Fed. Reg. Notices — Final special conditions

BILLING CODE 3410-02-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM315; Special Conditions No. 25-327-SC] Special Conditions: Airbus Model A380-800 Airplane; Emergency Exit Arrangement—Outside Viewing AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes.

Many of these novel or unusual design features are associated with the complex systems and the configuration of the airplane, including its full-length double deck. For these design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding outside viewing from emergency exits. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane. DATES: *Effective Date:* The effective date of these special conditions is August 28, 2006. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Holly Thorson, FAA, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone

(425)227-1357; facsimile

(425)227-1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Airbus applied for FAA certification/validation of the provisionally-designated Model A3XX-100 in its letter AI/L 810.0223/98, dated August 12, 1998, to the FAA. Application for certification by the Joint Aviation Authorities

(JAA)of Europe had been made on January 16, 1998, reference AI/L 810.0019/98. In its letter to the FAA, Airbus requested an extension to the 5-year period for type certification in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(c). The request was for an extension to a 7-year period, using the date of the initial application letter to the JAA as the reference date. The reason given by Airbus for the request for extension is related to the technical challenges, complexity, and the number of new and novel features on the airplane. On November 12, 1998, the Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR-100, granted Airbus' request for the 7-year period, based on the date of application to the JAA. In its letter AI/LE-A 828.0040/99 Issue 3, dated July 20, 2001, Airbus stated that its target date for type certification of the Model A380-800 had been moved from May 2005, to January 2006, to match the delivery date of the first production airplane. In a subsequent letter (AI/L 810.0223/98 issue 3, dated January 27, 2006), Airbus stated that its target date for type certification is October 2, 2006. In accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(d)(2), Airbus chose a new application date of December 20, 1999, and requested that the 7-year certification period which had already been approved be continued. The FAA has reviewed the part 25 certification basis for the Model A380-800 airplane, and no changes are required based on the new application date. The Model A380-800 airplane will be an all-new, four-engine jet transport airplane with a full double-deck, two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 1.235 million pounds with a typical three-class layout of 555 passengers. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A380-800 airplane meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-98. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Airbus A380-800 airplane because of novel or unusual design features, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 93-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.” Special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, are issued in accordance with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(a)(2). Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101. Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features Emergency evacuations are generally associated with adverse conditions, such as a fire outside the airplane. Because those adverse conditions may pose an immediate threat to the occupants of the airplane, it is often necessary to avoid opening emergency exits that would otherwise be usable. For this reason, it would be extremely useful to have a viewing window or other means of assessing the outside conditions to determine whether to open a particular emergency exit. The regulations governing the certification of the A380 do not adequately address a full-length double deck airplane in terms of the exit of passengers in an emergency and a viewing window or other means of assessing the outside conditions to determine whether to open an emergency exit. Therefore, special conditions are needed to ensure that each emergency exit has a means to permit viewing of the conditions outside the exit when the exit is closed. These special conditions are based upon Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(NPRM)96-9 and Amendment 25-116, effective November 26, 2004, which adopted a similar requirement into § 25.809(a). Discussion of Comments Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-05-10-SC, pertaining to Emergency Exit Arrangement—Outside Viewing, was published in the **Federal Register** on August 9, 2005 (70 FR 46112). Comments were received from the Airline Pilots Association

(ALPA)and the Boeing Company. *Requested change 1:* ALPA recommends that “* * * a special condition should be added to require that each [emergency] exit provide rescue personnel on the exterior of the aircraft a means to either determine whether the exit's emergency assist means (slide) is armed or disarmed or a means to disarm the emergency assist means from outside the aircraft. “Consideration must be given to the exits located on the lower deck just aft of the wing (Doors 3L & 3R). A sufficient view to determine slide usability must be ensured from inside the cabin when the exits above them have been activated and their slides deployed.” *FAA response:* A means to know whether the exits are disarmed when opened from the outside is covered in § 25.810(a)(1)(i). That is, the slides must automatically disarm when opened from the outside. Regarding the second point, the means to view conditions outside the exit must be sufficient to determine slide usability regardless of whether other slides have been deployed. This requirement is implicit in § 25.809(a). Therefore, we have not changed the special condition, as proposed. *Requested change 2:* The Boeing Company makes the following comment: “The certification basis for the Airbus Model A380 does *not* include Amendment 25-116, which included changes to 14 CFR 25.809 (Emergency Exit Arrangement). It appears, however that the FAA is now proposing to apply the requirements of Amendment 25-116 through Special Conditions, without any novel or unusual design features. This is contrary to part 21, which clearly specifies how the type certification basis of the airplane is to be established and when Special Conditions are warranted.” *FAA response:* The FAA does not agree. The full upper deck is a novel design and warrants enhanced visibility, since passengers will be evacuating from both decks and the slides deploy close to each other. Amendment 25-116 was adopted after the special condition was initiated. This process is very similar to the way the first widebody requirements evolved: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 69-33 contained many proposals similar to special conditions for the 747, DC-10, and L1011 airplanes and was later adopted in large part by Amendment 25-32. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Airbus A380-800 airplane. Should Airbus apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the Airbus A380-800 airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special condition is issued as part of the type certification basis for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. In addition to the requirements of § 25.809(a) at Amendment 25-72, the following special condition applies: Each emergency exit must have means to permit viewing of the conditions outside the exit when the exit is closed. The viewing means may be on the exit or adjacent to it, provided that no obstructions exist between the exit and the viewing means. Means must also be provided to permit viewing of the likely areas of evacuee ground contact with the landing gear extended as well as in all conditions of landing gear collapse. A single device that satisfies both objectives is acceptable. Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 28, 2006. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6-15005 Filed 9-8-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM314; Special Conditions No. 25-326-SC] Special Conditions: Airbus Model A380-800 Airplane; Stairways Between Decks AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. Many of these novel or unusual design features are associated with the complex systems and the configuration of the airplane, including its full-length double deck. For these design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding stairways between decks. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane. EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date of these special conditions is August 28, 2006. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Holly Thorson, FAA, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone

