§205A-6 Cause of action.
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/hi/205a-6A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
§205A-6 Cause of action.
(a)Subject to chapters 661 and 662, any person or agency may commence a civil action alleging that any agency:
(1)Is not in compliance with one or more of the objectives, policies, and guidelines provided or authorized by this chapter within the special management area and the waters from the shoreline to the seaward limit of the State's jurisdiction;
(2)Has failed to perform any act or duty required to be performed under this chapter; or
(3)In exercising any duty required to be performed under this chapter, has not complied with the provisions of this chapter.
(b)In any action brought under this section, the lead agency, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of right.
(c)A court, in any action brought under this section, shall have jurisdiction to provide any relief as may be appropriate, including a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
(d)Any action brought under this section shall be commenced within sixty days of the act which is the basis of the action.
(e)Nothing in this section shall restrict any right that any person may have to assert any other claim or bring any other action. [L 1977, c 188, pt of §3; am L 1979, c 200, §5]
Revision Note
In subsection (a)(1), "or" deleted after ending punctuation pursuant to §23G-15.
Law Journals and Reviews
Ala Loop and the Private Right of Action Under Hawai`i Constitution Article XI, Section 9: Charting a Path Toward a Cohesive Enforcement Scheme. 33 UH L. Rev. 367 (2010).
Case Notes
Judicial intervention under this section should not precede resolution of issues by administrative agency. 69 H. 81, 734 P.2d 161 (1987).
Section allowed plaintiff to bring generic declaratory action under §632-1 without the need to proceed under this section. 75 H. 237, 858 P.2d 726 (1993).
Where the appellant failed to file an appeal with the Maui planning commission regarding the county director of planning's issuance of a special management area minor permit, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction warranted dismissal of the case; the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. 132 H. 472 (App.), 323 P.3d 116 (2012).
Where the defendants contended that the case was moot because it pertained to the issuance of a special management area minor permit for an event that occurred prior to appeal, the appeal retained vitality because the questions presented were of public concern and, in the likely event that they recurred in the future, were of a nature that would likely become moot before they could be determined on appeal. 132 H. 472 (App.), 323 P.3d 116 (2012).