Sec. 2. Findings
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Congress makes the following findings: A robust overseas diplomatic presence is the sine qua non of an effective foreign policy, particularly in unstable environments where a flexible and timely diplomatic response can be decisive in preventing and addressing violent conflict. Diplomats routinely put themselves and their families at great personal risk to serve their country overseas where they increasingly face threats related to international terrorism, violent conflict, and public health, among others.
The Department of State has a remarkable record of protecting personnel while enabling an enormous amount of global diplomatic activity, often in insecure and remote places and facing a variety of evolving risks and threats, from terrorism to sonic attacks. With support from Congress, the Department of State has revised policy, improved physical security through retrofitting and replacing old facilities, deployed additional security personnel and armored vehicles, and greatly enhanced training requirements and facilities, including the new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center in Blackstone, Virginia.
However, there is broad consensus that the pendulum has swung too far toward eliminating risk, excessively inhibiting diplomatic activity; instead of protecting diplomats that authorize calculated risks, human psychology combined with Department of State policy incentivize extending embassy closures, reducing footprints, and postponing or denying travel requests. Congress must accept responsibility for its part in perpetuating a risk-averse culture, as its oversight too often promotes the myth that all security incidents are avoidable and appears more focused on finding scapegoats than improving policy; the Accountability Review Board requirement in the Diplomatic Security Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.) particularly furthers this perception.
The impact of reduced diplomatic engagement is both difficult to distill and undeniable; while the cost of an embassy closure or cancelled meeting is hard to measure, diplomatic missions rely on robust staffing and ambitious external engagement to advance United States interests as diverse as fighting terrorism and transnational organized crime, preventing and addressing violent conflict and humanitarian disasters, promoting United States businesses and trade, protecting the rights of marginalized groups, addressing climate change, and preventing pandemic disease.
Despite the fact that Congress currently provides annual appropriations in excess of $1,900,000,000 for embassy security, construction, and maintenance, the Department of State is unable to fully transform this considerable investment into true overseas presence given excessive restrictions that inhibit the ability of diplomats to— meet with foreign leaders to explain, defend, and advance United States priorities; understand and report on foreign political, social, and economic conditions; provide United States citizen services that are often a matter of life and death in insecure places; and collaborate and, at times, compete with other diplomatic missions.
Such restrictions present a clear and present danger to the core interests of the United States and contribute to the larger militarization of our national security, as military and intelligence agencies benefit from fewer security restrictions, greater risk tolerance, and less congressional scrutiny in the wake of security incidents. Given these stakes, Congress has a responsibility to empower, support, and hold the Department of State accountable for implementing an aggressive presence strategy that mitigates potential risks and adequately considers the myriad direct and indirect consequences of a lack of presence.
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U.S. Code