(425)227-1357; facsimile

(425)227-1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Airbus applied for FAA certification/validation of the provisionally-designated Model A3XX-100 in its letter AI/L 810.0223/98, dated August 12, 1998, to the FAA. Application for certification by the Joint Aviation Authorities

(JAA)of Europe had been made on January 16, 1998, reference AI/L 810.0019/98. In its letter to the FAA, Airbus requested an extension to the 5-year period for type certification in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(c). The request was for an extension to a 7-year period, using the date of the initial application letter to the JAA as the reference date. The reason given by Airbus for the request for extension is related to the, technical challenges, complexity, and the number of new and novel features on the airplane. On November 12, 1998, the Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR-100, granted Airbus' request for the 7-year period, based on the date of application to the JAA. In its letter AI/LE-A 828.0040/99 Issue 3, dated July 20, 2001, Airbus stated that its target date for type certification of the Model A380-800 had been moved from May 2005, to January 2006, to match the delivery date of the first production airplane. In a subsequent letter (AI/L 810.0223/98 issue 3, dated January 27, 2006), Airbus stated that its target date for type certification is October 2, 2006. In accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(d)(2), Airbus chose a new application date of December 20, 1999, and requested that the 7-year certification period which had already been approved be continued. The FAA has reviewed the part 25 certification basis for the Model A380-800 airplane, and no changes are required based on the new application date. The Model A380-800 airplane will be an all-new, four-engine jet transport airplane with a full double-deck, two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 1.235 million pounds with a typical three-class layout of 555 passengers. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A380-800 airplane meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-98. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Airbus A380-800 airplane because of novel or unusual design features, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 93-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.” Special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, are issued in accordance with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(a)(2). Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101. Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features The A380 incorporates seating on two full-length passenger decks, each of which has the capacity of a typical wide body airplane. Two staircases—one located in the front of the cabin and one located in the rear—allow for the movement of persons between decks. With large seating capacities on the main deck and the upper deck of the A380-800 airplane, the staircases need to be able to support movement between decks in an inflight emergency. In addition, although compliance with the evacuation demonstration requirements of § 25.803 does not depend on the use of stairs, there must be a way for passengers on one deck to move to the other deck during an emergency evacuation. This need must be addressed in the certification of the airplane. The regulations governing the certification of the A380 do not adequately address a passenger airplane with two separate full-length decks for passengers. The Boeing 747 and Lockheed L-1011 airplanes were certificated with limited seating capacity on two separate decks, and special conditions were issued to certificate those arrangements. When the seating capacity of the upper deck of the Boeing 747 exceeded 24 passengers, the FAA issued Special Conditions 25-61-NW-1 for a maximum seating capacity of 32 passengers on the upper deck for take-off and landing. A second set of Special Conditions, 25-71-NW-3, was issued to cover airplanes with a maximum seating capacity of 45 passengers on the upper deck for take-off and landing. That second set of Special Conditions was later modified to address airplanes with a maximum seating capacity of 110 passengers on the upper deck. These previously issued special conditions provided a starting point for the development of special conditions for the A380-800 airplane. In the case of both the L-1011 and the 747, the special conditions were based on the requirements and associated level of safety in place at the time of application for type certificate. The requirements and the level of safety have improved significantly since that time, and these special conditions reflect those improvements. In addition to the requirements of §§ 25.803 and 25.811 through 25.813, special conditions are needed to address the movement of passengers between the two full-length decks on the Model A380. These special conditions provide additional requirements for the stairways to ensure the safe passage of occupants between decks during moderate turbulence, an inflight emergency, or an emergency evacuation. Discussion of Comments Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-05-09, pertaining to stairways between decks, was published in the **Federal Register** on August 9, 2005 (70 FR 46110). Comments were received from the Boeing Company, the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), and the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA). *Requested change 1:* The Boeing Company states that as a general matter “a single stairway has been shown through service history of the Boeing Model 747-300 and -400 to be sufficient for an upper deck that is approved for up to 110 passengers (or has a single pair of type A exits). By comparison, the FAA is requiring a minimum of two stairways for the Model A380-800, which has *three* pairs of upper deck type A exits (or is theoretically eligible for up to 330 passengers on the upper deck).” The commenter recommends that the special conditions state that one stairway is sufficient for an upper deck that is approved to carry no more than 110 passengers. *FAA response:* The special conditions pertain to the design of the Model A380-800; thus discussion of designs that require only one stairway is not relevant. *Requested change 2:* ALPA requests that a special condition be added to ensure that the stairway can be used when the aircraft fuselage suffers minor deformation during a survivable accident or incident. *FAA response:* The stairway design must comply with all structural requirements; therefore, no change has been made to the special conditions, as proposed. *Requested change 3:* In terms of Special Condition a., ALPA suggests the following: “The procedures developed to accommodate the carriage of an incapacitated person from one deck to the other should be demonstrated using personnel from air carrier crews, representing the largest and smallest persons that the carriers may employ and with the same level of training that will be provided in service.” *FAA response:* The FAA does not believe that this is necessary. The design of the stairway must be demonstrated to be suitable for evacuation of an incapacitated person, and this might be accomplished by either crew or passengers assisting the crew. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that one of the stairs provide a means to transport an incapacitated person from the upper deck, in much the way such a person would be evacuated along the aisle of a single deck airplane. Any crew duties necessary to facilitate the evacuation should be consistent with existing processes and not require extraordinary effort. The comment is related more to the means of demonstrating compliance with the requirement than the substance of the requirement itself. Therefore, we have not changed the special condition, as proposed. *Requested change 4:* The Boeing Company requests that Special Condition b. be revised to read as follows: “There must be at least two stairways between decks that meet the following requirements: “The stairways must be designed * * * One of these stairways must be the stairway specified in paragraph a. above.” *FAA response:* The suggested wording is more explicit than that proposed, and we have changed the wording of Special Condition b. accordingly. *Requested change 5:* Regarding Special Condition c.1., AFA seeks clarification of the types of assistance needed by cabin crew in regard to merging of passengers from the two decks into the stairways. The commenter adds that, “Analysis is not an acceptable tool for demonstrating these requirements [for each stairway between decks].” *FAA response:* The assistance provided would be consistent with that currently provided by flight attendants to facilitate evacuation. In terms of the method of demonstration used to substantiate that the requirements are met, testing is more likely but analysis could be an appropriate method. Accordingly, no change has been made to the special conditions, as proposed. *Requested change 6:* Both the Boeing Company and AFA suggest revising Special Condition c.2. to require a handrail on both sides of a stairway, if the stairway is wide enough to accommodate more than a single lane of persons. AFA also suggests that there be a special condition relative to limit loads on the handrails. *FAA response:* The current design provides two handrails. The FAA does not consider it necessary to require two handrails, although other performance requirements in this special condition for the stairs may dictate the need for two handrails. The proposed special conditions require that the handrail design address foreseeable operating conditions, including turbulence and adverse attitude. This will necessitate a structural design capable of performing its function under those conditions. Stating the requirement objectively rather than prescriptively permits more flexibility