Unknown. Final special conditions

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A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.

--- schema: federal-register doc_type: fedreg source_file: FR-2006-12-13.xml --- 71 239 Wednesday, December 13, 2006 Contents Agriculture Agriculture Department See Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service See Forest Service Animal Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service PROPOSED RULES Exportation and importation of animals and animal products: Horse quarantine facilities, permanent, privately owned; standards, 74827-74847 E6-21032 Interstate transportation of animals and animal products (quarantine):

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To subscribe to the Federal Register Table of Contents LISTSERV electronic mailing list, go to http://listserv.access.gpo.gov and select Online mailing list archives, FEDREGTOC-L, Join or leave the list (or change settings); then follow the instructions. 71 239 Wednesday, December 13, 2006 Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM352; Special Conditions No. 25-339-SC] Special Conditions: Airbus Model A380-800 Airplane, Lithium Ion Battery Installation AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. The Airbus A380-800 will incorporate the use of high capacity lithium ion battery technology in on-board systems. For this design feature, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding lithium ion batteries. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. DATES: *Effective Date:* The effective date of these special conditions is November 30, 2006. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Holly Thorson, FAA, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone

(425)227-1357; facsimile

(425)227-1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Airbus applied for FAA certification/validation of the provisionally-designated Model A3XX-100 in its letter AI/L 810.0223/98, dated August 12, 1998, to the FAA. Application for certification by the Joint Aviation Authorities

(1)All characteristics of the lithium ion battery and its installation that could affect safe operation of the Airbus A380-800 airplane are addressed, and

(2)appropriate maintenance requirements are established to ensure the availability of electrical power from the batteries when needed. Background The current regulations governing installation of batteries in large transport category airplanes were derived from Civil Air Regulations

(CAR)Part 4b.625(d) as part of the re-codification of CAR 4b that established 14 CFR Part 25 in February, 1965. The new battery requirements, 14 CFR 25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), basically reworded the CAR requirements. Increased use of nickel-cadmium batteries in small airplanes resulted in increased incidents of battery fires and failures which led to additional rulemaking affecting large transport category airplanes as well as small airplanes. On September 1, 1977 and March 1, 1978, respectively the FAA issued 14 CFR 25.1353c(5) and c(6), governing nickel-cadmium battery installations on large transport category airplanes. The proposed use of lithium ion batteries for the emergency lighting system on the Airbus A380 airplane has prompted the FAA to review the adequacy of these existing regulations. Our review indicates that the existing regulations do not adequately address several failure, operational, and maintenance characteristics of lithium ion batteries that could affect the safety and reliability of the Airbus A380's lithium ion battery installation. At present, there is limited experience with use of rechargeable lithium ion batteries in applications involving commercial aviation. However, other users of this technology, ranging from wireless telephone manufacturers to the electric vehicle industry, have noted safety problems with lithium ion batteries. These problems include overcharging, over-discharging, and flammability of cell components. 1. Overcharging In general, lithium ion batteries are significantly more susceptible to internal failures that can result in self-sustaining increases in temperature and pressure ( *i.e.* , thermal runaway) than their nickel-cadmium or lead-acid counterparts. This is especially true for overcharging which causes heating and destabilization of the components of the cell, leading to the formation (by plating) of highly unstable metallic lithium. The metallic lithium can ignite, resulting in a self-sustaining fire or explosion. Finally, the severity of thermal runaway due to overcharging increases with increasing battery capacity due to the higher amount of electrolyte in large batteries. 2. Over-discharging Discharge of some types of lithium ion batteries beyond a certain voltage (typically 2.4 volts) can cause corrosion of the electrodes of the cell, resulting in loss of battery capacity that cannot be reversed by recharging. This loss of capacity may not be detected by the simple voltage measurements commonly available to flight crews as a means of checking battery status—a problem shared with nickel-cadmium batteries. 3. Flammability of Cell Components Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid batteries, some types of lithium ion batteries use liquid electrolytes that are flammable. The electrolyte can serve as a source of fuel for an external fire, if there is a breach of the battery container. These problems experienced by users of lithium ion batteries raise concern about the use of these batteries in commercial aviation. The intent of the proposed special condition is to establish appropriate airworthiness standards for lithium ion battery installations in the Airbus A380-800 airplane and to ensure, as required by 14 CFR 25.601, that these battery installations are not hazardous or unreliable. To address these concerns, the proposed special conditions adopt the following requirements: • Those sections of 14 CFR 25.1353 that are applicable to lithium ion batteries. • The flammable fluid fire protection requirements of 14 CFR 25.863. In the past, this rule was not applied to batteries of transport category airplanes, since the electrolytes utilized in lead-acid and nickel-cadmium batteries are not flammable. • New requirements to address the hazards of overcharging and over-discharging that are unique to lithium ion batteries. • New maintenance requirements to ensure that batteries used as spares are maintained in an appropriate state of charge. Discussion of Comments Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-06-08-SC, pertaining to the lithium ion battery installation in the Airbus A380 airplane, was published in the **Federal Register** on September 7, 2006. Comments were received from Acme Electric Corporation and the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA). In addition, comments submitted to the European Aviation Safety Agency

