Sec. 1245. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY POWER OF IRAN
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## SEC. 1245 ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY POWER OF IRAN ###
(a)Annual Report Not later than January 30 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on the current and future military strategy of Iran. ###
(b)Matters to Be Included The report required under subsection
(a)shall include a description of the security posture of Iran, including at least the following: ####
(1)A description and assessment of Iranian grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, including— #####
(A)the goals of Iran’s grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy. #####
(B)evolving thresholds for the use of direct and attributable force by Iran; #####
(C)any adjustments to the use of proxy forces by Iran; #####
(D)trends in Iran’s strategy that would be designed to establish Iran as the leading power in the Middle East and to enhance the influence of Iran in other regions of the world; #####
(E)Iranian strategy regarding other countries in the region, including other specified countries; and #####
(F)Iranian strategy regarding offensive cyber capabilities and defensive cyber capabilities. ####
(2)An assessment of the capabilities of Iran’s conventional forces, including— #####
(A)the size and capabilities of Iran’s conventional forces; #####
(B)the effectiveness of Iran’s conventional forces when facing United States forces in the region and other specified countries; #####
(C)a summary of Iran’s procurement of advanced conventional capabilities from Russia; #####
(D)a description of Iranian military doctrine, including Iranian anti-access or area denial and other maritime harassment capabilities; and #####
(E)an estimate of the funding provided for each branch of Iran’s conventional forces and Iran’s unconventional or parallel military forces. ####
(3)An assessment of Iran’s unconventional forces and related activities, including— #####
(A)the size and capability of Iranian special operations units, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force; #####
(B)the types and amount of support, including funding, lethal and non-lethal supplies, and training, provided to groups designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations, regional militant groups, and Iranian-linked proxy groups, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran or in response to a military attack by another country on Iran; #####
(C)the types and amount of support to be assessed under subparagraph
(B)shall include support provided to Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Asa'ib ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, any Iraqi Shia-militia operating under the auspices of the “Islamic Resistance”, the Fatemiyoun, the Zainabiyoun, and Ansar Allah (also known as the “Houthis”); #####
(D)the threat from Special Groups in Iraq, including Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, to United States and coalition forces located in Iraq and Syria; #####
(E)the role of Iran in supporting, facilitating, directing, or conducting attacks on United States forces in the region; #####
(F)an analysis of the effectiveness of Iran’s unconventional forces when facing United States forces in the region and other specified countries in the region; #####
(G)an estimate of the amount of funds spent by Iran to develop and support special operations forces and terrorist groups; #####
(H)a description of the structure of Iran’s global network of terrorist and criminal groups and an analysis of the capability of such network of groups and how such network of groups operates to support and reinforce Iran’s grand strategy; #####
(I)Iran’s cyber capabilities, including— ######
(i)Iran’s ability to use proxies and other actors to mask its cyber operations; ######
(ii)Iran’s ability to target United States governmental and nongovernmental entities , assets, and critical infrastructure; and ######
(iii)cooperation with or assistance from state and non-state actors in support or enhancement of Iran’s cyber capabilities; #####
(J)Iranian ability to manipulate the information environment both domestically and against the interests of the United States and its allies; and #####
(K)all formal or informal agreements involving a strategic military or security partnership with the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, or any proxies of either such country; and #####
(L)an assessment of the military power of Iranian proxies and partners, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, Ansar Allah, and Iraqi and Syrian proxies. ####
(4)An assessment of Iranian capabilities related to nuclear and missile forces, including— #####
(A)a summary of nuclear weapons-related advances, including development of related scientific and industrial infrastructure, fissile material inventories aggregated by level of enrichment, and weaponization-related activities in the preceding year; #####
(B)a summary of the capabilities of Iran’s ballistic missile forces, including developments in the preceding year, the size of Iran’s ballistic missile forces and Iran’s cruise missile forces, and the locations of missile launch, storage, and production sites; #####
(C)a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran’s ballistic missile forces and Iran’s cruise missile forces when facing United States forces in the region and other specified countries1 1Lack of punctuation at the end of subparagraph
(C)is so in law. Section 1268(a)(2)(B) of division A of Public Law 118-31 struck “; and” at the end of subparagraph (C). #####
(D)an estimate of the amount of funding expended by Iran since 2004 on programs to develop a capability to build nuclear weapons or to enhance Iran’s ballistic missile forces; #####
