work jointly with an African partner organization to develop a useful business skills program for young adult Africans that includes activities in both the U.S. and Africa.

(2)U.S. experts travel to Africa for in-country consultations and preliminary trainings. Working with the African partner, U.S. experts recruit and select African participants for a U.S.-based fellowship program.

(3)Provide a six- to ten-week U.S.-based fellows program for 10 to 15 Africans on business development that features both individualized and group learning and practice activities which develop technical and leadership skills plus cultural sensitivity.

(4)As a counterpart to the fellows program in the U.S., provide a multi-week program in Africa for 10-15 Americans to learn about business challenges and opportunities there and to assist in conducting workshops for a wider audience of Africans.

(5)Develop enhancement activities and leadership development opportunities to reinforce program goals after all participants' return to their home country. An essential follow-on component will be a longitudinal assessment of the achievements of the program. *Possible Program Model:* 1. Grantee sends Americans to work alongside African partners for two weeks or more to examine the needs of young adults in starting businesses in the region, and any in-country efforts that are already underway or planned to address those needs. These activities should include development of a working relationship among the Americans, their African project partners, and any African government offices that have responsibility for business development. 2. Grantee works with African partner organization to recruit a pool of 50 or more Young Professionals who are interested in starting businesses and will commit to a multi-staged development program. 3. Grantee and partner conduct a business skills program in Africa for the 50+ recruits, including instruction on how to write a business plan. Participants are invited to submit business plans to program organizers. 4. Competition is held where those who develop the best plans will be offered a U.S.-based fellowship program. 5. African participants come to the U.S. for fellowship program of six to ten weeks that features both individualized and group learning and practice activities which develop technical and leadership skills plus cultural sensitivity. (A shorter-term study tour for Africans will be considered inadequate.) 6. Grantee and African partner commit to a plan for additional business skills development activities in Africa after the grant is finished. These plans might include additional basic business training or mentoring of new businesses by American specialists and maintenance of a Web site for this purpose. 7. Grantee and African partner keep each other informed of developments in business education through email, telephone, video conferences, travel, etc, in order to maintain an informed momentum in their partnership. AF: Local Governance. *Program Contact:* Curtis Huff, tel:

(202)453-8159, e-mail: *HuffCE@State.gov.* *Project Goals:* ECA is seeking proposals that promote democratic institutions that are effective, responsive, transparent, and accountable to the people. Programs should increase skills and commitment to professional standards in municipal planning, policy analysis, bill drafting, budgeting, constituent relations, project implementation, and administration of services. Programs should promote the establishment of responsible watchdog organizations and develop a constructive working relationship with local government officials. *Audience:* Mayors, city councilors, public administrators, executives, municipal planners, and community watchdog leaders (especially women). Eligible Countries: Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania. *Successful programs will achieve the following:* • Educate local officials in a professional approach to public administration and empower them to conduct it with integrity and effectiveness while also designing training and building the ability to lead others in this field. • Enhance appreciation for American local governmental practices and the role of the watchdog groups. • Establish structured interaction among American and African participants designed to develop enduring professional ties. • Present plans to enable participants to initiate and support activities in their home countries that focus on local development and community service. *Successful applicants must demonstrate a capacity to conduct the following activities:*

(1)Work jointly with an African partner organization to develop an effective governance skills program for young adult Africans that includes activities in both the U.S. and Africa.

(2)Provide a six- to ten-week U.S.-based fellows program for 10 to 15 Africans on local government.

(3)As a counterpart to the fellows program in the U.S., provide a multi-week program in Africa for 10-15 Americans to learn about local governance challenges and opportunities there and to assist in conducting workshops for a wider audience of Africans.

(4)Grantee and African partner commit to a plan for additional local governance skills development activities in Africa after the grant is finished. These plans might include additional basic training or mentoring and maintenance of a web site for this purpose.

(5)Launch a self-sustaining program of enhancement activities and leadership development opportunities to reinforce program goals after all participants' return to their home country. An essential follow-on component will be a longitudinal assessment of the achievements of the program. *Possible Program Model:* 1. Grantee sends Americans to work alongside African partners for two weeks or more to learn about the local governance efforts in the region. 2. Grantee and partner conduct a local governance education program in Africa for local leaders. Program participants would then be invited to submit training plans, with the incentive that those who produce the best plans will be invited to the U.S. for fellowships. 3. Competition is held where those who develop the best plans will be offered a U.S.-based fellowship program. 4. African participants come to the U.S. for fellowship program of six to ten weeks that features both individualized and group learning and practice activities which develop technical and leadership skills plus cultural sensitivity. (A shorter-term study tour for Africans will be considered inadequate.) 5. Grantee and African partner commit to a plan for follow-on activities in Africa after the grant is finished. These plans might include additional training in public administration or even the development of a public administration academy. 6. The grantee and African partner keep each other informed of developments in public administration education through email, telephone, video conferences, travel, etc, in order to maintain their partnership. *REGION: East Asia and the Pacific (EAP):* EAP: Active and Responsible Citizenship. *Program Contact:* Clint Wright, tel:

(202)453-8164, e-mail: *WrightHC@state.gov.* *Project Goals:* ECA encourages proposals that will help educate citizens, local officials, and leaders of non-government organizations on their rights and responsibilities in a democracy. Programs should encourage the empowerment of foreign participants to participate in the development of public policy, public discussions, and debates by developing individual skills and organizations. Projects should engage government and NGO leaders in dialogue on issues impacting local communities and engage government leaders—national and local—on the importance of citizen participation in governmental decision-making. Projects should examine specific practices that promote an effective, accountable, transparent and responsive government and public administration that is crucial to the development of democracy. *Audience:* Should include representatives from government and non-governmental organizations, professional associations and community leaders between the ages of 25 and 40 with an emphasis on equal numbers of men and women. *Eligible Countries:* Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. (single-country projects only). *Successful programs will achieve the following:* • Encourage an understanding of the important elements of a civil society. This includes concepts such as volunteerism, grassroots activism, and the importance of the rule of law in all societies. • Programs should help develop an appreciation for American governmental and legal structures, an understanding of the diversity of American society, and the necessity for increased tolerance and respect for others with differing views and beliefs. *Successful applicants must fully demonstrate a capacity to achieve the following:*

(1)Recruit and select approximately 10 to 15 individuals from government, nongovernmental organizations, and community leaders throughout the target country, including private business leaders for a six to eight week U.S.-based fellows program. Partnering with organizations based in the proposed host-country is required.

(2)Coordinate and program the fellowships.

(3)The final part of the program will be conducting enhancement activities and leadership development opportunities that reinforce program goals after the participants' return to their home country. An essential follow on component will be a longitudinal assessment of the achievements of the program. *Possible Program Model:* 1. U.S. grantee identifies U.S. citizens to conduct in-country seminar for citizen leaders, teachers, NGO representatives, media, elected local government officials, and legal professionals to discuss transparency and accountability. The in-country partner (a local university or other appropriate professional group) will co-host the event with the U.S. grantee institution. During this phase, the grantee will openly recruit and select the participants to take part in the U.S.-based fellows program. 2. The grantee implements the U.S.-based fellowships in local elected officials' offices, NGO organizations, and citizen organizations. 3. An in-country program would be conducted by the U.S. experts who served as fellowship hosts or seminar leaders. The participants in U.S. program would help design seminars and serve as co-presenters. Organizers broaden impact through public outreach, including media. 4. Project may also support materials translated into native language, small grants for projects designed to expand the exchange experience, and support for the development of alumni association. *REGION: Europe (EUR):* EUR: Legislative Education and Practice Program (LEAP). *Program Contact:* Jon Crocitto, Tel.

(202)453-8149; e-mail: *CrocittoJA@state.gov.* *Project Goals:* In some European countries, concepts such as free democratic elections and political parties are still not very developed and other aspects of democracy almost seem to be moving backward. Free and democratic elections and civic activism and engagement are the backbone of a civil society. LEAP is designed to strengthen understanding of the U.S. legislative process and enhance appreciation of civic society. LEAP will provide Young Professionals from Europe with hands-on exposure to the U.S. political process through six-month internships in state legislatures, city councils or local governments in the U.S. U.S. participants should be selected among staff members at the various internship sites who will act as primary host/mentors to the foreign fellows during their U.S.-based program. After the internships are completed, these U.S. staff members will travel overseas to the interns' home countries. There they will participate in joint outreach activities, including media, and conduct on-site consultancies and presentations to wider audiences. *Audience:* Generally, ECA prefers program participants who have not previously been part of U.S.-based exchange programs as participants in new programs. However, the LEAP program is an exception. Because of the unique nature of this program, foreign participants who are alumni of long-term exchange programs (an academic year or more) in the United States (USG or privately sponsored) are favored as participants in this program. These alumni have previous experience living and attending school in the U.S. that will provide them with the cultural and linguistic background necessary to benefit fully from the program. The foreign participants should be selected through a merit-based, competitive process. They should be recent university graduates in political affairs or other relevant fields—approximately mid to late 20's in age, with some professional experience in the political or legislative arenas. Participants should have demonstrated leadership abilities and a commitment to or participation in the political process or policy-making through involvement in civic education activities, citizen advocacy groups, political campaigns, political parties, or election monitoring in their home countries. U.S. participants will be staff members of the state legislatures, city councils or local governments who act as hosts for the foreign participants during the inbound portion of the program. *Eligible Countries (all should be included):* Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia. *Successful applicants must fully demonstrate a capacity to achieve the following:*

(1)Manage (both programmatically and logistically) the program in the United States and overseas. Interested organizations must have offices and staff (or partner organizations) in all countries involved in the program. Close coordination with ECA and U.S. Embassy Public Affairs Sections in relevant countries will be essential.

(2)Conduct recruitment and selection of participants through a merit-based competitive process. A pre-departure and an arrival orientation to ensure that participants have realistic expectations and have essential information on their individual internships, host communities, their responsibilities, and logistics should be included. Use of host families for foreign participants in the U.S. is highly encouraged.

(3)Organize an intensive introduction to the U.S. political process to take place in whole or in part in Washington, DC.

(4)Identify and manage individualized internships with state legislators, city councils or local government that will expose participants to citizen participation in the political process. Internships at the state level would be strongly preferred.

(5)Coordinate all logistics and programming for consultancy and training program where U.S. participants will travel to the countries where foreign participants are from for two to three weeks. The U.S. participants would conduct workshops and trainings that cover the U.S. legislative process and will enhance appreciation of civic society. The training(s)/workshop(s) should be designed to engage a broad audience, not just program participants. The U.S. participants would also engage in joint outreach efforts, including engagement with the media. *Possible Program Model:* 1. U.S. grantee and in-country partner select about 20 foreign participants to participate in the U.S.-based program followed by a four to six month internship in state legislatures, city councils or local governments in the U.S. for foreign participants. 2. An in-country program for 10 to 15 U.S. participants (who hosted/worked with the foreign participants in the U.S.) for two to three weeks. This would include on-site consultancies and group workshop(s) for a broad audience. Foreign participants help design the seminars and serve as co-presenters. 3. A series of enrichment activities that could include support materials translated into target language, small grants for projects designed to expand the exchange experience, the creation of a web portal for ongoing virtual program activities and communication, and other activities. *EUR:* Outreach and Integration of Marginalized Populations in Western Europe. *Program Contact:* Brent Beemer, tel:

(202)453-8147, e-mail: *BeemerBT@state.gov.* Note: Interested Applicants are HIGHLY encouraged to contact ECA before submitting a proposal under this theme. *Project Goals:* ECA seeks programs that will engage community leaders, educators, youth influencers, journalists, and community-based organizations in examination of programs and practices to facilitate integration and empowerment of minority populations, particularly youth, in Western European countries. This program would look at issues related to the integration of immigrant and minority populations into a modern democratic society. This includes integration in the political system, economic opportunity, freedom of expression, access to education, and practice of an open social/cultural life, while maintaining ethnic identity within a multi-ethnic society. A specific concentration of programming on immigrant and minority youth populations and the special needs/challenges they face in modern society should be a major focus. An overall comparison and sharing of best practices in the U.S. and in the Western European countries on these issues should also be included. Programming should include an overview of U.S. and European government and legal structures, an understanding of the diversity of American and European societies and efforts to increase tolerance and respect for others with differing views and beliefs. Program content will include an overview of the range of historical and current American and European experiences with integrating various immigrant and minority citizens, examination of what has worked well and what has not, and analysis of the range of actors including government, NGOs, religious organizations, immigrant organizations, educational institutions, and the role of the media and public who report on these issues. *Audience:* Participants (from the U.S. and foreign countries) in the program should include representatives of non-governmental organizations, community leaders, educators, youth influencers, religious leaders, and journalists from minority communities. Note: European Union, national, and regional government officials are welcome to be part of programming, but given funding limitations, ECA funds may not be used to support their travel expenses. Eligible Countries (single-country projects only) Denmark, United Kingdom. *Successful programs will achieve the following:* • An understanding of issues related to the status of immigrant and minority populations in a modern democratic society. This includes integration in the political system, economic opportunity, and freedom of expression, education, and social/cultural life, while maintaining ethnic identity within a multi-ethnic society. A specific understanding of immigrant and minority youth populations and the special needs/challenges they face in modern society is envisioned. • An appreciation for American governmental and legal structures, and a better understanding of the diversity of American society and efforts over the nation's history to increase tolerance and respect for others with differing views and beliefs. Program content will include an overview of the range of historical and current American experience with integrating various immigrant and minority citizens, examination of what has worked well and what has not, and analysis of the range of actors including local government, NGOs, religious organizations, immigrant organizations, educational institutions, and the role of the media. • An enhanced leadership capacity that will enable participants to initiate and support activities in their home countries that focus on the status of minority populations. *Successful applicants must fully demonstrate a capacity to achieve the following:*

(1)Recruit and select approximately 15 to 20 individuals throughout the target country. Program should be designed for two groups to travel to the U.S. Partnering with organizations based in target country is required. Also, given resources available in Western Europe, successful applicants will have West European partners that will cover considerable program costs within the host country and cover all its own administrative costs for this project.

(2)In addition to identifying in-country partner and screening, selecting, and preparing participants prior to departure for the United States, the recipient of this grant will be responsible for building and executing a three to four week informative travel and training program in the United States.

(3)Conduct an in-country workshop(s) to examine the process of integration of marginalized populations in Europe and developing strategies to address these issues. The workshop(s) should be designed to engage a broad audience, not just program participants.

(4)Develop enhancement activities and development opportunities that reinforce program goals after the participants' return to their home country. An essential follow-on component will be a longitudinal assessment of the achievements of the program. *Possible Program Model:* 1. U.S. grantee and in-country partner identify West European citizens to participate in the U.S.-based program. Then a three to four week U.S. program that includes an orientation, study tour/site visits; possible short-term internships/work shadowing opportunities; hands on training/training-of-trainers; professional development; and the development of action plans. 2. An in-country workshop(s) for a broad audience to examine the process of integration of minority communities. Program conducted by U.S. experts that served as hosts or seminar leaders. Participants in U.S. program design the seminar and serve as co-presenters. 3. Enrichment activities that could include support materials translated into native language, small grants for projects designed to expand and sustain the exchange experience, and other activities. *REGION: Near East and North Africa (NEA):* NEA: Professional Mentoring for Women in Science and Technology. *Program Contact:* Thomas Johnston, Tel:

(202)453-8162; e-mail: *JohnstonTJ@state.gov.* *Project Goals:* ECA seeks proposals that will engage young women who have recently embarked on professions in fields requiring skills in mathematics, scientific and/or technological fields. Proposals should encourage the use of critical thinking in the professional sphere as well as other aspects of life. Proposals should include plans to provide eight- to ten-week mentorships in American laboratories, professional or commercial research and development labs, or in the high tech industries. This program will also send American specialists in similar fields to conduct/participate in seminars, workshops, on-site consultancies, and other types of activities in the home countries of Middle East participants, with the goal of reinforcing the mentorship experience and creating a wider network of women who are established in these professions or who aspire to do so. A principal goal of this program is the development of sustainable, long-term institutional and individual linkages based on the relationships established between U.S. mentors and non-American fellows. Mentoring programs for English-speaking fellows would be designed as individual affiliations with an appropriate American professional counterpart. Proposals should also envision small specialized shadowing opportunities for groups of 2-3 international participants without strong English skills. These group opportunities should incorporate diverse training methodologies and include full-time provision of an escort/interpreter. All proposals should also include a U.S. program component allowing all participants to come together, learn from each other and to build relationships. The Department has initiated outreach to women in science and technology in the Middle East through previous contact and conferences; organizers of previous projects may be consulted for additional contacts and information. Applicants for this ECA grant are encouraged to contact the ECA Program Officer, Thomas Johnston, for additional information and contacts. *Audience:* Middle Eastern participants will be women (22-35 years of age) who are newly engaged or rising in professional careers that require significant expertise/knowledge of mathematics, science, technology and/or innovative application of these skills, and who already are, or show promise of being, role models for others in their countries, particularly for women. We would consider, for example, a lawyer, whose work requires expert knowledge of environmental science as well as international law to be eligible for this program. *Eligible Countries:* Algeria; Bahrain; Egypt; Iraq; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Morocco; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Syria; United Arab Emirates; West Bank/Gaza; Yemen. *Successful applicants must demonstrate a capacity to achieve the following:*

(1)Recruit and select approximately 15 to 20 qualified individuals from throughout the eligible region, with representatives from as many countries as possible. The program should be designed for non-American fellows to travel to the United States for a group orientation program, even if they will be subsequently be engaged in individualized programs, in order to foster networking among the group. An in-country or in-region partner organization or affiliate offices overseas is required to coordinate recruiting and selection. Proposing organizations must be prepared to mount a merit-based selection process, to be described in the proposal.

(2)In addition to identifying its in-country (or in-region) partner and identifying, selecting, and preparing participants prior to departure for the United States, the recipient of this grant will be responsible for building and implementing an eight- to ten-week professional mentoring experience and training program in the United States. This will focus primarily upon individualized fellowships for the foreign participants at the R & D facilities of U.S. businesses, non-university high-tech institutes, or other appropriate affiliation as well as a commitment of appropriate American professional counterpart women to serve as mentors. The final selection of foreign fellows should take into account the types of placements that may be available in the U.S. ECA seeks creative and cost-efficient approaches to this selection and placement program.

(3)Conducting an in-country consultancy program and/or workshop in each participating country, during which the international fellow and American mentor will offer skill development and networking workshops for a broader range of program participants in that country.

(4)The development of a Web site designed to foster ongoing communication among the international and American participants and to publicize the results of this program. An essential follow-on component will be a longitudinal assessment of the achievements of the program. *Possible Program Model:* 1. U.S. grantee and in-country partner institution select young non-American women engaged in science and technology for participation in the U.S.-based mentoring/fellowship program. 2. An eight- to ten-week U.S. program that includes an orientation followed by individualized fellowships for English speakers; a shorter program designed around work shadowing opportunities with interpretation for groups of 2-3 non-English speakers. 3. An in-country program in each international participating country for one or more of the American mentors (who hosted/worked with the foreign participants in the U.S.). The in-country program would include on-site consultancies, group workshops/seminars and networking opportunities for a broad audience. Foreign participants would help design the seminars and serve as co-presenters. 4. The development of a project specific Web site, as well as enrichment activities that could include having support material translated into the native language, small grants for research-development projects designed to expand the exchange experience, and other activities. NEA: Math, Science, and Technology in Secondary Schools. *Program Contact:* Thomas Johnston, Tel:

(202)453-8162; e-mail: *JohnstonTJ@state.gov.* *Project Goals:* ECA seeks program proposals that will help develop institutional (and personal) linkages between secondary school teachers and administrators in the United States and partners in the NEA region in the disciplines of math, science, and technology innovation. ECA is looking to support creative programs that will link secondary school teachers and administrators from the U.S. and overseas in programming designed to explore approaches to engaging students in critical thinking, particularly in the teaching of math, science, and innovative approaches to technology, both in the classroom and through focused extracurricular activities, and to examine how professional counterparts in participating countries engage the successor generation. *Audience:* Math, science, and technology secondary school teachers and administrators. *Eligible Countries:* Algeria; Bahrain; Egypt; Iraq; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Morocco; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Syria; United Arab Emirates; West Bank/Gaza; Yemen. *Successful programs will achieve the following:* • An understanding of techniques used in the NEA region and in the United States to promote student engagement in critical thinking and discovery, particular in math, science, and technology. • Develop opportunities for productive personal relationships between groups from participating countries that could lead to affiliations between schools in the U.S. and schools in the NEA region. • Participants from each country should come from the same schools or set of schools (districts) so that direct linkages on both sides are facilitated and encouraged by the program. • An appreciation for the ways in which diverse populations can interact productively in the secondary school setting and work collaboratively to develop innovative responses to scientific and mathematics challenges. U.S. program presentations should showcase teaching math, science, and technology at the secondary level, special/accelerated programs and/or schools in the math, science, and technology disciplines, programs to attract students to these disciplines (especially girls), relevant after school programs, student job-shadowing programs, the roles of parents in schools, and how secondary schools build support and relationships with local science/technology businesses. • Enhanced leadership capacity among the NEA educators that will enable participants to initiate and support activities in their home schools and classrooms. • Create the foundation for collaborative partnerships among classrooms, through virtual or other exchanges. *Successful applicants must fully demonstrate a capacity to achieve the following:*

(1)Recruit and select approximately 15 to 20 secondary school teachers and administrators from overseas and 15 to 20 from the U.S. to take part in the program. To recruit effectively, the grantee organization must have affiliate offices in one or more NEA countries.

(2)The recipient of this grant will be responsible for building and executing a one to two week study tour for American educators in the NEA region and a two to three week study tour program in the United States for foreign educators.

(3)Develop enhancement activities and development opportunities that reinforce program goals after the participants' return to their home country. Grantee will be responsible for establishing electronic communications/on-line projects or other methods of continuing communication and developing collaborative projects between participants and their classrooms. An essential follow-on component will be a longitudinal assessment of the achievements of the program. *Possible Program Model:* 1. A merit-based competitive selection of American secondary school educators and administrators to participate in the overseas program is done. 2. A one to two week program is developed where the U.S. participants travel overseas. This should be done while schools in the host country(ies) are in session. While overseas, the U.S. participants will meet with and be hosted by foreign participants (and their schools) who have also been selected through an open merit-based competitive process. Programming should include time in active classrooms with students and presentation opportunities for the American participants in foreign schools/classrooms. 3. During an interim period, educators are in contact through active electronic communications and web-based programs. 4. A two to three week program is developed where the foreign participants travel to the U.S. This should be done while schools in the U.S. are in session. While in the U.S., the foreign participants will be hosted by U.S. participants (and their schools) whom they met in their program overseas. Programming should include time in active classrooms and at appropriate extracurricular sites with students and presentation opportunities for the foreign participants in American schools/classrooms. 5. Enrichment activities are developed that could include support materials translated into the native language, small grants for collaborative projects designed to expand and sustain the exchange experience, continuation of web/electronic activities, and other activities are done. *REGION: South Central Asia (SCA):* SCA: Secondary School Linkages. *Program Contact:* Brent Beemer, tel:

(202)453-8147, e-mail: *BeemerBT@state.gov.* *Project Goals:* ECA seeks program proposals that will help develop institutional (and personal) linkages between secondary schools in the United States and partner institutions in Turkmenistan or Pakistan. ECA will support creative programs that will link secondary school teachers and administrators from the U.S. and Turkmenistan or Pakistan in programming designed to explore each other's systems, schools, approaches to education, and study how their profession is engaging the successor generations in both countries. *Audience:* Secondary school teachers and administrators. Active parents involved with parent/teacher organizations. *Eligible Countries:* Turkmenistan, Pakistan (Single-Country Projects Only). *Successful programs will achieve the following:* • An understanding of issues related to the secondary school system in both countries. • Develop opportunities for personal relationships to develop among the participants and longer-term affiliations between schools in the U.S. and schools in Turkmenistan or Pakistan to take root. Participants from both countries in the program should come from the same schools or set of schools (districts) so that direct linkages on both sides are facilitated and encouraged by the program. • An appreciation for American governmental and legal structures, and a better understanding of the diversity of American society and how that affects the secondary school educational system. Program content should include presentations on the current American experience with integrating various immigrant citizens into the educational system, education of students with special needs, after school programs, student service/volunteer programs, the roles of parents in schools, and how secondary schools build support among local communities. • An enhanced leadership capacity among the foreign educators that will enable participants to initiate and support activities in their home schools and classrooms. *Successful applicants must fully demonstrate a capacity to achieve the following: *

(1)Recruit and select approximately 15 to 20 secondary school teachers and administrators from Turkmenistan or Pakistan and 15 to 20 from the U.S. to take part in the program. Partnering with a Turkmenistan-based or Pakistan-based organization or institution or having affiliate offices based there is required.

(2)The recipient of this grant will be responsible for building and executing a one to two week study tour for American educators overseas and a two to three week study tour program in the United States for foreign educators.

