Sec. 805. Report on understanding potential for and preventing nuclear proliferation in the middle east
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/bill/116/hr/7856/rh/section-805A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
It is the sense of Congress that— it is in the vital national interest of the United States to prevent the onward proliferation of nuclear weapons technology in the Middle East; Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s public declaration in March 2018 that Saudi Arabia would pursue a nuclear bomb if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, and Iran’s separate decision to expand nuclear enrichment activities following the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018, both increase the threat of a regional nuclear arms race; and the Comptroller General of the United States concluded in May 2020 that— it is unclear whether the Department of State and the Department of Energy kept Congress fully and currently informed of nuclear cooperation negotiations with Saudi Arabia, as required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ( 42 U.S.C. 2153 ); and these negotiations are stalled over nonproliferation conditions.
It is the policy of the United States that any civil nuclear cooperation agreement by the United States with Saudi Arabia should include strong safeguards, including the nonproliferation criteria established under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ( 42 U.S.C. 2153 ), to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community that the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an assessment of the efforts by the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since 2015 to develop a nuclear program.
The report under paragraph
(1)shall include an assessment of the following: The state of nuclear cooperation between Saudi Arabia and any other country other than the United States, such as the People’s Republic of China or the Russian Federation. Efforts by Saudi Arabia to modernize and further develop the missile capabilities and program of Saudi Arabia, including with other countries other than the United States, such as China. The willingness of Saudi Arabia to accede to and abide by a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ( 42 U.S.C. 2153 ) that would include the prohibition on domestic uranium enrichment. The willingness of Saudi Arabia to sign, implement, and abide by an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The willingness of Saudi Arabia to accept international monitoring and inspections of the nuclear activities of Saudi Arabia, similar in scope to such monitoring and inspections that Iran agreed to under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. If the United States and Saudi Arabia were to enter into a civil nuclear cooperation agreement under such section 123 that does not contain the prohibitions and criteria described in subparagraphs
(C)and (D), the likelihood that the United Arab Emirates would seek to remove restrictions on its peaceful nuclear program and renegotiate its civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. The report under paragraph
(1)shall be based on all available credible sources. The report under paragraph
(1)shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. If the Director of National Intelligence determines that the Director cannot submit the report under paragraph
(1)by the date required by such paragraph, the Director shall, before such date— submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report setting forth the reasons why the report cannot be submitted by such date and an estimated date for the submission of the report; and along with the relevant experts from the National Intelligence Council and other relevant elements of the intelligence community, testify before the appropriate congressional committees on the issues that will be covered by the report. Nothing in this section may be construed as authorizing—— the sharing of intelligence with the Government of Saudi Arabia; or any nuclear cooperation with the Government of Saudi Arabia. In this section: The term appropriate congressional committees means— the congressional intelligence committees; and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. The term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action means the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran and by the People’s Republic of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and all implementing materials and agreements related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The term prohibition on domestic uranium enrichment means, with respect to a civil nuclear cooperation agreement under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ( 42 U.S.C. 2153 ), provisions in the agreement that prohibit domestic uranium enrichment in the same manner as the agreement entered into by the United States and the United Arab Emirates under such section.