Sec. 5. Interagency strategy to address transnational repression in United States and abroad

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Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate , the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate , the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives , and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that contains a United States strategy to promote initiatives that will— enhance international awareness of transnational repression; address transnational repression, including through raising the costs of such activities for perpetrating governments and protecting targeted individuals and groups; conduct regular outreach (whether through government agencies or civil society organizations) with diaspora communities and other people who have been targeted by foreign governments regarding the transnational threats they face within the United States and around the world and the resources available to them without putting them at further risk; and develop policy and programmatic-related responses based on input from the communities and people referred to in paragraph

(3)and regularly seek and consider credible information obtained by nongovernmental organizations working on issues of transnational repression. The strategy required under subsection

(a)shall include— a plan developed in consultation with like-minded partner governments, civil society, the business community, and other entities for advancing and promoting— the rule of law and human rights globally with respect to the use of surveillance technology and export licensing policy regarding such technology; and safeguards to prevent the access, use, and storage of personal digital data by governments and technology companies for the purposes of transnational repression; public affairs, public diplomacy, and counter-messaging efforts, including through the use of the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at international bodies— to promote awareness; to develop a common understanding; and to draw critical attention to and oppose acts of transnational repression; a plan for establishing or strengthening regional and international coalitions— to monitor cases of transnational repression, including reprisals when human rights defenders and other activists face reprisals for engaging at multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations; and to create or strengthen emergency alert mechanisms for key stakeholders within the international community that can engage in public or private diplomacy to address emergency cases of transnational repression, including cases involving individuals and their family members who are at serious risk of rendition, disappearance, unlawful deportation, refoulement, or other actions; an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of working with partners and allies to push for the establishment of a special rapporteur for transnational repression at the United Nations; and a plan for engaging with diplomats and consular officials who abuse their positions by intimidating, threatening, attacking, or otherwise undermining the human rights and fundamental freedoms of exiles and members of diasporas in the United States. The strategy required under subsection

(a)shall include— ways in which the United States Government has previously and will continue to provide support to civil society organizations in the United States and in countries in which transnational repression occurs— to improve the documentation, investigation, and research of cases, trends, and tactics of transnational repression, including— any potential for misusing security tools to target individual dissidents, activists, or journalists; and ramifications of transnational repression in undermining United States policy or assistance efforts to promote internationally recognized human rights and democracy overseas; and to promote the transparency of the host country decision-making processes, including instances in which law enforcement actions against victims of transnational repression occurred because of INTERPOL red notices or extradition treaties; and a description of new or existing emergency assistance mechanisms, including the Fundamental Freedoms Fund and the Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund, to aid at-risk groups, communities, and individuals, and victims of transnational repression in the United States and in countries in which transnational repression occurs to address— physical security installation and support; operational support of organizations providing assistance to at-risk groups, communities, and individuals; psychosocial and psycho-emotional support; medical assistance, subject to the limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. ); digital security installation and support; support and training beyond basic digital hygiene training, including emergency response to cyberattacks and enhanced capacity to deter surveillance and monitoring by malicious actors; relocation support; legal advice and assistance; and trainings to build on their existing capacities so they can continue their activism. The strategy required under subsection

(a)shall include— the consideration of updates to United States law to directly address certain tactics of transnational repression, including— the criminalization of the gathering of information about private individuals in diaspora and exile communities on behalf of a foreign power that is intending to harass, intimidate, or harm an individual in order to prevent their exercise of internationally recognized human rights; and the expansion of the definition of foreign agents under the Foreign Registrations Act of 1938 ( 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq. ) and section 951 of title 18, United States Code; ways in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation coordinates with the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, United States intelligence agencies, and domestic law enforcement agencies in partner countries in responding to transnational repression; full consideration of unintended negative impacts of such expanded legal authorities on the civil liberties of communities targeted by transnational repression, taking into account the views of such affected communities; the development of specific outreach strategies to connect law enforcement, other agencies, and local municipal officials with targeted diaspora communities to ensure that individuals who are vulnerable to transnational repression are aware of the Federal and local resources available to them without putting them at further risk; and examining and reviewing the steps taken to address the legality of foreign governments establishing overseas police stations to monitor members of the diaspora. In addition to the matters set forth in subsection (b), the report required under subsection

(a)shall include— to the extent practicable, a list of— the governments that perpetrate transnational repression most often and the host countries that such governments are targeting most often; the host governments that cooperate most often with the governments on transnational repression actions referred to in subparagraph (A); any individuals, whether United States citizens or foreign nationals, who are complicit in transnational repression as agents of a foreign government referred to in subparagraph

(A)who are operating in the United States; refugees, asylum seekers, and populations that are most vulnerable to transnational repression in the United States and, to the extent possible, in foreign countries; entities that are exporting dual-use spyware technology to any of the governments referred to in subparagraph (A); entities that are buying and selling personally identifiable information that can be used to track and surveil potential victims; and entities that are exporting items on the Commerce Control List (as set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations) to any governments referred to in subparagraph

(a)that can be misused for human rights abuses; an assessment of how data that is purchased by governments most often perpetrating transnational repression is utilized; and a description of any actions taken by the United States Government to address transnational repression under existing law, including— section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(C) ); section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act ( 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); the interim final rule issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce relating to Information Security Controls: Cybersecurity Items (86 Fed. Reg. 58205; October 21, 2021; 87 Fed. Reg. 1670, effective March 7, 2022); section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of Public Law 116–94 ; 8 U.S.C. 1182 note); prosecutions and the statutory authority authorizing such prosecutions; establishing specific bureaucratic structures focused on transnational repression; which agencies are conducting outreach to victims of transnational repression and the form of such outreach; the challenges of intelligence agencies in identifying transnational repression threats and perpetrators; and United States technology companies that knowingly or unknowingly employ, or provide access to information to, foreign intelligence officers. The report required under subsection

(a)shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary. The Secretary of State shall provide the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives with annual updates of the strategy required under subsection (a).

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