(3)Develop enhancement activities and development opportunities that reinforce program goals after the participants' return to their home country. Grantee will be responsible for establishing electronic communications/on-line projects or other methods of continuing communications between participants. An essential follow-on component will be a longitudinal assessment of the achievements of the program. *Possible Program Model:* 1. A merit-based competitive selection of American secondary school educators and administrators to participate in the Turkmenistan-based or Pakistan-based program is conducted. 2. A one to two week program is developed where the U.S. participants travel to Turkmenistan or Pakistan. This should be done while schools in Turkmenistan or Pakistan are in session. While overseas, the U.S. participants will meet with and be hosted by foreign participants (and their schools) who have also been selected through an open merit-based competitive process. Programming should include time in active classrooms with students and presentation opportunities for the American participants in overseas schools/classrooms. 3. During an interim period, educators are in contact through active electronic communications and web-based programs. 4. A two to three week program is developed where the foreign participants travel to the U.S. This should be done while schools in the U.S. are in session. While in the U.S, the foreign participants will be hosted by U.S. participants (and their schools) whom they met in their program in Turkmenistan or Pakistan. Programming should include time in active classrooms with students and presentation opportunities for the foreign participants in American schools/classrooms. 5. Enrichment activities are developed that could include support materials translated into the native language, small grants for projects designed to expand and sustain the exchange experience, continuation of web/electronic activities, and other activities. SCA: Outreach and Integration of Marginalized Populations in Sri Lanka. *Program Contact:* Brent Beemer, tel:

(202)453-8147, e-mail: *BeemerBT@state.gov.* *Project Goals:* ECA seeks programs that will engage community leaders, educators, youth influencers, journalists, and community-based organizations in examination of programs and practices to engage underserved or disengaged segments of the Sri Lankan society. This would include strengthening outreach to youth, as well as support for minority rights for the Sinhalese Muslim population, especially at the local level. This program would examine issues related to the integration of marginalized populations into a modern democratic society, including integration in the political system, economic opportunity, freedom of expression, access to education, and practice of an open social/cultural life. A specific concentration of programming on minority youth populations and the special needs/challenges they face in modern society is encouraged. Programming should include a study of U.S. government and legal structures, an understanding of the diversity of American society and efforts over the nation's history to increase tolerance and respect for others with differing views and beliefs. Program content will include an overview of the range of historical and current American experience with integrating various immigrant and minority citizens, examination of what has worked well and what has not, and analysis of the range of actors including government, NGOs, religious organizations, immigrant organizations, educational institutions, and the role of the media and public who are involved in this these issues. *Audience:* Participants in the program should include representatives of non-governmental organizations, community leaders, educators, youth influencers, religious leaders, and journalists from minority communities. *Eligible Country:* Sri Lanka. *Successful applicants must fully demonstrate a capacity to achieve the following:*

(1)Recruit and select approximately 15 to 20 individuals throughout the target country. Program should be designed for two groups to travel to the U.S. An in-country partnering organization (based in Sri Lanka) is required.

(2)In addition to identifying in-country partner and screening, selecting, and preparing participants prior to departure for the United States, the recipient of this grant will be responsible for building and executing a three to four week study tour and training program in the United States.

(3)Conducting an in-country workshop(s) to examine the process of integration of marginalized populations in different societies and developing strategies to address these issues. The workshop(s) should be designed to engage a broad audience, not just program participants.

(4)The development of enhancement activities and development opportunities that reinforce program goals after the participants' return to their home country. An essential follow-on component will be a longitudinal assessment of the achievements of the program. *Possible Program Model:* 1. The U.S. grantee and in-country partner identify Sinhalese citizens to participate in the U.S.-based program. Then a three to four week U.S. program would occur that includes an orientation, study tour/site visits; possible short-term internships/work shadowing opportunities; hands on training/training-of-trainers; professional development; and the development of action plans. 2. A Sri Lanka-based workshop(s) for a broad audience to examine the status of minority communities. Participants in U.S. program help design the seminar and serve as co-presenters. 3. Enrichment activities would be developed that could include having support materials translated into the local language, small grants for projects designed to expand the exchange experience, and other activities. *REGION: Western Hemisphere (WHA):* WHA: Creating Economic Growth to Fight Poverty and Strengthen Democracy. *Program Contact:* Laverne Johnson, tel:

(202)453-8160, e-mail: *JohnsonLV@state.gov.* *Project Goals:* ECA seeks proposals designed to promote local grassroots economic growth and prosperity among emerging youth leaders from the indigenous and Afro-Latino communities by sharing practical methods to achieve this goal and to develop community leadership skills as a means to strengthen democracy. To increase understanding within the community of the linkage between entrepreneurial activity and free markets as well as the importance of transparency and accountability in business and government. *Audience:* Young entrepreneurs, media representatives, community leaders, and officials from governmental and non-governmental organizations that either service or come from the indigenous and Afro-Latino communities of the Hemisphere with a special emphasis on women. *Eligible Countries:* (Single-country and multiple-country projects accepted) Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. *Successful programs will achieve the following:* • Educate young men and women in entrepreneurial thinking and business leadership skills to empower them to engage in business creation. • Improve among participants an understanding of the role communication plays in creating the conditions necessary for a free market economy. • A better understanding of the roles of the private sector, and to a lesser extent, public sector who shape the local business environment. • An appreciation of the role of the individual entrepreneur in creating economic growth. • Enhance appreciation for American business practices and the role of the individual in creating growth through grassroots-focused entrepreneurial efforts. • Establish a structured interaction among American and Hemisphere participants designed to develop enduring professional ties. • Expand leadership capacity enabling participants to initiate and support activities in their home countries that focus on development and community service. *Successful applicants must fully demonstrate a capacity to achieve the following:*

(1)Recruit and select approximately 30 individuals from the business associations, banking and regulatory agencies and print media. The delegation should include individual business owners and individuals who report on business from diverse regions of the participating country. Program should be designed for two groups of 15 to travel to the U.S. for not less than ten days. For this phase of the program, partnering with organizations based in the proposed host-country is required.

(2)In addition to identifying in-country partner and screening, selecting, and preparing participants prior to departure for the United States, the grantee will be responsible for building and executing a four to six week residency program in the United States for approximately twelve additional Hemisphere participants.

(3)The final part of the program will be conducting enhancement activities and leadership development opportunities that reinforce program goals after all participants' return to their home country. An essential follow on component will be a longitudinal assessment of the achievements of the program. *Possible Program Model:* 1. Selected participants invited to attend in-country workshops (presented by the U.S. grantee and in-country partner) that focus on effective, practical methods of stimulating entrepreneurial skills and support free market structures in the countries listed in this announcement. 2. Key members of the in-country workshops invited to U.S. for business facilitation or mentoring to promote innovation and networking skills. Develop action plans to promote entrepreneurial skills and free markets upon return home. 3. Upon return, participants implement business action plans with guidance from U.S. mentors utilizing email and other direct communication. 4. U.S. mentors travel to country to evaluate implementation of action plan and offer assistance. III. Award Information *Type of Award:* Grant Agreement. *Fiscal Year Funds:* 2008, pending availability. *Approximate Total Funding:* $5,000,000. *Approximate Number of Awards:* 20. *Approximate Average Award:* $250,000 (Please Note: For the Legislative Education and Practice

(LEAP)program outlined under the European Section of this document, the Office anticipates awarding one grant for approximately $400,000. It is anticipated that all other awards made under this competition will average approximately $300,000.) *Ceiling of Award Range:* $350,000. *Anticipated Award Date:* Pending availability of funds, September 1, 2008. *Anticipated Project Completion Date:* September 30, 2010. III.1. Eligible Applicants Applications may be submitted by public and private non-profit organizations meeting the provisions described in Internal Revenue Code section 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3). III.2. Cost Sharing or Matching Funds There is no minimum or maximum percentage required for this competition. However, the Bureau encourages applicants to provide maximum levels of cost sharing and funding in support of its programs. When cost sharing is offered, it is understood and agreed that the applicant must provide the amount of cost sharing as stipulated in its proposal and later included in an approved grant agreement. Cost sharing may be in the form of allowable direct or indirect costs. For accountability, you must maintain written records to support all costs which are claimed as your contribution, as well as costs to be paid by the Federal Government. Such records are subject to audit. The basis for determining the value of cash and in-kind contributions must be in accordance with OMB Circular A-110, (Revised), Subpart C.23—Cost Sharing and Matching. In the event you do not provide the minimum amount of cost sharing as stipulated in the approved budget, ECA's contribution will be reduced in like proportion. III.3. Other Eligibility Requirements (a.) Grants awarded to eligible organizations with less than four years of experience in conducting international exchange programs will be limited to $60,000. (b.) Any one organization is limited to submitting no more than four proposals in this entire competition. If any one organization submits more than four, then all submitted proposals will be deemed ineligible in this competition. IV. Application and Submission Information: Note: Please read the complete announcement before sending inquiries or submitting proposals. Once the RFGP deadline has passed, Bureau staff may not discuss this competition with applicants until the proposal review process has been completed. IV.1. Contact Information To Request an Application Package Please contact the Office of Citizen Exchanges, ECA/PE/C, Room 220, U.S. Department of State, SA-44, 301 4th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20547,

(202)453-8174, *GustafsonDP@State.gov* to request a Solicitation Package. Please refer to the Funding Opportunity Number ECA/PE/C-08-01 located at the top of this announcement when making your request. Alternatively, an electronic application package may be obtained from grants.gov. Please see section IV.3f for further information. The Solicitation Package contains the Proposal Submission Instruction

(PSI)document which consists of required application forms, and standard guidelines for proposal preparation. Please specify Program Specialist David Gustafson and refer to the Funding Opportunity Number ECA/PE/C-08-01 located at the top of this announcement on all other inquiries and correspondence. IV.2. To Download a Solicitation Package Via Internet The entire Solicitation Package may be downloaded from the Bureau's Web site at *http://exchanges.state.gov/education/rfgps/menu.htm* , or from the Grants.gov website at *http://www.grants.gov.* Please read all information before downloading. IV.3. Content and Form of Submission Applicants must follow all instructions in the Solicitation Package. The application should be submitted per the instructions under IV.3f. “Application Deadline and Methods of Submission” section below. IV.3a. You are required to have a Dun and Bradstreet Data Universal Numbering System

(DUNS)number to apply for a grant or cooperative agreement from the U.S. Government. This number is a nine-digit identification number, which uniquely identifies business entities. Obtaining a DUNS number is easy and there is no charge. To obtain a DUNS number, access *http://www.dunandbradstreet.com* or call 1-866-705-5711. Please ensure that your DUNS number is included in the appropriate box of the SF-424 which is part of the formal application package. IV.3b. All proposals must contain an executive summary, proposal narrative and budget. Please Refer to the Solicitation Package. It contains the mandatory Proposal Submission Instructions

(PSI)document for additional formatting and technical requirements. IV.3c. You must have nonprofit status with the IRS at the time of application. If your organization is a private nonprofit which has not received a grant or cooperative agreement from ECA in the past three years, or if your organization received nonprofit status from the IRS within the past four years, you must submit the necessary documentation to verify nonprofit status as directed in the PSI document. Failure to do so will cause your proposal to be declared technically ineligible. IV.3d. Please take into consideration the following information when preparing your proposal narrative: IV.3d.1 Adherence to All Regulations Governing the J Visa The Office of Citizen Exchanges of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is the official program sponsor of the exchange program covered by this RFGP, and an employee of the Bureau will be the “Responsible Officer” for the program under the terms of 22 CFR part 62, which covers the administration of the Exchange Visitor Program (J visa program). Under the terms of 22 CFR part 62, organizations receiving grants under this RFGP will be third parties “cooperating with or assisting the sponsor in the conduct of the sponsor's program.” The actions of grantee program organizations shall be “imputed to the sponsor in evaluating the sponsor's compliance with” 22 CFR part 62. Therefore, the Bureau expects that any organization receiving a grant under this competition will render all assistance necessary to enable the Bureau to fully comply with 22 CFR part 62 *et seq.* The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs places critically important emphasis on the secure and proper administration of Exchange Visitor (J visa) Programs and adherence by grantee program organizations and program participants to all regulations governing the J visa program status. Therefore, proposals should *explicitly state in writing* that the applicant is prepared to assist the Bureau in meeting all requirements governing the administration of Exchange Visitor Programs as set forth in 22 CFR part 62. If your organization has experience as a designated Exchange Visitor Program Sponsor, the applicant should discuss their record of compliance with 22 CFR part 62 *et seq.,* including the oversight of their Responsible Officers and Alternate Responsible Officers, screening and selection of program participants, provision of pre-arrival information and orientation to participants, monitoring of participants, proper maintenance and security of forms, record-keeping, reporting and other requirements. The Office of Citizen Exchanges of ECA will be responsible for issuing DS-2019 forms to participants in this program. A copy of the complete regulations governing the administration of Exchange Visitor

(J)programs is available at *http://exchanges.state.gov* or from: United States Department of State, Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation, ECA/EC/ECD-SA-44, Room 734, 301 4th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20547, Telephone:

(202)203-5029, FAX:

(202)453-8640. IV.3d.2 Diversity, Freedom and Democracy Guidelines Pursuant to the Bureau's authorizing legislation, programs must maintain a non-political character and should be balanced and representative of the diversity of American political, social, and cultural life. “Diversity” should be interpreted in the broadest sense and encompass differences including, but not limited to ethnicity, race, gender, religion, geographic location, socio-economic status, and disabilities. Applicants are strongly encouraged to adhere to the advancement of this principle both in program administration and in program content. Please refer to the review criteria under the “Support for Diversity” section for specific suggestions on incorporating diversity into your proposal. Public Law 104-319 provides that “in carrying out programs of educational and cultural exchange in countries whose people do not fully enjoy freedom and democracy,” the Bureau “shall take appropriate steps to provide opportunities for participation in such programs to human rights and democracy leaders of such countries.” Public Law 106-113 requires that the governments of the countries described above do not have inappropriate influence in the selection process. Proposals should reflect advancement of these goals in their program contents, to the full extent deemed feasible. IV.3d.3. Program Monitoring and Evaluation Proposals must include a plan to monitor and evaluate the project's success, both as the activities unfold and at the end of the program. The Bureau recommends that your proposal include a draft survey questionnaire or other technique plus a description of a methodology to use to link outcomes to original project objectives. The Bureau expects that the grantee will track participants or partners and be able to respond to key evaluation questions, including satisfaction with the program, learning as a result of the program, changes in behavior as a result of the program, and effects of the program on institutions (institutions in which participants work or partner institutions). The evaluation plan should include indicators that measure gains in mutual understanding as well as substantive knowledge. Successful monitoring and evaluation depend heavily on setting clear goals and outcomes at the outset of a program. Your evaluation plan should include a description of your project's objectives, your anticipated project outcomes, and how and when you intend to measure these outcomes (performance indicators). The more that outcomes are “smart” (specific, measurable, attainable, results-oriented, and placed in a reasonable time frame), the easier it will be to conduct the evaluation. You should also show how your project objectives link to the goals of the program described in this RFGP. Your monitoring and evaluation plan should clearly distinguish between program *outputs* and *outcomes.* *Outputs* are products and services delivered, often stated as an amount. Output information is important to show the scope or size of project activities, but it cannot substitute for information about progress towards outcomes or the results achieved. Examples of outputs include the number of people trained or the number of seminars conducted. *Outcomes,* in contrast, represent specific results a project is intended to achieve and is usually measured as an extent of change. Findings on outputs and outcomes should both be reported, but the focus should be on outcomes. We encourage you to assess the following four levels of outcomes, as they relate to the program goals set out in the RFGP (listed here in increasing order of importance): 1. Participant satisfaction with the program and exchange experience. 2. Participant learning, such as increased knowledge, aptitude, skills, and changed understanding and attitude. Learning includes both substantive (subject-specific) learning and mutual understanding. 3. Participant behavior, concrete actions to apply knowledge in work or community; greater participation and responsibility in civic organizations; interpretation and explanation of experiences and new knowledge gained; continued contacts between participants, community members, and others. 4. Institutional changes, such as increased collaboration and partnerships, policy reforms, new programming, and organizational improvements. Please note: Consideration should be given to the appropriate timing of data collection for each level of outcome. For example, satisfaction is usually captured as a short-term outcome, whereas behavior and institutional changes are normally considered longer-term outcomes. Overall, the quality of your monitoring and evaluation plan will be judged on how well it

(1)specifies intended outcomes;

(2)gives clear descriptions of how each outcome will be measured;

(3)identifies when particular outcomes will be measured; and

(4)provides a clear description of the data collection strategies for each outcome (i.e., surveys, interviews, or focus groups). (Please note that evaluation plans that deal only with the first level of outcomes [satisfaction] will be deemed less competitive under the present evaluation criteria.) Grantees will be required to provide reports analyzing their evaluation findings to the Bureau in their regular program reports. All data collected, including survey responses and contact information, must be maintained for a minimum of three years and provided to the Bureau upon request. IV.3e. Please take the following information into consideration when preparing your budget: IV.3e.1. Applicants must submit a comprehensive budget for the entire program. Budget requests may not exceed $350,000. There must be a summary budget as well as breakdowns reflecting both administrative and program budgets. Applicants may provide separate sub-budgets for each program component, phase, location, or activity to provide clarification. The Bureau reserves the right to increase or decrease awards to meet the overall needs of the program. IV.3e.2. Allowable costs for the program include the following: 1. Travel. International and domestic airfare; visas; transit costs; ground transportation costs. Please note that all air travel must be in compliance with the Fly America Act. There is no charge for J-1 visas for participants in Bureau sponsored programs. 2. Per Diem. For U.S.-based programming, organizations should use the published Federal per diem rates for individual U.S. cities. Domestic per diem rates may be accessed at: *http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?programId=9704&channelId=-15943&ooid=16365&contentId=17943&pageTypeId=8203&contentType=GSA_BASIC&programPage=%2Fep%2Fprogram%2FgsaBasic.jsp&P=MTT.* ECA requests applicants to budget realistic costs that reflect the local economy and do not exceed Federal per diem rates. Foreign per diem rates can be accessed at: *http://aoprals.state.gov/content.asp?content_id=184&menu_id=78.* 3. Interpreters. For U.S.-based activities, ECA strongly encourages applicants to hire their own locally based interpreters. However, applicants may ask ECA to assign State Department interpreters. One interpreter is typically needed for every four participants who require interpretation. When an applicant proposes to use State Department interpreters, the following expenses should be included in the budget: Published Federal per diem rates (both “lodging” and “M&IE”) and “home-program-home” transportation in the amount of $400 per interpreter. Salary expenses for State Department interpreters will be covered by the Bureau and should not be part of an applicant's proposed budget. Bureau funds cannot support interpreters who accompany delegations from their home country or travel internationally. 4. Book and Cultural Allowances. Foreign participants are entitled to a one-time cultural allowance of $150 per person, plus a book allowance of $50. Interpreters should be reimbursed up to $150 for expenses when they escort participants to cultural events. U.S. program staff, trainers or participants are not eligible to receive these benefits. 5. Consultants. Consultants may be used to provide specialized expertise or to make presentations. Honoraria rates should not exceed $250 per day. Organizations are encouraged to cost-share rates that would exceed that figure. Subcontracting organizations may also be employed, in which case the written agreement between the prospective grantee and sub-grantee should be included in the proposal. Such sub-grants should detail the division of responsibilities and proposed costs, and subcontracts should be itemized in the budget. 6. Room rental. The rental of meeting space should not exceed $250 per day. Any rates that exceed this amount should be cost shared. 7. Materials. Proposals may contain costs to purchase, develop and translate materials for participants. Costs for high quality translation of materials should be anticipated and included in the budget. Grantee organizations should expect to submit a copy of all program materials to ECA, and ECA support should be acknowledged on all materials developed with its funding. 8. Equipment. Applicants may propose to use grant funds to purchase equipment, such as computers and printers; these costs should be justified in the budget narrative. Costs for furniture are not allowed. 9. Working meal. Normally, no more than one working meal may be provided during the program. Per capita costs may not exceed $15-$25 for lunch and $20-$35 for dinner, excluding room rental. The number of invited guests may not exceed participants by more than a factor of two-to-one. When setting up a budget, interpreters should be considered “participants.” 10. Return travel allowance. A return travel allowance of $70 for each foreign participant may be included in the budget. This allowance would cover incidental expenses incurred during international travel. 11. Health Insurance. Foreign participants will be covered during their participation in the program by the ECA-sponsored Accident and Sickness Program for Exchanges (ASPE), for which the grantee must enroll them. Details of that policy can be provided by the contact officers identified in this solicitation. The premium is paid by ECA and should not be included in the grant proposal budget. However, applicants are permitted to include costs for travel insurance for U.S. participants in the budget. 12. Wire transfer fees. When necessary, applicants may include costs to transfer funds to partner organizations overseas. Grantees are urged to research applicable taxes that may be imposed on these transfers by host governments. 13. In-country travel costs for visa processing purposes. Given the requirements associated with obtaining J-1 visas for ECA-supported participants, applicants should include costs for any travel associated with visa interviews or DS-2019 pick-up. 14. Administrative Costs. Costs necessary for the effective administration of the program may include salaries for grantee organization employees, benefits, and other direct and indirect costs per detailed instructions in the Application Package. While there is no rigid ratio of administrative to program costs, proposals in which the administrative costs do not exceed 25% of the total requested ECA grant funds will be more competitive under the cost effectiveness and cost sharing criterion, per item V.1 below. Proposals should show strong administrative cost sharing contributions from the applicant, the in-country partner and other sources. Please refer to the Solicitation Package for complete budget guidelines and formatting instructions. IV.3f. Application Deadline and Methods of Submission: *Application Deadline Date:* February 15, 2008. *Reference Number:* ECA/PE/C-08-01. *Methods of Submission:* Applications may be submitted in one of two ways: (1.) In hard-copy, via a nationally recognized overnight delivery service (i.e., DHL, Federal Express, UPS, Airborne Express, or U.S. Postal Service Express Overnight Mail, etc.), or (2.) electronically through *http://www.grants.gov.* Along with the Project Title, all applicants must enter the above Reference Number in Box 11 on the SF-424 contained in the mandatory Proposal Submission Instructions

(PSI)of the solicitation document. IV.3f.1. Submitting Printed Applications Applications must be shipped no later than the above deadline. Delivery services used by applicants must have in-place, centralized shipping identification and tracking systems that may be accessed via the Internet and delivery people who are identifiable by commonly recognized uniforms and delivery vehicles. Proposals shipped on or before the above deadline but received at ECA more than seven days after the deadline will be ineligible for further consideration under this competition. Proposals shipped after the established deadlines are ineligible for consideration under this competition. ECA will *not* notify you upon receipt of application. It is each applicant's responsibility to ensure that each package is marked with a legible tracking number and to monitor/confirm delivery to ECA via the Internet. Delivery of proposal packages *may not* be made via local courier service or in person for this competition. Faxed documents will not be accepted at any time. Only proposals submitted as stated above will be considered. Important note: When preparing your submission please make sure to include one extra copy of the completed SF-424 form and place it in an envelope addressed to “ECA/EX/PM”. The original and 8 copies of the application should be sent to: U.S. Department of State, SA-44, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Ref.: ECA/PE-08-01, Program Management, ECA/EX/PM, Room 534, 301 4th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20547. Applicants submitting hard-copy applications must also submit the “Executive Summary” and “Proposal Narrative” sections of the proposal in text (.txt) or Microsoft Word format on a PC-formatted disk. The Bureau will provide these files electronically to the appropriate Public Affairs Section(s) at the U.S. embassy(ies) for its(their) review. IV.3f.2. Submitting Electronic Applications Applicants have the option of submitting proposals electronically through Grants.gov ( *http://www.grants.gov* ). Complete solicitation packages are available at Grants.gov in the “Find” portion of the system. Please follow the instructions available in the 'Get Started' portion of the site ( *http://www.grants.gov/GetStarted* ). Several of the steps in the Grants.gov registration process could take several weeks. Therefore, applicants should check with appropriate staff within their organizations immediately after reviewing this RFGP to confirm or determine their registration status with Grants.gov. Once registered, the amount of time it can take to upload an application will vary depending on a variety of factors including the size of the application and the speed of your Internet connection. Therefore, we strongly recommend that you not wait until the application deadline to begin the submission process through Grants.gov. Direct all questions regarding Grants.gov registration and submission to: Grants.gov Customer Support. Contact Center Phone: 800-518-4726. Business Hours: Monday-Friday, 7 a.m.-9 p.m. Eastern Time. E-mail: *support@grants.gov.* Applicants have until midnight (12 a.m.), Washington, DC time of the closing date to ensure that their entire application has been uploaded to the Grants.gov site. There are no exceptions to the above deadline. Applications uploaded to the site after midnight of the application deadline date will be automatically rejected by the grants.gov system, and will be technically ineligible. Applicants will receive a confirmation e-mail from grants.gov upon the successful submission of an application. ECA will *not* notify you upon receipt of electronic applications. It is the responsibility of all applicants submitting proposals via the Grants.gov Web portal to ensure that proposals have been received by Grants.gov in their entirety, and ECA bears no responsibility for data errors resulting from transmission or conversion processes. IV.3f.3. Applicants may not submit proposals that address more than one region or that include countries not eligible under a specific theme designated in the RFGP. Proposals that do so will be declared technically ineligible and will receive no further consideration in the review process. For the purposes of this competition, eligible regions are Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Near East, North Africa, South Central Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. IV.3g. Intergovernmental Review of Applications: Executive Order 12372 does not apply to this program. V. Application Review Information V.1. Review Process The Bureau will review all proposals for technical eligibility. Proposals will be deemed ineligible if they do not fully adhere to the guidelines stated herein and in the Solicitation Package. All eligible proposals will be reviewed by the program office, as well as the Public Diplomacy section overseas, where appropriate. Eligible proposals will be subject to compliance with Federal and Bureau regulations and guidelines and forwarded to Bureau grant panels for advisory review. Proposals may also be reviewed by the Office of the Legal Adviser or by other Department elements. Final funding decisions are at the discretion of the Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Final technical authority for grants resides with the Bureau's Grants Officer. Review Criteria Technically eligible applications will be competitively reviewed according to the criteria stated below. These criteria are not rank ordered and all carry equal weight in the proposal evaluation: 1. Program Planning and Ability to Achieve Objectives: Program objectives should be stated clearly and should reflect the applicant's expertise in the subject area and region. Objectives should respond to the topics in this announcement and should relate to the current conditions in the target country/countries. A detailed agenda and relevant work plan should explain how objectives will be achieved and should include a timetable for completion of major tasks. The substance of workshops, internships, seminars and/or consulting should be described in detail. Sample training schedules should be outlined. Responsibilities of proposed in-country partners should be clearly described. A discussion of how the applicant intends to address language issues should be included, if needed. 2. Institutional Capacity: Proposals should include

(1)the institution's mission and date of establishment;

(2)detailed information about proposed in-country partner(s) and the history of the partnership;

(3)an outline of prior awards-U.S. government and/or private support received for the target theme/country/region; and

(4)descriptions of experienced staff members who will implement the program. The proposal should reflect the institution's expertise in the subject area and knowledge of the conditions in the target country/countries. Proposals should demonstrate an institutional record of successful exchange programs, including responsible fiscal management and full compliance with all reporting requirements for past Bureau grants as determined by Bureau Grants Staff. The Bureau will consider the past performance of prior recipients and the demonstrated potential of new applicants. Proposed personnel and institutional resources should be adequate and appropriate to achieve the program's goals. The Bureau strongly encourages applicants to submit letters of support from proposed in-country partners. 3. Cost Effectiveness and Cost Sharing: Overhead and administrative costs in the proposal budget, including salaries, honoraria and subcontracts for services, should be kept to a minimum. Proposals in which the administrative costs do not exceed 25% of the total requested ECA grant funds will be more competitive (see IV.3e.2 #14 for clarification on this). Applicants are strongly encouraged to cost share a portion of overhead and administrative expenses. Cost-sharing, including contributions from the applicant, proposed in-country partner(s), and other sources should be included in the budget request. Proposal budgets that do not reflect cost sharing will be deemed not competitive in this category. 4. Support of Diversity: Proposals should demonstrate substantive support of the Bureau's policy on diversity. Achievable and relevant features should be cited in both program administration (selection of participants, program venue and program evaluation) and program content (orientation and wrap-up sessions, program meetings, resource materials and follow-up activities). Applicants should refer to the Bureau's Diversity, Freedom and Democracy Guidelines in the Proposal Submission Instructions

(PSI)and the Diversity, Freedom and Democracy Guidelines section, Item IV.3d.2, above for additional guidance. 5. Post-Grant Activities: Applicants should provide a plan to conduct activities after the Bureau-funded project has concluded in order to ensure that Bureau-supported programs are not isolated events. Funds for all post-grant activities must be in the form of contributions from the applicant or sources outside of the Bureau. Costs for these activities must not appear in the proposal budget, but should be outlined in the narrative. 6. Program Monitoring and Evaluation: Proposals should include a detailed plan to monitor and evaluate the program. Program objectives should target clearly defined results in quantitative terms. Competitive evaluation plans will describe how applicant organizations would measure these results, and proposals should include draft data collection instruments (surveys, questionnaires, etc) in Tab E. Successful applicants (grantee institutions) will be expected to submit a report after each program component concludes or on a quarterly basis, whichever is less frequent. The Bureau also requires that grantee institutions submit a final narrative and financial report no more than 90 days after the expiration of a grant. VI. Award Administration Information VI.1a. Award Notices: Final awards cannot be made until funds have been appropriated by Congress, allocated and committed through internal Bureau procedures. Successful applicants will receive an Assistance Award Document

(AAD)from the Bureau's Grants Office. The AAD and the original grant proposal with subsequent modifications (if applicable) shall be the only binding authorizing document between the recipient and the U.S. Government. The AAD will be signed by an authorized Grants Officer, and mailed to the recipient's responsible officer identified in the application. Unsuccessful applicants will receive notification of the results of the application review from the ECA program office coordinating this competition. *For assistance awards involving the Palestinian Authority:* All awards made under this competition must be executed according to all relevant laws and policies regarding assistance to the Palestinian Authority, and to the West Bank and Gaza. Recipients must consult with the Public Affairs Section in Jerusalem prior to submission of proposal. Note: To assure that planning for the inclusion of the Palestinian Authority complies with requirements, please contact Thomas Johnston, Tel.

