§ 189
361 words·~2 min read·
/ca/penal-code/189A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
(a)All murder that is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or that is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 287, 288, or 289, or former Section 288a, or murder that is perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death, is murder of the first degree.
(b)All other kinds of murders are of the second degree.
(c)As used in this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)“Destructive device” has the same meaning as in Section 16460.
(2)“Explosive” has the same meaning as in Section 12000 of the Health and Safety Code.
(3)“Weapon of mass destruction” means any item defined in Section 11417.
(d)To prove the killing was “deliberate and premeditated,” it is not necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of the defendant’s act.
(e)A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision
(a)in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:
(1)The person was the actual killer.
(2)The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
(3)The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision
(d)of Section 190.2.
(f)Subdivision
(e)does not apply to a defendant when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.