Sec. 192. Oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern
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In this section: The term Biological Weapons Convention means the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972. The term life sciences dual use research of concern means life sciences research that— involves the Peoples Republic of China; and based on current understanding can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be misapplied to do harm with no, or only minor, modification to pose a significant threat with potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.
It is the policy of the United States to— conduct rigorous scrutiny of, and regularly review, collaboration on international biological, bacteriological, virological, and other relevant research that could be weaponized or could reasonably be considered life sciences dual-use research of concern, and incorporate national security and nonproliferation considerations and country-specific conditions into decisions regarding such collaboration; ensure that, in the search for solutions to pressing global health challenges, United States Government support for public health research and other actions does not advance the capabilities of the PRC in the area of life sciences dual use research of concern or inadvertently contribute to the proliferation of biological weapons technologies; and declassify, to the maximum extent possible, all intelligence relevant to the PRC’s compliance or lack of compliance with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and other national security concerns regarding PRC biological, bacteriological, virological, and other relevant research that could be weaponized or could reasonably be considered life sciences dual use research of concern that may be outside the scope of the BWC.
The Secretary of State shall— ensure robust and consistent Department of State participation in interagency processes and review mechanisms related to oversight of life sciences dual-use research of concern; participate in interagency working groups and task forces related to vetting United States Government funding related to international cooperation in nonproliferation, life sciences, high containment laboratories, and infectious diseases, to develop policies and processes for post-award oversight of grants and funding for life sciences dual use research of concern, including as aligned with current laws and regulations and for grants or funding from other Federal departments and agencies, in order to keep apprised of any national security or foreign policy concerns that may arise with respect to an international project or a project involving a foreign partner, funded by another Federal department or agency; conduct periodic reviews of the adequacy of consultative mechanisms with other Federal Departments and agencies with respect to oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern, especially consultative mechanisms mandated in United States law, and identify recommendations for improving such consultative mechanisms; direct Chiefs of Mission to ensure Country Team Assessments are submitted to the Department of State and the head of the Federal department or agency proposing to sponsor a program or collaboration to assess whether such program or collaboration involves life sciences dual use research of concern, and ensure that such Assessments are integrated into relevant interagency processes; and direct Chiefs of Mission to increase embassy reporting on life sciences dual use research of concern, biosecurity hazards trends in the development of synthetic biology and biotechnology, and other related matters.
The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall report to and consult with the Department of State on any proposed programs, projects, initiatives, or funding for life sciences dual use research of concern. The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations should use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to block representatives from any country listed in paragraph 2 from serving in leadership positions within any United Nations organ, fund, program, or related specialized agency with responsibility for global health security (including animal health), biosecurity, atomic, biological or chemical weapons, or food security and agricultural development.
The countries described in paragraph
(1)are— the People’s Republic of China; the Russian Federation; the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; the Assad Regime of Syria; and any other country specified in the report required by section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act ( 22 U.S.C. 2593a(a) ) in the relevant calendar year. This section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
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Sec. 192
Oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern
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