(202)453-8162; e-mail: *JohnstonTJ@state.gov* for additional information. VI.2. Administrative and National Policy Requirements Terms and Conditions for the Administration of ECA agreements include the following: Office of Management and Budget Circular A-122, “Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations.” Office of Management and Budget Circular A-21, “Cost Principles for Educational Institutions.” OMB Circular A-87, “Cost Principles for State, Local and Indian Governments”. OMB Circular No. A-110 (Revised), Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements with Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and other Nonprofit Organizations. OMB Circular No. A-102, Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Governments. OMB Circular No. A-133, Audits of States, Local Government, and Non-profit Organizations. Please reference the following Web sites for additional information: *http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/grants. http://exchanges.state.gov/education/grantsdiv/terms.htm#articleI. * VI.3. Reporting Requirements You must provide ECA with a hard copy original plus one electronic copy of the following reports: 1. Quarterly program and financial reports for the duration of the program. 2. A final program and financial report no more than 90 days after the expiration of the award. Grantees will be required to provide reports analyzing their evaluation findings to the Bureau in their regular program reports. (Please refer to IV. Application and Submission Instructions (IV.3.d.3) above for Program Monitoring and Evaluation information. All data collected, including survey responses and contact information, must be maintained for a minimum of three years and provided to the Bureau upon request. All reports must be sent to the ECA Grants Officer and ECA Program Officer listed in the final assistance award document. VI.4. Optional Program Data Requirements Organizations awarded grants will be required to maintain specific data on program participants and activities in an electronically accessible database format that can be shared with the Bureau as required. As a minimum, the data must include the following:

(1)Name, address, contact information and biographic sketch of all persons who travel internationally on funds provided by the grant or who benefit from the grant funding but do not travel.

(2)Itineraries of international and domestic travel, providing dates of travel and cities in which any exchange experiences take place. Final schedules for in-country and U.S. activities must be received by the ECA Program Officer at least three weeks prior to the official opening of the activity. VII. Agency Contacts For questions about this announcement, contact: Brent Beemer, Office of Citizen Exchanges, ECA/PE/C, Room 220, ECA/PE/C-08-01, U.S. Department of State, SA-44, 301 4th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20547, 202-453-8147; *BeemerBT@state.gov.* All correspondence with the Bureau concerning this RFGP should reference the above title and number ECA/PE/C-08-01. Please read the complete announcement before sending inquiries or submitting proposals. Once the RFGP deadline has passed, Bureau staff may not discuss this competition with applicants until the proposal review process has been completed. VIII. Other Information Notice The terms and conditions published in this RFGP are binding and may not be modified by any Bureau representative. Explanatory information provided by the Bureau that contradicts published language will not be binding. Issuance of the RFGP does not constitute an award commitment on the part of the Government. The Bureau reserves the right to reduce, revise, or increase proposal budgets in accordance with the needs of the program and the availability of funds. Awards made will be subject to periodic reporting and evaluation requirements per section VI.3 above. Dated: November 13, 2007. C. Miller Crouch, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State. [FR Doc. E7-22659 Filed 11-19-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4710-05-P SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMMISSION Notice of Public Hearing and Commission Meeting AGENCY: Susquehanna River Basin Commission. ACTION: Notice of Public Hearing and Commission Meeting. SUMMARY: The Susquehanna River Basin Commission will hold a public hearing as part of its regular business meeting beginning at 1:30 p.m. on December 5, 2007 in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. At the public hearing, the Commission will consider:

(1)The approval of certain water resources projects,

(2)enforcement actions involving three projects,

(3)consideration of a request for an administrative hearing,

(4)extension of two emergency water withdrawal certificates, and

(5)revision of the Commission's current project fee schedule. Details concerning the matters to be addressed at the public hearing and business meeting are contained in the Supplementary Information section of this notice. DATES: December 5, 2007. ADDRESSES: Woods Conference Room, Alumni Sports and Fitness Complex, Franklin & Marshall College, 929 Harrisburg Pike, Lancaster, Pa. See Supplementary Information section for mailing and electronic mailing addresses for submission of written comments. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard A. Cairo, General Counsel, telephone:

(717)238-0423; ext. 306; fax:

(717)238-2436; e-mail: *rcairo@srbc.net* or Deborah J. Dickey, Secretary to the Commission, telephone:

(717)238-0423, ext. 301; fax:

(717)238-2436; e-mail: *ddickey@srbc.net.* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In addition to the public hearing and its related action items identified below, the business meeting also includes the following items on the agenda:

(1)Special recognitions for Pennsylvania Senator Noah Wenger and New York Alternate Commissioner Scott Foti,

(2)a report on the present hydrologic conditions of the basin,

(3)adoption of a final rulemaking for agricultural consumptive water use,

(4)approval of certain low flow augmentation for agricultural consumptive use mitigation,

(5)revision of aquifer test standards,

(6)approval of the FY-07 independent audit, and

(7)various contract and grant approvals. Public Hearing—Projects Scheduled for Action 1. *Project Sponsor and Facility:* Village of Waverly (Well 4), Tioga County, N.Y. Modification of groundwater approval (Docket No. 20030207). 2. *Project Sponsor and Facility:* Snow Mountain LLC, Scranton City, Lackawanna County, Pa. Application to transfer approvals for surface water withdrawal of 7.300 mgd and consumptive water use of up to 1.600 mgd (Docket No. 20030405). 3. *Project Sponsor:* Graymont

(PA)Inc. Project Facility: Pleasant Gap Facility, Spring Township, Centre County, Pa. Modification of consumptive water use approval (Docket No. 20050306). 4. *Project Sponsor:* Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Project Facility: Pleasant Gap Facility, Spring Township, Centre County, Pa. Modification of consumptive water use approval (Docket No. 20050307). 5. *Project Sponsor:* Parkwood Resources, Inc. Project Facility: Cherry Tree Mine, Burnside Township, Indiana and Clearfield Counties, Pa. Application for consumptive water use of up to 0.225 mgd. 6. *Project Sponsor and Facility:* Mountainview Thoroughbred Racing Association, Inc., East Hanover Township, Dauphin County, Pa. Modification of consumptive water use approval (Docket No. 20020819). 7. *Project Sponsor and Facility:* King Drive Corp., Middle Paxton Township, Dauphin County, Pa. Modification of consumptive water use approval (Docket No. 20020615). 8. *Project Sponsor and Facility:* York Plant Holding LLC, Springettsbury Township, York County, Pa. Application for consumptive water use of up to 0.575 mgd. Public Hearing—Projects Scheduled for Enforcement Actions 1. *Project Sponsor and Facility:* Cooperstown Dreams Park, Inc. (Docket No. 20060602), Town of Hartwick, Otsego County, N.Y. 2. *Project Sponsor:* Sand Springs Development Corp. (Docket No. 20030406). Project Facility: Sand Springs Golf Community, Butler Township, Luzerne County, Pa. 3. *Project Sponsor and Facility:* BC Natural Chicken, LLC (Docket No. 20040305), Bethel Township, Lebanon County, Pa. Public Hearing—Request for Administrative Hearing 1. Project Sponsor: PPL Susquehanna, LLC. *Project Facility:* Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Salem Township, Luzerne County, Pa. (Docket No. 19950301). Public Hearing—Extension of Emergency Water Withdrawal Certificates 1. Project Sponsor and Facility: City of Lock Haven, Wayne Township, Clinton County, Pa. 2. Project Sponsor and Facility: Houtzdale Municipal Authority (Docket No. 19950101), Rush Township, Centre County, Pa. Public Hearing—Fee Schedule Revision Revise the project fee schedule to include escalations for the Consumer Price Index and the addition of a fee category for withdrawals less than 100,000 gpd. Opportunity To Appear and Comment Interested parties may appear at the above hearing to offer written or oral comments to the Commission on any matter on the hearing agenda, or at the business meeting to offer written or oral comments on other matters scheduled for consideration at the business meeting. The chair of the Commission reserves the right to limit oral statements in the interest of time and to otherwise control the course of the hearing and business meeting. Written comments may also be mailed to the Susquehanna River Basin Commission, 1721 North Front Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102-2391, or submitted electronically to Richard A. Cairo, General Counsel, e-mail: *rcairo@srbc.net* or Deborah J. Dickey, Secretary to the Commission, e-mail: *ddickey@srbc.net.* Comments mailed or electronically submitted must be received prior to December 5, 2007 to be considered. Authority: Public Law 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 *et seq.* , 18 CFR parts 806, 807, and 808. Dated: November 9, 2007. Thomas W. Beauduy, Deputy Director. [FR Doc. E7-22648 Filed 11-19-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7040-01-P TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, as Amended by Public Law 104-13; Proposed Collection, Comment Request AGENCY: Tennessee Valley Authority. ACTION: Proposed collection; comment request. SUMMARY: The proposed information collection described below will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB)for review, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35, as amended). The Tennessee Valley Authority is soliciting public comments on this proposed collection as provided by 5 CFR 1320.8(d)(1). Requests for information, including copies of the information collection proposed and supporting documentation, should be directed to the Agency Clearance Officer: Alice D. Witt, Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street (EB 5B), Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801;

(423)751-6832. (SC: 000YRFB). Comments should be sent to the Agency Clearance Officer no later than *January 22, 2008.* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: *Type of Request:* Regular submission; proposal to extend without revision a currently approved collection of information (OMB control number 3316-0016). *Title of Information Collection:* Farmer Questionnaire-Vicinity of Nuclear Power Plants. *Frequency of Use:* On occasion. *Type of Affected Public:* Individuals or households, and farms. *Small Businesses or Organizations Affected:* No. *Federal Budget Functional Category Code:* 271. *Estimated Number of Annual Responses:* 300. *Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours:* 150. *Estimated Average Burden Hours Per Response:* .5. *Need for and Use of Information:* This survey is used to locate, for monitoring purposes, rural residents, home gardens, and milk animals within a five mile radius of a nuclear power plant. The monitoring program is a mandatory requirement of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission set out in the technical specifications when the plants were licensed. Steven A. Anderson, Senior Manager, IT Planning & Governance, Information Services. [FR Doc. E7-22604 Filed 11-19-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8120-08-P 72 223 Tuesday, November 20, 2007 CORRECTIONS Ben DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security 15 CFR Part 774 [Docket No. 070105004-7050-01] RIN 0694 AD95 December 2006 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary Agreement Implementation: Categories 1, 2, 3, 5 Part I, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Commerce Control List; Wassenaar Reporting Requirements; Definitions; and Statement of Understanding on Source Code Correction In rule document E7-21247 beginning on page 62524 in the issue of Monday, November 5, 2007, make the following corrections: PART 774—[CORRECTED] 1. On page 62545, in Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List), Category 6 Sensors, Export Control Classification Number

(ECCN)6A005, in the second column, in paragraph b.6.a., in the first line, “μs” should read “ns”. 2. On page 62547, in Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List), Category 6 Sensors, Export Control Classification Number

(ECCN)6A995, in the second column, the second occurrence of paragraph “d.1.a.” should read “d.1.a..1.”. 3. On the same page, in the same Supplement, in the same Category, in the same ECCN, in the same column, paragraph “d.1.a.2.1.” should read, “d.1.a..2.”. [FR Doc. Z7-21247 Filed 11-19-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 1505-01-D 72 223 Tuesday, November 20, 2007 Rules and Regulations Part II Department of Homeland Security 6 CFR Part 27 Appendix to Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards; Final Rule DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 6 CFR Part 27 [DHS-2006-0073] RIN 1601-AA41 Appendix to Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards AGENCY: Department of Homeland Security. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: This final rule revises the list of chemicals of interest, or COI, which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the Department) included as Appendix A to the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Interim Final Rule. Appendix A lists chemicals of interest and screening threshold quantities, or STQs. Any facility that possesses (or later comes into possession of) the listed chemicals in quantities that meet or exceed the STQ for any applicable security issue must complete and submit a Top-Screen. This will assist the Department in determining whether a facility presents a high level of security risk. In this final rule, DHS, among other things:

(i)Adjusts the STQs for certain COI;

(ii)defines the specific security issue or issues implicated by each chemical of interest, and in some cases, establishes different STQs for COI based upon the security issue presented; and

(iii)adds provisions that instruct facilities on how to calculate the quantities of COI that they have in their possession. These refinements to Appendix A will assist the Department in more precisely identifying facilities that may be designated as high risk, while reducing the burden on facilities that possess chemicals in smaller amounts. EFFECTIVE DATES: The effective date of Appendix A to part 27, as added on April 9, 2007 (72 FR 17688) and revised by this rule is November 20, 2007. Additionally, the regulations published in this document are effective November 20, 2007. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the rule is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of November 20, 2007. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marybeth Kelliher, Chemical Security Compliance Division, Department of Homeland Security, 703-235-5263. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Note that for brevity, all references to CFR parts will be to parts in Title 6 of the Code of Federal Regulations (6 CFR), unless otherwise noted. Table of Contents I. Background II. The Final Rule: The Revised List of Chemicals A. Overall Approach to Appendix A B. Effect of a Final Appendix A C. Provisions by Security Issue 1. Release-Toxics and Release-Flammables 2. Release-Explosives 3. Theft/Diversion-Chemical Weapons/Chemical Weapons Precursors 4. Theft/Diversion-Weapons of Mass Effect 5. Theft/Diversion-Explosives/Improvised Explosive Device Precursors 6. Sabotage/Contamination D. Chemicals With a Specialized Approach 1. Propane 2. Chlorine 3. Ammonium Nitrate E. Technical Corrections III. Discussion of Comments A. Specific Chemicals or Types of Chemicals 1. In General 2. Propane 3. Chlorine 4. Ammonium Nitrate 5. Acetone and Urea 6. Chemical Weapons and Chemical Weapons Precursors 7. Explosives 8. Hydrogen Peroxide B. Coverage of Appendix A 1. Colleges and Universities 2. Medical Research Organizations and Similar Laboratories 3. Farms and the Agricultural Industry; Fumigation Industry 4. Overlap With Other Federal Entities 5. Concerns About Being Over-Inclusive C. Screening Threshold Quantities 1. In General 2. Modifying the “Any Amount” STQ 3. Mixtures and Solutions D. Revisions to the COI List 1. Technical Corrections 2. Formatting and Approach E. Other Comments 1. Procedural Issues 2. Compliance Issues 3. Miscellaneous Comments IV. Regulatory Analyses A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Abbreviations and Terms Used in This Document ACG—A Commercial Grade AN—Ammonium Nitrate APA—A Placarded Amount ASP—Alternative Security Program CAS—Chemical Abstract Service CGA—Compressed Gas Association COI—Chemicals of Interest CSAC—Chemical Security Analysis Center CSAT—Chemical Security Assessment Tool CUM 100g—Cumulative STQ of 100 grams for Designated Chemical Weapons CVI—Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information CW—Chemical Weapons CWC—Chemical Weapons Convention CWP—Chemical Weapons Precursors DOT—U.S. Department of Transportation EPA—Environmental Protection Agency EXP—Explosives FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigation IED—Improvised Explosive Device IEDP—Improvised Explosive Device Precursors LNG—Liquefied Natural Gas NFPA—National Fire Protection Association NOS—Not Otherwise Specified NPGA—National Propane Gas Association RMP—EPA's Risk Management Program SVA—Security Vulnerability Assessment SSP—Site Security Plan STQ—Screening Threshold Quantity TQ—Threshold Quantity TSA—Transportation Security Administration VBIED—Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device WME—Weapon of Mass Effect I. Background On October 4, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 (the Act), which provided the Department of Homeland Security with the authority to regulate the security of high risk chemical facilities. *See* Pub. L. 109-295, § 550. Section 550 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to promulgate interim final regulations “establishing risk-based performance standards for security of chemical facilities” by April 4, 2007 and specified that the regulations “shall apply to chemical facilities that, in the discretion of the Secretary, present high levels of security risk.” *Id* . Pursuant to Section 550, on December 28, 2006, the Department issued an Advance Notice of Rulemaking (Advance Notice), which discussed a range of regulatory and implementation issues. *See* 71 FR 78276. By directing the Secretary to issue “interim final regulations,” Congress authorized the Secretary to proceed without the traditional notice and comment required by the Administrative Procedure Act. *See* 71 FR 78276, 78277. The Department, however, saw great benefit in soliciting comments on as much of the program as was practicable in the short timeframe permitted under the statute and therefore voluntarily sought comment on the Advance Notice, including a range of significant programmatic issues and regulatory text. On April 9, 2007, the Department issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR), which responded to the comments to the Advance Notice and established a new part 27 to Title 6 of the Code of Federal Regulations. *See* 72 FR 17688. Part 27 establishes risk-based performance standards for the security of our Nation's chemical facilities. The rule requires covered chemical facilities to prepare Security Vulnerability Assessments

(SVAs)that identify facility security vulnerabilities. The rule also requires covered chemical facilities to develop and implement Site Security Plans

(SSPs)that identify measures that satisfy the identified risk-based performance standards. It also allows certain covered chemical facilities, in specified circumstances, to submit Alternate Security Programs

(ASPs)in lieu of an SVA, SSP, or both. In addition, the rule contains associated provisions addressing inspections and audits, recordkeeping, and the protection of information that constitutes Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI). Finally, the rule provides the Department with authority to compel compliance through the issuance of orders, including orders assessing civil penalties and orders to cease operations. The IFR, except for Appendix A to part 27, went into effect on June 8, 2007. Appendix A contained a tentative list of Chemicals of Interest (COI). DHS accepted comments on the tentative list of chemicals in Appendix A (hereafter referred to as proposed Appendix A or proposed appendix) for 30 days until May 9, 2007. With this final rule, the Department responds to those comments and provides a final list of Chemicals of Interest in Appendix A. The same principles that guided the Department during the development of the proposed list have guided the Department during the development of this revised list, and those main principles are summarized here. First, DHS did not use any single, existing list as its sole source or classify all chemicals on any existing list in a particular way. Instead, DHS used multiple sources, so that it could obtain a more complete picture of the universe of facilities that may qualify as high risk. Second, in identifying the chemicals and STQs for chemicals, the Department sought to strike an appropriate balance: Sufficiently inclusive of chemicals in quantities that might present a high level of risk under the statute without being overly inclusive and thereby capturing facilities that are unlikely to present a high level of risk. Third, the Department has identified chemicals by considering security issue(s) associated with a chemical. The Department has identified the COI for preliminary screening based on the belief that these chemicals, if released, stolen or diverted, and/or contaminated, have the potential to create significant human life and/or health consequences. II. The Final Rule: The Revised List of Chemicals A. Overall Approach to Appendix A While the universe of chemicals in Appendix A has remained substantially the same, the Department has re-structured the format of the appendix and has more clearly defined the provisions associated with these chemicals. The Department has included a considerable amount of additional information in the appendix as well as some new provisions to the regulatory text. The changes that the Department has made have come directly from comments or otherwise logically resulted from comments where DHS agreed that the comments raised valid points and were within the scope of the proposed appendix. The proposed appendix listed only a chemical and a corresponding Chemical Abstract Service

(CAS)number, 1 however the final appendix includes that information as well as a new column with commonly-used synonyms for certain chemicals. The final appendix also adds several new columns that identify the security issue(s) associated with each chemical of interest (COI). 2 In addition, the Department has assigned an STQ and minimum concentration provision to each chemical of interest. The final appendix, unlike the proposed appendix, does not trigger reporting obligations based on possession of an STQ of “any amount.” 3 1 CAS numbers are unique identifiers for chemical substances. 2 The Department has added definitions for Chemical of Interest

(COI)and Security Issue to § 27.105 “Definitions.” 3 *See* footnote 64. In the final appendix, the Department has listed the security issue(s) associated with each chemical of interest. Although these same security issues drove the Department's selection of chemicals for inclusion in the proposed appendix, the Department did not list (in the proposed appendix) the security issue(s) for each particular chemical. This additional information provides guidance to regulated entities, so that they better understand how to use the appendix, and it explains the Department's rationale(s) for including these chemicals, at these STQs, on the list. The seven columns on the far right of the appendix contain the chemical facility security issues that the Department has identified for this appendix. There are three main categories of security issues: Release, theft/diversion, and sabotage/contamination. 4 Two categories have three subcategories each. The “release” category has three subcategories:

(1)Release-Toxic: Chemicals with the potential to create a toxic cloud that would affect populations within and beyond the facility, if intentionally released;

(2)Release-Flammables: chemicals with the potential to create a vapor cloud explosion that would affect populations within and beyond the facility, if intentionally released; and

(3)Release-Explosives: chemicals with the potential to affect populations within and beyond the facility if intentionally detonated. The “theft and diversion” category also has three subcategories:

(1)Theft/Diversion-Chemical Weapons (CW)/Chemical Weapons Precursors (CWP): chemicals that could be stolen or diverted and used as CW or easily converted into CW;

(2)Theft/Diversion-Weapons of Mass Effect (WME): chemicals that could be stolen or diverted and used directly as WME; and

(3)Theft/Diversion-Explosives (EXP)/Improvised Explosive Device Precursors (IEDP): chemicals that could be stolen or diverted and used in explosives or IEDs. The third category, “sabotage/contamination,” refers to those chemicals that, if mixed with other readily-available materials, have the potential to create significant adverse consequences for human life or health. 4 As noted in the IFR and consistent with the definition of “security issue” in § 27.105, the Department recognizes one additional security issue—critical to government mission and national economy. (DHS has added a definition of security issue in this final rule at § 27.105.) The loss or interruption in production of certain chemicals, materials, or facilities could create significant adverse consequences for national security, the national or regional economy, and/or the ability of the government to deliver essential services. The Department plans to assess currently-available information and to collect new information (e.g., through the Top-Screen process) as a means of identifying facilities responsible for these types of chemicals. At this time, DHS is not including any chemicals in the appendix based on this security issue, though it may do so in the future. The Department has established baseline STQs for the chemicals of interest for each security issue. (DHS discusses the baselines in this preamble and also summarizes the general rules in Table 1: “Summary of General Rules by Security Issue” at the end of this section). DHS has set the STQ for each chemical of interest at the baseline amount for that chemical's security issue(s). Where necessary, the Department has identified a few exceptions. Most notably, DHS has developed a specialized approach for propane, chlorine, and ammonium nitrate. Each chemical in Appendix A presents at least one security issue, and some chemicals present multiple security issues. Where there are multiple issues associated with a chemical, a facility must complete and submit a Top-Screen if it meets or exceeds the STQ for any of the applicable security issues. For example, there are two security issues associated with arsenic trichloride: release-toxic and theft/diversion-CW/CWP. In the Security Issue columns of the appendix, there is a mark in the box for release-toxic and for theft/diversion-CW/CWP, and there is a STQ (and minimum concentration) listed under the Release column and under the Theft column. If the facility meets or exceeds the STQ listed in either the Release column or the Theft column (using the appropriate calculation provisions discussed below), the facility must complete and submit a Top-Screen. The Department has revised the regulatory text in § 27.200(b)(2) and § 27.210(a)(1)(i) to reflect this change. The Department will periodically update the list of chemicals in Appendix A and will do so subject to notice and comment. The Department may add or remove chemicals, or categories of chemicals, or may change STQs based on new or additional information. In revising Appendix A, the Department has found it necessary to revise the regulatory text, clarifying how facilities should use the appendix. The Department added § 27.203, which instructs facilities on how to calculate the STQ for a given chemical and § 27.204, which addresses mixtures. In this section of the preamble, DHS discusses provisions that are general or that apply to multiple security issues. DHS discusses provisions related to specific security issues in section II(C). Section 27.203(a) provides specific exclusions from the calculation requirements that apply to chemicals of interest in all security issue categories. Facilities need not count chemicals of interest covered by these exclusions, because chemicals in such circumstances or forms are unlikely to contribute to the potential consequences of a successful attack. DHS has adopted several of these exclusions from the Environmental Protection Agency's