(EASA)by the Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom were sent to the FAA by EASA. Comments From Acme Electric Corporation *Requested change 1:* The commenter suggests that “ * * * charging in environments of less than 0 °C [degrees Celsius] will need to be addressed; several references have stated that Lithium metal may plate onto the anode if charged in this environment.” *FAA response:* Paragraph 1 of the special conditions addresses charging environment by requiring that “safe cell temperatures and pressures must be maintained during any foreseeable charging or discharging condition.” We consider charging in environments of less than 0 degrees C to be foreseeable. In our judgment, therefore, this concern is adequately addressed by the special conditions, as proposed. *Requested change 2:* The commenter indicates that the special conditions should address the effects of a short circuit in the battery on the battery itself and on its surroundings. *FAA response:* This issue is addressed in Paragraphs 1 and 6 of the special conditions. Paragraph 1 specifies that Safe cell temperatures and pressures must be maintained during any foreseeable charging or discharging condition and during any failure of the charging or battery monitoring system not shown to be extremely remote. The lithium ion battery installation must preclude explosion in the event of those failures. Paragraph 6 specifies that Each lithium ion battery installation must have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems caused by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short circuit of the battery or of its individual cells. We consider short circuits in the battery to be a failure that is covered by these special conditions. *Requested change 3:* The commenter also states that “At the present time, Lithium Ion batteries require non-passive electronics and/or software as an integral part of the assembly; therefore, additional requirements of 14 CFR 25.1309, 25.1316 and 25.1431 are also needed.” *FAA response:* The requirements of § 25.1309, 25.1316, and 25.1431 do apply to the lithium ion battery installation. The special conditions specify additional requirements that are needed, but not already provided by the part 25 requirements in the A380 certification basis. Comments From the Airline Pilots Association The Airline Pilots Association

(ALPA)conditionally supports the FAA's proposal for special conditions for lithium ion batteries on the A380-800 aircraft, but “strongly maintains that there needs to be adequate protections and procedures in place to ensure that concerns regarding lithium ion batteries are fully addressed and protected against.” Appended to the ALPA comments was a copy of FAA report DOT/FAA/AR-06/38, September 2006, Flammability Assessment of Bulk-Packed, Rechargeable Lithium-Ion Cells in Transport Category Aircraft. With the knowledge of the safety hazards described in the appended report and by others, ALPA requested that the FAA consider the specific concerns discussed below. *Requested change 4:* The commenter requests that Paragraph 3 of the special conditions be revised to ensure that the certification design of the A380 prevents explosive or toxic gasses emitted by a lithium ion battery from entering the cabin. The commenter also requests that the FAA assure that flight crew procedures and training are adequate to protect both passengers and crew, if explosive or toxic gasses do enter the cabin. *FAA response:* The FAA has no regulations that prohibit smoke or gasses from electrical equipment in the electrical equipment bays from entering the flightdeck or passenger cabins. However, 14 CFR 25.857 prohibits hazardous quantities of smoke, flames, or extinguishing agents from cargo compartments from entering any compartment occupied by the crew or passengers. Paragraph

