Sec. 1236. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF NATO

1,171 words·~5 min read·/statute-compilations/comps-13932/sec-1236

A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.

## SEC. 1236 SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF NATO ###

(a)Findings Congress finds the following: ####

(1)The Warsaw Summit Communique, issued on July 9, 2016, by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (in this section referred to as “NATO”) clearly defines the need for, and the importance of, the nuclear mission of NATO. ####

(2)The Warsaw Summit Communique states— #####

(A)with respect to the nuclear deterrence capability of NATO, “As a means to prevent conflict and war, credible deterrence and defence is essential. Therefore, deterrence and defence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. . . The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Nuclear weapons are unique. Any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote”; #####

(B)with respect to the nature of the nuclear deterrence posture of NATO, “NATO must continue to adapt its strategy in line with trends in the security environment-including with respect to capabilities and other measures required-to ensure that NATO’s overall deterrence and defence posture is capable of addressing potential adversaries’ doctrine and capabilities, and that it remains credible, flexible, resilient, and adaptable.”; and #####

(C)with respect to the importance of contributions to the nuclear deterrence mission from across the NATO alliance, “The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies, in part, on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. These Allies will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective. That requires sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission and planning guidance aligned with 21st century requirements. The Alliance will ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.”. ####

(3)Secretary of Defense James Mattis, in response to the advance policy questions for his Senate confirmation hearing on January 12, 2017, stated that— #####

(A)“NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture relies in part on U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by NATO allies. These capabilities include dual-capable aircraft that contribute to current burden-sharing arrangements within NATO. In general, we must take care to maintain this particular capability, and to modernize it appropriately and in a timely fashion.”; and #####

(B)the role of the nuclear weapons of the United States is “to deter nuclear war and to serve as last resort weapons of self-defense. In this sense, U.S. nuclear weapons are fundamental to our nation’s security and have historically provided a deterrent against aggression and security assurance to U.S. allies. A robust, flexible, and survivable U.S. nuclear arsenal underpins the U.S. ability to deploy conventional forces worldwide.”. ####

(4)On March 28, 2017, General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of the United States European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, testified to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that “NATO and U.S. nuclear forces continue to be a vital component of our deterrence. Our modernization efforts are crucial; we must preserve a ready, credible, and safe nuclear capability.”. ####

(5)The Russian Federation is currently undergoing significant modernization and recapitalization of all three legs of its nuclear triad, continues to field and modernize a large variety of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and is developing and deploying new and unique nuclear capabilities. ####

(6)Russia remains in violation of the INF Treaty due to the development, testing, and, most recently, the operational deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in violation of the INF Treaty. ####

(7)On March 28, 2017, General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the security consequences of the deployment of such INF Treaty-violating missiles, testifying to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that “our assessment of the impact is that it more threatens NATO and infrastructure within the European continent than any other...area of the world that we have national interests in or alliance interests in.”. ####

(8)On March 28, 2017, General Curtis Scaparrotti, in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, responded to a question asking if Russia intends to return to compliance with the INF Treaty by stating, “I don’t have any indication that they will at this time.”. ####

(9)Rhetoric from Russian officials has demonstrated that Moscow has sought to leverage its nuclear arsenal to threaten and intimidate neighboring countries, including members of NATO, as was the case when the Russian Ambassador to Denmark stated, “Danish warships will be targets for Russian nuclear missiles” in response to Denmark’s potential cooperation in the NATO missile defense system. ###

(b)Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— ####

(1)the nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities of NATO are of critical importance to the security of the United States and of the NATO alliance, and must continue to adapt to the changed security environment in Europe; ####

(2)the ability of the United States to forward-deploy dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons, and of select members of NATO to participate in the nuclear deterrence mission of NATO by hosting forward-deployed nuclear weapons of the United States or operating dual-capable aircraft, is central to the credibility of the nuclear deterrence and defense posture of NATO; ####

(3)the strategic forces of the United States, the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and the French Republic, and the dual-capable aircraft operated by the United States and other members of NATO constitute foundational elements of the nuclear deterrence and defense posture of NATO; ####

(4)NATO should modernize its nuclear-related infrastructure to ensure the highest-level of safety and security; ####

(5)effective deterrence requires NATO to conduct nuclear planning and exercises aligned with 21st century requirements and modernize nuclear-related capabilities and infrastructure, including dual-capable aircraft, command and control networks, and facilities; and ####

(6)to ensure the continued credibility of the deterrence and defense posture of NATO, the planned completion of F-35A aircraft development and testing, as well as the delivery of such aircraft to members of NATO, must not be delayed. ###

(c)INF Treaty Defined In this section, the term “INF Treaty” means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

(INF)Treaty”, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.