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Code · STATUTE-COMPILATIONS · National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 · Sec. 5521

Sec. 5521. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN EFFORTS IN SYRIA AND LEBANON

1,060 words·~5 min read·/statute-compilations/comps-15772/sec-5521

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## SEC. 5521 SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN EFFORTS IN SYRIA AND LEBANON ###
(a)Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that, regardless of the ultimate number of United States military personnel deployed to Syria, it is a vital interest of the United States to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hizballah, and other Iranian-backed forces from establishing a strong and enduring presence in Syria that can be used to project power in the region and threaten the United States and its allies, including Israel. ###
(b)Report ####
(1)Report required Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that assesses— #####
(A)efforts by Iran to establish long-term influence in Syria through military, political, economic, social, and cultural means; #####
(B)the degree to which Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon contributes to Iranian strategy with respect to the region; and #####
(C)the threat posed by the efforts described in subparagraph
(A)to United States interests and allies. ####
(2)Elements The report under paragraph
(1)shall include each of the following: #####
(A)An assessment of— ######
(i)how Iran and Iranian-backed forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hizballah, have provided or are currently providing manpower, training, weapons, equipment, and funding to the Syrian government led by President Bashar al-Assad; ######
(ii)the support provided by Iran and Hizballah to Shia militias operating in Syria composed of domestic fighters from Syria and foreign fighters from countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan; ######
(iii)operational lessons learned by Hizballah based on the recent experiences of Hizballah in Syria; ######
(iv)the threat posed by Iran and Iranian-backed forces to— ######
(I)the al-Tanf garrison; and ######
(II)areas of northeast Syria that are currently controlled by local partner forces of the United States; ######
(v)the degree to which efforts of the United States to sustain and strengthen Kurdish forces in Syria may undermine the influence of Iran and Iranian-backed forces in Syria; ######
(vi)how Iran and Iranian-backed forces seek to enhance the long-term influence of such entities in Syria through non-military means such as purchasing strategic real estate in Syria, constructing Shia religious centers and schools, securing loyalty from Sunni tribes in exchange for material assistance, and inducing the Assad government to open Farsi-language departments at Syrian universities; ######
(vii)whether the prominent role of Iran in Syria, including the influence of Iran over government institutions, may increase the likelihood of the reconstitution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in Syria; and ######
(viii)the provision of goods, services, or technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah for the purpose of indigenously manufacturing or otherwise producing missiles. #####
(B)An analysis of— ######
(i)how Iran is working with the Russian Federation, Turkey, and other countries to increase the influence of Iran in Syria; ######
(ii)the goals of Iran in Syria, including, but not limited to, protecting the Assad government, increasing the regional influence of Iran, threatening Israel from a more proximate location, building weapon-production facilities and other military infrastructure, and securing a land bridge to connect Iran through Iraq and Syria to the stronghold of Hizballah in southern Lebanon; and ######
(iii)the foreign and domestic supply chains that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid acquisition or development by Hizballah of missile production facilities, including the geographic distribution of such foreign and domestic supply chains. #####
(C)A description of— ######
(i)how the efforts of Iran to transfer advanced weapons to Hizballah and to establish a military presence in Syria has led to direct and repeated confrontations with Israel; ######
(ii)the intelligence and military support that the United States provides to Israel to help Israel identify and appropriately address specific threats to Israel from Iran and Iranian-backed forces in Syria; ######
(iii)the threat posed to Israel and other allies of the United States in the Middle East resulting from the transfer of arms or related material, or other support, by Iran to Hizballah and other proxies; ######
(iv)Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel operating within Syria, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Revolutionary Guard Corps forces of Iran, and the number and geographic distribution of such personnel; ######
(v)any rocket-producing facilities in Lebanon for nonstate actors, including whether such facilities were assessed to be built at the direction of Hizballah leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation between Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership; and ######
(vi)Iranian expenditures in the previous calendar year on military and terrorist activities outside the country, including the amount of such expenditures with respect to each of Hizballah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, proxy forces in Iraq and Syria, ballistic missile research and testing, and any other entity, country, or activity that the Director determines as destabilizing to the Middle East region. ####
(3)Form of report The report under paragraph
(1)shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. ####
(4)Definitions In this subsection: #####
(A)Appropriate congressional committees the term “appropriate congressional committees” means— ######
(i)the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ######
(ii)the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. #####
(B)Arms or related material The term “arms or related material” means— ######
(i)nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons or materials or components of such weapons; ######
(ii)ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or components of such weapons; ######
(iii)destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons; ######
(iv)defense articles or defense services, as those terms are defined in paragraphs
(3)and (4), respectively, of section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794); ######
(v)defense information, as that term is defined in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403); or ######
(vi)items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
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Sec. 5521
SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN EFFORTS IN SYRIA AND LEBANON
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