60-498.03. Operator's license revocation decision; notice; contents.
347 words·~2 min read·
/ne/chapter-60/60-498-03A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
(1)The director shall reduce the decision revoking an operator's license under sections 60-498.01 to 60-498.04 to writing, and the director shall notify the person in writing of the revocation. The notice shall set forth the period of revocation and be served by mailing it to such person to the address provided to the director at the administrative license revocation hearing or, if the person does not appear at the hearing, to the address appearing on the records of the director. If the address on the director's records differs from the address on the arresting peace officer's report, the notice shall be sent to both addresses.
(2)If the director does not revoke the operator's license, the director shall immediately notify the person in writing of the decision. The notice shall set forth the time and place the person may obtain his or her license. The notice shall be mailed as provided in subsection
(1)of this section. No reinstatement fee shall be charged for return of the confiscated operator's license pursuant to this subsection.
Administrative license revocation statutes are reviewed using the rational relationship standard of review. The administrative license revocation statutes do not violate equal protection, nor do they constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Schindler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 256 Neb. 782, 593 N.W.2d 295 (1999).
A refusal to submit to a chemical test for alcohol occurs when the licensee, after being asked to submit to a test, so conducts himself as to justify a reasonable person in the requesting officer's position in believing that the licensee understood that he was asked to submit to a test and manifested an unwillingness to do so. Wohlgemuth v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 687, 285 N.W.2d 102 (1979).
A preliminary refusal followed by a consent to submit to a test for blood alcohol content does not furnish a basis for imposition of the sanction prescribed by the statute if a test was in fact performed and the state was not prejudiced by the delay in performing the test. Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625, 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979).