Rooney v. North Dakota — 196 U.S. 319 (1905)

196 U.S. 319 (1905) ROONEY v. NORTH DAKOTA. No. 123. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 12, 1905. Decided January 23, 1905. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA. *322 Mr. B.F. Spalding, with whom Mr. Seth Newman was on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Emerson H. Smith, with whom Mr. W.H. Barnett was on the brief, for defendant in error. *324 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. It appears from the statement of the case that the statute in force when the sentence of death was pronounced differed from those in force when the crime was committed and when the verdict was rendered, in these particulars: 1. By the later law, close confinement in the penitentiary for not less than six months and not more than nine months, after judgment and before execution, was substituted for confinement in the county jail for not less than three months nor more than six months after judgment and before execution. *325 2. By the later law, hanging, within an inclosure at the penitentiary by the warden or his deputy, was substituted for hanging by the sheriff within the yard of the jail of the county in which the conviction occurred. We are of opinion that in the particulars just mentioned the statute of 1903 is not repugnant to the constitutional provision declaring that no State shall pass an ex post facto law. It did not create a new offense nor aggravate or increase the enormity of the crime for the commission of which the accused was convicted, nor require the infliction upon the accused of any greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the commission of the offense. The changes, looked at in the light of reason and common sense and applied to the present case, are to be taken as favorable rather than as unfavorable to him. It may be sometimes difficult to say whether particular changes in the law are or are not in mitigation of the punishment for crimes previously committed. But it must be taken that there is such mitigation when by the later law there is an enlargement of the period of confinement prior to the actual execution of the criminal by hanging. The giving, by the later statute, of three months' additional time to live, after the rendition of judgment, was clearly to his advantage, for the court must assume that every rational person desires to live as long as he may. If the shortening of the time of confinement, whether in the county jail or in the penitentiary before execution, would have increased, as undoubtedly it would have increased, the punishment to the disadvantage of a criminal sentenced to be hung, the enlargement of such time must be deemed a change for his benefit. So that a statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time a crime was committed cannot be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime. Calder v. Ball, 3 Dall. 386, 391, Chase, J.; Story's Const. § 1345; Cooley's Const. Lim. [*]267; Commonwealth v. Gardner, 11 Gray, 438, 443; 1 Bishop's Crim. Law, § 280. Besides, the extension of the time to live, given by the later law, increased the opportunity of the accused *326 to obtain a pardon or commutation from the Governor of the State before his execution. Nor was the punishment, in any substantial sense, increased or made more severe by substituting close confinement in the penitentiary prior to execution for confinement in the county jail. It is contended that "close confinement" means "solitary confinement," and Medley's Case, 134 U.S. 160 , is cited in support of the contention that the new law increased the punishment to the disadvantage of the accused. We do not think that the two phrases import the same kind of punishment. Although solitary confinement may involve close confinement, a criminal could be kept in close confinement without being subjected to solitary confinement. It cannot be supposed that any criminal would be subjected to solitary confinement when the mandate of the law was simply to keep him in close confinement. Again, it is said that the law in force when the crime was committed only required confinement, whereas the later statute required close confinement. But this difference of phraseology is not material. "Confinement" and "close confinement" equally mean such custody, and only such custody, as will safely secure the production of the body of the prisoner on the day appointed for his execution. The objection that the later law required the execution of the sentence of death to take place within the limits of the penitentiary rather than in the county jail, as provided in the previous statute, is without merit. However material the place of confinement may be in case of some crimes not involving life, the place of execution, when the punishment is death, within the limits of the State, is of no practical consequence to the criminal. On such a matter he is not entitled to be heard. The views we have expressed are in accord with those announced by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. State v. Rooney, 12 N. Dak. 144, 152. We are of opinion that the law of 1903 did not alter the *327 situation to the material disadvantage of the criminal, and, therefore, was not ex post facto when applied to his case in the particulars mentioned. Judgment affirmed.

Public-domain opinion of the United States Supreme Court, reproduced from the court record (U.S. Reports). Historical text may contain OCR artifacts. Provided for reference — not legal advice.