(3)of these special conditions specifies that No explosive or toxic gasses emitted by any lithium ion battery in normal operation or as the result of any failure of the battery charging system, monitoring system, or battery installation—not shown to be extremely remote—may accumulate in hazardous quantities within the airplane.” The special conditions require that any explosive or toxic gasses emitted by a lithium ion battery be limited to less than hazardous quantities anywhere on the airplane. (A separate set of special conditions pertaining to fire protection for the A380 requires a demonstration of means to prevent hazardous quantities of smoke originating from an electrical equipment bay from penetrating into the flightdeck or passenger cabins.) Finally, FAA operational requirements ensure that all crewmembers receive adequate training in both normal and emergency equipment and procedures. Flight attendants are cognizant of cabin environmental conditions and are trained to report smoke or fumes in the cabin. Flightdeck crew are aware of emergency procedures for responding to smoke, gasses, or fumes from known or unknown sources. *Requested change 5:* The commenter states, We are very concerned with a fire erupting in flight, and being able to rapidly extinguish it. The Special Conditions should require that there be a means provided to apply extinguishing agents by the flight (cabin) crew instead of promoting it as an option in managing the threat posed by the use of lithium-ion batteries. ALPA maintains that the petitioner must provide means for extinguishing fires that occur vs. listing it as an option in § 25.863. *FAA response:* The FAA shares the commenter's concern over a fire erupting in flight. We have concluded that providing a means for controlling or extinguishing a fire—such as stopping the flow of fluids, shutting down equipment, or fireproof containment, as described in paragraph

(4)of 14 CFR 25.863—is an adequate alternative to requiring the flight or cabin crew to use extinguishing agents. *Requested change 6:* The commenter suggests that the special conditions address means to ensure that the lithium ion batteries do not overheat or overcharge in the event of failure or malfunction of the automatic disconnect function, when a means of disconnecting the batteries from the charging source is not available. *FAA response:* The FAA agrees that there should be a means to prevent overheating or overcharging of lithium ion batteries in the event of failure or malfunction of the automatic disconnect function, described in Paragraph (7). Paragraphs (1), (2), and

(6)of these special conditions address the issue of failure modes of the lithium ion batteries. *Requested change 7:* Finally, ALPA commented on monitoring and warning features that will indicate when the state-of-charge of the batteries has fallen below levels considered acceptable for dispatch of the airplane. The commenter suggested that the special conditions address the location of the warning indication; whether it is displayed to the captain, the crew, or both; and the training to be incorporated in the crew training programs. *FAA response:* Flightdeck warning indicators associated with the state of charge of the lithium ion battery and appropriate training of the crew will be addressed during certification as part of the flight deck evaluation. As required by § 25.1309(c), this evaluation will ensure that the warning indication is effective and appropriate for the hazard. Comments From the Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom (UK CAA) *Requested change 8:* In its comments to EASA, the UK CAA states that Paragraph 5 of the special conditions should be revised to read as follows: No fluids or gasses that may escape from any Li-ion battery may be allowed to damage surrounding aeroplane structure, or any adjacent systems or equipment, including electrical wiring, in such a way as to hazard the aeroplane. The UK CAA indicates that Paragraph 5, as proposed, specifies that no escaping corrosive fluids or gasses may damage aeroplane structures or adjacent essential equipment. The reasons for this are obvious, and the requirement is fully supported. However, it is noted that CS/JAR 25.1309 [EASA and Joint Aviation Authority regulation 25.1309] in its title makes a distinction between equipment and systems. Thus a requirement that specifies protection only for essential equipment could be misinterpreted as not applying to essential systems. For absolute clarity, this requirement should be extended to show that it applies to both essential equipment and essential systems. Furthermore, corrosive fluids and gasses could also damage any non-essential electrical equipment or electrical wiring in such a way as to cause short circuits or arcing that could itself pose a hazard to the aeroplane. For completeness, this requirement should also seek to preclude damage to any adjacent electrical equipment or wiring whose failure could present a hazard to the airplane. *FAA Response:* The wording of Paragraph

