Sec. 4. Investigation and report
1,138 words·~5 min read·
/bill/117/sres/763/is/section-4·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
The Senate Select Committee shall investigate and, not later than 1 year after the date of agreement to this resolution, shall submit a report to the Senate on the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan. The report required under subsection
(a)shall address the following: Intelligence products available to the United States Government over the course of the withdrawal, including as related to— anticipated timelines for a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, especially as the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan districts and provinces, often without fighting, in early to mid 2021; the ability of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to prevent a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces and associated combat, logistical, and other support; the willingness of then-President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani and other Afghan political leaders to remain in Afghanistan as the military situation deteriorated, including any plans such leaders may have made to escape Afghanistan as the Taliban advanced; any other intelligence that may have informed decisions by the United States Government regarding the timeline for the withdrawal of its forces, moving of its embassy in Kabul, initiation of a noncombatant evacuation operation, force requirements for a noncombatant evacuation operation, or related matters; and any dissenting views shared in writing or other formats, including verbally, by United States diplomats, military commanders, or other government officials regarding the topics described in subparagraphs
(A)through (D). The failure to secure Hamid Karzai International Airport, relocate the United States Embassy in Kabul, and initiate a noncombatant evacuation operation prior to Kabul’s imminent collapse, despite warnings by military commanders on the ground that such a collapse was increasingly likely and could occur rapidly, including— the failure by the United States Government to accelerate the fortification of the Hamid Karzai International Airport, the relocation of the United States Embassy in Kabul, or the initiation of the noncombatant evacuation operation in response to warnings that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was increasingly likely to collapse and could do so rapidly; the development of a trigger assessment tool or other conditions-based planning aids to support monitoring of and timely response to the deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, including use of such aids by Department of Defense and Department of State officials in Afghanistan; table-top exercises or other planning events held at agency or interagency levels, with particular focus on planning assumptions, associated timelines, and participant reactions to the planning events; any decision by the Department of State or other Federal agency to delay or deprioritize planning for a noncombatant evacuation operation, including for the purpose of demonstrating confidence in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; any suggestion by Department of State or other United States Government officials that executing a noncombatant evacuation operation would constitute failure for the United States in Afghanistan, as reported by the United States Central Command investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing; and any orders, instructions, or other guidance provided to Department of Defense officials to prevent such officials from planning for a noncombatant evacuation operation with multinational partners, as reported by the United States Central Command investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing. The decision to prioritize evacuating as many individuals as possible over protecting members of the United States Armed Forces and thoroughly vetting all prospective evacuees, as reported by the United States Central Command investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing, including— force protection measures, including obstacles, barriers, and other measures, implemented at the Hamid Karzai International Airport prior to and during execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation; and force protection measures not implemented at the Hamid Karzai International Airport, with an explanation for why such force protection measures were not implemented and implications of the failure to implement such measures for risk to force during execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation. Threat reporting prior to the suicide bombing at Abbey Gate, additional force protection measures implemented in response to such threat reporting, and additional force protection measures not implemented in response to such threat reporting, with an assessment of why certain additional force protection measures were not taken. The failure to thoroughly vet evacuees prior to their transfer to United States territory, military installations, or other locations outside of Afghanistan, including detailed descriptions of— any delays by the Department of State to send adequate numbers of consular officials to Hamid Karzai International Airport to facilitate thorough vetting of prospective evacuees; any changes to guidance issued by the Department of State regarding the vetting of prospective evacuees over the course of the noncombatant evacuation operation; any guidance issued by the President or other United States Government officials to reduce standards for or expedite vetting of prospective evacuees prior to their removal from Afghanistan; any failure by the United States Government to utilize all existing biometric databases or proper identification standards when processing individuals to be removed from Afghanistan; and any criminal incidents involving evacuees following their transfer to United States territory. The total number of United States nationals left in Afghanistan following the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the knowledge on the part of United States Government officials of the total number of United States nationals left in Afghanistan when such officials informed Congress that the United States Government had not left Americans behind in Afghanistan. Equipment provided by the United States to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and recovered by the Taliban following the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, including the type and amount of such equipment recovered by the Taliban as well as the manner in which the Taliban has been able to use such equipment. Detailed descriptions of— orders issued by the President related to the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, including with regard to the relocation of the United States Embassy in Kabul and the initiation and execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation; analysis or recommendations provided by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of United States Central Command, and other national security leaders related to the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, including as related to— the deteriorating military situation in Afghanistan; and the consequent need to accelerate the relocation of the United States Embassy in Kabul and the initiation of the noncombatant evacuation operation; and requests for forces or other requests for additional authorities or resources made to the President by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or other national security leaders during the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the President’s responses to any such requests. Any other matters identified by members of the Senate Select Committee. The report required under subsection
(a)shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.