§291-2 [OLD] REPEALED.

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§291-2 [OLD] REPEALED. L 1971, c 150, §3.

§291-2 Reckless driving of vehicle or riding of animals; penalty. Whoever operates any vehicle or rides any animal recklessly in disregard of the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving of vehicle or reckless riding of an animal, as appropriate, and shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both. [PC 1869, c 26, §1; am L 1907, c 68, §1; RL 1925, §4388; RL 1935, §6280; am L 1941, c 116, §1; RL 1945, §11701; RL 1955, §311-1; HRS §291-1; am L 1976, c 149, §1; am L 1977, c 162, §1; ren L 1986, c 171, §1; am L 1998, c 287, §2]

Cross References

Wild cattle or other dangerous animals, see §142-97.

Case Notes

Instructions to jury, see 22 H. 786 (1915).

Complaint held insufficient though substantially in language of statute. 25 H. 584 (1920).

Death ensuing from the operation of a vehicle in violation of this section may constitute manslaughter. 29 H. 7 (1926).

Instruction singling out "unavoidable accident". 32 H. 728 (1933).

Person convicted of heedless and reckless driving may not invoke double jeopardy when person is indicted for negligent homicide upon the death of the injured. 40 H. 331 (1953).

Charge in language of statute held insufficient. 41 H. 591 (1957).

Statute requires no more than ordinary negligence as a standard of guilt. 46 H. 245, 377 P.2d 688 (1962).

Substantial evidence test applies to review of evidence; this test not altered by HRCrP. 46 H. 245, 377 P.2d 688 (1962).

Standard not affected by point system law. 46 H. 345, 379 P.2d 592 (1963).

Section not limited to public property but applies to private property as well. 55 H. 505, 523 P.2d 315 (1974).

No obvious defect in an oral charge where the record demonstrates the charge tracks the statutory language, and the defendant clearly understood the accusation plus mounted a viable defense. 70 H. 314, 769 P.2d 1105 (1989).

Officer's additional observations, considered in concert with the reasonable inferences arising from defendant's screeching of tires, warranted an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant had, at a minimum, committed the offense of reckless driving of a vehicle, in violation of this section; thus, officer's investigative stop was within the parameters of permissible police conduct. 102 H. 228, 74 P.3d 980 (2003).

The reckless state of mind definition under §702-206(3)

(1993)applies to this reckless driving statute; in determining whether an identified risk is substantial and unjustifiable under §702-206(3), the nature and degree of the risk disregarded by the actor, the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct, and the circumstances known to the actor in acting must be weighed. 113 H. 321, 151 P.3d 802 (2007).

Where a reckless state of mind could be inferred from the circumstances to conclude that there was conscious awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the safety of others and property on the part of defendant, and deference must be given to the trier of fact with respect to questions of credibility and weight of the evidence, there was substantial evidence to find defendant guilty of reckless driving in violation of this section. 113 H. 321, 151 P.3d 802 (2007).

See 35 H. 324 (1940); 35 H. 396 (1940); 36 H. 537 (1943); 37 H. 591 (1947); 43 H. 54 (1958).