(5)is identical to that of 14 CFR 25.1353(c)(4), applicable to all batteries. For clarity, we will revise the text to read as follows: No corrosive fluids or gasses that may escape from any lithium ion battery may damage surrounding structure or any adjacent systems, equipment or electrical wiring of the airplane in such a way as to cause a major or more severe failure condition, in accordance with 14 CFR 25.1309

(b)and applicable regulatory guidance. *Requested change 9:* The UK CAA also commented to EASA that Paragraph 9 of the Special Conditions should be revised to read “The instructions for Continued Airworthiness, *required by 14 CFR 25.1529* , must contain maintenance requirements for * * *.” *FAA Response:* The FAA concurs with this editorial comment and has revised the text of Paragraph 9 of the Special Conditions accordingly. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Airbus A380-800 airplane. Should Airbus apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the Airbus A380-800 airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. In lieu of the requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), the following special conditions apply: Lithium-ion batteries on the Airbus Model 380-800 airplane must be designed and installed as follows:

(1)Safe cell temperatures and pressures must be maintained during any foreseeable charging or discharging condition and during any failure of the charging or battery monitoring system not shown to be extremely remote. The lithium ion battery installation must preclude explosion in the event of those failures.

(2)Design of the lithium ion batteries must preclude the occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure.

(3)No explosive or toxic gasses emitted by any lithium ion battery in normal operation or as the result of any failure of the battery charging system, monitoring system, or battery installation—not shown to be extremely remote—may accumulate in hazardous quantities within the airplane.

(4)Installations of lithium ion batteries must meet the requirements of 14 CFR 25.863(a) through (d).

(5)No corrosive fluids or gasses that may escape from any lithium ion battery may damage surrounding structure or any adjacent systems, equipment or electrical wiring of the airplane in such a way as to cause a major or more severe failure condition, in accordance with 14 CFR 25.1309

(b)and applicable regulatory guidance.

(6)Each lithium ion battery installation must have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems caused by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short circuit of the battery or of its individual cells.

(7)Lithium ion battery installations must have a system to control the charging rate of the battery automatically, so as to prevent battery overheating or overcharging, and,

(i)A battery temperature sensing and over-temperature warning system with a means for automatically disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of an over-temperature condition, or,

(ii)A battery failure sensing and warning system with a means for automatically disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of battery failure.

(8)Any lithium ion battery installation whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane must incorporate a monitoring and warning feature that will provide an indication to the appropriate flight crewmembers, whenever the state-of-charge of the batteries has fallen below levels considered acceptable for dispatch of the airplane.

(9)The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness, required by 14 CFR 25.1529, must contain maintenance requirements for measurements of battery capacity at appropriate intervals to ensure that batteries whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane will perform their intended function as long as the battery is installed in the airplane. The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness must also contain procedures for the maintenance of lithium ion batteries in spares storage to prevent the replacement of batteries whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane with batteries that have experienced degraded charge retention ability or other damage due to prolonged storage at a low state of charge. Note: These special conditions are not intended to replace 14 CFR 25.1353(c) in the certification basis of the Airbus A380-800 airplane. The special conditions apply only to lithium ion batteries and their installations. The requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(c) remain in effect for batteries and battery installations of the Airbus A380-800 airplane that do not utilize lithium ion batteries. Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 30, 2006. Kevin Mullin, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6-21188 Filed 12-12-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM313; Special Conditions No. 25-340-SC] Special Conditions: Airbus Model A380-800 Airplane; Fire Protection AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus A380-800 airplane, which has novel and unusual design features, such as a full-length, double deck passenger cabin and electrical equipment bays distributed throughout the airplane. For these design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding fire protection. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane. DATES: *Effective Date:* The effective date of these special conditions is November 30, 2006. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Holly Thorson, FAA, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone

(425)227-1357; facsimile

(JAA)of Europe had been made on January 16, 1998, reference AI/L 810.0019/98. In its letter to the FAA, Airbus requested an extension to the 5- year period for type certification in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(c). The request was for an extension to a 7-year period, using the date of the initial application letter to the JAA as the reference date. The reason given by Airbus for the request for extension is related to the technical challenges, complexity, and the number of new and novel features on the airplane. On November 12, 1998, the Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR-100, granted Airbus' request for the 7-year period, based on the date of application to the JAA. In its letter AI/LE-A 828.0040/99 Issue 3, dated July 20, 2001, Airbus stated that its target date for type certification of the Model A380-800 has been moved from May 2005, to January 2006, to match the delivery date of the first production airplane. In a subsequent letter (AI/L 810.0223/98 issue 3, dated January 7, 2006), Airbus stated that its target date for type certification is October 2, 2006. In accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(d)(2), Airbus chose a new application date of December 20, 1999, and requested that the 7-year certification period which had already been approved be continued. The FAA has reviewed the part 25 certification basis for the Model A380-800 airplane, and no changes are required based on the new application date. The Model A380-800 airplane will be an all-new, four-engine jet transport airplane with a full double-deck, two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 1.235 million pounds with a typical three-class layout of 555 passengers. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A380-800 airplane meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-98. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Airbus A380-800 airplane because of novel or unusual design features, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 93-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.” Special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, are issued in accordance with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(a)(2). Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101. Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features The Airbus Model A380-800 airplane has novel or unusual design features relative to airplanes previously certificated under 14 CFR part 25. These design features include full-length passenger cabins on the main deck and the upper deck and electrical equipment bays that are distributed throughout the airplane—on the main deck and upper deck as well as in the lower lobe. Generally, transport category airplanes have one or two electrical equipment bays located in the lower lobe, adjacent to pressure regulator/outflow valves. If there were a fire in an electrical equipment bay, any smoke would be drawn toward the outflow valves and be discharged from the airplane without entering occupied areas. In the Airbus Model A380-800, the electrical equipment bays are distributed throughout the airplane. Only those equipment bays located in the lower lobe of the airplane are adjacent to pressure regulator/outflow valves. For this combination of electrical equipment bays distributed throughout the airplane and a double deck passenger cabin, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding fire protection. Based upon its review of incidents of smoke in the passenger cabin, the FAA determined that an airplane with electrical equipment bays located below, on, and above the main deck of a double deck airplane presents a greater risk of smoke penetration than older designs with equipment bays only in the lower lobe adjacent to pressure regulator/outflow valves. In the event of a fire, airplanes with older designs rely upon “trial and error” to determine whether the source of fire or smoke is in the electrical equipment bay. Typically, this involves the pilots following a procedure in the Airplane Flight Manual. It may involve shutting down power to the avionics equipment in one electrical equipment bay and reconfiguring the airplane's environmental control system ( *e.g.