(EPA)Risk Management Program

(RMP)regulation. Sections 27.203(a)(1)-(5), (6), and

(8)track the EPA exemptions in 40 CFR 68.115(b)(4)(i)-(iv), 68.115(b)(3), and 68.115(b)(2)(iii), respectively. The concepts are the same, though DHS has adjusted the language to make it consistent with the language in part 27 (e.g., whereas EPA considers TQs present at a “stationary source,” DHS considers STQs at a “facility”). Note that EPA applies these exemptions to release chemicals (i.e., those which it regulates under RMP), while DHS applies these exclusions to all part 27 chemicals of interest (i.e., to all chemicals associated with the security issues of release, theft/diversion, and sabotage/contamination). DHS has formulated one other exclusion specifically for this regulation. In § 27.203(a)(7), DHS exempts chemicals of interest in solid waste (including hazardous waste) regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(RCRA)(42 U.S.C. 6901 *et seq.* ) DHS does not believe that it is necessary for facilities to count COI in RCRA-regulated solid waste toward their STQ, because the Department does not believe that this waste is a likely target of a terrorist attack or contains COI that are likely sources of terrorist uses. As stated in the regulatory text, though, this exclusion does not apply to waste covered by 40 CFR 261.33, “Discarded commercial chemical products, off-specification species, container residues, and spill residues thereof.” This type of waste can include virtually pure chemicals (including off-specification products that may merely be inconsistent with a customer's specifications) that have been discarded. DHS thinks it is important for facilities to include this waste in the STQ calculation, because this waste is a potential source of COI that would be just as attractive to a terrorist as the chemical product itself. Paragraph

(b)of § 27.203 addresses STQ calculations related to release chemicals. Section 27.203(b)(1) provides instructions concerning the substances that facilities shall include when determining whether they possess quantities of a release chemical that meet or exceed the STQ. Proposed Appendix A did not contain the instructions enumerated in § 27.203(b)(1), but further consideration and a review of the comments caused DHS to provide these instructions. Pursuant to § 27.203(b)(1)(i), facilities must include chemicals in a vessel, which, pursuant to 40 CFR 68.3, “means any reactor, tank, drum, barrel, cylinder, vat, kettle, boiler, pipe, hose, or other container.” Facilities must also include chemicals of interest stored in magazines, as defined in 27 CFR 555.11. Pursuant to that Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

(ATF)definition, a magazine is “any building or structure, other than an explosives manufacturing building used for storage of explosive materials.” In addition, facilities must include chemicals of interest in underground storage facilities. For purposes of part 27, an underground storage facility refers to a below-ground storage location for chemicals of interest or mixtures of chemicals of interest (e.g., petroleum-based materials) that are placed in the storage location (until needed) after having been extracted from the ground and refined or processed. Such facilities include, but are not limited to, depleted reservoirs in oil and/or oil gas fields, aquifers, and salt cavern formations. DHS understands that certain products (e.g., propane, natural gas, petroleum) may be stored in these underground storage facilities, and DHS wants to ensure that facilities count this material toward the amount of their COI. Pursuant to § 27.203(b)(1)(ii), facilities must count chemicals of interest in specified transportation containers toward the STQ amount for release chemicals. In using this terminology, DHS is referring to the same category of transportation containers that EPA refers to in its RMP regulation—that is, transportation containers used for storage not incident to transportation, including transportation containers connected to equipment at a facility for loading or unloading and transportation containers detached from the motive power that delivered the container to the facility. *See* 40 CFR 68.3 (containing a description of transportation containers within the definition of “stationary source”). These transportation containers would include, for example, tank cars attached to processing units and tank cars detached from motive power that had delivered the tank car to the facility. While the EPA RMP regulation at 40 CFR 68.3 does not specifically mention transportation containers detached from the motive power, EPA discusses such provision in its Final Rule titled “List of Regulated Substances and Thresholds for Accidental Release Prevention; Amendments” 5 and in its Frequently Asked Questions on the EPA Web site. 6 Part 27 (like EPA's RMP regulation) does not require facilities to include chemicals of interest in transportation when calculating their STQs. DHS adopts the EPA definition of transportation, and accordingly considers a container to be in transportation as long as it is attached to the motive power (e.g., truck or locomotive) that delivered it to the site. If the tank car is detached from the motive power, and therefore no longer in transportation, the facility must consider the contents of the tank car in calculating its STQ. 5 *See* 63 FR 640 (January 6, 1998). 6 *See* FAQ II.C.2 on the EPA Web site at *http://yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/content/caa-faqs.htm.* Pursuant to § 27.203(b)(1)(iii), facilities must also include chemicals of interest that are present as process intermediates, by-products, and incidental production materials. This means, for example, that a refinery must count toward the STQ for hydrogen sulfide the quantity of hydrogen sulfide produced as a by-product of any of its various processes. Or a facility should count toward the STQ for 37% hydrochloric acid the quantity of 37% hydrochloric acid produced from the absorption of hydrogen chloride gas into water and stored temporarily prior to subsequent dilution below the threshold concentration. DHS requires the inclusion of these items in calculating the STQ, because while they may not be present at all times, when present, they could be released and contribute to the consequences of an attack. The remaining two subsections in § 27.203(b)(1) are items that EPA exempted, but which DHS believes are important to include in this regulatory program; they have the potential to create a significant offsite impact in the event of a successful attack. First, when calculating the amount of a chemical of interest, facilities must include chemicals in natural gas or liquefied natural gas

(LNG)stored in “peak shaving facilities.” *See* § 27.203(b)(1)(iv). Companies typically store natural gas or LNG in peak shaving facilities when demand for product is low or slows. The natural gas or LNG is stored until it is used later during peak consumption periods. EPA excludes the chemicals in these peak shaving facilities by virtue of the fact that EPA considers them storage incident to transportation, and EPA does not subject that type of storage to its RMP regulation. 7 Within DHS, TSA is the lead agency for the security of pipeline transportation and of transportation-related facilities; however, such facilities (e.g., peak shaving facilities) may be required to provide information under part 27. TSA and the Chemical Security Compliance Division will work together to ensure that DHS efforts directed at pipelines are complementary. 7 Under the RMP rule, EPA considers there to be a threshold quantity of a substance if it is present at a stationary source. 40 CFR 68.115(a). “The term stationary source does not apply to transportation, including storage incident to transportation, of any regulated substance * * *.” 40 CFR 68.3. EPA “considers the transportation exemption to include storage fields for natural gas where gas taken from pipelines is stored during non-peak periods, to be returned to the pipelines when needed.” 63 FR 640, 642 (Jan. 6, 1998). Because EPA considers this type of storage incident to transportation, the type of storage is not subject to EPA's RMP rule. Second, facilities must also include chemicals of interest in fuels when stored in above-ground tank farms, including tank farms that are part of pipeline systems. *See* § 27.203(b)(1)(v). This includes fuels with any one of the four National Fire Protection Association

(NFPA)flammability hazard ratings and not just fuels with an NFPA flammability hazard rating of 4. EPA excludes these fuels by virtue of the provisions in its mixtures rule for regulated flammable substances. *See* 40 CFR 68.115(b)(2). These fuels also would have been excluded under DHS's flammable mixtures provisions ( *see* § 27.204(a)(2) 8 ) except that DHS specifically included these fuels through this provision here in § 27.203(b)(1)(v), because of concern that they could create significant human life or health consequences if an intentional attack by a terrorist were successful. 8 Section 27.204(a)(2) provides that “except as provided in § 27.203(b)(1)(v) for fuels that are stored in aboveground tank farms (including farms that are part of pipeline systems), if a release-flammable chemical of interest is present in a mixture in a concentration equal to or greater than one percent (1%), and the mixture has a National Fire Protection Association

(NFPA)flammability hazard rating of 1, 2, or 3, the facility shall count the entire weight of the mixture toward the STQ.” Without the “exception” clause, DHS would have excluded these fuels by virtue of the fact that these fuels are mixtures that likely have NFPA flammability hazard ratings of 1, 2, and 3. Pursuant to § 27.204(a)(2), facilities need not count the entire amount of these mixtures (i.e., mixtures with COI present in a concentration equal to or greater than one percent (1%) and with a flammability hazard rating of 1, 2, or 3) toward the STQ. In § 27.203(c), DHS provides that facilities shall only count theft/diversion chemicals of interest that are in a transportation packaging. DHS has adopted the Department of Transportation

(DOT)definition of packaging, which refers to “a receptacle and any other components or materials necessary for the receptacle to perform its containment function in conformance with the minimum packing requirements of [DOT's Hazardous Materials Regulations].” *See* 49 CFR 171.8. This includes, but is not limited to, cylinders, bulk bags, bottles inside or outside of a box, cargo tanks, and tank cars. DHS has focused the universe of theft/diversion chemicals of interest in this fashion, because the theft/diversion security issue revolves around portable and transportable amounts of certain chemicals. DHS is concerned about both the theft of portable amounts of these chemicals and the diversion of shipments of these chemicals. The Department has also added § 27.204, which addresses mixtures. It provides a minimum concentration provision for each security issue. The Department included this provision in response to commenters, who requested guidance on how to treat mixtures of chemicals of interest. *See* § 27.204. A facility must count toward the STQ for a given chemical all quantities of that chemical that meet or exceed the listed minimum concentration amount. These minimum concentration provisions are derived from existing federal regulatory programs (including EPA's RMP program and the Department of Commerce's Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)) Regulations, as well as from industry technical standards ( *see, e.g.* , Standard for Classification of Toxic Gas Mixtures, CGA P-20-2003). The specific minimum concentration provision for each security issue is discussed in the sections below. In calculating chemical amounts, facilities should consider the chemicals in their possession within the framework for each of the three separate and distinct security issues categories (release, theft/diversion, and sabotage/contamination). A facility must count each chemical of interest in its possession, using the relevant calculation provisions for each of the categories, and if the facility possesses an amount that meets or exceeds the STQ for any one of the categories (i.e., security issues), the facility must complete and submit a Top-Screen. To illustrate that point, the Department highlights sulfur dioxide, which is both a release-toxic (STQ: 5,000 pounds) and theft/diversion-WME (STQ: 500 pounds). —Toward the release STQ of 5,000 pounds, a facility must count all quantities of sulfur dioxide in vessels and underground storage facilities; in transportation containers used for storage not incident to transportation, including storage containers connected to equipment at a facility for loading or unloading and storage containers detached from the motive power that delivered the container to the facility; and present as process intermediates, by-products, and material produced incidental to the production of a product if they exist at any given time. —Toward the theft/diversion-WME STQ of 500 pounds, a facility must count all quantities of sulfur dioxide in a transportation packaging. If the facility has 5,000 pounds or more of sulfur dioxide aggregated onsite in vessel(s), transportation packaging(s), etc. or 500 pounds or more of sulfur dioxide in transportation packagings (or both), the facility must complete and submit a Top-Screen. Facilities must consider each security issue framework independently. As a result, there may be chemicals of interest that a facility counts under more than one security issue framework. That is completely appropriate, as there is a different focus (and therefore distinct counting and mixtures rules) for each security issue. For example, with respect to sulfur dioxide, a facility will count toward its release STQ quantities of sulfur dioxide in a tank car when that tank car is connected to equipment at the facility for loading and unloading and when that tank car is detached from the motive power that delivered it to the facility ( *see* § 27.203(b)(1)(ii)) and it will count toward its theft/diversion-WME STQ quantities of sulfur dioxide in tank cars ( *see* § 27.203(c)). Under both frameworks (release and theft), the facility may, in fact, count the same sulfur dioxide. As there are separate purposes for each framework, however, this is appropriate. The theft-STQ is focused on preventing someone from stealing or diverting the shipment of sulfur dioxide in the tank car and weaponizing it. The release-STQ is focused on preventing someone from intentionally releasing a quantity of sulfur dioxide that could affect the population within and beyond the facility. 9 Specialized STQs apply to ammonium nitrate, chlorine, and propane. Table 1.—Summary of General Rules by Security Issue Security issue STQ 9 COI to exclude COI to include Minimum concentration Release—Toxic 500-20,000 lbs 27.203(a) 27.203(b)(2) 27.203(b)(1) 27.204(a)(1) 27.204(a)(1) Release—Flammable 10,000 lbs 27.203(a) 27.203(b)(2) 27.203(b)(3) 27.203(b)(1) 27.204(a)(2) 27.204(a)(2) Release—Explosive 5,000 lbs 27.203(a) 27.203(b)(1) 27.204(a)(3) Theft/Diversion—CW/CWP CUM 100 grams-220 lbs 27.203(a) 27.203(c) 27.204(b)(1) Theft/Diversion—WME 15-500 lbs 27.203(a) 27.203(c) 27.204(b)(2) Theft/Diversion—EXP/IEDP 100-400 lbs 27.203(a) 27.203(c) 27.204(b)(3) Sabotage/Contamination A Placarded Amount 27.203(a) 27.203(d) 27.204(c) B. Effect of a Final Appendix A Under Section 550, the Department has the authority to use its best judgment and all available information in determining whether a facility presents a high level of security risk. Appendix A will assist the Department in determining which facilities present a high level of security risk. In Appendix A, the Department has identified chemicals of interest (at specified STQs) that trigger preliminary screening requirements. If a facility possesses a chemical of interest at or above the STQ for any applicable security issue, the facility must complete and submit a Chemical Security Assessment Tool

(CSAT)Top-Screen. The STQ is not the threshold for establishing whether a given facility is a high risk facility, but it is a threshold for determining whether the facility must complete and submit a Top-Screen. Only after the Department gathers additional information through the Top-Screen process will the Department make a determination 10 as to whether a facility presents a high level of security risk and therefore must comply with the substantive requirements in part 27. Accordingly, the presence or amount of a particular chemical is not the sole factor in determining whether a facility presents a high level of security risk; it is not the only indicator of a facility's coverage under part 27. 10 Based on the information the Department receives in accordance with § 27.200 and § 27.205 (including information submitted through the Top-Screen), the Department makes a preliminary determination as to a facility's placement in a risk-based tier. *See* § 27.220(a). Following review of a covered facility's Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA), the Department makes a final determination as to a facility's placement in a risk-based tier. *See* § 27.220(b). Sections 27.200(b)(2) and 27.210 contain the requirements related to Appendix A, and those requirements are fully operative upon publication of this final rule in the **Federal Register** . Section 27.200(b)(2) requires facilities to complete and submit a Top-Screen if they possess any of the chemicals identified in Appendix A at or above the STQ for any applicable security issue. If a facility possesses even one of the chemicals of interest listed in Appendix A at or above the applicable STQ, the facility has an obligation to complete and submit a Top-Screen. Section 27.210(a)(1)(i) provides the initial submissions schedule for facilities that have to submit a Top-Screen pursuant to Appendix A. Pursuant to § 27.210(a), the Department uses two methods to require facilities to undergo preliminary screening (i.e., complete and submit a Top-Screen). The first method, found in § 27.210(a)(1)(i), is linked to Appendix A. From the effective date of a final Appendix A (i.e., this final rule), facilities that possess any of the chemicals listed in Appendix A at or above the STQ for any applicable security issue will have 60 calendar days to complete and submit a Top-Screen to DHS. Facilities that later come into possession of such chemicals at or above the STQ for any applicable security issue will have to complete and submit a Top-Screen within 60 calendar days of coming into possession of such chemicals. *See* § 27.210(a)(1)(i). In addition, covered facilities 11 have an ongoing obligation to complete and update the Top-Screen as provided in § 27.210(d). Covered facilities that make material modifications to their operations or site must complete and submit a revised Top-Screen within 60 days of the material modification. *See* § 27.210(d). 11 As used herein, a “covered facility” (or “covered chemical facility”), means “a chemical facility determined by the Assistant Secretary to present high levels of security risk. * * *” and differs from a “chemical facility” (or “facility”), which refers to “any establishment that possesses or plans to possess, at any relevant point in time, a quantity of a chemical substance determined by the Secretary to be potentially dangerous or that meets other risk-related criteria identified by the Department.” *See* § 27.105. Although DHS will require many *facilities* to complete and submit a Top-Screen, DHS will only require *covered facilities* to develop a chemical facility security program (i.e., complete a SVA pursuant to § 27.215, develop and implement a SSP pursuant to § 27.225, etc.). The second method, found in § 27.210(a)(1)(ii), allows the Department to contact facilities independently of Appendix A. Facilities must complete and submit a Top-Screen if the Department notifies the facility to do so through a **Federal Register** notice or on an individual basis through written notification. The Department may choose to contact facilities in this manner based on new or additional information or based on intelligence information about terrorists' interest in certain chemicals or certain facilities. The Department will specify the time frame for these Top-Screen submissions in the written notification. Since the effective date of the IFR, the Department has used the second method (i.e., contacting certain facilities individually and directing them to complete the Top-Screen). With the publication of this final rule, both triggering requirements for completing the Top-Screen will be in effect. C. Provisions by Security Issue 1. Release-Toxics and Release-Flammables a. Chemicals To identify the release chemicals for Appendix A, the Department looked to the list of substances in the EPA's RMP rule. 12 *See* Tables 1 and 2 to 40 CFR § 68.130 for release-toxics and Tables 3 and 4 to 40 CFR 68.130 for release-flammables. The Department had included all of the EPA RMP substances in proposed Appendix A, 13 and aside from the exceptions noted below, continues to do so in this final appendix. For release-toxics, the Department uses the same listing criteria, including the EPA acute toxicity criteria and vapor pressure cut-off, which can be found in EPA's final rule, “List of Regulated Substances and Threshold for Accidental Release Prevention; requirements for Petitions Under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act as Amended.” *See* 59 FR 4478, 4482 (January 31, 1994). EPA includes a toxic substance on its RMP list if the substance is an acute toxic that has vapor pressure high enough that the release could result in an offsite poisonous inhalation hazard. 12 The Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401, *et seq.* ) provides that the EPA shall promulgate a list of substances that “in the case of accidental release, are known to cause or may reasonably be anticipated to cause death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or the environment.” *See* 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(3). 13 Note that some of these chemicals present not only a release issue, but present additional security issue(s) too (e.g., theft and diversion or sabotage and contamination). In this final appendix, the Department has removed three release-toxic chemicals 14 that it had included in the proposed appendix. While these three toxic chemicals appear on EPA's RMP list, they do not meet the RMP listing criteria for vapor pressure. EPA included these three chemicals in their RMP list, because Congress specifically required their inclusion pursuant to § 7412(r)(3) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 *et seq* . 15 Because these chemicals do not otherwise meet the RMP listing criteria for toxic chemicals, DHS has removed them from Appendix A. 14 The three release-toxics are: Toluene 2,4-diisocyanate; Toluene 2,6-diisocyanate; and Toluene diisocyanate (unspecified isomer). 15 In 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(3), Congress directed EPA to include toluene diisocyanate

(TDI)in its RMP list. EPA looked to the types of TDI in commercial production (i.e., those types listed on the Toxic Substances Control Act Chemical Substance Inventory) and listed the three forms noted in footnote 14. For release-flammable chemicals, DHS also uses the same listing criteria as EPA does for release-flammable chemicals. EPA, and now DHS, identifies flammable gases and volatile flammable liquids based on the flash point and boiling point criteria that the NFPA uses for its highest flammability hazard ranking (Class IA). The criteria can be found in EPA's Final List Rule. *See* 59 FR 4478, 4480 (January 31, 1994). b. STQ DHS set the STQ for release-toxics at the same amount that EPA set the Threshold Quantity

(TQ)for toxic substances under its RMP regulation. 16 That amount ranges from 500 to 20,000 pounds, depending on the toxicity and volatility of the substance. Likewise, DHS set the STQ for release-flammables at the same amount as EPA—10,000 pounds. The Department has adopted the EPA RMP TQs, because DHS accepts the same rationale that EPA used when setting its TQs—i.e., that they are amounts that, if released, have the potential to create significant human health effects. The Department realizes that, in developing these TQs, EPA collected extensive input on and conducted a thorough analysis, and DHS wants to leverage that knowledge base. 16 *See* 40 CFR part 68. Whereas the Department had proposed to set the STQs for these release chemicals at seventy-five percent of the EPA RMP TQs in the IFR, the Department has instead set these STQs at the same amount as the EPA RMP TQs. In doing so, the Department accepted the recommendation of many commenters to set the STQ for these release chemicals at, rather than below, the EPA RMP TQs. The Department realized that it did not need to reduce its STQs to a level below that of the EPA TQs, because even though DHS and EPA are seeking to satisfy two different mandates (i.e., DHS to prevent an intentional release and EPA to prevent an accidental release), DHS has made accommodations for that difference. The DHS method for calculating an STQ is more conservative than that of the EPA for TQs. Under part 27, except for the exclusions listed in § 27.203(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), a facility must aggregate the total amount of COI that it possesses at its facility, including COI that may exist in separate processes. By contrast, under EPA's RMP regulation, a facility must consider the total quantity of a regulated substance “contained in a process” that exceeds the TQ. *See* 40 CFR 68.115(a). For example, a facility that has multiple processes (involving an RMP substance), with each process below the threshold for the reportable TQ, would not be covered under RMP. That facility, however, would be covered under part 27 if the total quantity of all the processes (associated with a chemical of interest) was at or above the STQ. DHS believes that, in the case of an intentional terrorist attack, chemicals or materials would likely be released from multiple vessels rather than a single vessel. As a result, the Department believes that setting the STQ at an amount that reflects the entire inventory of the facility better captures the potential consequences of an intentional attack. The Department believes this is more appropriate than EPA's valid assumption for accidents that the worst-case release 17 would be a release from the largest vessel. 17 In 40 CFR 68.3, EPA defines “worst-case release” as “the release of the largest quantity of a regulated substance from a vessel or process line failure that results in the greatest distance to an endpoint defined in § 68.22(a).” Despite the general rule for release chemicals (i.e., that the DHS STQs are the same as the EPA TQs), there are a few differences between the EPA TQs and the DHS STQs. First, as discussed below in section II(D)(1), DHS treats propane differently than all other release-flammables. Second, the RMP TQ for toxic substances applies to all DHS release-toxics except for eleven 18 that meet the RMP listing criteria for both toxicity and flammability. EPA treats these substances as toxics in its RMP rule; however, DHS lists these substances as flammables (and sets the STQ at 10,000 pounds), because, in an intentional release, they are more likely to act like flammables and potentially create an explosive vapor cloud. 18 The eleven RMP release-toxics are: ethylene oxide, furan, hydrazine, hydrogen selenide, methyl chloride, methyl mercaptan, nickel carbonyl, peracetic acid, phosphine, propylene oxide, and tetranitromethane. In calculating whether a facility meets the STQ for release-toxic or release-flammable chemicals, the facility need not include release-toxic or release-flammable chemicals of interest that a facility manufactures, processes, or uses in a laboratory at the facility under the supervision of a technically qualified individual as defined in 40 CFR 720.3. See § 27.203(b)(2). DHS adopted this laboratory quantities exclusion, including the definition of “technically qualified individual,” from EPA. The comparable EPA laboratory quantities exemption is located in EPA's RMP regulation at 40 CFR 68.115(b)(5), and EPA's definition of “technically qualified individual” is located at 40 CFR 720.3(ee). EPA defines a “technically qualified individual” to mean “a person or persons

(1)who, because of education, training, or experience, or a combination of these factors, is capable of understanding the health and environmental risks associated with the chemical substance which is used under his or her supervision,

(2)who is responsible for enforcing appropriate methods of conducting scientific experimentation, analysis, or chemical research to minimize such risks, and

