Rules and Regulations. Final rule
/register/2019/04/19/2019-07940·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT
Action: Final rule
Citation: FR Doc. 2019-07940 · RIN 2120-AA64 · 14 CFR 39
Summary
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the inner skin of the lap splices, at the lower fastener row, is subject to scratch cracks that may interact with widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires a general visual inspection (GVI) of certain lap splice inspection areas for any repair common to the fuselage skin lap splice dual frequency eddy current (DFEC) inspection areas, repetitive DFEC inspections of certain lap splice inner skins for any crack, and applicable on-condition actions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
Dates
This AD is effective May 22, 2019. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of May 22, 2019.
Supplementary Information
Discussion We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on October 15, 2018 (83 FR 51887). The NPRM was prompted by an evaluation by the DAH indicating that the inner skin of the lap splices, at the lower fastener row, is subject to scratch cracks that may interact with WFD. The NPRM proposed to require a general visual inspection of certain lap splice inspection areas for any repair common to the fuselage skin lap splice inspection areas, repetitive DFEC inspections of a certain lap splice inner skin for any crack, and applicable on-condition actions. We are issuing this AD to address scratches that can grow into scratch cracks, which could interact with multi-site damage (MSD) fastener hole fatigue cracking. This condition, if not addressed, could result in accelerated crack growth rate, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane. Comments We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this final rule. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment. Effect of Winglets on Accomplishment of the Proposed Actions Aviation Partners Boeing stated that accomplishing Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST01518SE does not affect the actions specified in the proposed AD. We concur with the commenter. We have redesignated paragraph (c) of the proposed AD as paragraph (c)(1) of this AD and added paragraph (c)(2) to this AD to state that installation of STC ST01518SE does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions required by this AD. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01518SE is installed, a “change in product” alternative method of compliance (AMOC) approval request is not necessary to comply with the requirements of 14 CFR 39.17. Request for Clarification of the Affected Airplanes Boeing requested that we clarify the affected airplanes in the NPRM. Boeing pointed out that the SUMMARY of the NPRM currently states “for certain The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes,” and requested that we change the SUMMARY of the NPRM to state “for all The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes.” We acknowledge this typographical error. Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018, specifies “all The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes,” and our intent was to match the service information. We have revised the SUMMARY and paragraph (c)(1) of this AD accordingly. Request To Revise the Safety Issue Boeing requested that we clarify the nature of the safety issue. Boeing pointed out that the SUMMARY of the NPRM suggests that the safety issue is limited to WFD. Boeing also mentioned that lap splice WFD for the Model 757 fleet is already addressed by AD 2018-18-07, Amendment 39-19386 (83 FR 45037, September 5, 2018) (“AD 2018-18-07”). Boeing specified that the safety issue that the NPRM is mitigating is the potential for interaction between MSD and scratch cracks on the inner skin of the lap splices. Boeing requested that we revise the “prompted by” statement in the SUMMARY of the NPRM to specify “. . . at the lower fastener row is subject to scratch cracks that may interact with WFD.” We acknowledge the commenter's concern. As written, the SUMMARY of the NPRM can be misconstrued to specify duplicate actions (lap splice WFD) already addressed by AD 2018-18-07. The intent of this AD action is to address the potential for interaction between MSD and scratch cracks on the inner skin of the lap splices. Therefore, we have revised the SUMMARY and paragraph (e) of this AD accordingly. Request for Clarification of the GVI Inspection Area Boeing requested that we clarify the GVI inspection area. Boeing mentioned that the SUMMARY and “Related Service Information Under 1 CFR part 51” section of the NPRM each describe a GVI common to the fuselage skin lap splice inspection areas. Boeing pointed out that the wording seems confusing and could be perceived as a circular description ( i.e., that the inspection area is common to the inspection area). Boeing also pointed out that there is no mention of the commonality of the DFEC inspection areas and the GVI inspection areas. We agree with the commenter's request for the reasons provided. We have revised the SUMMARY and “Related Service Information Under 1 CFR part 51” section of this AD accordingly. Request for Clarification of the Affected Inspection Area Boeing requested that we clarify the affected inspection area. Boeing mentioned that the SUMMARY of the NPRM states “. . . DFEC inspections of a certain lap splice inner skin. . . .” Boeing pointed out that this statement suggests that only one skin panel is affected. Boeing requested that we revise the SUMMARY of the NPRM to state “. . . DFEC inspections of certain lap splice inner skins. . . .” We agree with the commenter's request for the reasons provided. We have revised the SUMMARY of this AD accordingly. Request To Clarify That the Inspections Are Not Limited to Lap Splices at Stringer (S) 14 Boeing requested that we clarify that the inspections are not limited to lap splices at S-14. Boeing mentioned that the “Related Service Information Under 1 CFR part 51” section of the NPRM describes the service information as procedures for “. . . repetitive DFEC inspections of the S-14 lap splice inner skin for any crack. . . .” Boeing pointed out that the description does not mention any of the other lap splice stringer locations where the inspections are required. Boeing requested that we revise the description to