in the design and takes the specific installation into account. In fact, Airbus has used the design specifications from other industries in the design of the stairs; in practice, therefore, those strength criteria will form the baseline for the design. *Requested change 7:* The Boeing Company suggests revising Special Condition c.4. to address narrow stairways with handrails on both sides, because such a stairway “can be used safely in the conditions specified without requiring a wall above the handrail or equivalent on each side.” *FAA response:* The special condition permits an equivalent means, so that—if the use of a handrail were shown to be equivalent in certain cases—the special condition would permit its use. *Requested change 8:* AFA supports Special Condition c.5. and suggests that there should also be special conditions “requiring that the surface of the treads and landings should also be designed to include adequate slip resistant properties. Additionally, the treads and risers should have uniform dimensions in order to allow the user to establish a uniform gait when using the stairway.” *FAA response:* The regulations already address slip resistance for surfaces likely to become wet in service, so this aspect is not novel. In terms of the detailed design of the treads and risers, rather than being prescriptive, we are using a performance based approach in the special condition. Performance-based requirements will very likely drive the design, as suggested, since the suggested features are generally regarded as necessary to achieve efficient and safe stair usage. *Requested change 9:* Although acknowledging that the proposed illumination level is the same as for the rest of the airplane interior, ALPA states that the proposed level of illumination for the stairway is far too low. The commenter recommends that the illumination should be an average of 1 foot-candle with a minimum of 0.1 foot-candle. This is the same as that specified in the NFPA Life Safety Code, 1997. *FAA response:* As noted by ALPA, the emergency lighting level is consistent with the other requirements for emergency lighting in the cabin as well as for stairs on other airplanes. The general emergency lighting requirements concerning battery discharge and cold-soak will also apply to the lighting on the stairs, so the typical illumination values will, in fact, be much higher. The proposed standards have demonstrated satisfactory service experience. Therefore, we have made no change to the special condition, as proposed. *Requested change 10:* The Boeing Company suggests revising Special Condition c.8. to read as follows: “An exit sign must be provided in the upper deck near the stairway, visible to upper deck passengers while seated or standing. In addition, the upper end of the stairway must include an exit sign visible to passengers while descending the stairway, leading them to main deck exits beyond the sign. Both exit signs must meet the requirements of Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(ii).” The commenter further recommends that—if a lower exit sign is required in the stairway—the sign should not be visible to main deck passengers who are not on the stairs. *FAA response:* As proposed, Special Condition c.8. specifies that an exit sign be visible to a person on the stairway. This will provide guidance to people using the stairway, but not necessarily direct people to the stairway. The optimum evacuation strategy is for people to evacuate from the deck on which they are seated. Adding signs to direct people to the stairs could actually slow the overall evacuation. Conversely, if people do use the stairs, they will have an indication that exits are available. Therefore, we have not changed the text of the Special Conditions, as proposed. *Requested change 11:* The Boeing Company suggests that Special Condition d. be revised to read, “Each entrance or path to the entrance of a stairway must be visible from a seat designated for flight attendants' use during taxi, takeoff, and landing. Cabin crew procedures and positions must be established. * * *” A comment submitted by AFA states, “AFA agrees that cabin crew positions and procedures need to be established to help *manage* the use of the stairs between decks but do not believe that cabin crew can “control” or prevent movement of * * * passengers between the two decks.” The commenter suggests replacing the word “control” with the word “manage” [or “management”] to reflect a more realistic situation. *FAA response:* The direct view requirements will be applied to the stairs as they are to other egress paths. The FAA agrees that “manage” is a better term than “control” and has changed the text of Special Condition d. accordingly. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Airbus A380-800 airplane. Should Airbus apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the Airbus A380-800 airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. In addition to the requirements of §§ 25.803 and 25.811 through 25.813, the following special conditions apply: a. At least one stairway between decks must meet the following requirements: The stairway accommodates the carriage of an incapacitated person from one deck to the other. The crew member procedures for such carriage must be established. b. There must be at least two stairways between decks that meet the following requirements: The stairways must be designed such that evacuees can achieve an adequate rate for going down or going up under probable emergency conditions, including a condition in which a person falls or is incapacitated while on a stairway. One of the stairways must be the stairway specified in paragraph a. above. c. Each stairway between decks must meet the following requirements: 1. It must have an entrance, exit, and gradient characteristics that—with the assistance of a crew member—would allow the passengers of one deck to merge with passengers of the other deck during an evacuation and exit the airplane. These entrance, exit, and gradient characteristics must occur with the airplane in level attitude and in each attitude resulting from the collapse of any one or more legs of the landing gear. These requirements must be demonstrated by tests and/or analysis. 2. The stairway must have a handrail on at least one side in order to allow people to steady themselves during foreseeable conditions, including but not limited to the condition of gear collapse on the ground and moderate turbulence in flight. The handrails must be constructed, so that there will be no obstruction on them which will cause the user to release his/her grip on the handrail or will hinder the continuous movement of the hands along the handrail. Handrails must be terminated in a manner which will not obstruct pedestrian travel or create a hazard. Adequacy of the design must be demonstrated by using persons representative of the 5% female and the 95% male. 3. The stairway must be designed and located to minimize damage to it during an emergency landing or ditching. 4. The stairway must have a wall or the equivalent on each side to minimize the risk of falling and to facilitate use of the stairway under conditions of abnormal airplane attitude. 5. Treads and landings must be designed and demonstrated to be free of hazard. The landing area at each deck level must be demonstrated to be adequate in terms of flow rate for the maximum number of people that will be using the stair in an emergency. Treads and risers must be designed to ensure an easy and safe use of the stairway. 6. General emergency illumination must be provided so that—when measured along the centerlines of each tread and landing—the illumination is not less than 0.05 foot-candle. 7. In normal operation, the general illumination level must not be less than 0.05 foot-candles. The assessment must be done under day light and dark of night conditions. 8. Both stairway ends must be indicated by an exit sign visible to passengers when in the stairway. This exit sign must meet the requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(ii). 9. A floor proximity path marking system which meets the requirements of § 25.812(e) must be available to guide passengers in the stairway to the stairway ends. It must not direct the occupants of the cabin to the stair entrance. 10. The public address system must be audible in the stairway during all flight phases. 11. “No smoking” and “return to seat” signs must be installed and must be visible in the stairway both going up and down and at the stairway entrances. d. Cabin crew procedures and positions must be established to manage the use of the stairs on the ground and in flight under both normal and emergency situations. This may require that cabin crew members have specific dedicated duties for the management of the stairs during emergency and precautionary evacuations. e. It should not be hazardous for crew members or passengers who are returning to their seats to use the stairways during moderate turbulence. Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 28, 2006. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6-15001 Filed 9-8-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM318; Special Conditions No. 25-329-SC] Special Conditions: Airbus Model A380-800 Airplane, Escape Systems Installed in Non-Pressurized Compartments AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. Many of these novel or unusual design features are associated with the complex systems and the configuration of the airplane, including its full-length double deck. For these design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding escape systems installed in non-pressurized compartments. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane. DATES: *Effective Date:* The effective date of these special conditions is August 28, 2006. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Holly Thorson, FAA, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone

(425)227-1357; facsimile

(425)227-1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Airbus applied for FAA certification/validation of the provisionally-designated Model A3XX-100 in its letter AI/L 810.0223/98, dated August 12, 1998, to the FAA. Application for certification by the Joint Aviation Authorities

(JAA)of Europe had been made on January 16, 1998, reference AI/L 810.0019/98. In its letter to the FAA, Airbus requested an extension to the 5-year period for type certification in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(c). The request was for an extension to a 7-year period, using the date of the initial application letter to the JAA as the reference date. The reason given by Airbus for the request for extension is related to the technical challenges, complexity, and the number of new and novel features on the airplane. On November 12, 1998, the Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR-100, granted Airbus' request for the 7-year period, based on the date of application to the JAA. In its letter AI/LE-A 828.0040/99 Issue 3, dated July 20, 2001, Airbus stated that its target date for type certification of the Model A380-800 had been moved from May 2005, to January 2006, to match the delivery date of the first production airplane. In a subsequent letter (AI/L 810.0223/98 issue 3, dated January 27, 2006), Airbus stated that its target date for type certification is October 2, 2006. In accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(d)(2), Airbus chose a new application date of December 20, 1999, and requested that the 7-year certification period which had already been approved be continued. The FAA has reviewed the part 25 certification basis for the Model A380-800 airplane, and no changes are required based on the new application date. The Model A380-800 airplane will be an all-new, four-engine jet transport airplane with a full double-deck, two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 1.235 million pounds with a typical three-class layout of 555 passengers. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A380-800 airplane meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-98. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Airbus A380-800 airplane because of novel or unusual design features, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 93-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.” Special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, are issued in accordance with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(a)(2). Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101. Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features All of the escape systems on the upper deck and one pair of the escape systems on the main deck of this airplane are installed in non-pressurized compartments. These non-pressurized compartments will be exposed to extremely cold temperatures on every flight. When the certification testing was conducted for previous airplane programs, the FAA considered that the extreme environmental conditions to which the escape systems can be exposed would be independent of one another. For example, the escape system would be tested under conditions of extreme cold in one test and exposed to 25-knot winds at ambient temperature in a separate test. On the Model A380-800 airplane, however, all the upper deck escape systems and one pair of the main deck escape systems are located in non-pressurized compartments. As a result, these escape systems will be exposed to extremely cold temperatures on every flight. Therefore, they must be tested under conditions of both extremely cold temperatures and strong winds. In the past, several airplanes have had a pair of escape systems installed in non-pressurized compartments. These escape systems were off-wing systems that are less affected by wind than are other escape systems, and only one pair of exits was affected. Testing the combined effects of extremely cold temperature and strong winds was not required for these systems. On the A380, however, one-half of the escape systems are installed in non-pressurized compartments. Therefore, the adverse effects of a failure of the escape system—due to the combination of extremely cold temperatures and strong wind—would be much more severe. The regulations do not adequately address escape systems installed in non-pressurized compartments; therefore, a special condition is needed to require the applicant to demonstrate that escape systems in non-pressurized compartments function properly when exposed to both extremely cold temperatures and strong winds. Discussion of Comments Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-05-13-SC, pertaining to escape systems installed in non-pressurized compartments, was published in the **Federal Register** on August 9, 2005 (70 FR 46099). Comments were received from the Airline Pilots Association

