Sec. 1665. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON HOMELAND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

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## SEC. 1665 SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON HOMELAND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ###

(a)Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— ####

(1)it is a national priority to defend the United States homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate); ####

(2)although the currently deployed ground-based midcourse defense system provides a level of protection of the entire United States homeland, including the East Coast, against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea and Iran, this capability needs to be improved to meet evolving ballistic missile threats; ####

(3)the initial step in this process of improvement is to correct the problems that caused the flight test failures with the current kill vehicles, and to improve the reliability of the deployed ground-based interceptor fleet; ####

(4)as indicated by senior officials of the Department of Defense, continued investments to enhance homeland defense sensor and discrimination capabilities are essential to improve the operational effectiveness and shot doctrine of the ground-based midcourse defense system; ####

(5)given limitations with the currently deployed exo-atmospheric kill vehicles, it is important to re-design the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle using a rigorous acquisition approach, including realistic testing, that can achieve a demonstrated capability as soon as practicable using sound acquisition principles and practices; and ####

(6)in order to stay ahead of evolving ballistic missile threats, the Department should design the next generation exo-atmospheric kill vehicle to take full advantage of improvements in sensors, discrimination, kill assessment, battle management, and command and control, including the potential to engage multiple objects. ###

(b)Report Required ####

(1)In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with the Commander of the United States Northern Command, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the status of current and planned efforts to improve the homeland ballistic missile defense capability of the United States. ####

(2)Elements The report under paragraph

(1)shall include the following: #####

(A)A detailed description of the current assessment of the threat to the United Sates from limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate), particularly from countries such as North Korea and Iran, and an assessment of the projected future threat through 2023, including a discussion of confidence levels and uncertainties in such threat assessment. #####

(B)A detailed description of the status of efforts to correct the problems that caused the flight test failures of the capability enhancement-I and capability enhancement-II exo-atmospheric kill vehicles. #####

(C)A detailed description of the status of efforts to field the additional 14 ground-based interceptors planned for deployment at Fort Greely, Alaska, including the status of the refurbishment of Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely, and the operational impact of the additional interceptors. #####

(D)A detailed description of the plans and progress toward improving the capability, reliability, and availability of fielded ground-based interceptors, including progress toward improving the capabilities of ground-based interceptors deployed with upgraded capability enhancement-I and capability enhancement-II exo-atmospheric kill vehicles. #####

(E)A detailed description of the planned improvements to homeland ballistic missile defense sensor and discrimination capabilities, including through the use of additional sensor systems of the United States, and an assessment of the expected operational benefits of such improvements to homeland ballistic missile defense. #####

(F)A detailed description of the plans and efforts to redesign, develop, test, and field the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle for the ground-based midcourse defense system, and an explanation of the expected improvements of such kill vehicle with respect to capability, cost effectiveness, reliability, maintainability, and producibility. #####

(G)A detailed description of the plans for developing, testing, and fielding the next generation exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, and an explanation of how the anticipated capabilities are intended to remain ahead of evolving ballistic missile threats. #####

(H)A status of efforts on, and goals for, a common kill vehicle with multiple object kill capability, and an explanation of how such capability could keep the missile defense capability of the United States paced ahead of evolving ballistic missile threats. #####

(I)A detailed description of the options to improve the homeland ballistic missile defense capability that would respond to the emergence of a long-range ballistic missile threat from Iran, including an evaluation of the potential benefits and drawbacks of— ######

(i)the deployment of a missile defense interceptor site on the East Coast; ######

(ii)the deployment of a missile defense interceptor site in another location in the United States other than on the East Coast; ######

(iii)the deployment of a missile defense interceptor site in a location other than in the United States; and ######

(iv)the deployment of additional ground-based interceptors for the ground-based midcourse defense system at Fort Greely, Alaska, or Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, or both. #####

(J)Any other matters the Director considers appropriate. ####

(3)Form The report under paragraph

(1)shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.