* , shutting down the recirculation fan) to see whether the amount of smoke in the flightdeck or passenger compartment is reduced or eliminated. If these actions do not eliminate the smoke, the flight crew may turn the power back on in the one electrical equipment bay, shut it off in the other equipment bay, and reconfigure the environmental control system again to see whether the smoke is now reduced or eliminated. This approach may be acceptable for airplanes with no more than two electrical equipment bays, both located in the lower lobe. In that case, there are only two options: a fire in an electrical equipment bay is in either one or the other. However, for an airplane with electrical equipment bays located below, on, and above decks, this approach is not sufficient, because—in the time it takes to determine the source of smoke—a fire could spread and the quantity of smoke could increase significantly. Furthermore, the “trial and error” approach raises concern over the lack of informational awareness that a flight crew would have should smoke penetration occur. Many factors—including the airflow pattern, configuration changes in the environmental control system, potential leak paths, and location of outflow/ regulator valves—would make it difficult to identify a smoke source, especially during flight or system transients, such as climbing/descending or changes in ventilation. Current regulations (§ 25.857) require that cargo compartments have a means to exclude hazardous quantities of smoke or fire extinguishing agent from penetrating into occupied areas of the airplane. However, there are no requirements that address the following: • Preventing hazardous quantities of smoke or extinguishing agent originating from the electrical equipment bays from penetrating into occupied areas of the airplane; • Installing smoke or fire detectors in electrical equipment bays; or • Preventing hazardous quantities of smoke or extinguishing agent originating on one deck from spreading to the other deck. The FAA believes that smoke detectors are needed in all electrical equipment bays on the A380 to ensure that the flightcrew can make an informed decision as to the source of smoke and can shut down the specific electrical equipment bay from which the smoke is coming. These special conditions, therefore, require that there be a smoke or fire detection system in each electrical equipment bay. They also include requirements to prevent propagation of hazardous quantities of smoke or fire extinguishing agent between or throughout the passenger cabins on the main deck and the upper deck. Discussion of Comments Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-05-08-SC, pertaining to fire protection for the Airbus A380 airplane, was published in the **Federal Register** on August 9, 2005 (70 FR 46108). A comment was received from the Boeing Company. *Requested change 1:* Boeing states that two conditions must be met in order to issue Special Conditions and that neither one is met in this case. Specifically, Boeing says that the distributed electrical equipment bays are not a novel or unusual design feature, because “There have been remote electrical equipment bays on many previously certificated airplane models, and similar Special Conditions have not been required.” In addition, Boeing states that the current regulations are adequate to ensure that remote electrical equipment bays are safe. Boeing concludes, therefore, that the proposed Special Conditions are neither necessary nor justified. *FAA response:* The FAA does not agree. As stated above in the *Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features,* the FAA finds that both conditions required for issuance of a special condition are met: previous part 25 rulemaking did not envision distributed electrical equipment bays on passenger decks, and new standards are necessary to maintain the level of safety of part 25. The FAA requested that Boeing provide further corroboration of its comment that “There have been remote electrical equipment bays on many previously certificated airplane models, and similar Special Conditions have not been required.” Our review of the information provided by Boeing indicates that the specific design features incorporated into certain Boeing models are not the same as those on the Airbus A380. Specifically, the A380 has multiple electrical equipment bays distributed throughout the lower lobe and on and above the main deck, whereas Boeing airplanes have at most two electrical equipment bays, both located in the lower lobe. Historically, electrical equipment bays have been located in the lower lobe, adjacent to pressure regulator/outflow valves such that any smoke in the equipment bay would be drawn toward the outflow valves and leave the airplane without entering occupied areas. The presence of electrical equipment bays on and above the main deck presents a special challenge in the event of a fire and creates uncertainty as to whether smoke will penetrate into occupied areas of the airplane. To summarize, the FAA believes that it is appropriate to impose these special conditions for the A380-800 because:

