Sec. 2. Findings
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Congress makes the following findings: The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are each considered— a foreign adversary (as defined in section 825(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 ( Public Law 118–31 ; 137 Stat. 322; 46 U.S.C. 50309 note)); a country of risk (as defined in section 6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 ( Public Law 118–159 ; 138 Stat. 2488; 42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for purposes of assessing counterintelligence risks posed by certain visitors to National Laboratories; a foreign country of concern (as defined in section 10612(a) of the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act ( Public Law 117–167 ; 136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C. 19221 note)); a covered foreign country (as defined in section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 ( Public Law 118–159 ; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 U.S.C. 4651 note prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition on operation, procurement, and contracting relating to foreign-made light detection and ranging technology; and a covered foreign country (as defined in section 1622 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 ( Public Law 117–81 ; 135 Stat. 2086; 10 U.S.C. 421 note prec.)) for purposes of a strategy and plan to implement certain defense intelligence reforms.
According to the 2025 Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment, the United States faces an increasingly contested and dangerous global landscape as the four adversaries named in paragraph
(1)deepen cooperation in a manner that— reinforces threats posed by each such adversary individually; and poses new challenges to the strength and power of the United States globally. Much of the cooperation referred to in paragraph
(3)is occurring bilaterally, as the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea strengthen diplomatic, economic, and military ties in accordance with bilateral agreements, which include— the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, signed at Beijing July 11, 1961; the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People's Republic of China, issued on March 27, 2021; the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on International Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development, issued on February 4, 2022; the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, signed at Pyongyang June 18, 2024; the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at Moscow January 17, 2025; and traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The most concerning forms of such cooperation with respect to the interests of the United States occur bilaterally in the realm of defense cooperation. Examples include the following: The transfer and sharing of weapons and munitions. Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran has supplied the Russian Federation with drones and ballistic missiles, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has provided artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. Likewise, the Russian Federation has agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with Su–35 fighter jets and air defense assistance. The transfer and sharing of dual-use technologies and capabilities. Dual-use goods supplied by the People’s Republic of China have enabled the Russian Federation to continue defense production in the face of wide-ranging sanctions and export controls intended to prevent the Russian Federation from accessing the necessary components to fuel its defense industry. In turn, reporting indicates that the Russian Federation has provided technical expertise on satellite technology to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and is working closely with the People’s Republic of China on air defense and submarine technology. Joint military activities and exercises. The military forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are actively participating in the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, and joint military exercises between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are expanding in scope, scale, and geographic reach, including in close proximity to territory of the United States. Coordination on disinformation and cyber operations, including coordinated messaging aimed at denigrating and isolating the United States internationally. Adversaries of the United States are also cooperating in a manner that may circumvent United States and multilateral economic tools. Examples include the following: The continued purchase by the People’s Republic of China of oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran despite sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the United States on oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran. The veto by the Russian Federation of, and abstention by the People’s Republic of China in a vote on, a United Nations Security Council resolution relating to monitoring United Nations Security Council-levied sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Adversaries of the United States are cooperating multilaterally in international institutions such as the United Nations and through expanded multilateral groupings, such as the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa group (commonly known as BRICS ), to isolate and erode the influence of the United States. Such increased cooperation and alignment among the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses a significant threat to United States interests and national security. Such increasing alignment— allows each such adversary to modernize its military more quickly than previously anticipated; enables unforeseen breakthroughs in capabilities through the sharing among such adversaries of critical military technologies, which could erode the technological edge of the United States Armed Forces; presents increasing challenges to strategies of isolation or containment against such individual adversaries, since the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea now provide critical lifelines to each other; threatens the effectiveness of United States economic tools, as such adversaries cooperate to evade United States sanctions and export controls and seek to establish alternative payment mechanisms that do not require transactions in United States dollars; and increases the chances of United States conflict or tensions with any one of such adversaries drawing in another, thereby posing a greater risk that the United States will have to contend with simultaneous threats from such adversaries in one or more theaters.
Connectionstraces to 9
Traces to 9 documents
public-private-law
- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024Public Law 118-31
- Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025Public Law 118-159
- Making appropriations for Legislative Branch for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2022, and for other purposes.AugPublic Law 117-167
- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022Public Law 117-81
U.S. Code
- Securing logistics information data of the United States§ 50309
- Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence§ 7144b
- Strategy and report on the nation’s economic security, science, research, and innovation to support the national security strategy§ 19221
- Expenditure of appropriations: limitation§ 4651
- Funds for foreign cryptologic support§ 421
5 references not yet in our index
- 137 Stat. 322
- 138 Stat. 2488
- 136 Stat. 1635
- 138 Stat. 1818
- 135 Stat. 2086
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Sec. 2
Findings
Stat.137 Stat. 322
Stat.138 Stat. 2488
Stat.136 Stat. 1635
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