Sec. 231. Report on United States efforts to engage the People’s Republic of China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues
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/bill/116/s/4629/is/section-231·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
It shall be the policy of the United States that— an arms control dialogue with the Government of China, coordinated with United States allies and shaped by a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy, is in the national security interests of the United States; and the United States Government should formulate a strategy to engage the Government of China on relevant bilateral issues that lays the groundwork for bringing the People’s Republic of China into an arms control framework, including— fostering bilateral dialogue on arms control leading to the convening of bilateral strategic stability talks; negotiating norms for outer space; developing pre-launch notification regimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and expanding lines of communication between both governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of conventional war and increasing transparency.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that examines the approaches and strategic effects of engaging the Government of China on arms control, including— areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China, including on nuclear, ballistic, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific; how the United States Government can foster increased interest on the part of the Government of China in arms control; identifying strategic military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China that the United States Government is most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may benefit United States and allied security interests; opportunities for multilateral arms control in the Indo-Pacific region; mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military escalation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China; and opportunities and methods to create strategic transparency between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes— a concrete plan for arms control talks that includes both the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation; if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for ensuring United States security from Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons; efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis; and the interest level of the Government of China in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report, and a separate classified annex, that includes the following elements: The strategy behind the decision to extend or not extend New START. If New START were allowed to expire, an assessment of whether such an expiration is in the national security interests of the United States, including the specific reasons for such conclusion.
An examination of the effects of the expiration of New START on— strategic stability with the Russian Federation; the United States nuclear budget; spending on United States conventional forces as a result of increased nuclear spending; and international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. An assessment of how the Government of the Russian Federation will modify its nuclear forces in an unconstrained environment and how the United States Government will respond if the Government of the Russian Federation expands its arsenal.
An assessment of how the United States Government will need to alter intelligence capabilities and spending to regain, if possible, the knowledge of the Russian Federation’s arsenal that is currently provided by the inspection and verification mechanisms inherent to New START.