Sec. 30210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act
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This section may be cited as the . Taiwan Peace and Stability Act In this section: The term appropriate congressional committees means— the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. The term international organization includes United Nations funds, programs, specialized agencies, entities, and bodies, as well as other organizations outside of the United Nations system that the Secretary of State determines appropriate, in consultation with other relevant Federal departments and agencies.
The term One-China Principle means only the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan. The term civil society organizations means international civil society organizations that are critical to maintaining Taiwan’s international space and enabling Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in the global community. The term potential PLA campaigns means— a naval blockade of Taiwan; an amphibious assault and ground invasion of Taiwan, especially such invasion designed to accomplish a fiat accompli before intervention is possible; or a seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s outlying islands.
Congress makes the following findings: The United States has consistently sought to advance peace and stability in East Asia as a central element of United States foreign policy toward the region. The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that threatens to erode United States policy and create a fait accompli on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future.
In order to ensure the longevity of United States policy and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their future independently, it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and physical space. Taiwan has provided monetary, humanitarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever in countries around the world. During the COVID–19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests to countries in need.
Since 2016, the Gambia, São Tomé and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China. Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA.
Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021. The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the 11th busiest airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization since 2013. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758
(1971)does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people on Taiwan. It is the policy of the United States to— maintain the position that peace and stability in the Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; and work with allies and partners to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional stability. It is the sense of Congress that— Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, is home to 23,500,000 people, and is an important contributor to the global community; multiple United States Government Administrations have taken important steps to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations and to enhance cooperation with Taiwan to provide global public goods, including through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multilateral fora; nonetheless, significant structural, policy, and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international community; and efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with other parts of the global community could be further enhanced through a systematic approach, along with greater attention from Congress and the American public to such efforts. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy— to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in a prioritized set of international organizations; and that responds to growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, international organizations, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its One-China Principle with respect to Taiwan. The strategy required under paragraph
(1)shall include— an assessment of the methods the PRC uses to coerce actors to into adhering to its One-China Principle , including those employed against governments, international organizations, and civil society organizations and pressure on commercial actors, to the extent relevant in the context of Taiwan’s meaningful participation international organizations; an assessment of the policies of foreign governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify likeminded allies and partners who might become public or private partners in the strategy; a systematic analysis of all international organizations, as practicable, to identify those that best lend themselves to advancing Taiwan’s participation, including— the organization’s policy on the requirements to obtain membership and observer status, as well as the foundational documents defining membership requirements and observer status within the organization; the organization’s participation rules; the processes for developing membership requirements and participation rules; the policies of current members regarding Taiwan’s political status; and the organization’s relative reliance on contributions from the PRC and how it may affect internal decision-making; an evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of expanding economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with countries that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns with United States interests; a survey of international organizations that have allowed Taiwan’s meaningful participation, including an assessment of whether any erosion in Taiwan’s engagement has occurred within those organizations and how Taiwan’s participation has positively strengthened the capacity and activity of these organizations, providing positive models for Taiwan’s inclusion in other similar forums; a list of not more than 20 international organizations at which the United States Government will prioritize using its voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation over the three-year period following the date of enactment of this Act, to be derived from the organizations identified pursuant to subparagraph (C); and a description of the diplomatic strategies and the coalitions the United States Government plans to develop to implement subparagraph (F). The strategy required under paragraph
(1)shall be submitted in classified form but may include an unclassified summary. The Secretary of State and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate— not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, with respect to the international organizations identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and not later than 180 days after the date of the submission of the strategy required under paragraph (1), and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years, regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required. No later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in consultation with the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on cooperation with Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral development initiatives, through the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate. The report required in paragraph