(ALPA)and from an individual commenter. *Requested change 1:* ALPA suggests that the special conditions “should be amended to ensure that the testing done to evaluate that the escape system functions correctly after exposure to cold soak and high altitude also evaluates the repeated cycling of these parameters. In addition, exposure to heat and humidity, water intrusion and the introduction of precipitation propelled at and past the slide compartment at speeds equal to those used in approaches and departures should also be evaluated.” *FAA response:* Evaluation of the response of the escape systems installed in non-pressurized compartments to these environmental conditions is required by 14 CFR 25.1309 and will be addressed as part as the compliance demonstration for the escape systems. Accordingly, we have not changed the special condition, as proposed. *Requested change 2:* The individual commenter addresses the stowage of survival kits with the slide/rafts in non- pressurized locations. He states that, “The safety issue is that the life/raft items are not immediately ready and attached to the slide/raft in a ditching as they are on slide/rafts stored in the pressurized section of aircraft.” *FAA response:* Stowage of survival kits has not yet been resolved for the upper deck slide/rafts. In the case of portable life rafts, the entire raft must be retrieved for ditching; with slide/rafts, the raft is available automatically when the exit is opened. It may be feasible to stow the survival kit separately from the slide/raft and maintain the same level of safety as that provided by portable rafts, and that would be an acceptable design alternative. This can be addressed within the existing regulations. Therefore, no change has been made to the special conditions, as proposed. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Airbus A380-800 airplane. Should Airbus apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the Airbus A380-800 airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. In addition to the requirements of §§ 25.810, 25.1301 and 25.1309, the following special condition applies: For the escape systems on the Model A380-800 airplane that are installed in non-pressurized compartments and thus are exposed to extremely cold temperatures on every flight, it must be demonstrated that the escape systems function properly in the combination of the cold soak associated with long flight at altitude and a 25-knot wind from the critical angle. Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 28, 2006. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6-15011 Filed 9-8-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM317; Special Conditions No. 25-328-SC] Special Conditions: Airbus Model A380-800 Airplane, Flotation and Ditching AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. Many of these novel or unusual design features are associated with the complex systems and the configuration of the airplane, including its full-length double deck. For these design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding flotation and ditching. These proposed special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane. DATES: *Effective Date:* The effective date of these special conditions is August 28, 2006. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Holly Thorson, FAA, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone

(425)227-1357; facsimile

(425)227-1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Airbus applied for FAA certification/validation of the provisionally-designated Model A3XX-100 in its letter AI/L 810.0223/98, dated August 12, 1998, to the FAA. Application for certification by the Joint Aviation Authorities

(JAA)of Europe had been made on January 16, 1998, reference AI/L 810.0019/98. In its letter to the FAA, Airbus requested an extension to the 5-year period for type certification in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(c). The request was for an extension to a 7-year period, using the date of the initial application letter to the JAA as the reference date. The reason given by Airbus for the request for extension is related to the technical challenges, complexity, and the number of new and novel features on the airplane. On November 12, 1998, the Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR-100, granted Airbus' request for the 7-year period, based on the date of application to the JAA. In its letter AI/LE-A 828.0040/99 Issue 3, dated July 20, 2001, Airbus stated that its target date for type certification of the Model A380-800 had been moved from May 2005, to January 2006, to match the delivery date of the first production airplane. In a subsequent letter (AI/L 810.0223/98 issue 3, dated January 27, 2006), Airbus stated that its target date for type certification is October 2, 2006. In accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(d)(2), Airbus chose a new application date of December 20, 1999, and requested that the 7-year certification period which had already been approved be continued. The FAA has reviewed the part 25 certification basis for the Model A380-800 airplane, and no changes are required based on the new application date. The Model A380-800 airplane will be an all-new, four-engine jet transport airplane with a full double-deck, two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 1.235 million pounds with a typical three-class layout of 555 passengers. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A380-800 airplane meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-98. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Airbus A380-800 airplane because of novel or unusual design features, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 93-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.” Special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, are issued in accordance with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(a)(2), Amendment 21-69, effective September 16, 1991. Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101. Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features While the main deck of the A380-800 airplane has five pairs of type A exits, these are not sufficient for the total number of persons on board the airplane. Therefore, the upper deck exits must also be used as ditching exits. As a result, the upper deck exits are being equipped with slide/rafts. With two decks, there is the possibility of interference between the slides/rafts of the upper deck and the slide/rafts or rafts of the main deck. Since 14 CFR part 25 does not address the use of upper deck exits as ditching exits, special conditions are necessary to ensure that occupants can be safely evacuated from these exits following a ditching event. Discussion of Comments Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-05-12-SC, pertaining to flotation and ditching, were published in the **Federal Register** on August 9, 2005 (70 FR 46115). Comments were received from the Airline Pilots Association

(ALPA)and an individual commenter. *Requested change 1:* ALPA suggests that in general the special conditions “should evaluate the arrangement and utility of the slide/rafts at each exit using a realistic range of aircraft configurations and sea state.” Regarding proposed Special Condition b., ALPA recommends that “The demonstration of the boarding of the upper deck slide/rafts should be done using crewmembers from air carriers operating the aircraft. In addition, these crewmembers should have had no training beyond that which will be provided to regular line crewmembers.” *FAA response:* Demonstrations of the slide/rafts will consider a realistic range of airplane configurations and sea states. These demonstrations and the associated crew training will be consistent with current practice. The A380-800 is not novel with respect to those matters. Therefore, we have made no change to the special conditions, as proposed. *Requested change 2:* In terms of proposed Special Condition c., an individual commenter expressed concern about interference between the M3 slide/raft and other slide/rafts. ALPA commented that preventing such interference should not rely on crew procedures. *FAA response:* Since the M3 exit will not be used as a ditching exit, proposed Special Condition c. is not included in these Final Special Conditions. Should this exit later be reinstated as a ditching exit, appropriate requirements will be developed for its use. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Airbus A380-800 airplane. Should Airbus apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the Airbus A380-800 airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. In addition to the requirements of §§ 25.801, 25.807(i), 25.810, 25.1411, and 25.1415, the following special conditions apply: a. For door sill heights that would be greater than six

