Sec. 4. Statement of policy
1,438 words·~7 min read·
/bill/117/s/1169/rs/section-4·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue the following objectives: The United States global leadership role is sustained and its political system and major foundations of national power are postured for long-term political, economic, technological, and military competition with the PRC. The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains favorable to the United States and its allies. The United States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent with international law and practice, and the PRC neither dominates the region nor coerces its neighbors.
The allies and partners of the United States— maintain confidence in United States leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region; can withstand and combat subversion and undue influence by the PRC; and align themselves with the United States in setting global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the international community. The combined weight of the United States and its allies and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential benefits.
The United States leads the free and open international order, which is comprised of resilient states and institutions that uphold and defend principles, including sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international order is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors. The key rules, norms, and standards of international engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including the— protection of human rights, commercial engagement and investment, and technology; and that such rules, norms, and standards are in alignment with the values and interests of the United States, its allies and partners, and the free world.
Assure that the CCP does not— subvert open and democratic societies; distort global markets; manipulate the international trade system; coerce other nations via economic and military means; or use its technological advantages to undermine individual freedoms or other states’ national security interests. The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict. It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)— to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, scientific and technological innovation, democratic institutions, and other areas that improve the United States ability to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and national security interests; to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, military, informational, and technological realms that maximizes United States strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of harming United States interests and values of those of United States allies and partners; to lead a free, open, and secure international system characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and good and transparent governance; to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and values and bolster partner countries’ confidence that the United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and constant partner; to encourage and aid United States allies and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from coercion and external pressure; to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy competition in United States-China economic relations by— advancing policies that harden the United States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and tightening United States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent the PRC’s attempts to harm United States economic competitiveness; to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth in emerging markets around the world, including through the use of United States Government tools that— support greater private sector investment and advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule of law; promote open markets; establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks; improve the management of key economic sectors; combat corruption; and foster and support greater collaboration with and among partner countries and the United States private sector to develop secure and sustainable infrastructure; to lead in the advancement of international rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets; to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of United States companies and businesses in partner countries that seek fair competition; to ensure that the United States leads in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by— providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector to accelerate development of such technologies; modernizing and harmonizing with allies and partners export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations; enhancing United States leadership in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies; reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and codevelopment of critical technologies; collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by— crafting multilateral export control measures; building capacity for defense technology security; safeguarding chokepoints in the supply chains; and ensuring diversification; and designing major defense capabilities for export to allies and partners; to enable the people of the United States, including the private sector, civil society, universities and other academic institutions, State and local legislators, and other relevant actors to identify and remain vigilant to the risks posed by undue influence of the CCP in the United States; to implement measures to mitigate the risks referred to in paragraph (11), while still preserving opportunities for economic engagement, academic research, and cooperation in other areas where the United States and the PRC share interests; to collaborate with advanced democracies and other willing partners to promote ideals and principles that— advance a free and open international order; strengthen democratic institutions; protect and promote human rights; and uphold a free press and fact-based reporting; to demonstrate effective leadership at the United Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations; to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC; to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations, leveraging their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the PRC accountable for— violations and abuses of human rights; restrictions on religious practices; and, undermining and abrogating treaties, other international agreements, and other international norms related to human rights; to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, repression, coercion, and other malign behavior to attain unfair economic advantage and deference of other nations to its political and strategic objectives; to maintain United States access to the Western Pacific, including by— increasing United States forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region; modernizing the United States military through investments in existing and new platforms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater force structure and enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and a diverse, operationally resilient and politically sustainable posture; and operating and conducting exercises with allies and partners— to mitigate the PLA’s ability to project power and establish contested zones within the First and Second Island Chains; to diminish the ability of the PLA to coerce its neighbors; to maintain open sea and air lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea; and to project power from the United States and its allies and partners to demonstrate the ability to conduct contested logistics; to deter the PRC from— coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by developing more combat-credible forces that are integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National Defense Strategy; using gray-zone tactics below the level of armed conflict; or initiating armed conflict; to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military communication and improve de-escalation procedures to deconflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and military officials and other measures, in alignment with United States interests; and to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as appropriate.