(3)who is responsible for the safety assessments and clearances related to the procurement, storage, use, and disposal of the chemical substance as may be appropriate or required within the scope of conducting a research and development activity.” Like EPA, the DHS laboratory quantities exclusion does not apply to specialty chemical production; manufacture, processing, or use of substances in pilot plant scale operations; or activities, including research and development, involving chemicals of interest conducted outside the laboratory. Facilities that engage in such activities must count those chemicals toward their STQ. DHS believes that, in a release, a lab quantity of a release chemical would not significantly contribute to the consequentiality of an attack. Moreover, under this provision, DHS believes that, where lab quantities of release chemicals are used, there are appropriate controls by virtue of the fact it is done so under the supervision of a technically qualified individual. In adding this laboratory quantity provision, DHS was responsive to the numerous commenters, including those from colleges, universities, and industrial laboratories, who requested such a provision. As noted above, DHS adopted this laboratory quantities exclusion from the EPA. DHS, however, has made one minor clarifying adjustment to the language that it adopted from EPA. In response to comments, DHS added language to § 27.203(b)(2)(i) to make explicit that activities conducted outside the laboratory may include research and development activities. A facility must count all quantities of COI involved in activities conducted outside of the laboratory (including research and development) toward its STQ. In other words, such COI would not be subject to the laboratory quantities exclusion. c. Minimum Concentration (Mixtures) Pursuant to § 27.204(a) and as noted in the “minimum concentration” entries in the appendix, the minimum concentration of a release-toxic or release-flammable chemical of interest that a facility must include when counting the amount of COI is one percent (1%) by weight. Pursuant to § 27.204(a)(1), if a release-toxic chemical is present in a mixture, and the concentration of the chemical is equal to or greater than one percent (1%) by weight, the facility shall count the amount of the chemical of interest in the mixture toward the STQ. For example, if a facility has 500 pounds of a toxic mixture containing five percent (5%) acrolein, the facility should count five percent (5%) of the weight of the mixture, or 25 pounds of acrolein, toward the STQ of 5,000 pounds. Except for oleum, if a facility can measure or estimate (and document) that the partial pressure of the regulated substance in the mixture is less than 10 mm Hg, the facility need not consider the mixture when determining the STQ. If a release-toxic chemical of interest is present in a mixture, and the concentration of the chemical is less than one percent (1%) by weight of the mixture, the facility need not count the amount of that chemical in the mixture in determining whether the facility possesses the STQ. Note that these mixture provisions track those of the EPA in its RMP regulation. *See* 40 CFR 68.115(b)(1). Pursuant to § 27.204(a)(2), if a release-flammable chemical of interest is present in a mixture in a concentration equal to or greater than one percent (1%) by weight of the mixture, and the mixture has a NFPA flammability hazard rating of 4, the facility shall count the entire weight of the mixture toward the STQ. For example, if a facility has 500 pounds of a flammable mixture containing five percent (5%) pentane and the mixture as a whole has a NFPA flammability hazard rating of 4, the facility shall count the entire weight of the mixture, or 500 pounds, toward the STQ of 10,000 pounds. If a release-flammable chemical of interest is present in a mixture in a concentration equal to or greater than one percent (1%) by weight of the mixture, and the mixture has a NFPA flammability hazard rating lower than 4 (i.e., NFPA hazard rating of 1, 2, or 3), the facility need not count the entire weight of the mixture toward the STQ. If a release-flammable chemical of interest is present in a mixture, and the concentration of the chemical is less than one percent (1%) by weight, the facility need not count the mixture in determining whether the facility possesses the STQ. Note that these mixture provisions track those of the EPA in its RMP regulation. *See* 40 CFR 68.115(b)(2). 2. Release-Explosives a. Chemicals To identify release chemicals that present an explosive hazard, DHS looked to the DOT hazardous materials regulations ( *see* 49 CFR 171-180) and the EPA's original listing rule for RMP ( *see* 59 FR 4478 (January 31, 1994)). DOT identifies explosives as one of nine classes of hazardous materials that it regulates and divides explosives (“Class 1 explosives”) into six divisions. *See* 49 CFR 173.50(b). Although DHS had included explosives from the six DOT explosives divisions in the proposed Appendix A, DHS is only including Division 1.1 explosives in this final appendix. 19 After consideration of comments and further review, DHS decided to focus on Division 1.1 explosives, which are those that have a mass explosion hazard. A mass explosion hazard is one which affects almost the entire load instantaneously. 19 As a result of that decision, DHS removed chemicals such as dinitrosobenzene, sodium dinitro-o-cresolate, sodium picramate, tetrazol-1-acetic acid, and zirconium picramate. DHS has incorporated all of the DOT Class 1, Division 1.1 explosive chemicals with only two broad exceptions. First, the Department does not include those explosive materials for which DOT uses a generic shipping name with the suffix “N.O.S.” 20 This refers to materials with generic descriptions in the Hazardous Materials Table in 49 CFR 172.101 (e.g., Substances, explosive, n.o.s.). The Department has instead identified the relevant Class 1 explosive materials as only those that DOT specifically names in its Hazardous Materials Table. Second, DHS does not include articles or devices that DOT lists in its Hazardous Material Table. Examples of those articles and devices include charges, guns, detonators, detonator assemblies, fuses, primers, cartridges, and motors. DHS does not believe, at this time, that it is necessary to include this broader universe of substances and materials. Coverage of chemical facilities that present a high level of risk and that include these materials will be triggered by other STQ provisions of this rule. If the Department finds that is not the case for a particular facility, the Department will seek information from that facility. 20 N.O.S. refers to “not otherwise specified.” DHS believes it is appropriate to include DOT Class 1, Division 1.1 explosive materials in Appendix A despite the EPA's exclusion of these materials. At the onset of the RMP program, EPA had listed DOT Division 1.1 explosives as a regulated substance. EPA set the TQ at 5,000 pounds, because the EPA believed that a blast wave from such an amount had the potential to cause offsite impacts. *See* 59 FR 4478 (January 31, 1994). EPA later issued a final rule, delisting Class 1, Division 1.1 explosives. *See* 63 FR 640 (January 6, 1998). In the final rule, EPA concluded that “current regulations and current and contemplated industry practices promote safety and accident prevention in storage, handling, transportation, and use of explosives. As a result, these regulations and practices adequately protect the public and the environment from the hazards of accidents involving explosives.” *See* 63 FR 640, 641. DHS notes that EPA's decisions were based on safety and the prevention of an accidental release. DHS is concerned with an intentional attack on an explosives facility, which has the potential to generate significant impacts for human life and health beyond the facility. Given the different focus of DHS's regulation, it is important that DHS consider DOT Class 1, Division 1.1 explosives; there is the potential for a serious off-site effect from an intentional and successful attack on a facility with these explosives. b. STQ DHS proposed an STQ of 2,000 pounds 21 for release-explosives but now sets the STQ for release-explosives at 5,000 pounds. As discussed above in relation to release-toxics and release-flammables, DHS has decided to set the STQ for release chemicals at the EPA TQs. Five thousands pounds is the TQ that EPA had used for DOT Division 1.1 explosives when the DOT Division 1.1 explosives were part of the EPA RMP program. In addition, this is the same quantity that TSA now proposes to use for DOT explosives in its Rail Transportation Security NPRM. 22 All release-explosives are also listed as theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemicals (although all theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemicals are not listed as release-explosives, because the theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP category includes both actual explosives and precursors to explosives). A facility that possesses a chemical that presents both a release-explosive hazard and a theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP hazard must consider both of the applicable STQs, and if the facility possesses a quantity that satisfies either STQ, the facility must complete and submit the Top-Screen. 21 In the proposed appendix in the IFR, DHS set the STQ for these explosive chemicals at 2,000 pounds. In the IFR, however, DHS was only considering the theft/diversion concern. In the IFR, had DHS set the STQ for these explosive chemicals (using the method of calculating the STQ at 75% of the EPA RMP TQ) based on a release concern the STQ would have been 3,750 pounds. As discussed in this preamble, while the current EPA RMP does not contain release-explosives, EPA had previously included release-explosives in the RMP program, and when doing so, EPA set the TQ at 5,000 pounds. 22 71 FR 76852 (December 21, 2006). *See* proposed 49 CFR 1580.100(b)(1). In calculating whether a facility meets the STQ for release-explosive chemicals, the facility need not include release-explosive chemicals of interest that a facility manufactures, processes, or uses in a laboratory at the facility under the supervision of a technically qualified individual as defined in 40 CFR 720.3. *See* § 27.203(b)(2). This provision is identical to the laboratory quantities provision that applies to release-toxic and release-flammable chemicals and that is discussed above. 23 23 *See* § II(C)(1)(b) above. c. Minimum Concentration (Mixtures) Section 27.204(a)(3) provides that a facility shall count toward the STQ the total quantity of all commercial grades of release-explosives. DHS has added a definition of “A Commercial Grade”

(ACG)to § 27.105. ACG refers to any quality or concentration of a chemical of interest offered for commercial sale that a facility uses, stores, manufactures, or ships. 3. Theft/Diversion-CW/CWP a. Chemicals In identifying chemical weapons

(CW)and their precursors that are at risk for theft or diversion, the Department looked to the chemicals covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 24 The chemicals covered by the CWC regulations are divided into three lists, or “schedules,” based on their previous use as a CW or possible utility in developing chemical weapons. 25 Schedule 1 covers chemical weapons agents and their immediate precursors. They have very limited industrial and medical applications. Schedule 2 covers chemicals and precursors that have some industrial uses. Schedule 3 covers chemicals and precursors with broad commercial applications, some of which were formerly weaponized. 26 24 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is an international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation treaty, which is implemented by 22 U.S.C. 6701, *et. seq.* The Department of Commerce administers the implementing regulations. *See* 15 CFR part 710. 25 Schedule 1 chemicals are provided in Supplement No. 1 to 15 CFR part 712, Schedule 2 chemicals are provided in Supplement No. 2 to 15 CFR part 713, and Schedule 3 chemicals are provided in Supplement No. 3 to 15 CFR part 714. 26 *See* “The Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers on Industry Compliance,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Publication CWC-006 (Updated May 2006). While the Department included chemicals from all three Schedules 27 in proposed Appendix A, the Department has only included select chemicals from the CWC Schedules in final Appendix A. The Department continues to include all specifically identified Schedule 1 chemicals, because they are actual CW agents and their immediate precursors. Note that, based on comments, the Department has listed these Schedule 1 chemicals by their individual common name along with their chemical name. 27 There were a few Schedule 1 chemicals, however, that were inadvertently omitted from the proposed appendix. With respect to Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals, the Department has only included those Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals and precursors that are “easily weaponizable”—that is, they could be easily converted into chemical weapons using simple chemistry, equipment, and techniques. 28 DHS made the determination about “weaponizability” after consulting with several sources, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI)and the DHS Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC). 29 As a result of this approach, the Department removed chemicals that had appeared on the proposed list but were now determined not to be easily weaponizable (e.g., chloropicrin). In addition to including select CWC chemicals, Appendix A also contains one other easily weaponizable chemical (triethanolamine hydrochloride) from the Australia Group's 30 “Export Controls List: Chemical Weapons Precursors.” 28 Among the Schedule 2 chemicals, DHS included certain easily-weaponizable chemicals that are representative of “families” of Schedule 2 chemicals (as opposed to uniquely identifiable Schedule 2 chemicals). 29 One of the DHS Science and Technology Centers, the CSAC leverages existing Department of Defense (and other) infrastructure and capabilities to provide analysis and scientific assessment of the chemical threat against the homeland and the American public. 30 The Australia Group is an informal group of countries, which aims to allow exporting or transshipping countries to minimize the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon proliferation. See *http://www.australiagroup.net/en/control_list/precursors.htm.* b. STQ and Minimum Concentration (Mixtures) DHS has eliminated the “any amount” STQ that it used in the proposed appendix for theft/diversion-CW/CWP chemicals. In this final appendix, DHS has set the STQ for each theft/diversion-CW/CWP chemical based on the Schedule from which DHS adopted the chemical. The STQ for Schedule 1 chemicals is cumulative, or “CUM 100g,” meaning that all amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals at a facility count toward the cumulative STQ of 100 grams. Section 27.203(c) provides that “where a theft/diversion-Chemical Weapons

(CW)chemical is designated by “CUM 100g,” a facility shall total the quantity of all such designated chemicals in its possession to determine whether the facility possesses theft/diversion-CW chemicals that meet or exceed the STQ of 100 grams.” This is an aggregate amount and not a per agent limit. DHS added a definition for “CUM 100g” to § 27.105 “Definitions” and included this new provision in § 27.204(b)(1). “CUM 100g” is the entry for both the STQ and Minimum Concentration columns for all Schedule 1 chemicals. DHS decided to use this amount based on the recommendation of CSAC, which indicated that this amount merits proper security for purposes of preventing theft and diversion to create significant human impact and cause widespread panic. The STQs for Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals, which are based on their ease of weaponization, are 2.2 pounds and 220 pounds, respectively. 31 Unlike the STQ for Schedule 1 chemicals, these STQs are not cumulative. For non-Schedule 1 theft/diversion-CW/CWP chemicals of interest that are present in a mixture at or above the minimum concentration listed in the column in Appendix A, the facility should count the entire amount of the mixture toward the STQ. *See* § 27.204(b)(1). 31 The STQ for the chemical from the Australia Group, triethanolamine hydrochloride, is 220 pounds. 4. Theft/Diversion-WME a. Chemicals To identify chemicals that might be targeted for theft or diversion as weapons of mass effect (WME), the Department looked to the DOT hazardous materials regulations and considered gases that are poisonous by inhalation (PIH). In proposed Appendix A, DHS listed all DOT Division 2.3 PIH gases including those in Hazard Zones A through D. 32 In this finalized appendix, the Department has not included Hazard Zone D PIH gases (including carbon monoxide and sulfuryl fluoride), because they do not rise to a level of consequentiality that warrants inclusion as a theft/diversion-WME chemical. 33 In addition, the Department no longer includes methyl bromide on the list of chemicals, because it is being phased out of domestic manufacture and use under Clean Air Act regulations implementing the United States' obligations as a signatory to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 34 Thus, given the limited and decreasing availability of methyl bromide, the Department does not believe that the potential consequences of an attack warrant inclusion of that chemical on the list of chemicals in Appendix A. 32 DOT defines a “gas poisonous by inhalation” in 49 CFR 173.115(c) and assigns hazard zones in 49 CFR 173.116(a). 33 One Hazard Zone D chemical, ethylene oxide, is listed in the final Appendix A, because of its inclusion on EPA's RMP list. DHS lists ethylene oxide as a release-toxic but not as a theft-WME chemical. 34 Title VI of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7671, *et seq.* ), which addresses stratospheric ozone protection, directs EPA to establish a program for phasing out production and use of ozone-destroying chemicals, including methyl bromide. These requirements are in furtherance of the United States' obligations, as a signatory to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, to limit the production and use of such chemicals. In 2000, EPA issued a direct final rulemaking, which allowed for the phased reduction in methyl bromide consumption and which extended the phase-out to 2005. *See* 65 FR 70795 (November 28, 2000). EPA has further extended the phase-out program until alternatives for all critical uses of the chemical are available. *See* 71 FR 38325 (July 6, 2006). *See also http://www.epa.gov/ozone/mbr/index.html.* In the proposed appendix, with one exception, DHS did not include DOT Division 2.3 PIH gases for which DOT uses a generic shipping name with the suffix “N.O.S.” DHS has done the same in this final appendix. N.O.S. refers to materials with generic descriptions (e.g., Compressed gas, n.o.s. or Compressed gas, toxic, flammable, corrosive, n.o.s. *Inhalation Hazard Zone D;* or Insecticide gases n.o.s. or Insecticide gases, toxic, flammable, n.o.s. *Inhalation hazard Zone A* ). The Department has only included PIH gases that the Department of Transportation specifically names in the Hazardous Materials Table in 49 CFR 172.101. In addition, the Department has included germanium tetrafluoride. 35 While that chemical is not specifically named in the DOT Hazardous Materials Table, it is often named specifically by convention in industry. Given that it can be identified by its specific name and following a positive response from commenters as to the inclusion of this chemical, the Department decided to retain this chemical on the list. 35 The DOT shipping name for germanium tetrafluoride is “Liquefied Gas, Toxic, Corrosive, n.o.s. (Germanium Tetrafluoride)” if liquid is present and “Compressed Gas, Toxic, Corrosive, n.o.s. (Germanium Tetrafluoride)” if no liquid is present. b. STQ DHS has eliminated the “any amount” STQ that it used in the proposed appendix for theft/diversion-WME chemicals. DHS developed the STQs for these chemicals in this final rule based generally upon recommendations from the Compressed Gas Association

(CGA)in its comments to the proposed appendix in the IFR. The STQs for theft/diversion-WME chemicals vary based on Hazard Zone, thereby taking into account their relative toxicity. *See* 49 CFR 173.116 “Class 2—Assignment of Hazard Zone.” In their comments, CGA indicated that, aside from lecture bottles and sample cylinders, the minimum industry standard commercial size package for Hazard Zone A PIH gases is five

(5)pounds, and the minimum industry standard commercial size package for Hazard Zone B PIH gases is fifteen

(15)pounds. CGA recommended that DHS set the STQ for Hazard Zone A at any amount greater than five pounds and the STQ for Hazard Zone B at any amount greater than fifteen pounds. In this final rule, DHS has set the STQ for Hazard Zone A PIH gases, which are the most toxic of PIH gases, at fifteen

(15)pounds, and the STQ for Hazard Zone B PIH gases at forty-five

(45)pounds. These two STQs are the equivalent of approximately three standard commercial size packages for Hazard Zone A and B PIH gases. These two STQs represent quantities of Hazard Zone A and/or Hazard Zone B PIH gases that are likely to generate significant consequences, including the fact that portable quantities of these PIH gases may be subject to theft and/or diversion. The STQ for Hazard Zone C PIH gases is 500 pounds. That amount is equivalent to approximately five standard industrial gas cylinders. Hazard Zone C PIH gases are less toxic than those in Hazard Zones A and B, and DHS therefore has concluded that it is unlikely for amounts less than 500 pounds to generate a high degree of consequence. These general STQ rules apply to all theft/diversion-WME chemicals except in two instances. First, DHS has established specialized provisions for chlorine, which are discussed below in section II(D). Second, DHS set the STQ for two Hazard Zone C PIH gases (hydrogen fluoride and boron trichloride) at the STQ associated with Hazard Zone B PIH gases—i.e., 45 pounds instead of 500 pounds. Although DOT categorizes these substances as Hazard Zone C, industry generally treats these gases as Hazard Zone B gases because of their toxic properties. Industry commenters recommended, and DHS agreed, that the toxic properties of these chemicals warrant a higher degree of scrutiny and unique STQ in the security context. c. Minimum Concentration (Mixtures) If a theft/diversion-WME chemical of interest is present in a mixture at or above the minimum concentration amount listed in the Minimum Concentration column of the appendix, the facility shall count the entire amount of the mixture toward the STQ unless a specific minimum concentration is assigned in the Minimum Concentration column of Appendix A to part 27, in which case the facility should count the total quantity of all commercial grades of the chemicals at the specified minimum concentration. *See* § 27.203(b)(2). DHS derived the minimum concentrations from the Compressed Gas Association Standard for Classification of Toxic Gas Mixtures, CGAP-20-2003. 5. Theft/Diversion-EXP/IEDP a. Chemicals To identify chemicals that could be subject to theft or diversion for purposes of creating an explosion or producing an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), 36 the Department considered several sources. For proposed Appendix A, the Department included certain DOT Class 1 explosives. 37 The Department also included IED precursors that the National Research Council recommended for additional control in its report titled “Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings: An Integrated National Strategy for Marking, Tagging, Rendering Inert, and Licensing Explosives and Their Precursors.” 38 36 An IED is a device fabricated in an improvised manner that incorporates in its design explosives or destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals. It generally includes a power supply, a switch or timer, and a detonator or initiator. 37 *See* discussion in section II(C)(2) above. 38 The National Academy Press published the Report, which is available online at *www.nap.edu.* The National Research Council had appointed “The Committee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Materials” to address areas related to explosives. This final report presents the Committee's conclusions and recommendations. While the universe of theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemicals has remained substantially the same since the IFR, DHS has added a few chemicals (including IED precursors) and deleted a few chemicals at the recommendation of the FBI. 39 The FBI Explosives Unit 40 recommended the inclusion of certain chemicals based on their experience investigating IED attacks and evaluating IED components. 39 DHS added aluminum (powder), magnesium (powder), nitrobenzene, potassium permanganate, sodium azide, sodium hydrosulfite, and zinc hydrosulfite. 40 As stated on the FBI website, the FBI Explosives Unit “examines evidence associated with bombings. Explosives examinations involve the identification and function of the components used in the construction of incendiary as well as improvised explosive devices. In addition, the Unit performs chemical analyses to determine the type of explosive used in an improvised explosive or incendiary device, which includes bulk substance analysis as well as analysis of the residues left behind when an explosive detonates.” See *http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/org/eu.htm.* Of note in the realm of deleted chemicals (especially to the many commenters who requested their removal), the Department no longer includes acetone and urea in the appendix. Given the Department's inclusion of concentrated nitric acid and concentrated hydrogen peroxide in the appendix, the Department does not believe it is necessary to include acetone and urea. The Department is concerned about these chemicals, because they can be mixed to create explosives (e.g., Triacetone Triperoxide

(TATP)includes both acetone and hydrogen peroxide). The Department is electing, therefore, to list the more critical chemicals (i.e., concentrated hydrogen peroxide and concentrated nitric acid) of those mixtures. The effect is to target regulation to facilities possessing chemicals of interest to terrorists in order to thwart terrorism. The Department's decision is supported by the conclusions of the National Research Council report. In pertinent part, the National Research Council provides: **It is not feasible to control all possible chemical precursors to explosives.** Efforts to control access should focus on the chemicals identified by the committee as current candidates for control in the United States. These chemicals are ammonium nitrate, sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, nitromethane, concentrated nitric acid, concentrated hydrogen peroxide, sodium chlorate, potassium chlorate, and potassium perchlorate. Urea and acetone also meet the criteria for control but are adequately controlled if access to nitric acid and hydrogen peroxide is limited. 41 (Emphasis in the original.) 41 *See* the Executive Summary of the National Research Council Report titled “Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings: An Integrated National Strategy for Marking, Tagging, Rendering Inert, and Licensing Explosives and Their Precursors,” p. 15. In its discussion of chemicals that pose the greatest threat in the United States because of their ability to be used to improvise bombs, the National Research Council further discussed nitric acid/urea and hydrogen peroxide/acetone: Urea can be reacted with nitric acid to produce the explosive urea nitrate, the material used in the World Trade Center bombing. Urea is a nondetonable, ubiquitous, and inexpensive material with an annual production volume in North America of 19 million short tons (IFDC, 1997). It is used extensively as a fertilizer, as a noncorrosive ice-melting material at public facilities and in private homes, and as a reagent in many chemical processes. Because urea is a relatively innocuous chemical with a wide range of uses, the committee believes that preventing access to urea nitrate for illegal purposes is more easily achieved by controlling the other critical component required to make an explosive: nitric acid. 42 42 *Id.* at p. 147. Nitric acid, which is toxic and highly corrosive, has many industrial applications but is not commonly available to the general public. For that reason, the committee believes that sales of nitric acid are much more traceable than those of urea. Furthermore, controls on nitric acid would provide greater leverage in efforts to prevent bomb attacks than would controls on urea, because nitric acid can be reacted with a wide range of organic materials (e.g., cellulose, glycerine, and amines) to produce explosives. Although much of the nitric acid produced is used in on-site chemical processes, a large amount is shipped in tank cars to chemical processing plants or packaged in drums for sale to commercial businesses such as etchers and metal platers. All of these uses are amenable to good sales record keeping. The committee believes that such sales records are probably adequate for current law enforcement needs. 43 43 *Id.* at p. 147. Hydrogen peroxide can be reacted with acetone to make the powerful explosive TATP, which has been used by terrorists abroad but not thus far to any great extent in the United States. It can be made in large quantities but is extremely unstable and dangerous to handle. 44 44 *Id.* at p. 148. Acetone, one of the most common organic solvents, can be purchased readily from many sources in large quantities. As in the case of nitric acid and urea, controlling access to TATP is achieved more readily by limiting the availability of hydrogen peroxide than by controlling acetone. As with controls on nitric acid, controls on hydrogen peroxide would be preferred because hydrogen peroxide can be reacted with chemicals other than acetone to produce explosives. 45 45 *Id.* at p. 148. The Department, after consultation with the FBI Explosives Unit, finds persuasive the conclusion of the National Research Council and removed acetone and urea from Appendix A. The Department also removed nitro urea and urea nitrate, neither of which is commercially available. With respect to hydrogen peroxide, the Department has adjusted the concentration. In the proposed appendix, the Department listed a concentration of “at least 30%.” In this final appendix, the Department has increased the concentration for hydrogen peroxide to 35%, a common technical and food grade of hydrogen peroxide. The original 30% concentration was based on IED precursor regulations proposed in Canada. The Department received comments from various industries about the importance of hydrogen peroxide and the most common commercial grades of the chemicals. In consultation with the FBI Explosives Unit, the Department has revised the concentration it set for hydrogen peroxide, believing that this change in concentration will not significantly increase the likelihood of missing a high risk chemical facility through the part 27 program. b. STQ DHS has changed the STQ for theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemicals from the proposed amount of 2,000 pounds to 400 pounds. This new STQ equals the amount that is likely required to produce a small, vehicle-borne IED (VBIED). This STQ applies to all theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemicals except for

(1)ammonium nitrate, which the Department discusses below in section II(D)(3) and for

(2)a few chemicals where DHS used a different STQ at the recommendation of the FBI Explosives Unit. Specifically, DHS set the STQ for aluminum powder, magnesium powder, and nitrobenzene at 100 pounds instead of 400 pounds, because DHS believes that the effect of these particular chemicals at these quantities would have the same effect as the other theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemicals at 400 pounds. c. Minimum Concentration (Mixtures) As provided in § 27.204(b)(3), a facility shall count toward the STQ the total quantity of all commercial grades of a theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemical at the facility unless a specific minimum concentration is assigned in the Minimum Concentration column of Appendix A to part 27, in which case the facility should count the total quantity of all commercial grades of the chemicals at or above the specified minimum concentration. There are specified minimum concentrations for a few of the theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemicals, such as hydrogen peroxide (35%) or ammonium nitrate (nitrogen concentration of 23% nitrogen or greater). DHS has added a definition of “A Commercial Grade”

(ACG)to § 27.105. ACG refers to any quality or concentration of a chemical of interest offered for commercial sale that a facility uses, stores, manufactures, or ships. 6. Sabotage/Contamination a. Chemicals Sabotage/contamination refers to those chemicals that, if mixed with other readily-available materials, have the potential to create significant adverse consequences for human life or health. The Department's list of sabotage/contamination chemicals is substantially the same in the final appendix as it was in the proposed appendix. Sabotage/contamination chemicals currently include those chemicals that are capable of releasing a poisonous gas when exposed to water. In identifying the chemicals for this category, the Department referred to the table of “Water-Reactive Materials Which Produce Toxic Gases” in the 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG 2004). 46 The ERG 2004 is a joint publication of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Transport Canada, and the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation of Mexico. These materials are listed in the ERG 2004 as incompatible with water, because they produce large amounts of Toxic by Inhalation 47 gases when exposed to water. 46 The table is located on pages 344-348 of the ERG 2004, which is available on the Web at *http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/erg/gydebook.htm.* 47 Toxic by Inhalation