(6)feet above the waterline during a ditching event, an assist means must be provided from the airplane to the water. b. Boarding of the upper deck slide/rafts must be demonstrated for the rated and overload capacity of the slide/rafts from the representative door sill heights associated with planned and unplanned ditching. The boarding procedure must ensure that the occupants boarding the slide/rafts remain on the slide/raft whether the occupants enter the slide/raft or raft by walking, jumping or sliding. In addition, the boarding procedure must not result in injury either to occupants entering the slide/raft or to occupants already in the slide/raft. c. It must be demonstrated that the upper deck slide/rafts located at doors U1 and U2 (just forward and just aft of the wing) can be safely separated from the airplane. Safety considerations include damage to the slide/rafts, injury to occupants of the slide/raft, ejection of the occupants from the slide/raft into the water as a result of the contact with the wing, and the slide/raft becoming beached on the wing. Probable damage to the wing leading and trailing edge flight control structure during a water landing must be considered when assessing the damage caused to the slide/rafts or life rafts. d. It must be demonstrated that when the upper deck slide/rafts are separated from the airplane, they do not injure occupants of the slide/raft, eject occupants of the slide/raft into the water, or damage the slide/raft in a way that affects its seaworthiness. Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 28, 2006 Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6-15012 Filed 9-8-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM320; Special Conditions No. 25-330-SC] Special Conditions: Airbus Model A380-800 Airplane, Escape Systems Inflation Systems AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. Many of these novel or unusual design features are associated with the complex systems and the configuration of the airplane, including its full-length double deck. For these design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding escape system reliability. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane. DATES: *Effective Date:* The effective date of these special conditions is August 28, 2006. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Holly Thorson, FAA, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone

(425)227-1357; facsimile

(425)227-1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Airbus applied for FAA certification/validation of the provisionally-designated Model A3XX-100 in its letter AI/L 810.0223/98, dated August 12, 1998, to the FAA. Application for certification by the Joint Aviation Authorities

(JAA)of Europe had been made on January 16, 1998, reference AI/L 810.0019/98. In its letter to the FAA, Airbus requested an extension to the 5-year period for type certification in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(c). The request was for an extension to a 7-year period, using the date of the initial application letter to the JAA as the reference date. The reason given by Airbus for the request for extension is related to the technical challenges, complexity, and the number of new and novel features on the airplane. On November 12, 1998, the Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR-100, granted Airbus' request for the 7-year period, based on the date of application to the JAA. In its letter AI/LE-A 828.0040/99 Issue 3, dated July 20, 2001, Airbus stated that its target date for type certification of the Model A380-800 had been moved from May 2005, to January 2006, to match the delivery date of the first production airplane. In a subsequent letter (AI/L 810.0223/98 issue 3, dated January 27, 2006), Airbus stated that its target date for type certification is October 2, 2006. In accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(d)(2), Airbus chose a new application date of December 20, 1999, and requested that the 7-year certification period which had already been approved be continued. The FAA has reviewed the part 25 certification basis for the Model A380-800 airplane, and no changes are required based on the new application date. The Model A380-800 airplane will be an all-new, four-engine jet transport airplane with a full double-deck, two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 1.235 million pounds with a typical three-class layout of 555 passengers. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A380-800 airplane meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-98. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Airbus A380-800 airplane because of novel or unusual design features, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 93-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.” Special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, are issued in accordance with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(a)(2). Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101. Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features The inflation system for the escape systems associated with the exits includes a pressurized cylinder with a mixture of carbon dioxide and argon in both gaseous and liquid states. The inflation system also includes a smaller cylinder containing a solid propellant that burns to generate gaseous propellant. The opening of the valve and the ignition of the propellant are accomplished by the firing of squibs. The firing of these squibs is sequenced to improve their performance in the extreme temperatures to which they are subjected. Firing of the squibs is controlled by a system mounted on the emergency exit. The proposed design for the escape systems on the A380 is much more complex than the design of systems currently in use. Typically, inflation systems for escape systems consist of a pressurized cylinder containing a mixture of gases and a regulator valve that reduces the outlet pressure supplied from the inflation cylinder. The regulator valve is opened either by mechanical means or by the firing of a squib. The regulations governing the certification of the A380 do not adequately address the certification requirements of this type of inflation system for an escape system. Furthermore, the Technical Standard Order

(TSO)that addresses escape systems ( *i.e.* , TSO-C69c) does not adequately address this type of inflation system. The current requirements for escape system reliability are predicated on a simple inflation system, where reliability is driven by the performance of the inflatable itself. The existing requirements do not account for an inflation system that could adversely affect the overall reliability of the escape system. Since the A380 has 16 emergency exits, the requirements of § 25.810 require a total of 80 successful deployments (5 successive deployments for each exit). However, since the requirements apply to each system independently, failures in a system common to all the escape systems would not be adequately addressed. Therefore, the inflation system needs a specific requirement that will show adequate system reliability. With a goal of achieving 95% reliability of the inflation system with a 95% confidence, we are establishing such a requirement. As we noted above, the propellant used is designed to burn. The regulations do not address this type of propellant, and some measure of fire safety protection is needed. United Nations document No. ST/SG/AC.10/I1/Rev.3 “Transport of Dangerous Goods, Manual of Tests and Criteria,” section 13.7.1, contains a small scale test that addresses this concern. Propellants that pass this test will not be a fire hazard. Therefore, a special condition is needed to ensure that the inflation system for the A380 escape system is reliable and that the propellant itself does not constitute a fire hazard. Discussion of Comments Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-05-15-SC, pertaining to escape systems inflation systems, was published in the **Federal Register** on August 9, 2005, (70 FR 46100). Comments were received from the Airline Pilots Association