specify “. . . repetitive DFEC inspections of certain lap splice inner skins for any crack. . . .” We agree with the commenter's request for the reasons provided. We have revised the “Related Service Information Under 1 CFR part 51” section of this AD accordingly. Request To Revise the Costs of Compliance of the NPRM Boeing requested that we clarify the Costs of Compliance of the NPRM. Boeing mentioned that the NPRM specified 451 airplanes of U.S. registry. Boing specified that its records show there to be 561 airplanes of U.S. registry that would be affected by the NPRM. Boeing also pointed out that the difference in affected airplanes significantly increases the overall costs to the U.S. registered Model 757 fleet. We agree that Boeing records account for U.S. registered airplanes that the FAA did not include in the NPRM, and that this number may be a more accurate representation of the U.S. registered airplanes. We did not originally include airplanes in our cost estimate that are in storage or not currently active. We have updated the Costs of Compliance section of this AD to reflect the specific number of U.S. registered airplanes and the revised cost on U.S. operators. Request To Include Required for Compliance (RC) Language Boeing requested that we revise paragraph (i) of the proposed AD to include RC language. Boeing mentioned that this change would clarify which actions are mandated. We agree that clarification is necessary, however, we disagree with the request to include RC language in paragraph (i) of this AD. As noted in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018, if an RB is mandated by an AD, then all applicable requirements specified in the RB must be done. We did not include RC language because this AD requires accomplishment of all the actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018. Therefore, we have not changed this AD in this regard. Request To Exclude Airplanes With Certain Modifications FedEx and VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering (MAE) Inc. requested that we revise the NPRM to specify that inspections, methods, and compliance times regarding certain lap splices specified in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018, be omitted for the FedEx fleet of Model 757-200 airplanes. FedEx mentioned that its fleet has been modified using certain VT MAE Inc. supplemental type certificates (STCs), and is no longer configured as passenger airplanes. FedEx pointed out that its Model 757-200 fleet is identified as Groups 1, 4, and 5 in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018. VT MAE Inc. pointed out that because of the change in configuration related to the VT MAE Inc. STCs, certain lap splice inspection areas have been removed and those airplanes are unable to fully comply with the inspection procedures specified in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018. VT MAE Inc. proposed certain exceptions to the service information in the final rule. The proposed exceptions are for the lap splice inspections affected by the change in configuration related to the VT MAE Inc. STCs. FedEx requested that, in lieu of requesting an AMOC after publication, we include the exceptions proposed by VT MAE Inc. in the final rule. We acknowledge the commenters' remarks, however, we disagree with the request to include exceptions in this final rule that are specific to certain airplanes operated by FedEx. There are many different airplane configurations across multiple operators, and ADs cannot accommodate all possible configurations. However, under the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD, we will consider requests for approval of an AMOC that addresses the VT MAE Inc. STCs, if appropriate data are submitted to substantiate that the method would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard. Conclusion We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes: • Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and • Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM. We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final rule. Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51 We reviewed Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018. This service information describes procedures for a GVI of certain lap splice inspection areas for any repair common to the fuselage skin lap splice DFEC inspection areas, repetitive DFEC inspections of certain lap splice inner skins for any crack, and applicable on-condition actions. This service information is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section. Costs of Compliance We estimate that this AD affects 561 airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD: Estimated Costs for Required Actions Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. operators General visual inspection Up to 6 work-hours × $85 per hour = up to $510 $0 Up to $510 Up to $286,110. Repetitive DFEC inspections Up to 124 work-hours × $85 per hour = up to $10,540 per inspection cycle 0 Up to $10,540 per inspection cycle Up to $5,912,940 per inspection cycle. We have received no definitive data that would enable us to provide cost estimates for the on-condition actions specified in this AD. Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes and associated appliances to the Director of the System Oversight Division. Regulatory Findings This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): 2019-07-04 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-19615; Docket No. FAA-2018-0899; Product Identifier 2018-NM-099-AD. (a) Effective Date This AD is effective May 22, 2019. (b) Affected ADs None. (c) Applicability (1) This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes, certificated in any category. (2) Installation of Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST01518SE does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions required by this AD. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01518SE is installed, a “change in product” alternative method of compliance (AMOC) approval request is not necessary to comply with the requirements of 14 CFR 39.17. (d) Subject Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 53, Fuselage. (e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the inner skin of the lap splices, at the lower fastener row, is subject to scratch cracks that may interact with widespread fatigue damage (WFD). We are issuing this AD to address scratches that can grow into scratch cracks, which could interact with multi-site damage (MSD) fastener hole fatigue cracking. This condition, if not addressed, could result in accelerated crack growth rate, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane. (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Required Actions Except as specified by paragraph (h) of this AD: At the applicable times specified in the “Compliance” paragraph of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018, do all applicable actions identified in, and in accordance with, the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018. Note 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD: Guidance for accomplishing the actions required by this AD can be found in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-53A0111, dated May 21, 2018, which is referred to in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018. (h) Exceptions to Service Information Specifications (1) For purposes of determining compliance with the requirements of this AD: Where Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018, uses the phrase “the original issue date of Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB,” this AD requires using “the effective date of this AD.” (2) Where Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018, specifies contacting Boeing for alternative inspections or repair instructions, this AD requires alternative inspection or repair before further flight using a method approved in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i) of this AD. (3) Inspections performed in accordance with Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018, are not necessary in areas where existing FAA approved repairs cover the affected inspection areas; provided the outermost repair doubler extends a minimum of three rows of fasteners above and below the original group of lap splice fasteners subject to the inspection. Damage tolerance inspections specified for existing repairs must continue. Inspections outside of the repaired boundaries are still required as specified in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018. (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (1) The Manager, Los Angeles ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the certification office, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: . (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office. (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD if it is approved by the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO Branch, FAA, to make those findings. To be approved, the repair method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD. (j) Related Information (1) For more information about this AD, contact David Truong, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Section, FAA, Los Angeles ACO Branch, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 90712-4137; phone: 562-627-5224; fax: 562-627-5210; email: . (2) Service information identified in this AD that is not incorporated by reference is available at the addresses specified in paragraphs (k)(3) and (k)(4) of this AD. (k) Material Incorporated by Reference (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. (i) Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757-53A0111 RB, dated May 21, 2018. (ii) [Reserved] (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-5600; phone: 562-797-1717; internet . (4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport Standards Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: . Issued in Des Moines, Washington, on April 8, 2019. Michael J. Kaszycki, Acting Director, System Oversight Division, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. R1-2019-07587 Filed 4-18-19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 1301-00-D DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2018-0903; Product Identifier 2018-NM-113-AD; Amendment 39-19616; AD 2019-07-05] RIN 2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-19-14, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A318 and A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. AD 2016-19-14 required repetitive inspections for cracking of the 10VU rack fitting lugs, and repair of any cracking. Since we issued AD 2016-19-14, we have determined that the unsafe condition may exist on additional airplanes. This AD continues to require repetitive inspections for cracking of the 10VU rack fitting lugs, and repair of any cracking. This AD also adds airplanes to the applicability. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD is effective May 24, 2019. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of May 24, 2019. ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule, contact Airbus SAS, Airworthiness Office—EIAS, Rond-Point Emile Dewoitine No: 2, 31700 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email ; internet . You may view this referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Standards Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available on the internet at by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2018-0903. Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the internet at by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2018-0903; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations (phone: 800-647-5527) is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sanjay Ralhan, Aerospace Engineer, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206-231-3223. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Discussion We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to supersede AD 2016-19-14, Amendment 39-18663 (81 FR 71602, October 18, 2016) (“AD 2016-19-14”). AD 2016-19-14 applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A318 and A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on November 5, 2018 (83 FR 55299). Since we issued AD 2016-19-14, we have determined that the unsafe condition may exist on additional airplanes. This AD continues to require repetitive inspections for cracking of the 10VU rack fitting lugs, and repair of any cracking. This AD also adds airplanes to the applicability. We are issuing this AD to address reading difficulties of flight-critical information displayed to the flightcrew during a critical phase of flight, such as an approach or takeoff, which could result in loss of airplane control at an altitude insufficient for recovery. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD 2018-0131, dated June 19, 2018 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for all Airbus SAS Model A318 and A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. The MCAI states: During an unscheduled maintenance operation on an A330 aeroplane, the 10VU rack was removed for access and cracks were discovered on 10VU rack side fittings on lugs 1, 3 and 4. As a similar design is installed on A320 family aeroplanes, a sampling review was done to determine the possible fleet impact. The result showed that several aeroplanes had cracked or broken 10VU rack side fittings. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to a high vibration level on the primary flight and navigation displays during critical flight phases (take-off and landing), possibly creating reading difficulties for the crew. Prompted by these findings, Airbus developed mod 35869 to reinforce the affected rack fitting lugs. For in-service aeroplanes, Airbus published SB [service bulletin] A320-92-1087 to provide detailed inspection (DET) and repair instructions. Consequently, EASA AD 2015-0170 [which corresponds to FAA AD 2016-19-14] was issued to require, for all pre mod 35869 aeroplanes, repetitive DET of the affected 10VU rack fitting lugs and, depending on findings, accomplishment of a repair. Since that [EASA] AD was issued, analysis confirmed the need to extend the inspection to post mod 35869 aeroplanes. Airbus issued SB A320-92-1119 providing instructions for DET and repair of those aeroplanes accordingly. Airbus developed mod 157335 to further reinforce and adjust the affected rack fitting lugs. Analysis is still ongoing to confirm mod 157335 as terminating action for the requirements of this [EASA] AD, and further AD action may follow. For the reason described above, this [EASA] AD retains the requirements of EASA AD 2015-0170, which is superseded, expanding the Applicability to include post mod 35869 aeroplanes, and requiring, for all aeroplanes, repetitive DET of the affected 10VU rack fitting lugs and, depending on findings, accomplishment of a repair [and reporting positive and negative findings to Airbus]. You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the internet at by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2018-0903. Comments We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this final rule. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment. Request To Allow Flight With Cracked 10VU Lug JetBlue Airways requested that paragraph (i) of the proposed AD be revised to allow flight with one cracked 10VU lug and to require repair of that cracked 10VU lug prior to exceeding 5,000 flight cycles, 10,000 flight hours, or within 24 months after the effective date of the AD, whichever occurred first. The commenter noted that paragraph (i) of the proposed AD would require repair before further flight even if only one 10VU lug was cracked. The commenter stated that allowing flight with one cracked 10VU lug would be in line with the requirements of EASA AD 2018-0131, dated June 19, 2018, and the procedures described in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03, dated July 31, 2017; and Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1119, dated July 28, 2017. The commenter noted that if more than one 10VU lug was cracked then the repair of all cracked 10VU lugs must be done before further flight. We disagree with the commenter's request. As noted in the proposed AD, we have determined that, because of the safety implications and consequences associated with that cracking, any cracked 10VU rack fitting lug must be repaired before further flight. Our general policy does not allow flight with known cracks. This policy is based on the fact that such damaged airplanes do not conform to the FAA-certificated type design and, therefore, are not airworthy until a properly approved repair is made. However, under the provisions of paragraph (m)(1) of this AD, we will consider requests for approval of an extension of the compliance time if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the new compliance time would provide an acceptable level of safety, We have not changed this AD regarding this issue. Request To Clarify Testing Procedure Requirements United Airlines (UAL) requested that the final AD include a statement that the tests identified as “Required for Compliance” (RC) in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03, dated July 31, 2017 (“A320-92-1087, Revision 03”); and Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1119, dated July 28, 2017 (“A320-92-1119”), are only applicable if the component identified in the test was removed and re-installed in the airplane. The commenter suggested that the final AD allow operators to conduct tests only on components that were removed so operators could get access to the areas required to do the inspections. The commenter noted that Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03, subtask 921087-700-002-001, “Testing,” provides a list of components to be tested, but includes a statement that the required testing is dependent upon which components were removed for access to do an inspection and then re-installed on the airplane. The commenter stated that Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1119 does not include such a statement. The commenter explained that having this statement is important because not every component listed is installed on every 10VU rack, therefore operators could not do a test on a component that was never installed, and including this statement would account for different avionics equipment configurations within the 10VU rack. The commenter provided the example that some UAL airplanes are not equipped with angle-of-attack indicators or an integrated stand instrument system, therefore the required tests could not be accomplished for these components. We agree with the intent of the commenter's request and we will provide clarification regarding the RC tests. The intent of the RC tests in the Airbus service information is to require testing of equipment that was removed for access to do an inspection and then re-installed in the airplane. The Airbus service information includes this explanation regarding required testing in different locations. Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03, paragraph 3.D.(2), “Subtask 921087-700-002-001, Testing,” includes a statement that the testing is dependent upon which components were removed in order to do an inspection and are being re-installed on the airplane. The location of this statement in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1119, paragraph 3.D.(2), “Subtask 921119-710-001-001, Testing,” is in a note, which states that “The test procedure is to be accomplished after the installation of the equipment removed for access . . . .” This note has the same intent as the statement and operators are not expected to do testing on components that were never installed in the 10VU rack; operators only have to test components that were removed and then re-installed. We have not changed this AD regarding this issue. Request To Refer to Current Service Information UAL requested that, prior to publication of the final AD, we verify that the current published revision level of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087 and Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1119 are referred to in the final AD. The comment stated that this would avoid the need to apply for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) immediately after publication of the final AD. We agree with the commenter's request and we have verified that Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03; and Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1119; are the current published revision levels of these documents. We have not changed this AD regarding this issue. Request To Revise Reporting Method JetBlue Airways requested that paragraph (j) of the proposed AD be revised to remove the reference to the Airbus Service Bulletin Reporting Online Application on Airbus World ( ). The commenter advocated that operators should be allowed to report their findings to Airbus using a method of their choosing and that the proposed AD should not specify how operators should report their findings. We agree to clarify. Paragraph (j) of this AD does not require operators to report their findings using only the Airbus Service Bulletin Reporting Online Application. Paragraph (j) of this AD provides operators with the option of either using the Airbus Service Bulletin Reporting Online Application or submitting the results to Airbus in accordance with the instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03 (for Group 1 airplanes); or Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1119 (for Group 2 airplanes); as applicable. We have not changed this AD regarding this issue. Conclusion We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule as proposed, except for minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes: • Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and • Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM. Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51 Airbus has issued Service Bulletins A320-92-1087, Revision 03, dated July 31, 2017; and A320-92-1119, dated July 28, 2017. This service information describes procedures for repetitive inspections for cracking of the 10VU rack fitting lugs, and repair of any cracking. These documents are distinct since they apply to airplanes in different configurations. This service information is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section. Costs of Compliance We estimate that this AD affects 461 airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD: Estimated Costs Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. operators 2 work-hours × $85 per hour = $170 $0 $170 $78,370 We estimate that it would take about 1 work-hour per product to comply with the reporting requirement in this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of reporting the inspection results on U.S. operators to be $85 per product. We estimate the following costs to do any necessary repairs that would be required based on the results of the inspection. We have no way of determining the number of aircraft that might need these repairs: Estimated Costs of On-Condition Actions Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product 83 work-hours × $85 per hour = $7,055 $9,140 $16,195 Paperwork Reduction Act A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB control number. The control number for the collection of information required by this AD is 2120-0056. The paperwork cost associated with this AD has been detailed in the Costs of Compliance section of this document and includes time for reviewing instructions, as well as completing and reviewing the collection of information. Therefore, all reporting associated with this AD is mandatory. Comments concerning the accuracy of this burden and suggestions for reducing the burden should be directed to the FAA at 800 Independence Ave. SW, Washington, DC 20591, ATTN: Information Collection Clearance Officer, AES-200. Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes and associated appliances to the Director of the System Oversight Division. Regulatory Findings We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: 1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; 2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and 4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by removing Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-19-14, Amendment 39-18663 (81 FR 71602, October 18, 2016), and adding the following new AD: 2019-07-05 Airbus SAS: Amendment 39-19616; Docket No. FAA-2018-0903; Product Identifier 2018-NM-113-AD. (a) Effective Date This AD is effective May 24, 2019. (b) Affected ADs This AD replaces AD 2016-19-14, Amendment 39-18663 (81 FR 71602, October 18, 2016) (“AD 2016-19-14”). (c) Applicability This AD applies to the Airbus SAS airplanes identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(4) of this AD, certificated in any category, all manufacturer serial numbers. (1) Model A318-111, -112, -121, and -122 airplanes. (2) Model A319-111, -112, -113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes. (3) Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes. (4) Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. (d) Subject Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 92, Electric and Electronic Common Installation. (e) Reason This AD was prompted by a report of cracks found during maintenance