(TIH)is synonymous with Poisonous by Inhalation (PIH). b. STQ In the proposed appendix, the STQ for sabotage/contamination chemicals was 2,000 pounds. The STQ now listed for sabotage/contamination chemicals is A Placarded Amount (APA). DHS added a definition of APA to § 27.105, providing that it refers to the STQ for a sabotage/contamination chemical of interest, as calculated in accordance with § 27.203(d). Section 27.203(d) provides that “[a] facility meets the STQ for a sabotage/contamination chemical of interest if it ships the chemical and is required to placard the shipment of that chemical pursuant to the provisions of subpart F of 49 CFR part 172.” Subpart F of 49 CFR part 172 contains the DOT placarding requirements within the DOT Hazardous Materials regulations. c. Minimum Concentration (Mixtures) As provided in § 27.204(c), a facility shall count toward the STQ the total quantity of all commercial grades of a sabotage/contamination chemical that it possesses unless a specific minimum concentration is assigned in the Minimum Concentration column of Appendix A to part 27, in which case the facility should count the total quantity of all commercial grades of the chemicals at the specified minimum concentration. DHS has added a definition of “A Commercial Grade”

(ACG)to § 27.105. ACG refers to any quality or concentration of a chemical of interest offered for commercial sale that a facility uses, stores, manufactures, or ships. D. Chemicals With a Specialized Approach 1. Propane Propane, a release-flammable chemical, is one of the many RMP flammable chemicals that DHS adopted from EPA's RMP list. In the IFR, the proposed STQ for propane (an RMP flammable) was 7,500 pounds, which is seventy-five percent of the RMP TQ. Using the revised general DHS rule for release-flammables, the STQ for propane would be 10,000 pounds. DHS, however, set the STQ for propane in this final rule at 60,000 pounds. Sixty thousand pounds is the estimated maximum amount of propane that non-industrial propane customers, such as restaurants and farmers, typically use. The Department believes that non-industrial users, especially those in rural areas, do not have the potential to create a significant risk to human life or health as would industrial users. The Department has elected, at this time, to focus efforts on large commercial propane establishments but may, after providing the public with an opportunity for notice and comment, extend its part 27 screening efforts to smaller facilities in the future. This higher STQ will focus DHS's security screening effort on industrial and major consumers, regional suppliers, bulk retail, and storage sites and away from non-industrial propane customers. The minimum concentration and mixtures provisions for propane are the same as for all other release-flammables. Pursuant to § 27.203(b)(3), facilities need not include propane in tanks of 10,000 pounds or less when calculating whether a facility has a total inventory of 60,000 pounds. DHS included this provision, in part, because of its desire to exclude farmers and agricultural users of propane who routinely have three or more propane tanks 48 for heating their homes and/or their chicken/turkey houses. If DHS listed propane at 10,000 pounds (the STQ for all other release-flammable chemicals), many more entities, including homeowners, farmers, and small businesses, would have to complete and submit the Top-Screen. DHS does not expect that such dispersed inventories, often located away from population centers, are likely to meet its definition of high risk chemical facilities. DHS believes that the revised approach toward propane is better geared toward identifying and addressing the risks associated with major propane inventories. 48 Typical tank sizes include approximately 2,205 pounds and 4,418 pounds. 2. Chlorine In the proposed appendix, DHS set the STQ for chlorine at 1,875 pounds. There are two security issues associated with chlorine, each with its own STQ. Using the DHS baseline rules, the STQ for chorine as a release-toxic would be 2,500 pounds, 49 and the STQ for chlorine as a theft/diversion-WME chemical would be 45 pounds. 50 Consistent with all other release-toxic chemicals, DHS set the release-toxic STQ for chlorine at 2,500 pounds and requires facilities to use the calculation and mixtures provisions that apply to all other release-toxic chemicals. *See* §§ 27.204(a)(1) and 27.203(b)(1)(i)-(ii). 49 DHS used the RMP TQ for release-toxic chemicals, and the RMP TQ for chlorine is 2,500 pounds. 50 Chlorine is a DOT Division 2.3 PIH gas in Hazard Zone B, and the baseline STQ for Hazard Zone B PIH gases is generally 45 pounds. DHS, however, developed a unique approach for chlorine where it presents a theft/diversion-WME security issue. Instead of 45 pounds, DHS established a higher STQ for the theft-WME STQ for chlorine—500 pounds. 51 Five hundred pounds is the equivalent of five standard 100-pound cylinders. (The minimum concentration for chlorine that presents a theft-WME security issue is 9.77%.) Setting the theft/diversion-WME STQ for chlorine at 45 pounds would have been both burdensome for numerous manufacturers (which are reliant on chlorine as a starting material) and difficult for DHS to effectively implement, manage, and enforce. The U.S. produces 11 million metric tons of chlorine per year. The vast majority of chlorine production is used for processing a wide range of paper, plastic, textile, medicine, insecticides, paint, and other materials. Chlorine is also used in water and wastewater treatment. While most chlorine is consumed at the facility where it is produced, four million metric tons are shipped annually in small containers, one-ton containers, and cargo tank motor vehicles, and tank cars across the country. 51 As with all theft/diversion chemicals, facilities must only count toward the theft-WME STQ for chlorine those quantities of chlorine in transportation packagings. *See* § 27.203(c). Given the enormous production, transportation, and importance of chlorine, DHS increased the theft/diversion-WME STQ for chlorine from 45 pounds to 500 pounds. DHS believes that quantities less than 500 pounds would capture facilities that are unlikely to present significant consequences. This amount is considered a portable and transportable amount that could be diverted or stolen. Overall, DHS's approach toward chlorine recognizes that chlorine is distinct from other WME precursors in terms of its broad utility and availability. 3. Ammonium Nitrate

(AN)In proposed Appendix A, the Department identified only one form of ammonium nitrate (nitrogen concentration of 28%-34%) and set the STQ at 2,000 pounds. Based on the consideration of comments, the Department has revised its approach in this final appendix, identifying AN in two forms:

(1)The DOT Division 1.1 explosive found in 49 CFR 172.101 and

(2)the more common form frequently used as a fertilizer. DHS assigned a STQ to each form. Given the breadth of AN's use and history, DHS has crafted a specialized approach to address this chemical's specific security concerns. The first entry for AN in the appendix addresses AN as an explosive. The Department has listed the DOT Division 1.1 explosive: Ammonium nitrate [with more than 0.2 percent combustible substances, including any organic substance calculated as carbon, to the exclusion of any other added substance]. 52 As an explosive, AN presents two security issues: Theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP and release-explosive. DHS is treating the possible theft/diversion of this form of AN in the same way that it is treating all other DOT Division 1.1 explosives. 53 Where a facility has larger amounts of AN as an explosive, there may also be release hazards. As that is the case, DHS has set the STQ for the possible release of AN as an explosive at 5,000 pounds. 54 That STQ is the same TQ that EPA had set for DOT Division 1.1 explosives when EPA included such substances in its RMP rule. 52 The entry for this form of AN can be found in the DOT Hazardous Materials Regulations at 49 CFR § 172.101. 53 Where AN as an explosive presents a theft-EXP/IEDP security issue, the STQ is 400 pounds, and a facility is expected to include all amounts of ACG of AN when determining whether it meets or exceeds the STQ. And, per § 27.203(c), in calculating this theft STQ, facilities need only count amounts in transportation packagings. 54 Consistent with the mixtures provision for all release-explosives ( *see* § 27.204(a)(3)), facilities are expected to include all amounts of ACG of AN in calculating the STQ. The second entry for AN in the appendix addresses the more common form of AN in solid form with a nitrogen concentration of 23% or greater. This form of AN is largely used in the agricultural community and in amounts that typically exceed 400 pounds (the STQ for all other theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemicals). Given the circumstances surrounding its use (i.e., extensive use in the agricultural industry), DHS has set the STQ for this form of AN at 2,000 pounds. (This form of AN in a mixture will count toward the STQ in a minimum concentration of 33% or more.) This STQ is geared toward ensuring that DHS secures AN inventories at major manufacturing and distribution facilities, as opposed to individual farmers involved mainly in the application of AN. DHS believes that terrorists are interested in maximizing death and injuries from an attack and are, therefore, less interested in attacking facilities in rural areas or other areas with low population densities. DHS referenced many sources in developing this approach. In addition to considering DOT and EPA regulations, DHS consulted with Departmental experts, such as the DHS Office for Bombing Prevention, which administers the Bomb Making Awareness Program, and other federal experts, such as the FBI Explosives Unit. The Department's approach was further supported by international resources, including the British Health and Safety Executive's publication titled “Storing and Handling Ammonium Nitrate” and Canada's proposed regulations on Restricted Components issued pursuant to Canada's Explosives Act. 55 55 The Explosives Regulatory Division

(ERD)of Natural Resources Canada has posted the proposed regulation on their Web site at *http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mms/explosif/pdf/RestrictedComp_e.pdf.* E. Technical Corrections DHS made several technical corrections to the chemicals listed in Appendix A, and those corrections, many of which are highlighted below, improve the accuracy of the list. Many commenters assisted DHS in identifying these items. DHS removed the entries for certain chemicals (because they were synonyms for already-listed chemicals) and instead listed them as synonyms in the new “Synonyms” column. 56 DHS also corrected the Chemical Abstract Service

(CAS)number for several chemicals 57 and the spelling and/or name of other chemicals. 58 56 This includes, for example, calcium dithionite (already listed as calcium hydrosulfite), sodium dithionite (already listed as sodium hydrosulfite); zinc dithionite (already listed as zinc hydrosulfite); and dimethyl phosphoramido-dichloridate (already listed as N, N-dimethyl phosphoramidic dichloride). 57 This includes, for example, chromium oxychloride; DF, dinitroresorcinol; dipicrylamine [or] hexyl (formerly listed as hexanitrodiphenylamine, which is now listed as a synonym); hexyltrichlorosilane; magnesium aluminum phosphide (now listed separately as magnesium phosphide and aluminum phosphide); octonal; octolite; sodium phosphide; strontium phosphide; torpex (formerly listed as hexotonal); and trinitronaphthalene. 58 This includes, for example, 1-pentene; boron trifluoride (and its synonym borane, trifluoro); boron trifluoride compound with methyl ether (1:1); pentaerythritol tetranitrate; propyl chloroformate; sulfur tetrafluoride (and its synonym sulfur fluoride); and vinyl acetylene. In addition, DHS made chemical-specific edits. For example, DHS separated the entry for “hydrogen fluoride/hydrofluoric acid (conc. 50% or greater)” into two entries. DHS had included them as one listing in the proposed listing, because they were included as such on EPA's RMP list. As they are two different chemicals (one is a gas and the other is a fuming liquid), albeit with the same CAS number, DHS has separated them into two entries. 59 As another example, DHS clarified the inclusion of various explosive chemicals. The Department added RDX/cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (CAS #121-82-4), which had been inadvertently omitted in the proposed appendix. The Department is including this DOT Division 1.1 explosive, because the Department is including all such DOT Division 1.1 explosives, given the risk of their theft or diversion for terrorism purposes. The Department now lists HMX under its common name (i.e., HMX); in the proposed appendix, the Department had listed HMX under its chemical name (cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine). Note, however, that the Department has included HMX's chemical name in the synonym column for the HMX entry. 59 For hydrofluoric acid (conc. 50% or greater), which presents a release-toxic security issue, DHS assigns a STQ of 1000 pounds and minimum concentration of 50% or greater. For hydrogen fluoride (anhydrous), when it presents a release-toxic security issue, DHS assigns a STQ of 1,000 pounds and a minimum concentration of 1.00%. For hydrogen fluoride (anhydrous), when it presents a theft-WME security issue, DHS assigns a STQ of 15 pounds and a minimum concentration of 42.53%. III. Discussion of Comments In the Interim Final Rule, DHS sought comment on the proposed list of DHS Chemicals of Interest in Appendix A to part 27. DHS received approximately 4,300 public comments, and almost 4,000 of those comments were related to the issues surrounding propane. Commenters to the proposed appendix included trade associations, citizens, companies, universities, hospitals and research facilities, and members of Congress. In the sections below, DHS provides a topical summary of the comments and responses to those comments. A. Specific Chemicals or Types of Chemicals 1. In General *Comment:* Commenters suggested that DHS should remove chemicals that are widely used in the U.S., (e.g., acetone, chlorine, propane, sodium nitrate, urea), asserting that such chemicals should not be regulated as a chemical security risk. Some argued that commonly available chemicals are unlikely targets of theft from a facility. Other commenters provided specific arguments why DHS should not regulate commonplace chemicals: Carbon monoxide is a common byproduct that can occur frequently in everyday locations (e.g., from a car, heater, or furnace). Hydrogen sulfide is a natural byproduct that is easily generated, whether in labs during reactions or from geothermal facilities. Yet other commenters thought that there was only limited harm from other chemicals, and so DHS should not regulate those chemicals. For example, potassium nitrate and sodium nitrate do not ignite on their own, therefore the explosive hazard from those chemicals is reduced, and so DHS should not regulate these chemicals on their own. And, the flashpoint of triethanolamine, at 212 degrees Fahrenheit, is so high that it would have to be extremely hot for the chemical to heat up, ignite, and become an explosive hazard. *Response:* The Department has included the chemicals of interest in Appendix A due to their potential, when used as part of an attack, to create significant human life or health consequences. Each of these chemicals presents at least one of the security issues described in section II above. Not only has the Department carefully weighed the value of including any given chemical, but the Department has clearly defined the parameters for each chemical. In this final rule, the Department has replaced the “any amount” STQs (that it proposed in the IFR) with numerical quantities. The Department has also provided instruction on how a facility should calculate an STQ and how a facility should consider chemicals of interest in a mixture. *See* §§ 27.203 and 27.204. In addition, the Department reiterates that possession of a chemical of interest listed in Appendix A does not equate to coverage under the standards in part 27. Possession of a chemical of interest at the listed STQ is merely a trigger for a facility to complete and submit a Top-Screen. Furthermore, when a facility completes a Top-Screen, that information becomes but one factor in the Department's determination of whether a facility presents a high level of security risk. In response to the comments about specific chemicals, the Department replies as follows: DHS removed carbon monoxide from the list as part of its larger decision to remove DOT Division 2.3 PIH gases in Hazard Zone D. Carbon monoxide is a Hazard Zone D PIH gas. DHS continues to list hydrogen sulfide on the list, because it meets the Department's criteria for both release-toxic and theft/diversion-WME chemicals. EPA lists hydrogen sulfide as a release-toxic on its RMP list. Aside from the exceptions noted above, DHS has included as release-toxics in Appendix A all of the toxics on EPA's RMP list. Also, DOT identifies hydrogen sulfide as a Division 2.3 PIH gas, Hazard Zone B. Aside from the exceptions noted above, DHS has included all of the DOT Division 2.3 PIH gases as theft/diversion-WME chemicals in Appendix A. DHS, however, excludes naturally occurring sources (such as geothermal operations) of hydrogen sulfide pursuant to § 27.203(a)(9). DHS continues to list potassium nitrate and sodium nitrate, although they are common oxidizers, they could be used to create IEDs. Finally, DHS continues to list triethanolamine, because it can be easily converted into a chemical weapon, not because of the flashpoint or other physical characteristics of the chemical itself. *Comment:* Commenters remarked on how some Appendix A chemicals of interest, such as acetone, propane, and urea, are preferable to possible substitutes not on Appendix A, due to their comparatively lower toxicity or environmental impact. In particular, they noted that the inclusion of certain chemicals means that facilities, in an attempt to avoid going through the screening process, will transition away from Appendix A chemicals and possibly toward more dangerous substitutes. For example, in lieu of acetone, facilities might transition to the use of more toxic solvents. *Response:* With respect to the specific chemicals mentioned, DHS notes that, for the reasons discussed above, DHS has removed acetone and urea from the list of chemicals, and it has substantially revised the STQ for propane. As for concerns that facilities will transition to more dangerous substitute chemicals, DHS makes the following points. Appendix A is DHS's first attempt to identify chemicals of interest around which there are serious security concerns, and the aim of Appendix A is to provide a screening tool for the DHS chemical security regulatory program. If there is a need to address different or additional chemicals in the future, DHS has the option of revising Appendix A, subject to notice and comment when appropriate, to include any different or additional chemicals. The Department also has the ability to reach out directly to facilities it believes may present a high level of security risk, even for chemicals not included in Appendix A. *See* 27 CFR 27.210(a)(1)(ii). While facilities covered by part 27 have flexibility in deciding how to meet the part 27 requirements (for example, a facility can choose to reduce, substitute, or eliminate its inventory of an Appendix A chemical of interest at any time), DHS will, through its review of Site Security Plans and visits to facilities, determine whether facilities have adequately selected, developed, and implemented risk-based measures designed to satisfy the risk-based performance standards. *See* 27 CFR 27.225 and 27.245. *Comment:* One association recommended that DHS exclude from the list anhydrous ammonia used for food refrigeration and contained in closed-loop refrigeration systems. Another individual, however, supported DHS inclusion of facilities that use anhydrous ammonia either for refrigeration during food processing and storage or as part of emission controls for coal-fired electrical generation, because such facilities are typically near population centers and transportation systems. Several other commenters urged DHS to increase the 7,500 pound STQ for anhydrous ammonia, so that it would match the TQ for other regulatory programs. *Response:* As a toxic chemical utilized across industries, DHS believes that anhydrous ammonia can present a high risk and, under certain circumstances, generate major consequences for human life or health. Therefore, DHS continues to include anhydrous ammonia in the list of chemicals. DHS, however, raised the STQ for anhydrous ammonia to 10,000 pounds. That tracks the amount that EPA uses in its RMP regulation. *See* 40 CFR 68.130, Table 1. DHS expects that facilities will count toward their STQ the quantity of anhydrous ammonia stored as part of a refrigeration system in addition to the quantity of anhydrous ammonia in the actual system *Comment:* Manufacturing plants pointed out that most plants need a minimum inventory of nitric acid to operate efficiently. Commenters assert that 2,000 pounds, the amount proposed in Appendix A, is too low to operate efficiently, and therefore, large numbers of manufacturing plants would have to go through the Top-Screen process. Other commenters remarked that nitric acid is included in the inventory of laboratories at colleges and universities. *Response:* The Department continues to include nitric acid in Appendix A given the security risks it presents. In large quantities, nitric acid presents a release hazard, and so DHS has set the STQ at 15,000 pounds. In addition, DHS is aware that nitric acid, in smaller quantities, is useful in creating IEDs. DHS has set the STQ for divertible quantities of nitric acid (i.e., amounts in transportation packagings) at 400 pounds. 2. Propane In proposed Appendix A, the Department included propane on the list of Chemicals of Interest

(COI)with a STQ of 7,500 pounds. *Comment:* DHS received almost 4,000 comments related to propane, and many of these comments disagreed with the proposed inclusion of propane and the proposed STQ for propane. There were comments from propane distributors and retailers; agricultural businesses; private citizens; and numerous small business, including forklift operators, camp grounds, parks, bakeries, and construction companies. Agricultural businesses indicated that they use propane for multiple purposes, including heating their chicken and/or turkey houses, drying produce, or keeping livestock and farm produce warm. They indicated that many farms have multiple tanks of propane and that the regulation will impact many small, family-owned farms, which will have to complete the Top-Screen. Others pointed out that these propane tanks on farms are often separated by a significant distance or a building. Propane distributors and retailers indicated that their main customer base is residential, commercial/industrial, motor fuel, agricultural, and wholesale. In the residential market, propane is used primarily for home heating, water heating, and cooking purposes. Many commenters stated that a significant percentage of their customer base, including residential users, would have to complete and submit a Top-Screen under the proposed threshold. They speculated that this might force propane users to shift to other more environmentally hazardous fuel sources. Retailers and distributors also claimed that customers had already begun to request the completion and submission of the Top-Screen on their behalf. Commenters asserted that the worst case scenario of an explosion from a 1,000 gallon tank of propane is only approximately 500 feet for a 1 psi over-pressure condition. While that type of incident is enough to break windows and cause injuries due to glass shrapnel, they did not think it would be likely to cause structural damage and, hence, should not be considered as a national security threat. Many commenters felt that that DHS had gone beyond the limitations contained in Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, which they asserted provides that nothing in the rules can supersede other federal laws pertaining to the manufacture, distribution in commerce, use, or sale of chemicals. *See* Section 550(f). Commenters offered suggestions for revisions. Many commenters suggested that DHS should incorporate the statutory exemptions from EPA's Risk Management Program rules, including the statutory exemptions from the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security, and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act (Pub. L. 106-40). Commenters also proposed that DHS add a footnote to the Appendix A entry for propane, indicating that regulated entities need not count all propane storage tanks of less than 1,200 gallons toward the threshold amount. *Response:* The Department continues to include propane in the list of chemicals in Appendix A. The Department has not adopted the statutory exemption from the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security, and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act (Pub. L. 106-40). That Act amended the Clean Air Act to remove flammable fuels from the list of substances with respect to which reporting and other activities are required under the risk management plan program, and for other purposes. EPA codified that provision at 40 CFR 68.126. Congress did not include such a provision exempting propane in the authorizing legislation for part 27, and so DHS has not exempted propane from part 27. The Department disagrees with the statement that the Department has gone beyond the limitations contained in Section 550. The listing of propane in Appendix A merely triggers the requirement that a facility (possessing the listed amount) complete and submit a Top-Screen to DHS. That, in no way, supersedes any other federal law regulating manufacture, sale, or use of propane. The Department, however, has changed several provisions related to propane, as discussed in section II(D)(1). The Department believes its approach to securing significant stocks of propane is informed, manageable, and proportionate to its existing use and risk profile. In response to the comment about propane storage tanks, the Department notes that, per § 27.203(b)(3), DHS will not require facilities to include quantities of propane in tanks of 10,000 pounds or less. 3. Chlorine In proposed Appendix A, the Department included chlorine on the list with an STQ of 1,875 pounds. *Comment:* Many commenters provided input on DHS's inclusion of chlorine on the COI list. The majority of commenters encouraged DHS to use the EPA RMP TQs for all RMP release-toxic chemicals, including chlorine. They argued that the RMP TQ of 2,500 pounds is a well-reasoned number and that the chemical industry is familiar with that number. As an additional argument against an STQ of 1,875 pounds, commenters argued that large amounts of chlorine are readily available through production or purchase given its diversified uses in and across the water treatment, electronics, steel, pharmaceutical, and plastics industries. Similarly, other commenters asserted that water and wastewater treatment facilities possess chlorine, however those locations are not chemical facilities in a traditional sense and therefore they are lower risk locations. By contrast, one individual commenter recommended a lower STQ for chlorine. The commenter suggested that DHS should lower the STQ for chlorine to 150 pounds, which is the size of a commonly available commercial cylinder. The commenter was concerned that the theft of small containers of chlorine would enable a terrorist to use chlorine gas in attacks on public gatherings. *Response:* While the Department recognizes the importance of chlorine to the Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources, and especially the chemical sector, the Department also realizes that the theft/diversion of chlorine to develop a WME is a serious security concern. Recent terrorist incidents involving chlorine cylinders in Iraq have reinforced this concern. To balance these concerns, the Department has developed a revised approach toward chlorine, which is discussed in section II(D)(2) above. With this approach, the Department hopes to facilitate the introduction and implementation of security standards that prevent the theft or diversion of chlorine for terrorist purposes without unduly interfering with the continued, legitimate production, transportation, and use of chlorine. In response to the comment about public water systems and water treatment systems, the Department notes that it has excluded those systems consistent with the statutory exclusion in Section 550 ( *see* § 27.110(b)). 4. Ammonium Nitrate

(AN)In proposed Appendix A, the Department included ammonium nitrate (nitrogen concentration of 28%-34%) on the list of COI with a STQ of 2,000 pounds. *Comment:* There were several comments about AN with most commenters supporting the inclusion of AN on the COI list. Several commenters remarked on the reduced availability of AN fertilizer due to liability concerns over its use in terrorism. Commenters expressed differing opinions on the percentage of nitrogen in AN that DHS should consider for purposes of preventing AN's use as an explosive precursor. Commenters requested clarification of the STQ and whether it applied to solid, liquid, and/or mixtures of AN. *Response:* DHS revised its approach toward ammonium nitrate, as discussed above in section II(D)(3). This revised approach recognizes that AN is integral to the agriculture and explosives industries, yet also seeks to satisfy the DHS mandate to enhance the security of facilities that present a high level of risk. 5. Acetone and Urea In proposed Appendix A, the Department included acetone and urea on the list, each with an STQ of 2,000 pounds. *Comment:* The Department also received a large number of comments on acetone and urea. Commenters from a wide array of industries remarked on the important uses and widespread availability of these two chemicals. Commenters noted that, while other regulatory regimes cover acetone and urea, they typically do so for amounts lower than the proposed STQ of 2,000 pounds. *Response:* The Department's initial concerns around acetone and urea centered on its potential theft and diversion for use as an explosives precursor. After considering the comments received and consulting with expert sources, including the FBI Explosives Unit and the report produced by the National Research Council, the Department does not believe that acetone and urea need to be tracked as closely the Department tracks other explosives precursors, especially concentrated hydrogen peroxide and nitric acid. The Department has removed acetone and urea from the list of Chemicals of Interest in Appendix A. 6. Chemical Weapons