(ALPA)and an individual commenter. *Requested change 1:* ALPA recommends that the tests of the inflation system “be conducted on the aircraft (or a mockup). Bench testing does not adequately ensure that the entire system will have the declared reliability. The system and its components should be subjected to accelerated aging representative of long-term storage (temperature and pressure cycling), long term exposure (high and low frequency vibration) as part of each test.” ALPA adds that “the inflation systems should be demonstrated to function in winds from the most severe angle at speeds up to at least the maximum wind speed (gust included) for which flight operations can occur.” *FAA response:* Many of these recommendations go beyond current regulatory requirements for inflation systems. For example, wind performance is already specified in 14 CFR part 25. The purpose of the special conditions is to establish criteria that will validate that the reliability of the inflation system as a component will not drive the overall reliability of the escape system. Thus tests on the escape slides installed on the airplane will be performed as is consistent with current practice, and additional tests will be performed on the inflation system itself. Accordingly, we have not changed the special conditions, as proposed. *Requested change 2:* An individual commenter expresses concern about various aspects of the inflation system, including its output of high temperature gas; residue from combustion of the solid propellant; high pressure produced in the inflation system; activation of the inflation system, including inadvertent activation by a lightning strike; and the need for a redundant manual (backup) power source for the inflation system. *FAA response:* These comments relate to the general safety and suitability of the inflation system for the escape system and its related components. These are fundamental considerations for any airplane system. Although the inflation system may warrant highly specific considerations, it is the need to show the reliability of the system relative to conventional design that makes it novel. Showing that the system elements are compatible with one another is a basic certification requirement for any system. To address the novel features of the inflation system requires imposition of special conditions in addition to the applicable requirements of § 25.1301. The slide must be both soaked and inflated at a range of temperatures to determine its operating range. The minimum pressures are determined to establish evacuation rate and stiffness. Therefore, the initial internal pressure of the slide will not be an issue in the qualification. The electrical systems are protected against lightning by other requirements. The manual backup is, indeed, an alternative electrical supply, which is addressed in the system safety analysis. Accordingly, we have not changed the special conditions, as proposed. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Airbus A380-800 airplane. Should Airbus apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the Airbus A380-800 airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Airbus A380-800 airplane. a. In addition to the requirements of § 25.810, the following special condition applies: To ensure that the inflation system is a reliable design, it must be tested using 84 inflation/firing system bench tests with no more than one failure. For these special conditions, the inflation/firing system is defined as everything upstream of the outlet connection to the inflation valve, which includes but is not limited to the door-mounted systems that provide the firing signals to the squibs, the squibs themselves, the solid propellant, and the valve. b. In addition to the requirements of § 25.853(a) and Appendix F Part I (a)(ii), in standard atmosphere conditions, the following special condition applies: To ensure that the propellant itself does not contribute significantly to a fire, the propellant must be subjected to and must pass a standard “Small-Scale Burning Test,” as specified in United Nations document No. ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev. 3 “Transport of Dangerous Goods, Manual of Tests and Criteria,” section 13.7.1. Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 28, 2006. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6-15010 Filed 9-8-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2006-25097; Directorate Identifier 2005-SW-19-AD; Amendment 39-14762; AD 2006-19-05] RIN 2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Arrow Falcon Exporters, Inc. (Previously Utah State University); Firefly Aviation Helicopter Services (Previously Erickson Air-Crane Co.); California Department of Forestry; Garlick Helicopters, Inc.; Global Helicopter Technology, Inc.; Hagglund Helicopters, LLC (Previously Western International Aviation, Inc.); International Helicopters, Inc.; Precision Helicopters, LLC; Robinson Air Crane, Inc.; San Joaquin Helicopters (Previously Hawkins and Powers Aviation, Inc.) S.M.&T. Aircraft (Previously U.S. Helicopters, Inc., UNC Helicopter, Inc., Southern Aero Corporation, and Wilco Aviation); Smith Helicopters; Southern Helicopter, Inc.; Southwest Florida Aviation International, Inc. (Previously Jamie R. Hill and Southwest Florida Aviation); Tamarack Helicopters, Inc. (Previously Ranger Helicopter Services, Inc.); U.S. Helicopter, Inc. (Previously UNC Helicopter, Inc.); West Coast Fabrication; and Williams Helicopter Corporation (Previously Scott Paper Co.) Model HH-1K, TH-1F, TH-1L, UH-1A, UH-1B, UH-1E, UH-1F, UH-1H, UH-1L, and UH-1P Helicopters; and Southwest Florida Aviation Model SW204, SW204HP, SW205, and SW205A-1 Helicopters AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive

(AD)for the specified restricted category type-certificated helicopters. The AD requires a review of the helicopter records to determine the Commercial and Government Entity

(CAGE)code of the tail rotor (T/R) slider. If the T/R slider is FAA approved or has a certain legible CAGE code, this AD requires no further action. If you cannot determine whether the T/R slider is FAA approved and it has no stamped CAGE code, an illegible stamped CAGE code, or an affected CAGE code, the AD also requires, before further flight and at specified intervals, magnaflux inspecting the T/R slider for a crack. If a crack is found, the AD requires, before further flight, replacing the T/R slider with an airworthy T/R slider. The AD also requires replacing the T/R slider with an airworthy T/R slider on or before accumulating 1,000 hours time-in-service

(TIS)or on or before 12 months, whichever occurs first. This amendment is prompted by two accidents attributed to sub-standard T/R sliders that failed during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a T/R slider, loss of T/R control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. DATES: Effective October 16, 2006. Examining the Docket You may examine the docket that contains this AD, any comments, and other information on the Internet at *http://dms.dot.gov,* or at the Docket Management System (DMS), U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Room PL-401, on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, Washington, DC. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kreg Voorhies, Aerospace Engineer, Denver Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100D), 26805 E. 68th Ave., Room 214, Denver, Colorado 80249, telephone

