Sec. 1243. Non-compliance by the Russian Federation with its obligations under the INF Treaty
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Congress finds the following: The Department of State, on July 31, 2014, released the Annual Report on the Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments which included the finding that, The United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile
(GLCM)with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. . According to the testimony of senior officials of the Department of State, the Russian Federation is not complying with numerous treaties and agreements, including the INF Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Vienna Document, the Budapest Memorandum, the Istanbul Commitments, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Russian Federation has recently withdrawn from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The Commander of U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, General Philip Breedlove, USAF, stated that [a] weapon capability that violates the I.N.F., that is introduced into the greater European land mass is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with . . . I would not judge how the alliance will choose to react, but I would say they will have to consider what to do about it, [i]t can’t go unanswered. . General Breedlove has further stated that we need to first and foremost signal that we cannot accept this change and that, if this change is continued, that we will have to change the cost calculus for Russia in order to help them to find their way to a less bellicose position. . General Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that, I think we have to make it very clear that things like their compliance with the INF treaty that there will be political, diplomatic and potentially military costs in terms of the way we posture ourselves and the way we plan and work with our allies to address those provocations…It concerns me greatly. I certainly would counsel them not to roll back the clock. . The Secretary of Defense, Ashton B. Carter, testified that, On the military side, we have begun to consider . . . what our options are, because the INF treaty is a treaty, meaning that it’s a two-way street. We accepted constraints in return for constraints of the then Soviet Union. It is a two-way street, and we need to remind them that it’s a two-way street, meaning that we, without an INF treaty, can take action also that we both decided years ago was best for neither of us to take. . The Department of Defense has been considering a range of military options to respond to the Russian Federation’s violation of the INF Treaty and these options would aim to negate any advantage Russia might gain from deploying an INF-prohibited system, and all of these would be designed to make us more secure , and these options fall into three broad categories: active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles; counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces. . President Barack Obama stated in Prague in 2009 that, Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. . It is the sense of the Congress that— the Russian Federation should return to compliance with the INF Treaty; the continuing violation of the INF Treaty by the Russian Federation threatens the viability of the INF Treaty; the United States has reportedly been undertaking diplomatic efforts to address with the Russia Federation its violations of the INF Treaty since 2013, and the Russian Federation has failed to respond to these efforts in any meaningful way; not only should the Russian Federation end its cheating with respect to the INF Treaty, but also its illegal occupation of the sovereign territory of another nation, its plans for stationing nuclear weapons on that nation’s territory, and its cheating and violation of as many as eight of its 12 arms control obligations and agreements; and there are several United States military requirements that would be addressed by the development and deployment of systems currently prohibited by the INF Treaty. The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of— whether the Russian Federation has flight-tested, deployed, or possesses a military system that has achieved an initial operating capability of a covered missile system; and whether the Russian Federation has begun steps to return to full compliance with the INF Treaty, including by agreeing to inspections and verification measures necessary to achieve high confidence that any covered missile system will be eliminated, as required by the INF Treaty upon its entry into force. The notification required under paragraph
(1)shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not later than 30 days after the date on which the Russian Federation meets any of the requirements of subparagraphs
(A)and
(B)of paragraph (1). The notification required under paragraph
(1)shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex if necessary. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment, and every 120-day period thereafter for a period of 5 years, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification on the status and content of updates provided to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)and allies of the United States in East Asia, on the Russian Federation’s flight testing, operating capability and deployment of a covered missile system, including updates on the status and a description of efforts with such allies to develop collective responses, including economic and military responses, to the Russian Federation’s arms control violations, including violations of the INF Treaty. The notification required under paragraph
(1)shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex if necessary. If, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the President determines that the Russian Federation has not begun steps to return to full compliance with the INF Treaty, including by agreeing to inspections and verification measures necessary to achieve high confidence that any covered missile system will be eliminated, as required by the INF Treaty upon its entry into force, the President shall begin developing the following military capabilities: Counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile and cruise missile attacks, including capabilities that may be acquired from allies. Countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the Armed Forces of the United States or allies of the United States, including capabilities that may be acquired from allies. The Secretary of Defense may use funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2016 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense-wide, as specified in the funding table in section 4201, to carry out the development of capabilities pursuant to paragraph
(1)that are recommended by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet military requirements and current capability gaps. In making such a selection, the Chairman shall give priority to such capabilities that the Chairman determines could be tested and fielded most expediently, with the most priority given to capabilities that the Chairman determines could be fielded in two years. During each 180-day period beginning on the date on which funds are first obligated to develop capabilities under paragraph (2), the Chairman shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on such capabilities, including the costs of development (and estimated total costs of each system if pursued to deployment) and the timeline for development flight testing and deployment. The provisions of subparagraph
(A)shall not be in effect on and after the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the INF Treaty is no longer in force or the Russian Federation has fully returned to compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the following: Potential deployment locations of the military capabilities described in paragraph
(1)in East Asia and Eastern Europe, including any potential basing agreements that may be required to facilitate such deployments. Any required safety and security measures, estimates of potential costs of deployments described in subparagraph
(A)and an assessment of whether or not such deployments in Eastern Europe may require a decision of the North Atlantic Council. In this section: The term appropriate congressional committees means the following: The congressional defense committees. The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. The term covered missile system means ground-launched ballistic missiles or ground-launched cruise missiles with a flight-tested range of between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The term INF Treaty means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF)Treaty, signed at Washington, December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.