Sec. 3. Statement of policy
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Congress finds the following: The Government of China and the Communist Party of China employ a wide range of political, informational, and economic measures to influence, coerce, intimidate, or undermine the United States interests or the interests of United States partners and allies. The December 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America states, Although the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. .
The political influence operations efforts of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China have received less scrutiny than similar efforts of the Government of the Russian Federation, but given China’s economic strength and the growing apparatus being used to spread its influence globally, efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal pose significant and consequential long-term challenges to United States interests and values. The Government of China and the Communist Party of China use overt and covert means to target the political and economic elite, the media and public opinion, civil society and academia, and members of the Chinese diaspora.
The Government of China and the Communist Party of China employ an array of government entities, friendship and exchange organizations, private entities and businesspeople, and government-funded foundations, think tanks, educational and other projects to carry out political influence operations, which is often referred to as united front work. These political influence operations violate national sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally different from traditional efforts by states to shape international policy debates and improve their public image through public diplomacy and strategic communications campaigns.
The aims of the political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China are— to protect the political security of the Chinese Communist Party, both within China and globally; to domestically and globally promote the idea that the Chinese Communist Party’s political and economic model is superior to the governments of Western democracies; to promote the interests of the regime globally; and to weaken Western alliances and partnerships. The political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China take advantage of the open and democratic nature of the United States, including— constitutional protections for free speech and a free press; and the desire of some individuals or institutions to attract Chinese investment, gain access to Chinese markets, or attain greater global influence.
It is the sense of Congress that— the political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China are not soft power intended to persuade, but sharp power intended— to penetrate or corrupt democratic countries and undermine democratic institutions and freedoms; to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and policies favorable to the Government of China’s interest through disinformation, coercion, corruption, and other means; to widen the scope of Chinese authoritarian influence around the world, including— to suppress political opposition to the Chinese Communist Party; and to violate the internationally recognized human and civil rights of Chinese citizens living in nations around the world; and to undermine the strength of American alliances around the world; and the American people need reliable and current information— to identify the key institutions, individuals, entities, and ministries that carry out such operations; and to distinguish between malign political influence operations intended to undermine core American freedoms, democratic institutions, and cultural, educational, business, and people-to-people exchanges that may benefit the United States and China.
It is the policy of the United States— to clearly differentiate between the Chinese people and culture and the Government of China and the Communist Party of China in official statements, media, and messaging; to clearly differentiate between legal, internationally accepted public diplomacy and strategic communications campaigns and illicit activities to undermine democratic institutions or freedoms; to protect United States citizens and legal residents from malign or coercive political influence operations; to enhance cooperation and coordination with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Taiwan (officially known as the Republic of China ), whose governments and institutions have faced acute pressure from the political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China, and with other allies throughout the world; to create strategies to ensure that countries in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere are aware of China’s sharp power and provide needed capacity to counter them effectively; to implement more advanced transparency requirements concerning collaboration with Chinese actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks, and government officials; to use various forums to raise awareness about— the goals and methods of the political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China; and common patterns and approaches used by Chinese intelligence agencies or related actors; to require greater transparency for Confucius Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by the Government of China, the Communist Party of China, or by individuals or public or private organizations with a demonstrable affiliation with the Government of China or the Communist Party of China that are operating in the United States to register through the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 ( 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a comparable mechanism; to seek ways to increase Chinese language proficiency among mid-career professionals that do not rely on funding linked to the Government of China; to ensure that existing tools are sufficiently screening for the risk of Chinese influence operations; and to create more flexible tools, as needed, with the goals of— screening investments from the Government of China or sources backed by the Government of China to protect against the takeover of United States companies by Chinese state-owned or state-driven entities; and protecting institutions or business sectors critically important to United States national security and the viability of democratic institutions.
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U.S. Code