Sec. 1649. Sense of Senate on Nuclear Posture Review
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/bill/115/s/2987/pcs/section-1649·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
Congress makes the following findings: Secretary of Defense James Mattis said in his opening statement before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on February 6, 2018, Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a war that we were unable to deter. . In the same statement, Secretary Mattis said, Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons complex of laboratories and plants is also long past due … Due to consistent underfunding, significant and sustained investments will be required over the coming decade to ensure that the National Nuclear Security Administration will be able to deliver at the rate needed to support nuclear deterrence into the 2030s and beyond. .
Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter recently wrote that it is essential to recapitalize the nuclear Triad, because it is the bedrock of deterrence. During the past 25 years, the United States has made no major new investments in its nuclear forces, yet other countries have conducted vigorous buildups. This history does not support the contention that U.S. investments fuel the nuclear programs of others. My views are reflected in the latest Nuclear Posture Review. . Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Jim Miller recently wrote, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review offers continuity with past U.S. policy and plans, including those in the 2010 NPR.
It deserves broad bipartisan support. . The Foreign Minister of Japan, Taro Kono, said in a statement on February 3, 2018, Japan highly appreciates the latest NPR which clearly articulates the U.S. resolve to ensure the effectiveness of its deterrence and its commitment to providing extended deterrence to its allies including Japan, in light of the international security environment which has been rapidly worsened since the release of the previous 2010 NPR, in particular, by continued development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. .
In testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on April 30, 2018, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said, Modernizing the nation’s nuclear deterrent delivery systems and our nuclear command and control is the [Department of Defense’s] top priority. . It is the sense of the Senate that— the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is a measured and appropriate response to the current security environment, taking into account the developments in other nuclear weapons states such as the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation and the return to great power competition as identified by two successive Secretaries of Defense and outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy;
Congress should fully fund the complete nuclear modernization program of the Department of Defense, including the Columbia-class submarine, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, the B–21 long-range bomber, the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon, the re-engining of the B–52H bomber, and dual-capable aircraft; the Department of Defense should organize itself appropriately to engineer, acquire, and operate nuclear command, control, and communications systems that are secure, reliable, and modernized;
Congress should fully fund the National Nuclear Security Administration component of the nuclear modernization program, including— the existing warhead life extension programs and major alterations, including the W76–2 warhead modification program and the W80–4 life extension program; and the recapitalization of infrastructure for production and processing of plutonium pits, uranium, tritium, lithium, and trusted strategic radiation-hardened microelectronics; in order to execute the programs described in this subsection in the timely fashion required by the Nuclear Posture Review, the National Nuclear Security Administration must balance workload, improve management of large programs, and better integrate its acquisition programs with those of the Department of Defense; the United States maintains a steadfast commitment to the policy of extended deterrence in Europe and East Asia, and the nuclear modernization program will ensure that commitment remains credible; the United States should continue to honor long-held arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security commitments, and should seek to increase transparency and predictability through strategic dialogue, risk-reduction communication channels, and the sharing of best practices; when complied with by all parties, effective nuclear nonproliferation and arms control measures and agreements can support the security of the United States and countries that are allies or partners of the United States by— controlling the spread of nuclear materials, technology, and expertise; decreasing the risk of misperception and miscalculation; and avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms competition; and the United States should continue to affirm its commitments to arms control efforts that advance the security of the United States and countries that are allies or partners of the United States, and are verifiable and enforceable, including the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the New START Treaty ), which is in effect through February 2021, and with mutual agreement may be extended for up to five years.