Sec. 1272. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NATO AND UNITED STATES DEFENSE POSTURE IN EUROPE
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## SEC. 1272 SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NATO AND UNITED STATES DEFENSE POSTURE IN EUROPE It is the sense of Congress as follows: ####
(1)The Russian Federation’s further invasion of Ukraine poses a grave threat to United States security and interests around the globe and to the rules-based international order, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). ####
(2)The Russian Federation has demonstrated a complete disregard for the safety of civilians during its unlawful and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which has involved indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas and executions of noncombatants. ####
(3)The United States stands with the people of Ukraine and condemns the heinous acts committed by the Russian Federation against them, and Congress strongly supports continued assistance to Ukraine to sustain its ability to repel Russian invasion forces and continue to retake its sovereign territory. ####
(4)NATO remains the strongest and most successful military alliance in the world, founded on a commitment by its members to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The NATO alliance has grown more robust and more united in response to Russia’s 2022 further invasion of Ukraine, as allies have enhanced their deterrence and defense posture, and continued to send military aid to bolster Ukraine’s defenses. ####
(5)The United States— #####
(A)strongly supports the path of Sweden and Finland toward NATO membership, as evidenced by the overwhelming bipartisan Senate vote providing advice and consent to the ratification of the Protocols of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden; #####
(B)urges all NATO allies who have not ratified their accession to do so as soon as possible; #####
(C)reaffirms its ironclad commitment to NATO as the foundation of transatlantic security and to upholding its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, including Article 5; and #####
(D)encourages NATO members to move swiftly to meet their commitments made at the June 2022 NATO Summit to expand NATO’s multinational battle groups and enhance military posture on NATO’s eastern flank, and to urgently continue progress on meeting their Wales Pledge commitments, capability targets, contributions to NATO missions and operations, and resilience commitments. ####
(6)America’s European allies and partners have— #####
(A)made significant contributions to Ukraine’s defense against the Russian invasion, including critical military, economic, and humanitarian aid, sanctions, and export controls, to erode Russia’s ability to sustain its aggression; and #####
(B)welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees forced to flee their homeland. ####
(7)The United States must continue to work with these allies and partners to sustain this support, to collectively reconstitute weapons stocks, and to maintain unified resolve to reduce threats to critical infrastructure ranging from Russia’s weaponization of energy to China’s predatory investments in transportation and telecommunications infrastructure. ####
(8)The United States should develop and implement a long-term plan to adapt United States posture in Europe to the altered threat environment. The elevated United States posture currently in Europe is crucial in the current threat environment, and the United States posture changes announced during the June 2022 NATO Summit are important steps, including the establishment of the first permanently stationed headquarters in Poland, the commitment to maintain a rotational brigade combat team and headquarters in Romania, enhanced rotations to the Baltic countries, and the forward-stationing of two additional destroyers in Rota, Spain. ####
(9)European Deterrence Initiative
(EDI)investments have proven crucial to United States and NATO abilities to rapidly reinforce the European theater leading up to and during Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine. The United States should continue robust investments through EDI, including further enhancing United States posture in Europe and maintaining a committed schedule of exercises with allies. ####
(10)The Black Sea is critical to United States interests and to the security of NATO in the region, given Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war in Ukraine and Russia’s attempts to directly intimidate, coerce, and otherwise influence countries in this region. These allies’ and partners’ security will have major consequences for broader European security and collective efforts to enhance Black Sea countries’ defense and resilience capabilities are essential. In addition, the United States and NATO should consider adopting robust intergovernmental and interagency strategies for the Black Sea, to facilitate further collaboration among all countries in the region. ####
(11)Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania play a critical role in strategic efforts to continue to deter Russia. ####
(12)The United States should continue to pursue efforts consistent with the comprehensive, multilateral Baltic Defense Assessment conducted by the Department of Defense. Robust support to accomplish United States strategic objectives, including by providing continued assistance to the Baltic countries through security cooperation, including cooperation referred to as the Baltic Security Initiative pursuant to sections 332 and 333 of title 10, United States Code, should continue to be prioritized in the years to come. Specifically, such assistance should include the continuation of— #####
(A)enhancements to critical capabilities that will strengthen Baltic security as well as strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense posture, including integrated air and missile defense, maritime domain awareness, long-range precision fires, and command and control; #####
(B)efforts to enhance interoperability among Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and with NATO; #####
(C)infrastructure and other host-country support improvements that will enhance United States and allied military mobility across the region; #####
(D)efforts to improve resilience to hybrid and cyber threats in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and #####
(E)support for planning and budgeting efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that are regionally synchronized. ####
(13)It is in the United States interest to support efforts to enhance security and stability in the Western Balkans. The United States should continue its efforts to work with Western Balkans allies and partners to build interoperability and support institutional reforms. The United States should also support those countries’ efforts to resist disinformation campaigns, predatory investments, and other means by which Russia and China may seek to influence this region. ####
(14)The United States should continue to work closely with European allies and partners to counter growing malign activities by the People’s Republic of China across Europe, in the Indo-Pacific, and beyond.