Macon County v. Huidekoper — 134 U.S. 332 (1890)

134 U.S. 332 (1890) MACON COUNTY v. HUIDEKOPER. No. 615. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 17, 20, 1890. Decided March 17, 1890. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI. *336 Mr. James Carr (with whom was Mr. Robert G. Mitchell on the brief) for plaintiff in error. Mr. Joseph Shippen for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. According to the law of Missouri under which the bonds of Macon County were issued to the Missouri and Mississippi Railroad Company, in payment of its subscription of stock to that company, as stated above, the balance due upon the judgment of the relator, after application of the moneys raised by the special tax of one-twentieth of one per cent upon the assessed value of taxable property, stood on the same footing as any other liability of the county to be paid out of its general funds. To raise revenue to meet its expenses, which included that liability, the county was authorized to levy a tax of fifty cents on every one hundred dollars of valuation of taxable property in the county. United States v. County of Clark, 96 U.S. 211 ; Knox County Court v. United States, 109 U.S. 229 . In this case it appears that for the year 1885 the county had levied only thirty cents on every one hundred dollars of property, but it set up in its answer that it had levied fifty cents, treating the twenty cents which had been levied by the boards of townships for township and bridge purposes as part of the *337 fifty cents. The township is a separate organization from that of the county, with authority to purchase and hold real estate and make contracts and control its corporate property, and its taxes levied for those purposes over which it has control can in no just sense be termed taxes for county purposes. There can be, therefore, no valid objection to the county's levy of an additional twenty cents on the one hundred dollars to make up the fifty cents which it is authorized to levy to meet its expenses and liabilities. The apportioning of the funds collected to distinct and separate purposes does not affect the question presented. The proceeding is to obtain a further levy and the appropriation of its proceeds upon the judgment of the relator among other debts of the county. That the surplus remaining in the treasury over the payment of the warrant for the school fund, which is of prior registration, should be appropriated, pro rata, upon all the warrants of even date and registration, is a simple measure of justice. All the warrants were issued and registered on the same day, and if they could only be paid in the order of their registration, and a payment could not be made on any one without its surrender, as contended, the treasurer would be obliged to retain the funds in his possession until he had a sufficient amount to pay them all before applying any portion thereof. As the Circuit Court said, this is an absurd position, and it held that whenever any reasonable amount has accumulated it should be distributed, and added that the order of the court would be a full protection to the officer. In that respect as well as in other particulars, concurring with the court, we affirm its judgment. Affirmed:

Public-domain opinion of the United States Supreme Court, reproduced from the court record (U.S. Reports). Historical text may contain OCR artifacts. Provided for reference — not legal advice.