Sec. 1234. Assessment of Russian strategy in Ukraine
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Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the strategic, operational, and organizational strengths and weaknesses of the Russian Federation’s military strategy for the invasion and occupation of Ukraine, including an assessment of efforts and sources of leverage that could be used to exploit the weaknesses in that strategy as part of the effort to provide assistance to Ukraine. The assessment of Russia’s military strategy required by subsection
(a)shall include at a minimum a description of the following: Strategic strengths and weaknesses. Operational strengths and weaknesses. Organizational and logistical strengths and weaknesses. Strengths and weaknesses related to Russian employment of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), national guard, and reserve units. In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— the congressional defense committees; the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Section 1234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (134 Stat. 3936) is amended— in subsection (b)— by redesignating paragraph
(24)as paragraph (26); and by inserting after paragraph
(23)the following: The impacts of United States sanctions on improvements to the Russian military and its proxies, including an assessment of the impacts of the maintenance or revocation of such sanctions. A detailed description of— how Russian private military companies are being utilized to advance the political, economic, and military interests of the Russian Federation; the direct or indirect threats Russian private military companies present to United States security interests; how sanctions that are currently in place to impede or deter Russian private military companies from continuing their malign activities have impacted the Russian private military companies’ behavior; and all foreign persons engaged significantly with Russian private military companies. ; and in subsection (e)— in paragraph (1), by inserting , the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, after the Committee on Armed Services ; and in paragraph (2), by inserting , the Select Committee on Intelligence, after the Committee on Armed Services . Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of each military department, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of lessons learned by the respective military departments from the conflict following the Russian invasion of Ukraine that includes the following: Lessons learned from intelligence-sharing activities conducted between the United States, NATO, the European Union, and Ukraine throughout the conflict. Observed tactics and techniques of information-related capabilities and the integration of information-related capabilities in supporting Ukraine objectives. Analysis of the capabilities, tactics, and techniques implemented throughout the conflict following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, from each military department, with a focus on the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Analysis of all collected information to identify recurring strengths and weaknesses in United States and NATO tactics, training, and equipment. Recommendations to address any corrective actions. The report required by subsection
(e)shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. The unclassified portion of such report shall be published on a publicly accessible website of the Department of Defense. It is the sense of Congress that— the United States could greatly benefit from on-the-ground combat observations of the conflict following the Russian invasion of Ukraine to learn lessons about modern warfare between near-peer adversaries, and successful and unsuccessful aspects of both sides’ tactics, operations, and strategy; expert projections of how this conflict was likely to unfold were inaccurate, suggesting the United States has many lessons to learn from this conflict; the Department of Defense should, when feasible, organize Combat Observation Teams, who should be given battlefield access as non-combatants, with specialized skill sets to collect information, including by conducting first-person interviews, or other conflict-specific assessments and observations; such collection and observations should occur after the conflict has largely subsided, and the physical, political, and escalatory risk of sending an American combat observer team is sufficiently low; such teams should consist of talented senior officers and non-commissioned officers with appropriate experience and specialties for their task; Combat Observation Teams should be encouraged to interview Ukrainian military members, and civilians, conduct site surveys, and work with the United States embassy and other allied countries as appropriate; and the time is ripe for an infusion of lessons from Ukraine, and observations could ensure the United States is prepared for the future of modern warfare and conflict.
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- 134 Stat. 3936
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Sec. 1234
Assessment of Russian strategy in Ukraine
Stat.134 Stat. 3936
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