Sec. 3504. Countering the People's Republic of China’s proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to the Middle East
828 words·~4 min read·
/bill/117/hr/4521/eas/section-3504A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
Congress makes the following findings: The People’s Republic of China became a full participant of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, committing it to apply a strong presumption of denial in exporting nuclear-related items that a foreign country could divert to a nuclear weapons program. The People's Republic of China also committed to the United States, in November 2000, to abide by the foundational principles of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR)to not assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300 kilometers) . The 2020 Department of State Report on the Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments found that the People's Republic of China continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs of proliferation concern in 2019 and that the United States imposed sanctions on nine Chinese entities for covered missile transfers to Iran. A June 5, 2019, press report indicated that the People's Republic of China allegedly provided assistance to Saudi Arabia in the development of a ballistic missile facility, which if confirmed, would violate the purpose of the MTCR and run contrary to the longstanding United States policy priority to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation in the Middle East. The Arms Export and Control Act of 1976 ( Public Law 93–329 ) requires the President to sanction any foreign person or government who knowingly exports, transfers, or otherwise engages in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology to a country that does not adhere to the MTCR. The People's Republic of China concluded two nuclear cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia in 2012 and 2017, respectively, which may facilitate the People's Republic of China’s bid to build two reactors in Saudi Arabia to generate 2.9 Gigawatt-electric
(GWe)of electricity. On August 4, 2020, a press report revealed the alleged existence of a previously undisclosed uranium yellowcake extraction facility in Saudi Arabia allegedly constructed with the assistance of the People's Republic of China, which if confirmed, would indicate significant progress by Saudi Arabia in developing the early stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that precede uranium enrichment. Saudi Arabia’s outdated Small Quantities Protocol and its lack of an in-force Additional Protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement severely curtails IAEA inspections, which has led the Agency to call upon Saudi Arabia to either rescind or update its Small Quantities Protocol. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written determination, and any documentation to support that determination detailing— whether any foreign person in the People's Republic of China knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign person in the previous three fiscal years; and the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 ( 50 U.S.C. 4612(b) ) against any foreign person who knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item or items. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing— whether any foreign person in the People's Republic of China engaged in cooperation with any other foreign person in the previous three fiscal years in the construction of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity that has not been notified to the IAEA and would be subject to complementary access if an Additional Protocol was in force; and the policy options required to prevent and respond to any future effort by the People's Republic of China to export to any foreign person an item classified as plants for the separation of isotopes of uranium or plants for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel elements under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority. The determination required under subsection
(b)and the report required under subsection
(c)shall be unclassified with a classified annex. In this section: The term appropriate committees of Congress means— the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. The terms foreign person and person mean— a natural person that is an alien; a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of a foreign country or has its principal place of business in a foreign country; any foreign governmental entity operating as a business enterprise; and any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity described in subparagraph
(B)or (C).
Connectionstraces to 1
Traces to 1 document
1 reference not yet in our index
- Pub. L. 93-329
Citation graph
cites case law
Sec. 3504
Countering the People's Republic of China’s proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to the Middle East
Pub. L.Pub. L. 93-329
Cites 2Cited by 0 across 0 sources