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Code · BILL · 116th Congress · S. 4272 (Introduced in Senate) — To advance a policy for managed strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China. · Sec. 601

Sec. 601. Findings

1,247 words·~6 min read·/bill/116/s/4272/is/section-601

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Congress makes the following findings: The People’s Republic of China aims to use its growing military might in concert with other instruments of its national power to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific and establish hegemony over the region. The military balance in the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly unfavorable to the United States because— the PRC is rapidly modernizing and expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project power and create contested areas across the entire Indo-Pacific region;
PLA modernization has largely focused on areas where it possesses operational advantages and can exploit weaknesses in the United States suite of capabilities; and current United States force structure and presence do not sufficiently counter threats in the Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, bases, and forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific region are concentrated in large, close-in bases that are highly vulnerable to the PRC’s strike capabilities. This shift in the regional military balance and erosion of conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region— presents a substantial and imminent risk to the security of the United States; and left unchecked, could embolden the PRC to take actions to change the status quo before the United States can mount an effective response.
The PRC believes the political bonds between the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies are weakening. The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish confidence among United States allies and partners in the strength of United States commitments, even to the extent that these nations feel compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to protect their interests. The PRC is closely monitoring the United States reaction to PRC pressure and coercion of United States allies, searching for indicators of United States resolve.
Achieving so-called reunification of Taiwan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC to achieve its regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC has increased the frequency and scope of its exercises and operations targeting Taiwan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan, and flights across the unofficial median line in the Taiwan Strait. The Government of the PRC’s full submission of Hong Kong potentially accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, and makes the defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.
The defense of Taiwan is critical to— retaining the United States credibility as a defender of the democratic values and free-market principles embodied by Taiwan’s people and government; limiting the PLA’s ability to project power beyond the First Island Chain, including to United States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii; defending the territorial integrity of Japan; and preventing the PLA from diverting military planning, resources, and personnel to broader military ambitions.
The PRC has capitalized on the world’s attention to COVID–19 to advance its military objectives in the South China Sea, intensifying and accelerating trends already underway. The PRC has sent militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of an administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Islands under the Chinese local government of Sansha, aimed a fire control radar at a Philippine navy ship, encroached on Indonesia’s fishing grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, announced new research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef, and landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef to routinize such deployments.
On July 13, 2020, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo clarified United States policy on the South China Sea and stated, Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them. . These actions enable the PLA to exert influence and project power deeper into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, testified in 2019, In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States. .
The PLA also continues to advance its claims in the East China Sea, including through a high number of surface combatant patrols and frequent entry into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, over which the United States recognizes Japan’s administrative control. In April 2014, President Barack Obama stated, Our commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article five [of the U.S.-Japan security treaty] covers all territory under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands. .
On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo stated, As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty. . The PLA is modernizing and gaining critical capability in every branch and every domain, including— positioning the PLA Navy to become a great maritime power or blue-water navy that can completely control all activity within the First Island Chain and project power beyond it with a massive fleet of 425 battle force ships by 2030; increasing the size and range of its strike capabilities, including approximately 1,900 ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles capable of targeting United States allies and partners in the First and Second Island chains, United States bases in the Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea; boosting capabilities for air warfare, including with Russian-origin Su–35 fighters and S–400 air defense systems, new J–20 5th generation stealth fighters, and Y–20 heavy lift aircraft; and making critical investments in new domains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and space warfare.
The PRC is pursuing this modernization through all means at its disposal, including its Military-Civil Fusion initiative, which, as United States Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford said in March 2020, aims to make any technology accessible to anyone under the PRC’s jurisdiction available to support the Chinese Communist Party’s ambitions. . It enlists the whole of PRC society in developing and acquiring technology with military applications to pursue technological advantage over the United States in artificial intelligence, hy­per­son­ic glide vehicles, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space weapons, and other emerging capabilities.
The United States lead in the development of science and technology relevant to defense is eroding in the face of competition from the PRC. United States research and development spending on defense capabilities has declined sharply as a share of global research and development. The commercial sector’s leading role in innovation presents certain unique challenges to the Department of Defense’s reliance on technology for battlefield advantage. The PRC has vastly increased domestic research and development expenditures, supported the growth of new cutting-edge industries and tapped into a large workforce to invest in fostering science and engineering talent.
The PRC is increasing exports of defense and security capabilities to build its defense technology and industrial base and improve its own military capabilities. For example, the PRC has enjoyed particular success in exporting numerous unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Such exports have helped it establish new defense relationships, test its systems under operational conditions, and refine its designs for its own forces. The PRC has exploited an available gap in the global market, as the PRC does not subject itself to the limitations of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is a voluntary protocol under which the United States and other members restrict their own UAS exports.
PLA military analyst Song Zhongping has noted that the Chinese [defense] product now doesn’t lack technology, it only lacks market share, and the United States restricting its arms exports is precisely what gives China a great opportunity. .
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