Lawler v. Walker — 55 U.S. 149 (1852)

55 U.S. 149 (1852) 14 How. 149 DAVIS B. LAWLER, TIMOTHY WALKER, STEPHEN S. L'HOMMEDIEU, GEORGE GRAHAM, JOHN S. HARRISON, AND JACOB BURNET, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. JAMES H. AND JOHN WALKER. Supreme Court of United States. *150 It was argued upon printed briefs by Messrs. Fox, Walker, and Grosbeck for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Chase, with whom was Mr. Rockwell, for the defendants in error. *152 Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court. We do not think that this court has jurisdiction of this case. We cannot find in the record, nor can it be inferred from any part of it, (the certificate of the Supreme Court included) which of the statutes of Ohio were declared to be valid, which has been alleged to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. The 25th section of the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, requires something more definite than such a certificate, to give to this court jurisdiction. The conflict of a State law with the Constitution of the United States, and a decision by a State court in favor of its validity, must appear on the face of the record, before it can be reëxamined in this court. It must appear in the pleadings of the suit, or from the evidence in the course of trial, in the instructions asked for, or from exceptions taken to the ruling of the court. It must be, that such a question was necessarily involved in the decision, and that the State court would not have given a judgment without deciding it. The language of the section is, that no other cause can be assigned, or shall be regarded as a ground of reversal, than such as appears on the face of the record. This certificate is, that the Supreme Court of Ohio held that certain statutes of Ohio were valid, which had been alleged to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States, without naming what those statutes were. This is neither within the letter nor spirit of the act. If permitted, it would make the State courts judges of the jurisdiction of this court, and might cause them to take jurisdiction in cases in which conflicts between the State laws and the Constitution and the laws of the United States did not exist. The statutes complained of in this case should have been stated. Without that, the court cannot apply them to the subject-matter of litigation, to determine whether or not they violated the Constitution or laws of the United States. This court has already passed upon a certificate of a like kind from Ohio, in the case of the Commercial Bank and Eunice Buckingham's Executors, 5 How. 317 . That was more to *153 the purpose than this, but it was declared to be insufficient to give jurisdiction to this court. In that case it was certified that the plaintiffs in error relied upon the charter granted them in February, 1829, and the 4th section of it was given; and they claimed, if a section of an act of 1824 was applied in the construction of their charter, that it would be a violation of the Constitution of the United States, because it impaired the obligation of a contract. It was also stated that the objection had been overruled, and that a decision had been given in favor of the validity of the act of 1824. When the case was considered here, we first examined our jurisdiction under the 25th section, and determined against it. Not because we did not think that the certificate was a part of the record, or that it did not show sufficiently the act which the plaintiffs in error alleged could not be applied in that case without impairing the obligation of a contract, but because we thought, from our view of the entire record, that the only question which was raised on the trial of the case in the State court, was one of construction of two Ohio statutes. And that was, whether or not the bank was legally liable to pay on account of its refusal to pay its notes in specie, the six per cent. imposed by the act of 1824, as a penalty for such refusal, in addition to the twelve per cent. imposed by its charter. The constitutionality of the act of 1824 was not denied. Indeed, it was admitted. But it was urged that the application to make the bank pay the penalty imposed by it, and twelve per cent. besides, would impair the obligation of a contract which the State had made with the corporation in their charter. Here, then, the validity of the act of 1824 was not drawn in question, on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, nor was a point raised for the construction of any clause of the Constitution, of a treaty, or of a statute of the United States. The admission of the constitutionality and validity of the act of 1824, only raised a question of construction of two State statutes, one of which it was said would be repugnant to the other, if its penalty should be applied to the bank, in addition to that imposed by its charter, without words implying that the bank would not be liable to an universal statute, passed before the bank was chartered, which imposes six per cent. upon all banks which should refuse to pay their notes in specie. The court decided, that the bank was liable to the penalty of the act of 1824, but it erroneously supposed, because a constitutional point had been made in the argument, that it was one which necessarily arose from the case itself, and that it could not give a judgment in the case upon its merits without deciding that it involved the question of a conflict with the Constitution of the United States. *154 It was in that view of the case that this court said, in its opinion, "It is not enough that the record shows that the plaintiff contended and claimed, that the judgment of the court impaired the obligation of a contract and violated the provision of the Constitution of the United States, and that this claim was overruled by the court, but it must appear by clear and necessary intendment, from the record, that the question must have been raised and must have been decided in order to induce the judgment." And it was also in this view, when one State statute was said to be repugnant to another, both being admitted to be constitutional, that it was said in that case, "It is the peculiar province and privilege of the State courts to construe their own statutes," and when they did so, "it was no part of the functions of this court to review their decisions," or, in such cases, "to assume jurisdiction over them, on the pretence that their judgments have impaired the obligation of contracts." Having said that this court had not jurisdiction in this case on account of the insufficiency of the certificate, we now say, if it could be made as definite as that in the case of Buckingham's Executors, by inserting in it the statutes of Ohio, which the court supposed involved a constitutional question, that it would not give this court jurisdiction. Then the cases would be so much alike that the Buckingham case would rule this as to the question of jurisdiction. In the Buckingham case it was urged that the penalty, in a general statute upon banks, for refusing to pay their notes in specie, could not be imposed upon a bank subsequently chartered, in addition to the penalty imposed by its charter, without a violation of the Constitution of the United States. It is urged, in argument in this case, that a statute passed in 1816, entitled "an act to prohibit the issuing and circulating of unauthorized bank paper," which was amended in 1839; could not be applied to make the defendants liable to pay notes which were issued in 1840 by a canal company, in its corporate name, and which notes were meant for circulation in the community as bank paper. It was not contended that the canal company could legally issue such paper for circulation as money, though it was said they could give notes payable to order in payment of its debts. It was not denied that the company could give notes in payment of debts, but it was said, that they could not make them for that purpose and for circulation, as bank paper. The point then raised for decision, was, whether the canal company could do so, without making its stockholders and directors liable to pay them to the holders of the notes, under the statute of 1816, amended in 1839. The Supreme Court decided that the defendants in this case, being directors and stockholders of the *155 canal company were liable, by the statutes of 1816 and 1839, to pay such notes. It seems to us, that the statement gives its own answer, and that the Supreme Court, in making its decision, only gave a construction to an act of Ohio, which neither of itself, nor by its application, involved in any way a repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States, by impairing the obligation of a contract. Whether the construction of the act and the charter of the canal company was correct, or not, we do not say. We do not mean to discuss that point, or to give any opinion upon it; but we mean to say, that the construction does not violate a constitutional point under the 25th section of the Judiciary Statute, so as to give this court jurisdiction of this cause. If more was wanting in aid of our conclusion, it is to be found in the pleadings in the case, in the evidence given on the trial, the objections made to the admissibility of certain parts of it, in the prayers of the defendant to the court to instruct the jury, and in the charge which the court gave. By no one of them is a constitutional question raised. It was only suggested, in argument, and on that account it was, that the court certified that the "validity of statutes of Ohio was drawn into question, which were said to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and not because the court considered that such a point had been rightly raised before it, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789." We do not think it necessary to repeat any thing which this court has hitherto said, from an early day to the present, concerning the 25th section. Its interpretation will be found in the case of Crowell v. Randall, 10 Peters, 308; in other cases, cited in that case; and in Armstrong v. The Treasurer of Athens County, 16 Peters, 281. We shall direct this suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Order. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that this cause be, and the same is hereby, dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.

Public-domain opinion of the United States Supreme Court, reproduced from the court record (U.S. Reports). Historical text may contain OCR artifacts. Provided for reference — not legal advice.