(303)342-1092, fax

(303)342-1088. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD for the specified restricted category type-certificated helicopters was published in the **Federal Register** on June 22, 2006 (71 FR 35840). That action proposed to require a review of the helicopter records to determine the CAGE code of the T/R slider. If the T/R slider is FAA approved or has a certain legible CAGE code, the AD proposed no further action. If you cannot determine whether the T/R slider is FAA approved or if it has an illegible CAGE code or CAGE Code 15716 or 26098, the AD proposed, before further flight and at specified intervals, magnaflux inspecting the T/R slider for a crack. If a crack is found, the AD proposed, before further flight, replacing the T/R slider with an airworthy T/R slider. The AD also proposed replacing the T/R slider that has an illegible CAGE code or Code 15716 or 26098 with an airworthy T/R slider on or before accumulating 1,000 hours TIS or on or before 12 months, whichever occurs first. Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. No comments were received on the proposal or the FAA's determination of the cost to the public. The FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed. We estimate that this AD will affect 75 helicopters of U.S. registry and that it will take about: • 1 work hour to review the helicopter records and 2 work hours to remove and replace the T/R slider for a total of 3 work hours per helicopter to determine the CAGE code for each helicopter in the fleet; • 3 work hours for each magnaflux inspection with a total of 24 such inspections on each of 10 helicopters based on 600 hours TIS per year; and • 2 work hours to replace the T/R slider with 10 helicopters needing the T/R slider replaced. The average labor rate is $65 per work hour. Required parts will cost about $825 for each T/R slider. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators to be $70,975 ($195 per helicopter to determine the CAGE code and $5,635 per helicopter for repetitively inspecting and ultimately replacing the T/R slider on 10 helicopters). Regulatory Findings We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation: 1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; 2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD. See the DMS to examine the economic evaluation. Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new airworthiness directive to read as follows: **2006-19-05 Arrow Falcon Exporters, Inc. (previously Utah State University); California Department of Forestry; Firefly Aviation Helicopter Services (previously Erickson Air-Crane Co.); Garlick Helicopters, Inc.; Global Helicopter Technology, Inc.; Hagglund Helicopters, LLC (previously Western International Aviation, Inc.); International Helicopters, Inc.; Precision Helicopters, LLC; Robinson Air Crane, Inc.; San Joaquin Helicopters (previously Hawkins and Powers Aviation, Inc.); S.M.&T. Aircraft (previously U.S. Helicopters, Inc., UNC Helicopter, Inc., Southern Aero Corporation, and Wilco Aviation); Smith Helicopters; Southern Helicopter, Inc.; Southwest Florida Aviation International, Inc. (previously Jamie R. Hill and Southwest Florida Aviation); Tamarack Helicopters, Inc. (previously Ranger Helicopter Services, Inc.); U.S. Helicopters, Inc. (previously UNC Helicopter, Inc.); West Coast Fabrication; and Williams Helicopter Corporation (previously Scott Paper Co.):** Amendment 39-14762; Docket No. FAA-2006-25097; Directorate Identifier 2005-SW-19-AD. *Applicability:* Model HH-1K, TH-1F, TH-1L, UH-1A, UH-1B, UH-1E, UH-1F, UH-1H, UH-1L, and UH-1P helicopters, and Southwest Florida Model SW204, SW204HP, SW205, and SW205A-1 helicopters, with tail rotor (T/R) slider, part number (P/N) 204-010-720-3 or P/N 204010720-3, installed, certificated in any category. *Compliance:* Required as indicated. To prevent failure of the T/R slider, which could result in loss of T/R control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:

(a)Within 25 hours time-in-service (TIS), unless accomplished previously:

(1)Review the helicopter records to determine the Commercial and Government Entity

(CAGE)code of the T/R slider. If necessary, remove the installed T/R slider to determine the CAGE code.

(2)If the T/R slider is an FAA approved part; for example, an original equipment manufacturer

(OEM)part, and has a legible CAGE code other than Code 15716 or 26098; no further action is required.

(3)If you cannot determine whether the T/R slider is an FAA approved part and it contains no stamped CAGE code, an illegible stamped CAGE code, or is stamped with a CAGE code 15716 or 26098:

(i)Before further flight, unless accomplished previously, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours TIS, magnaflux inspect the T/R slider for a crack.

(ii)If a crack is found, before further flight, replace the cracked T/R slider with an airworthy T/R slider. Note 1: T/R sliders manufactured by Forest Scientific, Inc., were produced under a military contract and do not meet the OEM specifications. The machining process resulted in excess surface roughness. See Figure 1 of this AD. ER11SE06.033 Tail rotor sliders manufactured by Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.

(left)and Forest Scientific, Inc. (right). Note the rough finish of the Forest Scientific, Inc.-manufactured T/R slider compared to the one shown on the left. Note 2: T/R sliders manufactured by Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. have a vibro-etched P/N on them and do not have a CAGE code marking on the part.

(iii)On or before accumulating 1000 hours TIS or on or before 12 months, whichever occurs first, replace each T/R slider that has an illegible CAGE code or Code 15716 or 26098 with an FAA approved airworthy slider without a CAGE code or with a legible CAGE code other than 15716 or 26098. Any T/R slider removed from service based on the requirements of this paragraph is not eligible for installation on any helicopter.

(iv)Replacing the T/R slider with an FAA approved airworthy T/R slider without a CAGE code or with a legible CAGE code other than 15716 or 26098, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD.

(b)To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Contact the Manager, Denver Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100D), ATTN: Kreg Voorhies, Aerospace Engineer, 26805 E. 68th Ave., Room 214, Denver, Colorado 80249, telephone

(303)342-1092, fax

(303)342-1088, for information about previously approved alternative methods of compliance.

(c)This amendment becomes effective on October 16, 2006. Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on September 5, 2006. David A. Downey, Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 06-7577 Filed 9-8-06; 8:45 am]

Notices. Final special conditions