Sec. 602. Statement of policy expressing the political will of the United States to defend its interests in the Indo-Pacific and pursue expanded political-military cooperation with allies and partners
873 words·~4 min read·
/bill/116/s/4272/is/section-602A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
It is the policy of the United States— to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region as the most important political-military theater for United States foreign policy; to prioritize resources for achieving United States political and military objectives in this most critical region, while still balancing resources for other lower-priority security challenges across the globe; to reaffirm and strengthen United States commitments to treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region, as articulated by successive United States administrations and in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 ( Public Law 115–409 ; 132 Stat. 5387), including— with respect to Japan— upholding the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, done at Washington January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent security agreements; recognizing Japan’s administrative control over the Senkaku Islands and maritime exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea; and further advancing defense cooperation in priority areas, such as long-range precision fires, missile defense, maritime security, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum; with respect to the Republic of Korea— upholding the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent security agreements; and strengthening alliance defense and deterrence capabilities; with respect to Australia and New Zealand— upholding the Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent security agreements; increasing collaboration to address shared security challenges; and providing mutual support in the face of coercion; with respect to the Philippines— upholding the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, done at Washington August 30, 1951, including commitments relevant to the South China Sea, and all related and subsequent security arrangements; and cooperating with the Philippines to build and maintain defense capabilities, particularly in the maritime domain, that enable the Philippines to protect its sovereignty and resist external coercion; and with respect to Thailand— upholding the security treaties and all related and subsequent security arrangements that underpin the United States-Thailand alliance; and reinvigorating defense cooperation and partnership through exercises, training, and interoperability that enable it to protect its sovereignty and resist external coercion; to collaborate with United States treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and defense cooperation with other regional partners; to sustain the Taiwan Relations Act ( Public Law 96–8 ; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for United States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations of the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to support the development of capable, ready, and modern forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan; to enhance security partnerships with India, across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific, including as described in sections 204, 205, and 208 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 ( Public Law 115–409 ); to deter, in the shorter term, the PRC from capitalizing on the world’s focus on the COVID–19 pandemic to advance its military objectives in the Western Pacific, including deterring more aggressive behavior towards Taiwan and in the South China Sea; to deter, over the longer term, acts of aggression or coercion by the PRC against United States and allies’ interests along the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific by showing PRC leaders that the United States can and is willing to deny them the ability to achieve their objectives, including by— consistently demonstrating the political will of the United States to deepening existing treaty alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the PRC’s growing military capabilities and reach; maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of United States resolve and commitment to the region, and as platforms to ensure United States operational readiness and advance interoperability with allies and partners; adopting a more dispersed force posture throughout the region, particularly the Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific region; fielding long-range, precision-strike networks to United States and allied forces, including ground-launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in order to impose high risks on the PRC for operating in these zones, and maximize the United States ability to operate; strengthening extended deterrence to demonstrate that escalation against key United States interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; and collaborating with allies and partners to accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the burdens of mutual defense, including through the acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and training that will better enable them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and to convey to the PRC that, in the event that deterrence by denial fails, the United States, if necessary— will impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, reputational, and military costs on the PRC for its aggression; and will defend itself and its allies regardless of the point of origin of attacks against them.
Connectionstraces to 2
Traces to 2 documents
2 references not yet in our index
- 132 Stat. 5387
- Pub. L. 96-8
Citation graph
cites case law
Sec. 602
Statement of policy expressing the political will of the United States to defend its interests in the Indo-Pacific and pursue expanded political-military cooperation with allies and partners
Stat.132 Stat. 5387
Pub. L.Pub. L. 96-8
Cites 4Cited by 0 across 0 sources