Sec. 124. Developing economic tools to deter aggression against Taiwan
1,123 words·~5 min read·
/bill/118/s/5491/is/section-124·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States must be prepared to take immediate action to sanction any military or non-military entities owned, controlled, or acting at the direction of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party to— overthrow or dismantle the governing institutions in Taiwan; occupy any territory controlled or administered by Taiwan; or take significant action against Taiwan, or territory controlled or administered by Taiwan, including conducting a naval blockade, seizing Taiwan’s outlying islands, or perpetrating a significant cyberattack on Taiwan.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Office of the Sanctions Coordinator of the Department of State and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury shall establish an interagency task force to identify military or non-military entities that could be sanctioned immediately following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an attempt to achieve or has the significant effect of achieving the physical or political control of Taiwan, including by— overthrowing or dismantling the governing institutions in Taiwan; occupying any territory controlled or administered by Taiwan as of the date of the enactment of this Act; or taking significant action against Taiwan, or territory controlled or administered by Taiwan, including— the creation of a naval blockade of Taiwan; the seizure of the outlying islands of Taiwan; or the initiation of a significant cyberattack that threatens civilian or military infrastructure of Taiwan.
Not later than 180 days following the establishment of the task force required under subsection (b), the task force shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy for identifying targets that— assesses how existing sanctions programs could be used following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an attempt to achieve, or has the significant effect of achieving, the physical or political control of Taiwan as described in subsection (b); develops or proposes, as appropriate, new sanctions authorities that might be required to impose sanctions on targets identified under this section; analyzes the potential economic consequences to the United States, and to allies and partners of the United States, of various types of such sanctions and to assess measures that could be taken to mitigate such consequences, including through the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs, and other approaches; includes coordination with allies and partners to— leverage sanctions and other economic tools to deter or respond to aggression against Taiwan; identify and resolve potential impediments to coordinating sanctions-related efforts; and identify industries, sectors, or goods and services where the United States and allies and partners can take coordinated action through sanctions, or other economic tools that will have a significant negative impact on the economy of the PRC; assesses the resource gaps and needs at the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury, and other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, to most effectively use sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the threat posed by the PRC; recommends how best to target sanctions and other economic tools against individuals, entities, and economic sectors in the PRC, taking into account the role of such targets in supporting Government of the PRC or Chinese Communist Party policies and activities that pose a threat to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States, the negative economic implications for the PRC, including its ability to achieve its objectives with respect to Taiwan, and the potential impact of such sanctions on the stability of the global financial system, including with regard to— state-owned enterprises; government officials; financial institutions associated with the government; and PRC companies not formally designated by the Government of the PRC as state-owned enterprises; identifies any foreign military or non-military entities that would likely be used by the PRC in any action taken that demonstrates an attempt to achieve any, or has the significant effect of achieving, the physical or political control of Taiwan, as described in subsection (b), including entities in— shipping; logistics; energy, including oil and gas; aviation; ground transportation; and technology; describes policies, to be applied in the event of any PRC coercive action, including an invasion by the PRC that fringes upon the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan by preventing access to international waterways, airspace, or telecommunications networks, to— restrict the access of the People’s Liberation Army to oil, natural gas, munitions, and other supplies needed to conduct military operations against Taiwan, United States facilities in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Oceans, and allies and partners of the United States in the region; diminish the capacity of the industrial base of the PRC to manufacture and deliver defense articles to replace those lost in operations of the People’s Liberation Army against Taiwan, the United States, and allies and partners of the United States; and inhibit the ability of the PRC to evade United States and multilateral sanctions through third parties, including through secondary sanctions; and identifies tactics used by the Government of the PRC to influence the public in the United States and Taiwan through propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including such campaigns focused on delegitimizing Taiwan or legitimizing a forceful action by the PRC against Taiwan.
Not later than 180 days after the submission of the strategy required under subsection (c), the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on potential sources of leverage against the PRC and recommendations to reduce United States vulnerabilities. The report shall— identify goods and services from the United States that are relied on by the PRC such that reliance presents a strategic opportunity and source of leverage against the PRC, including during a conflict; identify procurement practices of the United States Government, and critical sectors within the United States economy, that are reliant on trade with the PRC and other inputs from the PRC (including drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients, critical minerals, and metallurgical inputs) such that those sectors present a strategic vulnerability and source of leverage that the Chinese Communist Party or the PRC could exploit, including during a conflict; and includes recommendations to Congress on steps that can be taken to reduce the sources of leverage described in subparagraph (B), including through— provision of economic incentives and making other trade and contracting reforms to support United States industry in critical sectors and to indigenize production of critical resources; and policies to facilitate near- or friend-shoring , or otherwise developing strategies to facilitate that process with allies and partners of the United States, in other sectors for which domestic reshoring would prove infeasible for any reason.
The report submitted under paragraph
(1)shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.