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Code · CFR · Title 14 — Aeronautics and Space · Part 450 — Launch and Reentry License Requirements · § 450.145

§ 450.145. Highly reliable flight safety system.

400 words·~2 min read·/us/cfr/t14/s§ 450.145·

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(a)General. For each phase of flight for which an operator must implement flight abort to meet the requirement of § 450.108(b)(1), the operator must use a highly reliable flight safety system on the launch or reentry vehicle, vehicle component, or payload with a design reliability in accordance with this section.
(b)Reliability. A highly reliable flight safety system must, using a means of compliance accepted by the Administrator—
(1)Have a design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing for the portion of the flight safety system onboard the vehicle; and
(2)Have a design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing for the portion of the flight safety system not onboard the vehicle, if used.
(c)Monitoring. An operator must monitor the flight environments experienced by any flight safety system component to the extent necessary to—
(1)Validate the predicted operating environment; and
(2)Assess the actual component life remaining or adjust any inspection period.
(d)Application requirements. An applicant must submit the information identified below, for any highly reliable flight safety system:
(1)Flight safety system description. An applicant must describe the flight safety system and its operation in detail, including all components, component functions, and possible operational scenarios.
(2)Flight safety system diagram. An applicant must submit a diagram that identifies all flight safety system subsystems and shows the interconnection of all the elements of the flight safety system. The diagram must include any subsystems used to implement flight abort both on and off the vehicle, including any subsystems used to make the decision to abort flight.
(3)Flight safety system analyses. An applicant must submit any analyses and detailed analysis reports of all flight safety system subsystems necessary to calculate the reliability and confidence levels required by paragraph
(a)of this section.
(4)Tracking validation procedures. An applicant must document and submit the procedures for validating the accuracy of any vehicle tracking data utilized by the flight safety system to make the decision to abort flight.
(5)Flight safety system test plans. An applicant must submit acceptance, qualification, and preflight test plans of any flight safety system, subsystems, and components. The test plans must include test procedures and test environments.
(6)Monitoring plan. An applicant must submit a description of any method used to validate the predicted operating environments. Other Prescribed Hazard Controls
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