Sec. 2702. STATEMENT OF POLICY

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## SEC. 2702 STATEMENT OF POLICY ###

(a)Policy With Respect to NATO Enlargement Congress urges the President to outline a clear and complete strategic rationale for the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and declares that— ####

(1)Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should not be the last emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe invited to join NATO; ####

(2)the United States should ensure that NATO continues a process whereby all other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that wish to join NATO will be considered for membership in NATO as soon as they meet the criteria for such membership; ####

(3)the United States should ensure that no limitations are placed on the numbers of NATO troops or types of equipment, including tactical nuclear weapons, to be deployed on the territory of new member states; ####

(4)the United States should reject all efforts to condition NATO decisions on review or approval by the United Nations Security Council; ####

(5)the United States should clearly delineate those NATO deliberations, including but not limited to discussions on arms control, further Alliance enlargement, procurement matters, and strategic doctrine, that are not subject to review or discussion in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; ####

(6)the United States should work to ensure that countries invited to join the Alliance are provided an immediate seat in NATO discussions; and ####

(7)the United States already pays more than a proportionate share of the costs of the common defense of Europe and should obtain, in advance, agreement on an equitable distribution of the cost of NATO enlargement to ensure that the United States does not continue to bear a disproportionate burden. ###

(b)Policy With Respect to Negotiations With Russia ####

(1)Implementation NATO enlargement should be carried out in such a manner as to underscore the Alliance's defensive nature and demonstrate to Russia that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in Europe, including Russia. Accordingly, the United States and its NATO allies should make this intention clear in negotiations with Russia, including negotiations regarding adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

(CFE)Treaty of November 19, 1990. ####

(2)Limitations on commitments to russia In seeking to demonstrate to Russia NATO's defensive and security-enhancing intentions, it is essential that neither fundamental United States security interests in Europe nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance be jeopardized. In particular, no commitments should be made to Russia that would have the effect of— #####

(A)extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO members, including rights or responsibilities with respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other NATO members; #####

(B)limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of new NATO members by, for example, restricting the construction of defense infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy necessary reinforcements; #####

(C)providing any international organization, or any country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation of such decisions, including deliberations and decisions with respect to the deployment of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to NATO; #####

(D)impeding the development of enhanced relations between NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the Alliance; #####

(E)establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central or Eastern Europe; #####

(F)requiring NATO to subsidize Russian arms sales, service, or support to the militaries of those former Warsaw Pact countries invited to join the Alliance; or #####

(G)legitimizing Russian efforts to link concessions in arms control negotiations to NATO enlargement. ####

(3)Commitments from russia In order to enhance security and stability in Europe, the United States should seek commitments from Russia— #####

(A)to demarcate and respect all its borders with neighboring states; #####

(B)to achieve the immediate and complete withdrawal of any armed forces and military equipment under the control of Russia that are deployed on the territories of the independent states of the former Soviet Union without the full and complete agreement of those states; #####

(C)to station its armed forces on the territory of other states only with the full and complete agreement of that state and in strict accordance with international law; and #####

(D)to take steps to reduce further its nuclear and conventional forces in Kaliningrad. ####

(4)Consultations As negotiations on adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe proceed, the United States should engage in close and continuous consultations not only with its NATO allies, but also with the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and the South Caucasus. ###

(c)Policy With Respect to Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation ####

(1)In general As the United States proceeds with efforts to develop defenses against ballistic missile attack, it should seek to foster a climate of cooperation with Russia on matters related to missile defense. In particular, the United States and its NATO allies should seek to cooperate with Russia in such areas as early warning. ####

(2)Discussions with nato allies The United States should initiate discussions with its NATO allies for the purpose of examining the feasibility of deploying a ballistic missile defense capable of protecting NATO's southern and eastern flanks from a limited ballistic missile attack. ####

(3)Constitutional prerogatives Even as the Congress seeks to promote ballistic missile defense cooperation with Russia, it must insist on its constitutional prerogatives regarding consideration of arms control agreements with Russia that bear on ballistic missile defense.