(E)an assessment of Iran’s space launch vehicle program and the ability of Iran to use those technologies to develop and field an intermediate-range ballistic missile or an intercontinental ballistic missile; #####
(F)a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran’s drone forcesand the exportation of Iranian drones globally; #####
(G)a detailed analysis of the domestic and foreign supply chains supporting Iran’s drone program; #####
(H)a detailed assessment of the domestic production capacity by Iran’s proxies in the Middle East of tactical munitions including mortars, rocket assisted munitions, and rockets and long-range strike capabilities, including, drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles; and #####
(I)a description or estimation of the threat posed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to European citizens or to member countries of the European Union. ####
(5)An assessment of transfers to and from Iran of military equipment, technology, and training from or to non-Iranian sources or destinations, including transfers that pertain to nuclear development, ballistic missiles, chemical, biological, and advanced conventional weapons, weapon systems, and delivery vehicles, including drones. ####
(6)An assessment of the use of civilian transportation assets and infrastructure, including commercial aircraft, airports, commercial vessels, and seaports, used to transport illicit military cargo to or from Iran, including military personnel, military goods, weapons, military-related electric parts, and related components. ####
(7)An assessment of military-to-military cooperation between Iran and foreign counties, including the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, North Korea, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and any other country designated by the Secretary of Defense with additional reference to cooperation and collaboration on the trafficking or development of nuclear, biological, chemical, and advanced conventional weapons, weapon systems, and delivery vehicles. ####
(8)An assessment of the extent to which the commercial aviation sector of Iran knowingly provides financial, material, or technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Russian Federation, Hezbollah, Hamas, Ansarallah, Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, any other foreign terrorist organization, or any Specially Designated Global Terrorist. ####
(9)An assessment of the use of civilians by groups supported by Iran to shield military objectives from attack, including groups such as— #####
(A)Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and #####
(B)the Special Groups in Iraq. ####
(10)An assessment of the threat posed by Iran against United States and partner military bases, to include missile, unmanned aircraft systems, and loitering munition attacks. ####
(11)An assessment of the sale, supply, or transfer of narcotics in the Middle East region by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran backed groups. ####
(12)An assessment of groups that are supported by Iran and designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations and regional military groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Special Groups in Iraq, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran. ####
(13)An assessment of how Iran would utilize additional resources to further activities described in paragraphs
(1)through (12). ####
(14)An assessment of the manner and extent to which the advances or improvements in the capabilities of Iran’s conventional and unconventional forces described in this section have affected Israel’s qualitative military edge during the preceding year. ###
(c)Definitions In this section: ####
(1)Iran’s conventional forces The term “Iran’s conventional forces”— #####
(A)means military forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran designed to conduct operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran’s unconventional forces and Iran’s ballistic missile forces and Iran’s cruise missile forces; and #####
(B)includes all branches and sub-branches of Iran’s national army or Artesh, such as its ground forces, air force, navy, and air defense forces as well as most branches of its parallel military, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps excluding its Quds-Force. ####
(2)Iran’s unconventional forces The term “Iran’s unconventional forces”— #####
(A)means forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran that carry out missions typically associated with special operations forces; and #####
(B)includes— ######
(i)the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force; and ######
(ii)any organization that— ######
(I)has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States; ######
(II)receives assistance from Iran; and ######
(III)######
(aa)is assessed as being willing in some or all cases of carrying out attacks on behalf of Iran; or ######
(bb)is assessed as likely to carry out attacks in response to a military attack by another country on Iran or its regional interests. ####
(3)Iran’s ballistic missile forces The term “Iran’s ballistic missile forces” means those elements of the military forces of Iran that employ ballistic missiles, including surface-to-surface or anti-ship variants. ####
(4)Iran’s cruise missile forces The term “Iran’s cruise missile forces” means those elements of the military forces of Iran that employ cruise missiles, including surface-to-surface or anti-ship variants. ####
(5)Specified countries The term “specified countries” means the countries in the same geographic region as Iran, including Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. ###
(d)Termination The requirement to submit the report required under subsection
(a)shall terminate on December 31, 2030. * * * * * * *
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Sec. 1245
ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY POWER OF IRAN
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