(CW)and Chemical Weapons Precursors

(CWP)*Comment:* While commenters supported the Department's reference to the Schedules of chemicals from the CWC, commenters generally noted that applying an STQ of “any amount” for all CWC chemicals was unnecessarily low. With the exception of Schedule 1 chemicals, which are weapons and therefore merit a relatively low STQ, commenters thought that the “any amount” STQ would create unreasonable compliance challenges for facilities. Commenters urged DHS to use the CWC Schedule 2 TQs for Schedule 2 CW/CWP chemicals. Commenters also remarked on the widespread commercial use of triethanolamine (a Schedule 3 chemical) in and across the chemical, personal care, and consumer products industries. *Response:* The Department has replaced all “any amount” STQs for theft/diversion-CW/CWP chemicals with numerical quantities. The Department did not use the CWC TQs for Schedule 2 chemicals because those amounts are too high. Those higher amounts are designed to prevent the development of state-level chemical weapons programs, not to prevent acts of chemical terrorism. DHS identified the STQ for Schedule 2 chemicals (at 2.2 pounds) by identifying how much one would need of the chemical to convert it easily into a weapon using simple chemistry. DHS included triethanolamine and several other Schedule 3 chemicals in the final appendix due to the ease with which they may be weaponized. 7. Explosives *Comment:* The American Pyrotechnics Association requested that DHS remove four oxidizers (ammonium perchlorate greater than 15 microns in size, potassium chlorate, potassium nitrate, and potassium perchlorate) from the list of chemicals in Appendix A. The American Pyrotechnics Association explained that, while these chemicals are used in pyrotechnic mixtures, they would neither create a highly toxic cloud nor could they be used in an explosive, flammable, or reactive manner until they were properly blended with an energetic fuel. In order to create an oxidizer and fuel bomb, one must go through extensive and difficult steps to obtain the materials and then must have the proper training to mix the chemicals in the proper ratio. In other words, terrorists would have to complete extensive measures to secure chemicals that would do very little damage. Commenters noted that neither DOT nor ATF classify the four oxidizers as explosives, and so therefore DHS should not either. *Response:* DHS has considered the American Pyrotechnics Association's comments and, based on consultations with expert sources (including the FBI Explosives Unit) the Department has determined that it is still desirable to include these four oxidizers on the list of chemicals in Appendix A. DHS is including ammonium perchlorate on the list, because it is a DOT Class 1, Division 1.1 explosive that presents two security issues (see section II(C) above): theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP and release-explosive. It is at risk of theft and misuse for making explosives, and it could present a release hazard from a successful attack on a facility with a large (5,000 pounds or greater) inventory. DHS is including the three potassium compounds (potassium chlorate, potassium nitrate, and potassium perchlorate), because they are IED precursors that warrant enhanced security. The National Research Council listed these chemicals in its report titled *Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings: An Integrated National Strategy for Marking, Tagging, Rendering Inert, and Licensing Explosives and Their Precursors* . The FBI's Explosives Unit has validated such conclusions for DHS. 8. Hydrogen Peroxide *Comment:* Given the availability of acetone, one commenter requested that DHS remove acetone from the list and retain hydrogen peroxide at 30%, if DHS was concerned about these chemicals being misused to make Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP). Commenters from the food, feed, steel, cleaning, and other industries remarked on the varied uses for commercial strength hydrogen peroxide as well as hydrogen peroxide formulations. The majority of commenters recommended that DHS adopt OSHA's and EPA's standard approach to listing hydrogen peroxide at a 52% concentration under their Process Safety Management

(PSM)regulations and Risk Management Program (RMP), respectively. *Response:* DHS listed hydrogen peroxide in the proposed Appendix A and continues to list it as a theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemical in final Appendix A because of its proven potential as an IEDP. In the final appendix, the Department listed “hydrogen peroxide (concentration of at least 35%)” on the list of chemicals and also set the minimum concentration for hydrogen peroxide at 35%. For a discussion of the Department's approach to hydrogen peroxide, see section II(C)(5) above. Commenters have requested that DHS use a 52% concentration for hydrogen peroxide, which they assert would be consistent with certain OSHA and EPA standards. While DHS understands industry's preference for consistent rules across federal agencies, DHS notes that DHS's mandate is distinct from other federal agencies that already regulate hydrogen peroxide. Both OSHA and EPA are concerned with accidental release and/or the detonation of hydrogen peroxide and so regulating concentrations of 52% or greater is reasonable given their mandates. DHS is charged with ensuring effective security at high risk chemical facilities. The security issue around hydrogen peroxide, a common IED precursor, demanded that DHS identify the concentration at which hydrogen peroxide is potentially useful to terrorists as an IED precursor. DHS, in consultation with the FBI, has determined that concentration to be at or above 35%. In any event, setting the Appendix A concentration at 35% for triggering the Top-Screen requirements in no way precludes any facility from meeting OSHA or EPA standards. B. Coverage of Appendix A 1. Colleges and Universities *Comment:* Colleges, universities, and university medical centers; associations that represent these institutions; and individuals associated with such institutions requested that DHS exempt these institutions or modify the rule to address the use of chemicals of interest at these institutions. Many colleges and universities endorsed the comments of the Campus Safety Health and Environmental Management Association (CSHEMA), which asserted that chemicals of interest do not pose a significant risk when they are widely dispersed in many locations, and in extremely small quantities per location, as is typical with colleges and universities. CSHEMA contended that DHS must not have intended to include colleges and universities given DHS's estimate of the number of affected facilities. CSHEMA also asserted that Appendix A imposes a heavy burden on colleges and universities and that the task of submitting a Top-Screen will be onerous for colleges and universities; in particular CSHEMA asserts that the time and cost burden of complying with the Top-Screen requirement will be exponentially higher than that which DHS estimated. CSHEMA made several recommendations; namely, that DHS replace all “any amount” STQs with a numeric quantity (CSHEMA suggested a minimum STQ of 100 pounds). CSHEMA also recommended that DHS exclude chemicals in containers of one pound or less and that DHS create a per-laboratory STQ. Other commenters provided similar comments. They explained that Appendix A includes numerous chemicals of interest that are found or synthesized at colleges and universities in amounts that exceed the “any amount” STQs. As a result, nearly all colleges, universities, and university hospitals would be required to complete and submit a Top-Screen. Because COI in extremely small quantities (typically milligram or gram quantities per container) are widely dispersed in many locations throughout universities, the commenters believe that these facilities pose no significant security risk. Commenters were also concerned that, while no one location on campus might exceed a threshold, the campus or university as a whole (particularly since there might be multiple campuses), might exceed an STQ. Commenters suggested that DHS provide an exemption, as does OSHA and EPA regulations, for laboratories that use small quantities of hazardous materials. Many college and universities described the security procedures that they currently have in place and stated that such procedures are adequate to protect against the security risks that they face. They asserted that it would impose significant burdens to exceed these measures. For example, while they currently do some chemical tracking, they believe that identifying and tracking very small amounts of chemicals for Appendix A purposes would impose a substantial new burden. Furthermore, they did not think that the risk posed by these quantities justifies the substantial burden that tracking would impose. Others maintained that, while locations can be secured, other security measures contained in the Site Security Plans would be antithetical to institutions of higher learning. As an alternative to seeking an exemption from the regulation for colleges and universities, commenters made a variety of other suggestions. A few commenters urged DHS to adopt different STQs or to exclude chemicals of interest that are used in laboratories at colleges and universities. They recommended that DHS replace “any amount” with numeric threshold quantities and that DHS base those quantities on amounts used by other federal agencies. Other commenters proposed a per container limit for COI, similar to what the EPA uses for its Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure regulations. *See* 40 CFR part 112. As noted above, CHSEMA proposed a one pound limit per container. Commenters also recommended DHS only regulate pure chemicals, explaining that a chemical that is part of a commercial product, formulation, or dilute solution should not be a COI. *Response:* Facilities that possess any of the chemicals listed in Appendix A at or above the STQ for any applicable security issue must complete and submit a Top-Screen. *See* § 27.200(b)(2) and § 27.210(a)(1)(i). Accordingly, the Department expects that all facilities, including colleges and universities, that possess such chemicals will complete and submit a Top-Screen. Because the need to do a Top-Screen is driven by the possession of chemicals, not the location of the chemicals, DHS can not simply exempt chemicals located at colleges and universities. In addition, the Department notes that existing federal regulatory schemes (e.g., those of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and CWC) do not exempt colleges, universities, and university medical centers from their chemical-related regulatory programs. Furthermore, given the apparent current state of security at academic institutions, DHS believes that exclusion of colleges and universities is not warranted. Based on the comments DHS received from colleges and universities, the Department understands that security varies dramatically across academic institutions. Representatives of the academic community acknowledged that they possess chemicals of interest. While some adhere to broad security strategies, others admitted having an incomplete or non-existent inventory of the contents and quantities of chemicals and no affordable or timely means of compiling an inventory. While the requirements of Appendix A will continue to apply to academic institutions, there are several revisions to Appendix A, many of which should allay the concerns of academic institutions. First, DHS is providing colleges and universities with the option to request an extension of time to complete and submit their Top-Screens following the publication of a final Appendix A. The president, dean, provost, or other senior official at a college or university may request an extension from the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, and DHS may grant that request for up to 60 additional calendar days following the publication of final Appendix A. Second, as discussed throughout this final rule, the Department has removed various chemicals from the list. Of note to academic institutions, the Department has removed acetone. Similarly, the Department has adjusted STQs for chemicals. The Department has assigned numeric quantities to all of the previous “any amount” STQs. Of note to academic institutions, DHS has changed the STQ for triethanolamine (a theft/diversion-CW/CWP chemical) from “any amount” to 220 pounds. Third, the Department has added an exclusion for facilities that possess laboratory quantities of release-toxic, release-flammable, and release-explosive chemicals. *See* § 27.203(b)(2). This tracks the exemption that EPA uses in its RMP program. Note, however, that while a facility need not count laboratory quantities of release chemicals of interest toward the facility's STQ, a facility must still count laboratory quantities of theft/diversion and sabotage/contamination chemicals of interest toward the facility's STQ. Fourth, all facilities, including colleges and universities, have flexibility in defining the boundaries of their facility and identifying the party at their institution that is responsible for compliance. 60 The requirements of part 27 are facility-specific. As such, an institution of higher learning can, if appropriate, submit a Top-Screen on a building-to-building basis or a campus-wide basis. This is comparable to the situation for owners or operators of a multi-unit enterprise. *See* 72 FR 17688, 17697. 60 Part 27 defines a “chemical facility or facility” as “any facility that possesses or plans to possess, at any relevant point in time, a quantity of a chemical substance determined by the Secretary to be potentially dangerous or that meets other risk-related criterion identified by the Department. As used herein, the term chemical facility or facility shall also refer to the owner or operator of the chemical facility. Where multiple owners and/or operators function within a common infrastructure or within a single fenced area, the Assistant Secretary may determine that such owners and/or operators constitute a single chemical facility or multiple chemical facilities depending on the circumstances.” *See* § 27.100. As noted in the preamble to the IFR, DHS believes that it will generally be straightforward for facilities to define their boundaries and identify the party (at their facility) responsible for compliance with the regulation. DHS acknowledges that, in some circumstances, the issue might be more complex. The Department will address those situations on a case-by-case basis. *See* 72 FR 17697. In addition, as indicated in the definition of “chemical facility,” the Assistant Secretary has the authority, where necessary, to make a determination about the operations at given facility or facilities. The Assistant Secretary may make the determination that a facility is a single chemical facility or multiple chemical facilities. Fifth, even if academic institutions get screened into this regulatory program ( *i.e.* , they complete the Top-Screen, DHS classifies them as a high-risk facility, and they have to develop and implement SVAs and SSPs), the academic institutions may well have security measures in place that will help them meet the applicable risk-based performance standards. *See* § 27.230 (indicating that a facility must select, develop in their SSP, and implement appropriately risk-based measures designed to satisfy the risk-based performance standards listed in § 27.230(a)(1)-(19)). In that case, the additional burden of complying with this regulation would consist of either creating a CSAT SSP or referencing measures in an existing security plan by way of an Alternate Security Program (ASP). *See* § 27.235 “Alternative Security Program.” Colleges and universities may benefit from working together to develop an ASP template specifically tailored to the research environment in an academic setting. 2. Medical Research Organizations and Similar Laboratories *Comment:* The assertions in the comments from medical research institutes and other similar laboratories largely resembled those of the colleges and universities. These comments came not only from medical research institutes but from non-production, non-diagnostic research laboratories; ancillary facilities at non-profit, non-commercial research organizations; operators of pharmaceutical laboratories; and companies that conduct research as a part of their business ( *e.g.* , industrial or food processing research and development laboratories, environmental testing labs, and testing or monitoring facilities). They argued that their institutions are not “high risk chemical facilities.” They also claimed that they use COI in the same way that colleges and universities do—that is, they have large numbers of chemicals and reagents in very small quantities, in small containers, and at multiple locations within a facility. In addition, they asserted that they did not comment on the Advance Notice of Rulemaking, because they did not believe that rule would cover them. Pharmaceutical research facilities asserted these security efforts would be very burdensome and would divert a large amount of time and resources away from their critical, life-saving research. Several of those commenters expressed concern about the “any amount” threshold. Those commenters included individuals and entities that conduct field calibration for pipelines and operations, operate compliance labs, sterilize instruments, and conduct blood or tissue test. A few commenters pointed out that the “any amount” threshold would mean that entities like clinics and dental offices would have to submit Top-Screens. Commenters requested that DHS exempt their laboratories or operations from the rule. In the alternative, the commenters requested other forms of relief, such as replacing the “any amount” STQ for common laboratory chemicals with a STQ of 10 pounds per storage location or 100 pounds per building; establishing a per container limit of 1 pound; setting higher levels for ubiquitous substances (such as acetone and triethanolamine); or defining a facility to include a storage location. *Response:* DHS directs readers to the response provided for colleges and universities, as that response is directly applicable to these comments by medical research institutes and other similar laboratories. The requirement to complete the Top-Screen is driven by the possession of certain chemicals in specified quantities, and DHS does not agree that the nature of a facility's operation alone warrants an exclusion. As such, the Department expects that medical research institutes and like institutions that possess any of the chemicals listed in Appendix A at or above the STQ for any applicable security issue will complete and submit a Top-Screen. *See* § 27.200(b)(2) and § 27.210(a)(1)(i). DHS also directs readers to the discussion of revisions to Appendix A, which is provided in the response to colleges and universities. Those revisions should address many of the concerns of medical research institutes and like institutions. 3. Farms and the Agricultural Industry; Fumigation Industry *Comment:* Several commenters, including farmers and other agricultural users of chemicals, asserted that they should be exempt from this rule, explaining that they extensively use chemicals like acrolein, ammonium nitrate (nitrogen concentration of 28%-34%), and sodium chlorate. Because farmers use these chemicals on farms for agricultural purposes, and often do so in remote and rural locations, commenters did not think that these chemicals raised any security concerns. Other commenters expressed concern that if DHS made exceptions for certain facilities (especially in the agricultural industry), loopholes would emerge and companies would exploit those loopholes in order to gain a financial edge. Several commenters asserted that DHS should exempt urea fertilizer, because it is widely-used. Another commenter requested that DHS work with agricultural producer groups in order to find appropriate ways to regulate commonly-used nitrogen fertilizers such as ammonia solutions, anhydrous ammonia, and urea. Commenters believed that the potential hazard or risk posed by these chemicals, particularly in a rural farm setting, is minimal and should not trigger the regulation of farms as “chemical facilities.” Yet other commenters agreed that DHS should exempt urea but for a different reason; they asserted that chemicals that are already highly regulated may not need the additional requirements of this rule, but the fact that a chemical like urea is not highly regulated supports the argument that the chemical by itself is not harmful. Commenters from the fumigation industry pointed out that DHS security regulation of chemicals (such as methyl bromide, chloropicrin, and sulfuryl fluoride) is unnecessary, since these substances are commonly used in the fumigation industry and already regulated under other federal regulatory schemes. In addition, commenters pointed out that there are licensing and control standards for these substances. Moreover, these chemicals are usually kept in small amounts in small containers under secure conditions by people who are licensed. *Response:* Pursuant to the authorizing legislation for part 27, the Department has exempted select facilities from this regulation. *See* Section 550(a) and § 27.110(b). Commenters to both the Advance Notice and to Appendix A requested that DHS exempt additional facilities and industries, such as universities, medical research institutes, and farms. Consistent with its position in the IFR, DHS has not provided any additional regulatory text exemptions. *See* 67 FR 17688, 17699. There are risks with facilities possessing certain amounts of certain chemicals, and the Department is seeking to address these risks under its new authority in Section 550. This extends to all facilities that present high levels of security risk and possess chemicals that may be of interest to terrorists. Moreover, these risks are associated with the characteristics and quantity of the chemical, rather than the business or activity associated with the industry or facility. As such, it would not be appropriate for DHS to exempt, by regulation, entire types of activities or industries. Nevertheless, the Department realizes the commercial importance of Appendix A chemicals of interest and does not seek to undermine their legitimate production, use, and/or sale. To that end, the Department has made numerous changes to the appendix and discusses them in section II of this preamble. In short, DHS has clearly identified the security issue(s) associated with each chemical, removed the “any amount” STQs, 61 removed chemicals (including acetone and urea), and developed a specialized approach for certain chemicals (including propane and AN). In addition, as discussed in the relevant sections above, DHS notes that it removed methyl bromide and chloropicrin from the list of chemicals in Appendix A. 61 *See* footnote 64. 4. Overlap With Other Federal Entities *Comment:* Many commenters expressed concern that the new rule creates regulatory redundancy. They indicated that numerous federal agencies, including ATF, DOT, DOJ, EPA, OSHA, TSA, and USCG, already have regulations on the identified chemicals and that some of these agencies heavily regulate companies that deal with chemicals. Commenters explained that companies that store and transport these materials must conduct a comprehensive risk and vulnerability assessment based on storage prior to transport, personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security. Commenters indicated that they would like to see consistency and cooperation between agencies. Commenters argued that DHS should remove chemicals that are already regulated by other federal agencies and pointed to several examples. Commenters asserted that the EPA, through the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136 *et seq.* , and DOT regulates chemicals such as methyl bromide, chloropicrin, and sulfuryl fluoride. Other commenters asserted that the EPA, through the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C.11011 *et seq.* , and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulate hydrogen peroxide (concentration of at least 30%). And yet other commenters pointed out that DOT regulates propane; DOT, along with EPA, regulates phosphine; and the DOC regulates triethanolamine under its Chemical Weapons Convention

(CWC)regulations. Other commenters recommended that DHS exempt facilities that are regulated by other federal agencies. Specifically, commenters requested exemptions for facilities that have already complied with EPA's Risk Management Program; natural gas pipelines and utility facilities that DOT's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) regulates; and facilities that have been screened out of the Maritime Transportation Security Act

(MTSA)( *e.g.* , offshore oil and gas facilities). Commenters asserted that the EPA RMP regulations, PHMSA pipeline and U.S. Coast Guard MTSA regulations assess facilities with similar criteria ( *i.e.* , potential risk to the public, the environment, and economic health) and therefore thought that DHS efforts would be redundant and a waste of resources. Many small businesses commented that it would be difficult for them to keep up with part 27 and other federal regulations, especially since TQs and STQs vary between agencies. Several commenters suggested that DHS should set its STQs consistent with those of other federal agencies or regulatory programs ( *e.g.* , OSHA, EPA, DOC). Commenters most frequently recommended that DHS use EPA RMP TQs and either substitute them categorically for all STQs or at least for the proposed “any amount” STQs. One commenter recommended that a chemical of interest that is also an extremely hazardous substance under EPA's Emergency Planning and Notification regulations at 40 CFR part 355 should have an STQ no lower than its threshold planning quantity. With respect to explosives, commenters pointed out that the explosives industry is already heavily regulated by DOT, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and ATF and is subject to risk assessments. Commenters believe the DHS efforts would be redundant and excessive for a low-threat industry. By contrast, another commenter suggested that DHS expand the list of COI to incorporate those substances regulated by the ATF. The commenter stated that explosives present security risks beyond manufacturing (such as transportation, end storage, and potential theft) that need to be taken into account. *Response:* The Department recognizes that multiple federal entities regulate matters related to chemicals. In the Advance Notice to part 27, the Department discussed pre-existing chemical security and safety programs, such as those of the USCG, EPA, OSHA, and ATF. The Department notes, however, that each entity regulates chemicals for distinct reasons. Congress has given each entity a different mandate, and so each entity must satisfy its mandate. For example, OSHA is concerned with, inter alia, the protection of employees that use certain chemicals in the workplace. DOT is concerned with the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials. EPA, through its RMP program, is concerned with preventing an accidental release of certain chemicals. DHS, however, is concerned with the security implications of facilities possessing these chemicals. Congress has given DHS explicit authority to regulate security at chemical facilities. To the extent there is overlap in the jurisdiction and efforts of multiple federal entities, DHS will work with those entities to coordinate efforts. Within DHS, the Department has already undertaken steps among headquarters and component offices ( *e.g.* , USCG, DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection/Chemical Security Compliance Division (CSCD), and TSA) to coordinate the application and enforcement of regulatory programs related to chemical security. There are liaison positions within CSCD for individuals from other DHS offices and components. In addition, DHS has developed informal and formal working groups to coordinate Departmental regulatory authorities in the chemical sector. With respect to federal entities outside of DHS, the Department will consider the necessity of various formalized arrangements, such as an inter-agency coordination process to resolve jurisdictional questions or conflicts, as this regulatory program develops. Despite the differing mandates between federal agencies that regulate chemicals, the Department has looked to the regulatory programs of these other federal agencies for guidance and direction. The Department found great value in considering a number of these regulatory programs, including those of the ATF, DOC, Department of Energy (DOE), DOT, EPA, and OSHA. In fact, the Department references, uses, and cites many of these regulations in this rule. With respect to offshore oil and gas facilities, as discussed in the IFR at 72 FR 17699, the Department notes that the statute (Section 550) and the regulation (§ 27.110(b)) exempt facilities regulated pursuant to MTSA. 5. Concerns About Being Over-Inclusive Section 27.105 defines a chemical facility as an establishment that “possesses or plans to possess, at any relevant point in time, a quantity of a chemical substance determined by the Secretary to be potentially dangerous or that meets other risk-related criteria identified by the Department.” *Comment:* Numerous commenters stated that this definition of a “chemical facility,” along with the chemicals and STQs listed in proposed Appendix A, will capture far more facilities than Congress originally intended. Commenters were concerned that these facilities, which they did not consider high risk facilities, would need to complete and submit a Top-Screen because of the proposed COI and STQs. For example, 105 of the 331 chemicals on the proposed list have a STQ with no “de minimis” quantity (i.e., an STQ of “any amount.”). Among those listed are many common chemicals (e.g., carbon monoxide) that can be found in many low risk facilities. As a result of the proposed list of COI and STQs, the rule would end up covering many entities that would not expect to be covered, such as rural schools, summer camps, universities, research facilities, farms, agricultural retailers, grocery stores, fumigators, and residential homes. Commenters asserted that if DHS did not alter its definition of chemical facility, the chemicals in the COI list, and the STQs on the COI list, DHS would receive a drastically larger number of Top-Screens (than the 40,000 Top-Screens, which DHS estimated in regulatory evaluation for the IFR). Commenters argued that the number of Top-Screens would be as high as hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions. Commenters believe this will bog down the review process, use too many resources on low risk facilities, and become counter-productive in the attempt to secure the homeland. Commenters were also concerned that if entities which did not expect to be included (e.g., farmers, small business owners, or home owners) are, in fact, included in Appendix A and expected to complete the Top-Screen, those entities will not know of the requirement and not comply, thereby incurring possible penalties and other consequences (e.g., filing fees, costs associated with hiring DHS compliance consultants). *Response:* In part 27, the Department classifies chemical facilities as high risk based on the presence of chemicals that may be an attractive target for terrorists. DHS has identified security issue(s) for each chemical, and that security issue is associated with the characteristics and quantity of the chemical. If a facility possesses that chemical at the specified amount, the Department expects that the facility will complete a Top-Screen. While the Department has not narrowed its definition of “chemical facility,” 62 the Department has refined the list of chemicals, as well as the parameters for including chemicals. *See* section II of the preamble. Among the changes, DHS established many new STQs, eliminated the “any amount” STQ, and has included new calculation provisions. The Department expects that these changes will effectively exclude most farmers, home owners, and small businesses from the Top-Screen process. The Department believes that its estimate regarding entities that will complete the Top-Screen continues to be accurate. 62 For a discussion on the definition of “chemical facility,” see footnote 61. In addition, the Department is providing some clarification on the coverage of truck terminals. The Department is taking the same approach toward truck terminals that it has taken toward railroad facilities. *See* 72 FR 17698-17699. DHS presently does not plan to screen truck terminals for inclusion in the Section 550 regulatory program, and therefore DHS will not request that owners and operators of truck terminals complete the Top-Screen risk assessment methodology. DHS and its components, including TSA, have concurrent and overlapping jurisdiction with respect to certain aspects of chemical security. DHS is working, and will continue to work, to address this overlapping jurisdiction and to determine whether it would want to include trucking terminals in its chemical security program. As with railroad facilities, DHS may, in the future re-evaluate the coverage of trucking terminals. DHS would do so by issuing a rulemaking considering the matter. Finally, in response to commenters who indicate that there may be a lack of awareness about these requirements, the Department notes that publication of a document in the **Federal Register** is official notice of a document's existence and its contents to those parties that may be subject to it or affected by it. In this case, the IFR and this final rule puts all affected parties on notice that they must comply with the terms of part 27. Despite this fact, the Department has undertaken outreach efforts since the publication of this IFR and will continue to do so. C. Screening Threshold Quantities 1. In General *Comment:* There were many comments about the STQs assigned to the chemicals in the list. The majority of commenters recommended that DHS increase the STQs, arguing that the proposed STQs were too low. Commenters asserted that DHS should significantly increase the STQs to relieve the burden on very low risk facilities. Other commenters argued that low STQs for common, widely-used chemicals will impose a huge burden on industry overall as well as a burden on small entities that make small amounts of several, different chemicals. By contrast, only one individual commenter recommended a downward STQ adjustment (for chlorine). *Response:* The Department has revised its approach to Appendix A, including substantial changes to the STQs. The changes are discussed in depth above in section II(C). *Comment:* Some individuals noted that a particular site or facility might have several locations where there is a small quantity of a COI, but in the aggregate the site could have more than an STQ. The commenters asked whether the threshold amount should be applied to the entire site, even if the different locations within the site are widely separated from one another. Another commenter thought that DHS should clarify its definition of STQ to include “all sources of a given chemical from a given facility, not just single sources with quantities that exceed STQs.” *Response:* As DHS discussed in the comment response about colleges and universities, facilities have flexibility to define their boundaries and identify the party (or parties) at their institution that is responsible for compliance. The requirements of part 27 are facility-specific. *Comment:* A commenter suggested that, because of varying uses or toxicity, DHS list STQs in smaller units of measures (i.e., grams) in addition to pounds. *Response:* Where appropriate, the Department has listed STQs in units other than pounds. For example, the Department lists the cumulative STQ for specified theft/diversion-CW/CWP chemicals at 100 grams. 2. Modifying the “Any Amount” STQ *Comment:* Several commenters expressed an opinion on the “any amount” STQ in the proposed appendix. Many commenters urged DHS to replace the “any amount” STQs with numeric levels. One commenter encouraged DHS to set the thresholds at amounts that reflect what experts believe is sufficient to produce an off-site consequence to the public as a result of attack, theft, or conversion into a weapon of mass destruction. Yet other commenters asked DHS to clarify the meaning of “any amount.” For example, one individual asked how a facility would know when it came into possession of “any amount.” Other commenters pointed out that certain COI are ingredients in many nonhazardous products, such as foods and cosmetics, and therefore thought that DHS would not have intended for those products to be subject to the rule. For example, an 8-ounce glass of whole milk contains approximately 230 milligrams of phosphorus, and yet DHS listed phosphorus as a COI with an STQ of “any amount.” Other commenters noted that if DHS retained the “any amount” STQ, every home, grocery store, and school with only a detectable amount would have to comply with the regulation. These commenters did not think that such a tiny amount of chemicals would make a viable terrorist target. Other commenters suggested that the “any amount” STQ would create a larger burden for both DHS and facilities that would otherwise not be affected by this rule. This, in turn, would divert limited resources away from those facilities that can actually be considered terrorist targets. A food industry commenter believed that overly expansive coverage would cause facilities in the industry to focus on chemical security compliance rather than potential threats to the food supply. *Response:* The Department has removed the “any amount STQs” from the list, and for the vast majority of chemicals, DHS assigned a numeric quantity to the STQ for each chemical. 63 The revised STQs are geared toward the hazard and consequences associated with the chemical. 63 for sabotage/contamination chemicals, a facility meets the STQ if it possesses A Placarded Amount—i.e., if it ships the listed chemical of interest and is required to placard the shipment of that chemical pursuant to DOT regulations at 49 CFR part 172. DOT regulations identify the amounts (such as “any quantity” or “1,001 lbs or more) for which placarding is required.” See 49 CFR 172.504. 3. Mixtures and Solutions *Comment:* Several individuals, entities, and organizations believed that the proposed appendix was unclear about the applicability of STQs to mixtures and solutions. Commenters argued that the concentration of a COI is the most important factor affecting potential harm. Commenters asserted that when a COI is listed in Appendix A without a percent concentration, then the STQ should apply to the weight of the pure substance, not to the weight of a mixture or solution. Alternatively, commenters suggested that DHS should establish minimum concentrations for all COI. Some commenters noted that the properties of a mixture might be significantly different from the properties of the listed COI that caused the mixture to be considered a health or security risk. One commenter suggested that DHS should exclude mixtures from the list, since most chemical mixtures do not share the same risk profile as their pure compound counterpart (e.g., acetone, cyanides, fertilizers, and gas mixtures). *Response:* The Department recognizes the importance of providing guidance on mixtures, and as discussed in section II, the Department added a new regulatory section that addresses mixtures. *See* § 27.204. The Department generally disagrees with commenters who assert that chemical mixtures are not a security concern. For example, toxic chemical mixtures are a security concern given their ability to vaporize from the mixture and potentially create a toxic cloud. Similarly, certain minimum concentrations of poisonous gases, particularly the highly toxic gasses, are potential weapons even in extremely low concentrations. D. Revisions to the COI List 1. Technical Corrections *Comment:* A handful of commenters noted that DHS had duplicate entries for chemicals in proposed Appendix A. The Department listed each of the four following chemicals twice, with a different STQ (“any amount” and 2000 pounds) for each entry:

