Sec. 6521. REPORT ON ASSESSING WILL TO FIGHT

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## SEC. 6521 REPORT ON ASSESSING WILL TO FIGHT ###

(a)Definitions In this section: ####

(1)Appropriate congressional committees The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following: #####

(A)The congressional intelligence committees. #####

(B)The Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. #####

(C)The Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. ####

(2)Military will to fight The term “military will to fight” means, with respect to the military of a country, the disposition and decision to fight, act, or persevere as needed. ####

(3)National will to fight The term “national will to fight” means, with respect to the government of a country, the resolve to conduct sustained military and other operations for an objective even when the expectation of success decreases or the need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices increases. ###

(b)Findings Congress finds the following: ####

(1)According to a study by the RAND corporation, “will to fight” is poorly analyzed and the least understood aspect of war. ####

(2)In testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate in May 2022, top intelligence officials of the United States indicated that although the intelligence community accurately anticipated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the intelligence community did not accurately assess the will of Ukrainian forces to fight in opposition to a Russian invasion or that the Ukrainian forces would succeed in averting a rapid Russian military occupation of Kyiv. ####

(3)According to the RAND corporation, the intelligence community estimated that the Afghan government’s forces could hold out against the Taliban for as long as 2 years if all ground forces of the United States were withdrawn. This estimate was revised in June 2021 to reflect an intelligence community view that Afghanistan’s military collapse could come in 6 to 12 months. In August 2021, the Afghan government fell within days after the ground forces of the United States were withdrawn. ####

(4)Similarly, the rapid advance of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and near-total collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces in 2014 appeared to take the policymakers of the United States by surprise. ####

(5)The apparent gaps in these analyses had important implications for policy decisions of the United States toward Russia and Afghanistan, and suggest a need for further examination of how the intelligence community assesses a foreign military’s will to fight. ###

(c)Report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report examining the extent to which analyses of the military will to fight and the national will to fight informed the all-source analyses of the intelligence community regarding how the armed forces and governments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq would perform at key junctures. ###

(d)Elements The report under subsection

(c)shall include the following: ####

(1)The methodology of the intelligence community for measuring the military will to fight and the national will to fight of a foreign country. ####

(2)The extent to which analysts of the intelligence community applied such methodology when assessing the military will to fight and the national will to fight of— #####

(A)Afghanistan following the April 2021 announcement of the full withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces; #####

(B)Iraq in the face of the rapid emergence and advancement in 2014 of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; and #####

(C)Ukraine and Russia during the initial phase of the invasion and march toward Kyiv by Russia in February 2022. ####

(3)The extent to which— #####

(A)the assessments described in paragraph

(2)depended on the observations of personnel of the United States Armed Forces who had trained Afghan, Iraqi, and Ukrainian armed forces; and #####

(B)such observations reflected any standardized, objective methodology. ####

(4)Whether shortcomings in assessing the military will to fight and the national will to fight may have affected the capacity of the intelligence community to provide “early warning” about the collapse of government forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. ####

(5)The extent to which “red teaming” was used to test the assessments described in paragraph (2). ####

(6)The extent to which dissenting opinions of intelligence analysts were highlighted in final written products presented to senior policymakers of the United States. ####

(7)The extent to which analysts and supervisors adhered to the policies, procedures, directives, and best practices of the intelligence community. ####

(8)Recommendations for analyses by the intelligence community going forward to incorporate lessons learned and enhance the quality of future analytical products to more accurately reflect the military will to fight and the national will to fight and improve the capacity of the intelligence community to accurately predict the success or failure of the armed forces of a foreign country. ###

(e)Annex In submitting the report under subsection

(c)to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, the Director shall also include an accompanying annex, which shall be classified, providing an inventory of the following: ####

(1)Collection gaps and challenges that may have affected the analysis of the collapse of government forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. ####

(2)Actions that the Director of National Intelligence has taken to mitigate such gaps and challenges. ###

(f)Form The report under subsection

(c)may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall include an unclassified summary of key findings, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.