Sec. 903. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION
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## SEC. 903 DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION **[**[50 U.S.C. 3001](/us/usc/t50/s3001) nt**]** ###
(a)In General It shall be the duty of the Commission— ####
(1)to review the efficacy and appropriateness of the activities of the United States intelligence community in the post-cold war global environment; and ####
(2)to prepare and transmit the reports described in sec- tion 904. ###
(b)Implementation In carrying out subsection (a), the Commission shall specifically consider the following: ####
(1)What should be the roles and missions of the intelligence community in terms of providing support to the defense and foreign policy establishments and how should these relate to tactical intelligence activities. ####
(2)Whether the roles and missions of the intelligence community should extend beyond the traditional areas of providing support to the defense and foreign policy establishments, and, if so, what areas should be considered legitimate for intelligence collection and analysis, and whether such areas should include, for example, economic issues, environmental issues, and health issues. ####
(3)What functions, if any, should continue to be assigned to the organizations of the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, and what capabilities should these organizations retain for the future. ####
(4)Whether the existing organization and management framework of the organizations of the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, provide the optimal structure for the accomplishment of their missions. ####
(5)Whether existing principles and strategies governing the acquisition and maintenance of intelligence collection capabilities should be retained and what collection capabilities should the Government retain to meet future contingencies. ####
(6)Whether intelligence analysis, as it is currently structured and executed, adds sufficient value to information otherwise available to the Government to justify its continuation, and, if so, at what level of resources. ####
(7)Whether the existing decentralized system of intelligence analysis results in significant waste or duplication, and, if so, what can be done to correct these deficiencies. ####
(8)Whether the existing arrangements for allocating available resources to accomplish the roles and missions assigned to intelligence agencies are adequate. ####
(9)Whether the existing framework for coordinating among intelligence agencies with respect to intelligence collection and analysis and other activities, including training and operational activities, provides an optimal structure for such coordination. ####
(10)Whether current personnel policies and practices of intelligence agencies provide an optimal work force to satisfy the needs of intelligence consumers. ####
(11)Whether resources for intelligence activities should continue to be allocated as part of the defense budget or be treated by the President and Congress as a separate budgetary program. ####
(12)Whether the existing levels of resources allocated for intelligence collection or intelligence analysis, or to provide a capability to conduct covert actions, are seriously at variance with United States needs. ####
(13)Whether there are areas of redundant or overlapping activity or areas where there is evidence of serious waste, duplication, or mismanagement. ####
(14)To what extent, if any, should the budget for United States intelligence activities be publicly disclosed. ####
(15)To what extent, if any, should the United States intelligence community collect information bearing upon private commercial activity and the manner in which such information should be controlled and disseminated. ####
(16)Whether counterintelligence policies and practices are adequate to ensure that employees of intelligence agencies are sensitive to security problems, and whether intelligence agencies themselves have adequate authority and capability to address perceived security problems. ####
(17)The manner in which the size, missions, capabilities, and resources of the United States intelligence community compare to those of other countries. ####
(18)Whether existing collaborative arrangements between the United States and other countries in the area of intelligence cooperation should be maintained and whether such arrangements should be expanded to provide for increased burdensharing. ####
(19)Whether existing arrangements for sharing intelligence with multinational organizations in support of mutually shared objectives are adequate.
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Sec. 903
DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION
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