(1)The A380-800 is a large, double deck airplane with multiple electrical equipment bays distributed throughout, *i.e.* , lower lobe, main deck, and upper deck.

(2)The A380-800 has electrical equipment bays located above the lower lobe and not adjacent to pressure regulator/outflow valves.

(3)The A380-800 has more than two electrical equipment bays.

(4)The A380-800 has electrical equipment bays located on or above passenger decks or the flight deck.

(5)An airplane with this combination of electrical equipment bays and passenger decks presents a greater risk of smoke penetration than older designs with equipment bays only in the lower lobe, adjacent to pressure regulator/outflow valves.

(6)For this combination of design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding fire protection.

(7)All electrical equipment bays on the A380 should contain smoke or fire detectors to ensure that in the event of a fire in one equipment bay the flight crew has sufficient situational information to enable them to shut down the correct electrical equipment bay. *Requested change 2:* Boeing objects to applying the proposed Special Conditions “to all [electrical] equipment bays, not just the remote equipment bay(s) that the FAA has determined to be novel and inadequately covered by the existing regulations. Applying this Special Condition to the main equipment bay appears to be a form of general rulemaking via Special Condition.” *FAA response:* The FAA does not agree. We contacted the Boeing Company regarding its comment and asked for clarification. It appears that Boeing's comment was focused on multiple electrical equipment bays located in the lower lobe and not the distributed electrical equipment bays in the A380 design. However, it is not only the remote electrical equipment bays which are a novel or unusual design feature. It is the combination of electrical equipment bays distributed on the main deck, the upper deck, and the lower lobe along with full-length passenger cabins on the main deck and the upper deck. This combination raises the possibility that smoke from a fire in an electrical equipment bay will penetrate into the flightdeck or into one or both passenger cabins. As noted above, the presence of smoke detectors in these equipment bays will ensure that the flight crew has sufficient situational information to enable them to shut down the correct electrical equipment bay and to prevent hazardous quantities of smoke from entering the flight deck or passenger cabins. Based on the fact that the electrical distribution center on the A380 includes electrical equipment bays in locations where fire and smoke are more hazardous to passengers, we believe that this special condition should apply not only to electrical equipment bays on the passenger decks, but to all electrical equipment bays. To do otherwise would not protect the entire electrical distribution system when such protection could be accomplished readily. *Requested change 3:* Finally, Boeing comments that the proposed Special Conditions add requirements for detecting smoke and fire and for preventing penetration of smoke and that such requirements have previously been associated with fire protection for cargo compartments, but not for electrical equipment bays. According to the commenter, There have been many issues raised with the smoke quantities and test methods for these tests, especially for cargo compartment tests. None of these discussions have included equipment bays as the location of the test, or the materials in the equipment bay as the fuel of the fire. Therefore, there is no agreement as to the detailed test procedures for the proposed equipment bay detection tests. *FAA response:* This comment pertains to how Airbus will show compliance with the requirements to install a smoke or fire detection system in each electrical equipment bay and to prevent smoke originating from the electrical equipment bays from penetrating between or throughout passenger cabins on the main deck and the upper deck. We have discussed these issues with Airbus and with specialists within the European Aviation Safety Agency and have established appropriate test criteria through the issue paper process. Clarification The FAA has revised the text in the *Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features* to clarify that the special conditions apply to propagation of smoke or extinguishing agents between or throughout the main deck and upper deck passenger cabins. Similarly, we have revised the text of Special Condition a.2.(c) to clarify that smoke from a source below the main deck must not rise above armrest height on the main deck. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Airbus A380-800 airplane. Should Airbus apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the Airbus A380-800 airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. a. Requirements to prevent propagation of smoke or extinguishing agents between or throughout main deck and upper deck passenger cabins: 1. To prevent such propagation, the following must be demonstrated:

(a)Means to prevent hazardous quantities of smoke or extinguishing agent originating from the electrical equipment bays from incapacitating passengers and crew, and

(b)Means to prevent hazardous quantities of smoke or extinguishing agent originating from one deck from propagating to the other deck via vents, stairways, and joints in the floor/ceiling. 2. A “small quantity” of smoke may enter an occupied area only under the following conditions:

(a)The smoke enters occupied areas during system transients 1 from below deck sources. No sustained smoke penetration beyond that from environmental control system transients is permitted. 1 Transient airflow conditions may cause air pressure differences between compartments, before the ventilation and pressurization system is reconfigured. Additional transients occur during changes to system configurations such as pack shut-down, fan shut-down, or changes in cabin altitude; transition in bleed source change, such as from intermediate stage to high stage bleed air; and cabin pressurization “fly-through” during descent may reduce air conditioning inflow. Similarly, in the event of a fire, a small quantity of smoke that penetrates into an occupied area before the ventilation system is reconfigured would be acceptable under certain conditions described within this special condition.

