Sec. 9508. Report on biosecurity risk and disinformation by the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China
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In this section: The term appropriate committees of Congress means— the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
The term critical infrastructure has the meaning given such term in section 1016(e) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 ( 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e) ). Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying whether and how officials of the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China may have sought— to suppress information about— the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan; the spread of the virus through China; and the transmission of the virus to other countries; to spread disinformation relating to the pandemic; or to exploit the pandemic to advance their national security interests.
The report required by subsection
(b)shall include assessments of reported actions and the effect of those actions on efforts to contain the novel coronavirus pandemic, including each of the following: The origins of the novel coronavirus outbreak, the time and location of initial infections, and the mode and speed of early viral spread. Actions taken by the Government of China to suppress, conceal, or misinform the people of China and those of other countries about the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. The effect of disinformation or the failure of the Government of China to fully disclose details of the outbreak on response efforts of local governments in China and other countries. Diplomatic, political, economic, intelligence, or other pressure on other countries and international organizations to conceal information about the spread of the novel coronavirus and the response of the Government of China to the contagion, as well as to influence or coerce early responses to the pandemic by other countries. Efforts by officials of the Government of China to deny access to health experts and international health organizations to afflicted individuals in Wuhan, pertinent areas of the city, or laboratories of interest in China, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Efforts by the Government of China, or those acting at its direction or with its assistance, to conduct cyber operations against international, national, or private health organizations conducting research relating to the novel coronavirus or operating in response to the pandemic. Efforts to control, restrict, or manipulate relevant segments of global supply chains, particularly in the sale, trade, or provision of relevant medicines, medical supplies, or medical equipment as a result of the pandemic. Efforts to advance the economic, intelligence, national security, and political objectives of the Government of China by exploiting vulnerabilities of foreign governments, economies, and companies under financial duress as a result of the pandemic or to accelerate economic espionage and intellectual property theft. Efforts to exploit the disruption of the pharmaceutical and telecommunications industries as well as other industries tied to critical infrastructure and bilateral trade between China and the United States and between China and allies and partners of the United States in order to advance the economic and political objectives of the Government of China following the pandemic. The report required under subsection
(b)shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
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Sec. 9508
Report on biosecurity risk and disinformation by the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China
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