Sec. 1066. Report on undersea cable posture
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/bill/118/s/4638/rs/section-1066A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
Not later than December 30, 2025, the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense (DOD-CIO) shall submit to the congressional defense committees a classified report on the threats, defense, and resilience of undersea cables used by the Department of Defense. The report required under subsection
(a)shall include the following elements: An assessment of the threats (i.e., physical, cyber, supply chain, and foreign ownership) to undersea cables owned or used by the Department of Defense, including— the current procedure when threats to such cables are identified by or reported to the Department of Defense (Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI)lead and United States Cyber Command supporting); the extent to which such cables are owned and operated solely by the Department of Defense, reported by agency or military department (DOD-CIO NMO would be lead); the extent to which such cables are owned and operated by non-government or commercial entities, but contracted to support the Department of Defense, reported by agency or military department (ODNI Lead, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Sustainment supporting); a list of Department of Defense missions that would be most severely disrupted by a loss of undersea cable capabilities (combatant commands would lead this prioritization); and intelligence gaps concerning threats to such cables (ODNI would be overall lead for this effort). The Department of Defense’s strategy to protect critical subsea cables and an assessment of the Department’s ability to execute that strategy, including for cables not owned by the Department of Defense (DOD-CIO). An assessment of the Department of Defense’s ability to restore critical subsea cable capabilities based on damage to or interdiction of existing undersea capabilities (DOD-CIO). An assessment of the Department of Defense’s ability to execute processes to prioritize and support restoration efforts if subsea cable capabilities are lost (DOD-CIO). Alternative capabilities to negate or mitigate the loss of critical undersea cable capabilities, including a Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency communication plan (DOD-CIO). A strategy for prioritizing Department of Defense missions in the event that undersea cable capabilities are lost (DOD-CIO). An assessment of support required from other United States Government, private sector, and foreign partners to defend, maintain, and restore undersea cable capabilities (DOD-CIO). An assessment of new or additional capabilities or authorities required to adequately defend, monitor, maintain or restore undersea cable capabilities (DOD-CIO), including, if additional capabilities are required, an estimated budget to support.