(b)Penetration of the small quantity of smoke is a dynamic event, involving either dissipation or mobility. Dissipation is rapid dilution of the smoke by ventilation air, and mobility is rapid movement of the smoke into and out of the occupied area. In no case, should there be formation of a light haze indicative of stagnant airflow, as this would indicate that the ventilation system is failing to meet the requirements of § 25.831(b).

(c)The smoke from a smoke source below the main deck must not rise above armrest height on the main deck.

(d)The smoke from a source on the same deck or above the deck must dissipate rapidly via dilution with fresh air and be evacuated from the airplane. A procedure must be included in the Airplane Flight Manual to evacuate smoke from the occupied areas of the airplane. In order to demonstrate that the quantity of smoke is small, a flight test must be conducted which simulates the emergency procedures used in the event of a fire during flight, including the use of V <sup>mo</sup> /M <sup>mo</sup> descent profiles and a simulated landing, if such conditions are specified in the emergency procedure. b. Requirement for fire detection in electrical equipment bays: A smoke or fire detection system that complies with 14 CFR 25.858(c) and

(d)must be provided for each electrical equipment bay. Each system must provide a visual indication to the flight deck within one minute after the start of a fire in an electrical equipment bay. Airplane tests must be conducted to show compliance with this requirement, and the performance of the smoke or fire detection system must be shown, in accordance with Advisory Circular 25-9A or by other means acceptable to the FAA. Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 30, 2006. Kevin Mullin, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6-21191 Filed 12-12-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 71 [Docket No. FAA-2006-25270; Airspace Docket No. 06-ASO-9] Establishment of Class D Airspace; Eastman, GA; Correction AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Correcting amendment. SUMMARY: This document contains a correction to the final rule (FAA-2006-25270; 06-ASO-9), which was published in the **Federal Register** on November 30, 2006 (71 FR 69191), establishing Class D airspace at Eastman, GA. This action corrects the effective date of the Class D airspace. DATES: *Effective Date:* December 13, 2006. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark D. Ward, Group Manager, System Support, Eastern Service Center, Federal Aviation Administration, P.O. Box 20636, Atlanta, Georgia 30320; telephone

(404)305-5627. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background **Federal Register** Document 06-9232, Docket No. FAA-2006-252760; Airspace Docket 06-ASO-9, published on November 30, 2006 (71 FR 69191), establishes Class D airspace at Eastman, GA. This action corrects the published docket. Designations for Class D airspace are published in Paragraph 5000 of FAA Order 7400.9P, dated September 1, 2006, and effective September 15, 2006, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1. The Class D airspace designation listed in this document will be published subsequently in the Order. Need for Correction As published, the final rule contains an error, which incorrectly states the effective date of the Class D airspace. Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me, the effective date for the establishment of Class D airspace at Eastman, GA, incorporated by reference at § 71.1, 14 CFR 71.1, and published in the **Federal Register** on November 30, 2006 (71 FR 69191), is corrected by making the following correcting amendment. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 71 Airspace, incorporation by reference, Navigation (air). In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration corrects the adopted amendment, 14 CFR part 71, by making the following correcting amendment: PART 71—DESIGNATION OF CLASS A, CLASS B, CLASS C, CLASS D, AND CLASS E AIRSPACE AREAS; AIRWAYS; ROUTES; AND REPORTING POINTS 1. The authority citation for part 71 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g); 40103, 40113, 40120; E.O. 10854, 24 FR 9565, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 389. § 71.1 [Corrected] 2. The incorporation by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 or Federal Aviation Administration Order 7400.9P, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, dated September 1, 2006, and effective September 15, 2006, is amended as follows: *Paragraph 5000 Class D Airspace.* ASO GA D Eastman, GA [Corrected] On page 69191, column 2, line 4 of the Effective Date, correct the year, changing “2000” to “2007”. Issued in College Park, Georgia, on December 6, 2006. Stephen Prater, Acting Manager, System Support Group, Eastern Service Center. [FR Doc. 06-9662 Filed 12-12-06; 8:45 am]

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