Sec. 301. Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan
344 words·~2 min read·
/bill/117/hr/9010/ih/section-301·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to— covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front work, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.
The strategy required under subsection
(a)shall include descriptions of— the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including— assistance in building the capacity of the Government of Taiwan and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities; assistance to enhance the Government of Taiwan’s ability to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns; the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities; support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations; the establishment of a coordinated partnership, through the American Institute in Taiwan's Global Cooperation and Training Framework, with like-minded governments to share data and best practices with the Government of Taiwan regarding ways to address sharp power operations supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party; and programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.