inspections on certain 10VU rack fitting lugs. We are issuing this AD to address reading difficulties of flight-critical information displayed to the flightcrew during a critical phase of flight, such as an approach or takeoff, which could result in loss of airplane control at an altitude insufficient for recovery. (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Definitions For the purpose of this AD, Group 1 airplanes are in a pre-Airbus Modification 35869 configuration, and Group 2 airplanes are in a post-Airbus Modification 35869 configuration. (h) Repetitive Inspections (1) For Group 1 airplanes: At the later of the times specified in table 1 to paragraph (h)(1) of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 20,000 flight cycles or 40,000 flight hours, whichever occurs first, do a detailed inspection for cracking of the 10VU rack fitting lugs, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03, dated July 31, 2017. ER19AP19.000 (2) For Group 2 airplanes: At the later of the times specified in paragraphs (h)(2)(i) and (h)(2)(ii) of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 20,000 flight cycles or 40,000 flight hours, whichever occurs first, do a detailed inspection for cracking of the 10VU rack fitting lugs, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1119, dated July 28, 2017. (i) Prior to exceeding 30,000 total flight cycles or 60,000 total flight hours, whichever occurs first. (ii) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD. (i) Repair If any crack is found during any inspection required by paragraph (h)(1) or (h)(2) of this AD: Before further flight, do a repair in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03, dated July 31, 2017 (for Group 1 airplanes); or Service Bulletin A320-92-1119, dated July 28, 2017 (for Group 2 airplanes); as applicable. Repair of a 10VU rack fitting lug does not terminate the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of this AD. (j) Reporting At the applicable time specified in paragraph (j)(1) or (j)(2) of this AD: Submit a report of findings (positive and negative) of each inspection required by paragraph (h) of this AD to Airbus Service Bulletin Reporting Online Application on Airbus World ( ), or submit the results to Airbus in accordance with the instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03, dated July 31, 2017 (for Group 1 airplanes); or Service Bulletin A320-92-1119, dated July 28, 2017 (for Group 2 airplanes); as applicable. Where Figure A-FAAAA, Sheet 02, of Appendix 01, “Inspection Report,” of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03, dated July 31, 2017; and Figure A-FAAAA, Sheet 02, of Appendix 01, “Inspection Report,” of Service Bulletin A320-92-1119, dated July 28, 2017; specifies sending removed lugs to Airbus for investigation, this AD does not include that requirement. (1) If the inspection was done on or after the effective date of this AD: Submit the report within 90 days after the inspection. (2) If the inspection was done before the effective date of this AD: Submit the report within 90 days after the effective date of this AD. (k) Credit for Previous Actions This paragraph provides credit for actions required by paragraphs (h)(1) and (i) of this AD if those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD using Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 02, dated November 25, 2014. (l) Paperwork Reduction Act Burden Statement A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2120-0056. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Comments concerning the accuracy of this burden and suggestions for reducing the burden should be directed to the FAA at: 800 Independence Ave. SW, Washington, DC 20591, Attn: Information Collection Clearance Officer, AES-200. (m) Other FAA AD Provisions (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the International Section, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (n)(2) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: . Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office. (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: As of the effective date of this AD, for any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer, the action must be accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); or Airbus SAS's EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature. (3) Required for Compliance (RC): If any service information contains procedures or tests that are identified as RC, those procedures and tests must be done to comply with this AD; any procedures or tests that are not identified as RC are recommended. Those procedures and tests that are not identified as RC may be deviated from using accepted methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the procedures and tests identified as RC can be done and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy condition. Any substitutions or changes to procedures or tests identified as RC require approval of an AMOC. (n) Related Information (1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI) EASA AD 2018-0131, dated June 19, 2018, for related information. This MCAI may be found in the AD docket on the internet at by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2018-0903. (2) For more information about this AD, contact Sanjay Ralhan, Aerospace Engineer, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206-231-3223. (3) Service information identified in this AD that is not incorporated by reference is available at the addresses specified in paragraphs (o)(3) and (o)(4) of this AD. (o) Material Incorporated by Reference (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise. (i) Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1087, Revision 03, dated July 31, 2017. (ii) Airbus Service Bulletin A320-92-1119, dated July 28, 2017. (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus SAS, Airworthiness Office—EIAS, Rond-Point Emile Dewoitine No: 2, 31700 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email ; internet . (4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport Standards Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: . Issued in Des Moines, Washington, on April 9, 2019. Michael Kaszycki, Acting Director, System Oversight Division, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2019-07940 Filed 4-18-19; 8:45 am]
Connectionstraces to 6
- 14 CFR 39
- 1 CFR 51