Reybold v. United States — 82 U.S. 202 (1872)

82 U.S. 202 (1872) 15 Wall. 202 REYBOLD v. UNITED STATES. Supreme Court of United States. *204 Mr. E. Fitch, for the appellant. Mr. G.H. Williams, Attorney-General, and Mr. C.H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, contra. *206 Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court. This case is in only one particular different from that of Morgan v. United States, decided at the last term. [*] Both were contracts of affreightment, with stipulations that the United States should bear the war risk and the owners the marine risk. The hiring in each case was for a particular purpose, the transportation of troops and munitions of war from place to place, as the necessities of the service might require; and although the United States were empowered to direct the manner of loading the vessels and their points of destination, yet the owners retained the control and management of them, and agreed to keep them in good repair and fit for the service in which they were engaged. In each case the loss sued for was occasioned by the perils of the sea, and in both the effort has been, notwithstanding the express terms of the contract that the owners were their own insurers against such risks, to shift the responsibility upon the United States. *207 It was insisted in Morgan's case that the owners were relieved and the government chargeable, because the master was compelled to proceed to sea by the peremptory order of the quartermaster, when, in his judgment, expressed to that officer, the state of the wind and tide rendered it hazardous to do so, but we held, as in several previous cases, [*] that if this were so, it was outside of the contract a tortious act of the officer and, therefore, not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. In the present case the master made no objection to the order requiring him to proceed on his voyage, and this constitutes the only difference between the two cases. This difference, however, instead of helping the cause of the claimant, makes the justice of the defence still clearer. It was the business of the master to know whether the navigation of the river was dangerous or not, and naturally, he would be better informed on such a subject than a quartermaster of the United States. How are we to know, in the absence of proof, that the order would have been given, or, if given, not withdrawn, had the master stated that in his opinion, in the state of the river, it was unsafe to attempt to make the voyage? Why not speak of the danger when he told the quartermaster, in reply to an inquiry on the subject, prior to the order being given, that his vessel was sheathed with iron and had capacity to take the men and horses to City Point? This was the time to have spoken, as the object of the inquiry was plainly to ascertain whether or not the boat, if she had the requisite capacity, was in a condition to withstand the masses of ice which were floating in the channel of the river. It is very clear that, upon the information which was given, in the absence of any objection to the proposed voyage, the officer of the government had the right to suppose, in the judgment of the master, it could be safely undertaken. It is no excuse to say that the master at the time knew it was unsafe to leave the wharf, but said nothing, *208 because he considered the order a military one, and as such to be obeyed. It is true, by the terms of the contract of affreightment, he was subject to the orders of the quartermaster, but this contract did not require him to sail out of port during such tempestuous weather as would necessarily jeopardize the safety of his boat. If obedience to an order given under such circumstances had been demanded, after proper objection, it would have been a tortious act on the part of an officer of the government. In such a case, if relief is to be afforded, it must come from Congress, for the Court of Claims has no power to entertain a suit based on a consideration of this character. If, however, the master chose to obey the order without objection, and in the course of the voyage the steamer commanded by him is lost or injured by a peril of the sea, her owners can have no just cause of complaint against the government, and must abide the consequences of their stipulation. In every aspect of the case the judgment of the Court of Claims should be AFFIRMED. NOTES [*] 14 Wallace, 531. [*] Reed v. United States, 11 Wallace, 591; United States v. Kimbal, 13 Id. 636.

Public-domain opinion of the United States Supreme Court, reproduced from the court record (U.S. Reports). Historical text may contain OCR artifacts. Provided for reference — not legal advice.