(1)Phosphorus oxychloride,

(2)phosphorus pentachloride,

(3)phosphorus trichloride, and

(4)thionyl chloride. In addition, the Department listed each of the following three chemicals twice by listing the chemical under two synonymous names:

(1)Calcium dithionite and calcium hydrosulfite,

(2)sodium dithionite and sodium hydrosulfite, and

(3)zinc dithionite and zinc hydrosulfite. The Department not only listed each of the following two chemicals twice by listing the chemical under two synonymous names, but also listed a different STQ under each name:

(1)Hydrogen cyanide (any amount) and hydrocyanic acid (1,875 pounds), and

(2)carbonyl sulfide (any amount) and carbon oxysulfide (7,500 pounds). Commenters noted that Appendix A listed incorrect CAS numbers for the following six chemicals: hexyltrichlorosilane, sodium phosphide, hexotonal, chromium oxychloride, diethyl phosphate, and dimethyl phosphate. *Response:* The Department appreciates the input from commenters on chemical names and CAS numbers. The Department used that information to ensure the accuracy of Appendix A. To that end, the Department has removed and revised duplicate entries, corrected CAS numbers, and added a column to the appendix containing commonly-used synonyms for certain chemicals of interest. 2. Formatting and Approach *Comment:* A few commenters recommended that DHS parallel the DOT hazard class approach in classifying and listing chemicals. The Institute of Makers of Explosives

(IME)made this suggestion in the context of explosives. To illustrate their point, the IME provided examples of chemicals in the same hazard class as several COI included in the Department's chemical-by-chemical approach. *Response:* As noted in the IFR, DHS's primary approach in this appendix is through the association of individual chemicals with specific security issues. While DHS will not preclude the use of hazard classes for other purposes (e.g., in the risk-based performance standard guidelines), DHS is not using the DOT hazard class approach at this point in time. *Comment:* One commenter suggested that DHS add the following generic “Not Otherwise Specified” (N.O.S.) chemicals to the COI list: Poison Gas, N.O.S.; Flammable Gas, N.O.S.; Flammable Liquid, N.O.S.; Spontaneous Combustible Liquid, N.O.S.; Organic Peroxide, N.O.S.; Poison Inhalation Hazard, N.O.S. The commenter suggested that DHS assign large STQ values to these N.O.S. chemicals. *Response:* For the reasons discussed above in sections II(C)(2) and II(C)(4), the Department is not using the DOT approach of categorizing chemicals, 64 and so DHS has not included N.O.S. chemicals on the COI list. 65 Instead, DHS has included chemicals on the COI list if they are uniquely identifiable. The Department, of course, retains its discretion to expand the COI list to include these or other chemicals in the future, as necessary. 64 Through its Hazardous Material Table in 49 CFR 172.101, DOT regulates the transportation of hazardous materials. For each material listed, DOT identifies a hazard class, provides the proper shipping name, and specifies the applicable requirements (e.g., labeling, packaging, etc). To denote hazardous materials without a specific shipping name, DOT uses the suffix “N.O.S.” and a generic shipping name. 65 The only exception is germanium tetrafluoride, which DHS discusses in section (II)(C)(4)(a) above. *Comment:* A commenter requested that DHS list the chemicals in CAS numerical sequence in addition to listing them in alphabetical order. *Response:* At this time, the Department will not list chemicals in CAS numerical sequence. The Department has, however, re-formatted the final Appendix, making it more user-friendly. E. Other Comments 1. Procedural Issues *Comment:* Many commenters were upset that DHS did not publish Appendix A in the Advance Notice. A large number of commenters wanted the comment period for Appendix A extended for an additional 30 to 60 days. Many commenters thought that 30 days was not a sufficient amount of time to fully digest and analyze the regulations. *Response:* Congress provided the Department with six months to promulgate interim final regulations on chemical security. *See* Section 550(a). The Department not only met that short deadline, but it published both an Advance Notice and IFR within that six-month period. While the Department did not include Appendix A in the Advance Notice, it nonetheless has provided the public with an opportunity to comment on the appendix. In the IFR, the Department provided the public with 30 days to comment on proposed Appendix A. The Department was unable to extend that time period, given that the Department is seeking to facilitate the expeditious implementation of this chemical security regulatory program. Until the Department finalizes Appendix A, the Department cannot fully implement this program. *Comment:* A few commenters asked that DHS incorporate procedures for changing the chemicals and STQs in Appendix A. Commenters want to be able to request that DHS delist (or remove) a chemical from Appendix A. Other commenters asked that DHS provide a 90 day comment period when adding chemicals. *Response:* DHS plans to periodically update the list of chemicals in Appendix A and will do so through notice and comment. At this time, DHS is not including a petition process like that of EPA, where members of the public may petition the EPA to add or delete substances from the RMP list. *See* 40 CFR 27.120. *Comment:* Commenters asked that the media be more involved in conveying information about the final rule, because they believe that there are many smaller businesses that are potentially affected and yet are not aware of these new standards. Commenters are concerned that individuals and businesses could face severe financial penalties or unfair prosecution if they lack a full understanding of the rule and fail to comply. *Response:* The Department recognizes the need for ongoing and expanded outreach on this regulatory program, and the Department has already initiated such outreach. For example, the Department began participating in conferences soon after the effective date of part 27 (e.g., the American Chemistry Council's ChemSecure Security Conference and Expo from April 17-19, 2007). The Department has also supported other events, such as the 2007 Chemical Sector Security Summit on June 11-13, 2007, which was convened by the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council. 66 In addition, the Department provides informative and up-to-date resources about part 27 on its Web site ( *http://www.dhs.gov/chemicalsecurity* ). The Department is interested in collaborating with private and public stakeholders, as well as the media, in the interest of promoting a full understanding of, and effective compliance with, part 27. 66 For information on the conference, see *http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1176736485793.shtm* 2. Compliance Issues *Comment:* Several commenters asked DHS for clarification on identifying the responsible party for submitting information through the Top-Screen. One commenter asked who, if anyone, is responsible to submit a Top-Screen, in each of the following three scenarios:

(1)If an American company buys a COI from one country and ships it directly to another country without ever possessing it;

(2)If an American company buys a COI from a foreign nation and temporarily stores it for resale to another USA or Canadian company; and,

(3)If an American company buys a COI above the threshold limit from an overseas producer and sells it to another USA company without ever handling it in their facility. *Response:* Part 27 applies to facilities located in the U.S. All facilities located in the U.S., including both domestic and foreign companies, that possess chemicals at the applicable STQ must complete and submit a Top-Screen. The converse is that a facility which does not operate in the U.S. and never possesses chemicals in the U.S., even if it is a U.S. company, does not have to complete and submit a Top-Screen. An American company that purchases chemicals of interest from one foreign country and ships it to another foreign country, without ever possessing the chemical in the U.S. does not need to complete and submit a Top-Screen. Any company, whether domestic or foreign, that stores chemicals of interest in the U.S. in quantities that at any time meet or exceed the STQ must complete and submit a Top-Screen. The Department realizes there are numerous, complicated business arrangements. Where a facility is unsure about its responsibility for compliance, the facility should consult with the Department pursuant to § 27.120, and the Department can work with the facility to resolve those issues. *Comment:* Other commenters raised concerns about third party responsibility. Commenters wanted to know who was responsible for complying with part 27 if a company or individual relies upon a third party to store and secure an Appendix A chemical above the STQ. There was also confusion over third party contractors/vendors who temporarily store COI on-site while completing a job. Commenters explained that the challenge is to determine who completes and submits, and how often, a Top-Screen for a temporary tank. Storage of COI may be temporary or transient in nature, which creates confusion about how to apply the definition of facility to COI. A few commenters asked if a landlord is responsible for ensuring compliance with DHS regulations if their tenant company leases a warehouse and stores a COI above its allotted threshold. *Response:* Whether a landlord or tenant is responsible for submitting a Top-Screen will depend on which party is responsible for security of the chemical. The party responsible for the security of the chemical is responsible for submitting the Top-Screen. This may vary depending on the operational and/or contractual relationship between the parties. *Comment:* A few commenters suggested that, in determining whether a facility possesses the chemicals in Appendix A at the quantities that trigger a Top-Screen, DHS should not include quantities of a chemical of interest that a facility is using or processing on-site. In some cases, a process might create a chemical of interest but not result in the storage of that chemical of interest. For example, carbon monoxide produced during combustion is transitory, and sulfur dioxide and sulfur trioxide are created and consumed during flue gas conditioning. *Response:* A facility shall calculate the STQ for release-toxic chemicals, such as sulfur trioxide, based on a facility's total inventory of the chemical. The Department has added clarity to this issue, by adding calculation provisions for each security issue. Section § 27.203(b)(1)(iii), in particular, provides that facilities shall include in their release STQ chemicals of interest that are present as process intermediates, by-products, or materials produced incidental to the production of a product. The Department notes that it no longer includes carbon monoxide on the list of chemicals in Appendix A. *Comment:* Commenters asked whether a facility, after not having a COI for an extended period of time, would have to re-submit a Top-Screen if the facility obtained a COI above the STQ. *Response:* Under § 27.210(a)(1)(i), a facility that possesses any of the chemicals listed in Appendix A at or above the corresponding STQs must complete and submit a Top-Screen within 60 calendar days of the effective date of this final rule. In addition, a facility that *comes into possession* of any of the chemicals in Appendix A at the listed STQs must complete and submit a Top-Screen within 60 calendar days of coming into possession of the chemicals (emphasis added). *Comment:* Commenters suggested that DHS establish a “holding-time” threshold for chemicals, with time frames including 30 days and 60 days. Some commenters suggested an exemption for facilities that possess chemicals only for short periods of time. *Response:* DHS has not established a “holding-time” threshold for chemicals. If terrorists have a reason to know that an attractive chemical is present at a facility, the duration for which it is present is largely irrelevant. As a result, a facility must submit and complete a Top-Screen if it possesses chemicals of interest in a quantity that at any time meets the STQ. 3. Miscellaneous *Comment:* One commenter was concerned that there was a lack of information describing the tier-based risk assessments. Another commenter indicated that they were unable to submit comprehensive comments, because DHS has not established criteria and performance standards for determining risk-based tiers. *Response:* Although these comments are outside the scope of the rulemaking, the Department provides a response, in the hopes of promoting a fuller understanding of part 27. The Department is preparing a comprehensive guidance document that provides detailed explanations for the requirements by tier. The Department will make this guidance document available to facilities that have a need to know the information. *Comment:* Commenters expressed concerns about the financial impact of these new regulations on the American economy. Some feel that the regulations would impose a larger financial burden on U.S.-based companies, giving foreign companies an advantage. One commenter, in particular, was concerned that there will be an undue economic burden on local businesses if DHS requires background checks for any level of facility. This, in turn, could lead to non-compliance. A few commenters requested that DHS establish and publish qualifications for reviewers 67 and that DHS require reviewers to register with CSAT. Other commenters noted that the EPA and other agencies release operating information to the public; they thought that DHS, however, should, for security reasons, maintain as classified the information that it collects because of part 27. Another commenter, after noting that registration is only internet-based, requested that paper registration be made available for areas that do not have public internet access. 67 A facility has the option of designating a reviewer for its facility. A reviewer is an individual who can review, but not enter, edit, or submit, information in the CSAT system. A facility can add a reviewer any time after the CSAT User Registration process. One commenter was concerned that the Chemical Security Regulatory Task Force, which consists of five trained individuals, would not be able to guide the thousands of facilities seeking guidance on these regulations. A few commenters were concerned about DHS's ability to process information requests quickly enough so that requesting companies would not be denied or penalized as a result. A commenter recommended that DHS replace the open-ended questions in the Top-Screen (which asks for the value of products shipped from facilities) with a pull down menu listing ranges of values. The commenter thought that this would help incorporate the smaller sites that are exempt from the comparatively high thresholds for declaring and hosting inspections of chemical weapons and their precursors under the CWC. *Response:* These comments are outside the scope of this rulemaking, which addresses the list of chemicals in Appendix A. IV. Regulatory Analyses A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review DHS prepared and placed in the docket a Regulatory Assessment addressing the economic impact of the IFR. *See* 72 FR 172688. That Regulatory Assessment is applicable to this final rule. B. Regulatory Flexibility Act The Regulatory Flexibility Act

(RFA)mandates that an agency conduct an RFA analysis when an agency is required to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking. *See* 5 U.S.C. 603(a). Because the Department was not required to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking for part 27, 68 the Department was not required to conduct a RFA analysis. Nevertheless, the Department did consider the impacts of part 27 on small entities, providing that analysis in the Regulatory Assessment for the IFR. *See* 72 FR 172688. That analysis is applicable to this final rule. 68 By directing the Secretary to issue “interim final regulations,” Congress authorized the Secretary to proceed without the traditional notice-and-comment required by the Administrative Procedure Act. *See* 71 FR 78276. List of Subjects Chemical security, Facilities, Incorporation by reference, Reporting and recordkeeping, Security measures. The Final Rule For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Department of Homeland Security revises part 27 to Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, to read as follows: Title 6—Department of Homeland Security Chapter 1—Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Secretary PART 27—CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM STANDARDS 1. The authority citation for part 27 continues to read as follows: Authority: Pub. L. 109-295, sec. 550. 2. Add the following definitions, in alphabetical order, to § 27.105, to read as follows: § 27.105 Definitions. *A Commercial Grade (ACG)* shall refer to any quality or concentration of a chemical of interest offered for commercial sale that a facility uses, stores, manufactures, or ships. *A Placarded Amount (APA)* shall refer to the STQ for a sabotage and contamination chemical of interest, as calculated in accordance with § 27.203(d). *Chemical of Interest* shall refer to a chemical listed in Appendix A to part 27. *CUM 100g* shall refer to the cumulative STQ of 100 grams for designated theft/diversion-CW/CWP chemicals and which is located in Appendix A to part 27 as the entry for the STQ and Minimum Concentration of certain theft/diversion-CW/CWP chemicals. *Security Issue* shall refer to the type of risks associated with a given chemical. For purposes of this part, there are four main security issues:

(1)Release (including toxic, flammable, and explosive); (2)Theft and diversion (including chemical weapons and chemical weapons precursors, weapons of mass effect, and explosives and improvised explosive device precursors),

(3)Sabotage and contamination, and

(4)Critical to government mission and national economy. 3. Amend § 27.200 by revising paragraph (b)(2) to read as follows: § 27.200 Information regarding security risk for a chemical facility.

(b)* * *

(2)A facility must complete and submit a Top-Screen in accordance with the schedule provided in § 27.210, the calculation provisions in § 27.203, and the minimum concentration provisions in § 27.204 if it possesses any of the chemicals listed in Appendix A to this part at or above the STQ for any applicable Security Issue. 4. Add § 27.203 to read as follows: § 27.203 Calculating the screening threshold quantity by security issue.

(a)*General.* In calculating whether a facility possesses a chemical of interest that meets the STQ for any security issue, a facility need not include chemicals of interest:

(1)Used as a structural component;

(2)Used as products for routine janitorial maintenance;

(3)Contained in food, drugs, cosmetics, or other personal items used by employees;

(4)In process water or non-contact cooling water as drawn from environment or municipal sources;

(5)In air either as compressed air or as part of combustion;

(6)Contained in articles, as defined in 40 CFR 68.3;

(7)In solid waste (including hazardous waste) regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901 *et. seq.,* except for the waste described in 40 CFR 261.33;

(8)in naturally occurring hydrocarbon mixtures prior to entry of the mixture into a natural gas processing plant or a petroleum refining process unit. Naturally occurring hydrocarbon mixtures include condensate, crude oil, field gas, and produced water as defined in 40 CFR 68.3.

(b)*Release Chemicals.* —(1) *Release-Toxic, Release-Flammable, and Release-Explosive Chemicals.* Except as provided in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3), in calculating whether a facility possesses an amount that meets the STQ for release chemicals of interest, the facility shall only include release chemicals of interest:

(i)In a vessel as defined in 40 CFR 68.3, in a underground storage facility, or stored in a magazine as defined in 27 CFR 555.11;

(ii)In transportation containers used for storage not incident to transportation, including transportation containers connected to equipment at a facility for loading or unloading and transportation containers detached from the motive power that delivered the container to the facility;

(iii)Present as process intermediates, by-products, or materials produced incidental to the production of a product if they exist at any given time;

(iv)In natural gas or liquefied natural gas stored in peak shaving facilities; and

(v)In gasoline, diesel, kerosene or jet fuel (including fuels that have flammability hazard ratings of 1, 2, 3, or 4, as determined by using National Fire Protection Association

(NFPA)704: Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response [2007 ed.], which is incorporated by reference at 27.204(a)(2)) stored in aboveground tank farms, including tank farms that are part of pipeline systems;

(2)Release-Toxic, Release-Flammable, and Release-Explosive Chemicals. Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2)(i), in calculating whether a facility possesses an amount that meets the STQ for release-toxic, release-flammable, and release-explosive chemicals, a facility need not include release-toxic, release-flammable, or release-explosive chemicals of interest that a facility manufactures, processes or uses in a laboratory at the facility under the supervision of a technically qualified individual as defined in 40 CFR 720.3.

(i)This exemption does not apply to specialty chemical production; manufacture, processing, or use of substances in pilot plant scale operations; or activities, including research and development, involving chemicals of interest conducted outside the laboratory.

(ii)[Reserved]

(3)Propane. In calculating whether a facility possesses an amount that meets the STQ for propane, a facility need not include propane in tanks of 10,000 pounds or less.

(c)*Theft and Diversion Chemicals.* In calculating whether a facility possesses an amount of a theft/diversion chemical of interest that meets the STQ, the facility shall only include theft/diversion chemicals of interest in a transportation packaging, as defined in 49 CFR 171.8. Where a theft/diversion-Chemical Weapons

(d)*Sabotage and Contamination Chemicals.* A facility meets the STQ for a sabotage/contamination chemical of interest if it ships the chemical and is required to placard the shipment of that chemical pursuant to the provisions of subpart F of 49 CFR part 172. 5. Add § 27.204 to read as follows: § 27.204 Minimum concentration by security issue.

(a)*Release Chemicals—*

(1)*Release-Toxic Chemicals.* If a release-toxic chemical of interest is present in a mixture, and the concentration of the chemical is equal to or greater than one percent (1%) by weight, the facility shall count the amount of the chemical of interest in the mixture toward the STQ. If a release-toxic chemical of interest is present in a mixture, and the concentration of the chemical is less than one percent (1%) by weight of the mixture, the facility need not count the amount of that chemical in the mixture in determining whether the facility possesses the STQ. Except for oleum, if the concentration of the chemical of interest in the mixture is one percent (1%) or greater by weight, but the facility can demonstrate that the partial pressure of the regulated substance in the mixture (solution) under handling or storage conditions in any portion of the process is less than 10 millimeters of mercury (mm Hg), the amount of the substance in the mixture in that portion of a vessel need not be considered when determining the STQ. The facility shall document this partial pressure measurement or estimate.

(2)*Release-Flammable Chemicals.* If a release-flammable chemical of interest is present in a mixture in a concentration equal to or greater than one percent (1%) by weight of the mixture, and the mixture has a National Fire Protection Association

(NFPA)flammability hazard rating of 4, the facility shall count the entire amount of the mixture toward the STQ. Except as provided in § 27.203(b)(1)(v) for fuels that are stored in aboveground tank farms (including farms that are part of pipeline systems), if a release-flammable chemical of interest is present in a mixture in a concentration equal to or greater than one percent (1%) by weight of the mixture, and the mixture has a National Fire Protection Association

(NFPA)flammability hazard rating of 1, 2, or 3, the facility need not count the mixture toward the STQ. The flammability hazard ratings are defined in NFPA 704: Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response [2007 ed.]. The Director of the Federal Register approves the incorporation by reference of this standard in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You may obtain a copy of the incorporated standard from the National Fire Protection Association at 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471 or *http://www.nfpa.org.* You may inspect a copy of the incorporated standard at the Department of Homeland Security, 1621 Kent Street, 9th Floor, Rosslyn VA (please call 703-235-0709) to make an appointment or at the or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to *http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.* If a release-flammable chemical of interest is present in a mixture, and the concentration of the chemical is less than one percent (1%) by weight, the facility need not count the mixture in determining whether the facility possesses the STQ.

(3)*Release-Explosive Chemicals.* For each release-explosive chemical of interest, a facility shall count the total quantity of all commercial grades of the chemical of interest toward the STQ, unless a specific minimum concentration is assigned in the Minimum Concentration column of Appendix A to part 27, in which case the facility should count the total quantity of all commercial grades of the chemical at the specified minimum concentration.

(b)*Theft and Diversion Chemicals.*

(1)Theft/Diversion-Chemical Weapons

(CW)and Chemical Weapons Precursors (CWP Chemicals: Where a theft/diversion-CWC/CWP chemical of interest is not designated by “CUM 100g” in Appendix A, and the chemical is present in a mixture at or above the minimum concentration amount listed in the Minimum Concentration column of Appendix A to part 27, the facility shall count the entire amount of the mixture toward the STQ.

(2)Theft/Diversion-Weapon of Mass Effect

(WME)Chemicals: If a theft/diversion-WME chemical of interest is present in a mixture at or above the minimum concentration amount listed in the Minimum Concentration column of Appendix A to part 27, the facility shall count the entire amount of the mixture toward the STQ.

(3)Theft/Diversion-Explosives/Improvised Explosive Device Precursor (EXP/IEDP) Chemicals. For each theft/diversion-EXP/IEDP chemical of interest, a facility shall count the total quantity of all commercial grades of the chemical toward the STQ, unless a specific minimum concentration is assigned in the Minimum Concentration column of Appendix A to part 27, in which case the facility should count the total quantity of all commercial grades of the chemical at the specified minimum concentration.

(c)*Sabotage and Contamination Chemicals.* For each sabotage/contamination chemical of interest, a facility shall count the total quantity of all commercial grades of the chemical toward the STQ. 6. Amend § 27.210 by revising paragraph (a)(1)(i) to read as follows: § 27.210 Submissions Schedule. (a)(1)(i) Unless otherwise notified, within 60 calendar days of November 20, 2007 for facilities that possess any of the chemicals listed in Appendix A at or above the STQ for any applicable Security Issue, or within 60 calendar days for facilities that come into possession of any of the chemicals listed in Appendix A at or above the STQ for any applicable Security Issue; or 7. Revise Appendix A to part 27 to read as follows: Appendix A to Part 27: DHS Chemicals of Interest BILLING CODE 4410-10-P ER20NO07.008 ER20NO07.009 ER20NO07.010 ER20NO07.011 ER20NO07.012 ER20NO07.013 ER20NO07.014 ER20NO07.015 ER20NO07.016 ER20NO07.017 ER20NO07.018 ER20NO07.019 ER20NO07.020 ER20NO07.021 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security. [FR Doc. 07-5585 Filed 11-19-07; 8:45 am]

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