Sec. 2. Requiring use of voting systems capable of producing voter-verified, auditable paper record in elections for Federal office
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Section 301 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081 ) is amended— by redesignating subsections
(c)and
(d)as subsections
(d)and (e); and by inserting after subsection
(b)the following new subsection: Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Safeguarding Election Infrastructure Act of 2019, no State or jurisdiction may purchase or otherwise acquire for use in an election for Federal office a direct recording electronic voting system or other electronic voting system that does not produce a voter-verified paper record as required by section 301(a)(2) (as amended by such Act). . Section 301(a)(2) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(2) ) is amended to read as follows: The voting system shall require the use of an individual, durable, voter-verified, paper ballot of the voter’s vote that shall be marked and made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter’s vote is cast and counted, and which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical character recognition device or other counting device. For purposes of this subclause, the term individual, durable, voter-verified, paper ballot means a paper ballot marked by the voter by hand or a paper ballot marked through the use of a nontabulating ballot marking device or system, so long as the voter shall have the option to mark his or her ballot by hand (or, in the case of an individual with a disability, by such alternative method as the election official shall establish that provides an equivalent opportunity, including with privacy and independence, as for other voters). The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to correct any error on the paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in accordance with clause (ii). The voting system shall not preserve the voter-verified paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible, at any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with the record of the voter’s vote without the voter’s consent. The individual, durable, voter-verified, paper ballot used in accordance with clause
(i)shall constitute the official ballot and shall be preserved and used as the official ballot for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used. Each paper ballot used pursuant to clause
(i)shall be suitable for a manual audit, and shall be counted by hand in any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office. In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, durable, voter-verified, paper ballots used pursuant to clause (i), and subject to subparagraph (B), the individual, durable, voter-verified, paper ballots shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast. The requirements of this subparagraph shall apply to all ballots cast in elections for Federal office, including ballots cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act and other absentee voters. In the event that— there is any inconsistency between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, durable, voter-verified, paper ballots used pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to any election for Federal office; and it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence (as determined in accordance with the applicable standards in the jurisdiction involved) in any recount, audit, or contest of the result of the election that the paper ballots have been compromised (by damage or mischief or otherwise) and that a sufficient number of the ballots have been so compromised that the result of the election could be changed, the determination of the appropriate remedy with respect to the election shall be made in accordance with applicable State law, except that the electronic tally shall not be used as the exclusive basis for determining the official certified result. For purposes of clause (i), only the paper ballots deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered in the calculation of whether or not the result of the election could be changed due to the compromised paper ballots. . Section 301(a)(4) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(4) ) is amended by inserting (including the paper ballots required to be used under paragraph (2)) after voting system . Section 301(a)(1) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(1) ) is amended— in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking counted and inserting counted, in accordance with paragraphs
(2)and
(3); in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking counted and inserting counted, in accordance with paragraphs
(2)and
(3); in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking counted each place it appears and inserting counted, in accordance with paragraphs
(2)and
(3); and in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking counted and inserting counted, in accordance with paragraphs
(2)and
(3). Section 301(d) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(d) ) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: , or, in the case of the requirements of this section which are first imposed on a State or jurisdiction pursuant to the amendments made by section 2 of the Safeguarding Election Infrastructure Act of 2019, with respect to voting systems used for elections held on or after the expiration of the 1-year period which begins on the date of the enactment of such Act .
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Sec. 2
Requiring use of voting systems capable of producing voter-verified, auditable paper record in elections for Federal office
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