(1)shall include the following: A comprehensive review of existing cooperation mechanisms and initiatives between USAID or DFC and relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan, including, but not limited to Taiwan’s International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF). An assessment of how USAID and DFC development cooperation with relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan compares to comparable cooperation with partners of similar economic size and foreign assistance capacity. An analysis of the opportunities and challenges the cooperation described in subparagraph
(A)has offered to date, including— opportunities collaboration has offered to expand USAID’s and DFC’s ability to deliver assistance into a wider range communities; sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF, other relevant agencies and departments in Taiwan, or the organizations’ implementing partners, have a comparative advantage in providing assistance; and opportunities to transition virtual capacity building events relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan, through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework and other forums, into in-person, enduring forms of development cooperation. An assessment of any legal, policy, logistical, financial, or administrative barriers to expanding cooperation in trilateral or multilateral development, including— availability of personnel at the American Institute in Taiwan responsible for coordinating development assistance cooperation; volume of current cooperation initiatives and barriers to expanding it; diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers facing the United States or other partners to including Taiwan in formal and informal multilateral development cooperation mechanisms; resource or capacity barriers to expanding cooperation facing the United States or Taiwan; and geopolitical barriers that complicate United States-Taiwan cooperation in third countries. Recommendations to address the challenges identified in subparagraph (D). A description of any additional resources or authorities that expanding cooperation might require. The strategy required in paragraph
(1)shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. It is the sense of the Congress that— expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan has benefited the people of both the United States and Taiwan; and the United States should explore opportunities to deepen, and where possible expand, economic ties between Taiwan and the United States. It is the sense of Congress that— PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, including through high rates of PRC sorties into air space near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United States position that differences in cross-Strait relations must be resolved peacefully; given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any increase in the risk of conflict demands attention and obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most viable means to prevent war; Taiwan should continue to implement its asymmetric defense strategy, including investing in cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also strengthening recruitment and training of its reserve and civil defense forces, and those capabilities include, but are not limited to, coastal defense cruise missiles; and while enhancing deterrence, it is also essential to maintain open and effective crisis communication and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately, conflict. No later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan. The strategy shall include the following: A comprehensive review of existing diplomatic, economic, and military tools to establish deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict and an assessment of their efficacy. An examination of the present and future capabilities of the United States and Taiwan to respond to the potential PLA campaigns against Taiwan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The analysis shall include an assessment of the progress Taiwan has made in developing the cost-effective and resilient capabilities needed to respond to its strategic environment, as well as any additional personnel, procurement, or training reforms required. An evaluation of the feasibility of expanding coordination with United States allies and partners to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. The review shall include a review of the following matters: Expanding coordination of public or private messaging on deterrence vis-à-vis Taiwan. Coordinating use of economic tools to raise the costs of PRC military action that could precipitate a cross-Strait conflict. Enhancing codevelopment and codeployment of military capabilities related to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or enhancing coordination on training of Taiwan’s military forces. Recommendations on significant additional diplomatic, economic, and military steps available to the United States Government, unilaterally and in concert with United States allies and partners, to enhance the clarity and credibility of deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. A description of any additional resources or authorities needed to implement the recommendations identified in subparagraph (D). The strategy required in paragraph
(1)shall be submitted classified form but may include an unclassified annex. Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 7 years, the President (or a designee), as well as representatives from the agencies and departments involved in developing the strategy required in paragraph (1), shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required in this subsection. The representatives from the relevant agencies and departments shall be at the Under Secretary level or above. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall present to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for strengthening the community of civilian defense professionals in Taiwan, facilitated through the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate. The plan required by paragraph
(1)shall include the following: A comprehensive review of existing United States Government and non-United States Government programmatic and funding modalities to support Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals in pursuing professional development, educational, and cultural exchanges in the United States, including— opportunities through Department of State-supported programs, such as the International Visitor Leaders Program; and opportunities offered through nongovernmental institutions, such as think tanks, to the extent the review can practicably make such an assessment. A description of the frequency that civilian defense professionals from Taiwan pursue or are selected for the programs reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A). An analysis of any funding, policy, administrative, or other barriers preventing greater participation from Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals in the opportunities identified pursuant to subparagraph (A). An evaluation of the value expanding the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subparagraph
(A)would offer for strengthening Taiwan’s existing civilian defense community, and for increasing the perceived value of the field for young professionals in Taiwan. An assessment of options the United States Government could take individually, with partners in Taiwan, or with foreign governments, or nongovernmental partners, to expand the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A). A description of additional resources and authorities required by the options assessed pursuant to subparagraph (E). The plan required by paragraph
(1)shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.