Sec. 232. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MISSILE DEFENSE
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## SEC. 232 SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MISSILE DEFENSE ###
(a)Findings Congress finds the following: ####
(1)In a December 18, 2010, letter to the Senate leadership, President Obama wrote that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)“invited the Russian Federation to cooperate on missile defense, which could lead to adding Russian capabilities to those deployed by NATO to enhance our common security against common threats. The Lisbon Summit thus demonstrated that the Alliance’s missile defenses can be strengthened by improving NATO-Russian relations. This comes even as we have made it clear that the system we intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and it will not in any way limit United States’ or NATO’s missile defense capabilities.”. ####
(2)In a February 2, 2011, message to the Senate concerning its December 22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty, President Obama certified that “It is the policy of the United States to continue development and deployment of United States missile defense systems to defend against missile threats from nations such as North Korea and Iran, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems. As stated in the Resolution, such systems include all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe, the modernization of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, and the continued development of the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor as a technological and strategic hedge.”. ####
(3)In a letter dated December 13, 2011, to Senator Mark Kirk, Robert Nabors, Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, wrote that “The United States remains committed to implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, and will not agree to any constraints limiting the development or deployment of United States missile defenses” and “[w]e will not provide Russia with sensitive information about our missile defense systems that would in any way compromise our national security. For example, hit-to-kill technology and interceptor telemetry will under no circumstances be provided to Russia.”. ###
(b)Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— ####
(1)pursuant to section 2 of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-38; 113 Stat. 205; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note), it is the policy of the United States “to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)...”; ####
(2)defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should deterrence fail; ####
(3)further limitations on the missile defense capabilities of the United States are not in the national security interest of the United States; ####
(4)the New Start Treaty and the April 7, 2010, unilateral statement of the Russian Federation on missile defense do not limit in any way, and shall not be interpreted as limiting, activities that the Federal Government of the United States currently plans or that might be required over the duration of the New START Treaty to protect the United States pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, or to protect the Armed Forces of the United States and allies of the United States from limited ballistic missile attack, including further planned enhancements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe; ####
(5)it was the Understanding of the Senate in its December 22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty that, “any additional New START Treaty limitations on the deployment of missile defenses beyond those contained in paragraph 3 of Article V, including any limitations agreed under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, would require an amendment to the New START Treaty which may enter into force for the United States only with the advice and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States”; and ####
(6)section 303(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)) requires that “no action shall be taken pursuant to this or any other Act that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.”. ###
(c)New START Treaty Defined In this section, the term “New START Treaty” means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011.
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- Pub. L. 106-38
- 113 Stat. 205
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Sec. 232
SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MISSILE DEFENSE
Pub. L.Pub. L. 106-38
Stat.113 Stat. 205
Cites 4Cited by 0 across 0 sources