Sec. 1235. Sense of Senate on enhancing deterrence against Russian aggression in Europe
1,499 words·~7 min read·
/bill/115/hr/5515/pap/section-1235·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
To protect the national security of the United States, it is the policy of the United States to pursue an integrated approach to strengthening the defense of allies and partners in Europe as part of a broader, long-term strategy backed by all elements of United States national power to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression. It is the sense of the Senate that in order to strengthen the defense of allies and partners in Europe, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and in consultation with the commander of United States European Command, should— prioritize the need for additional United States Army forward presence in Europe, especially increased forward-stationed combat enablers to enhance United States Army capability and capacity in areas such as— long-range fires; air and missile defense; combat engineering; logistics and sustainment; warfighting headquarters elements; and electronic warfare; conduct a review of the balance of United States Army presence in Europe between rotationally deployed and forward-stationed forces, including an examination of transitioning the rotational presence of a United States Army armored brigade combat team
(ABCT)in Europe to a forward-stationed ABCT, with consideration of— the opportunity to more effectively signal the enduring commitment of the United States— to assure allies and partners in Europe; and to deter Russian aggression; the significant recurring fiscal costs of rotating heavy, equipment-intensive units; the family readiness impacts of lengthy heel-to-toe rotational deployments; the potential advantages of interoperability and cultural proficiency that can be achieved by forward-stationed forces that have knowledge of local rules, regulations, culture, customs, geography, and counterpart military units and officials; the potential tradeoffs between— the training readiness and high operational tempo of rotational units; and the higher manning rates of forward-stationed forces; and the benefits of National Training Center rotations for rotationally deployed units as compared to maximized use of United States Army training areas in Europe, including the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany, by forward-stationed units in Europe; consider options for mitigating personnel impacts of heel-to-toe rotations of United States forces in Europe, including designation of Operation Atlantic Resolve as a named operation; examine the merit and feasibility of maintaining a continuous and enduring presence of at least one United States Army company in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; examine the merit and feasibility of increasing the presence of United States special operations forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to deter aggression, promote interoperability, build resilience through training activities focused on countering unconventional warfare strategies, and enable the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)to take collective action if required; examine the merit and feasibility of prepositioning certain equipment and ammunition in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; continue rotational deployments of United States forces to Romania and Bulgaria while taking full advantage of the training opportunities available at military locations such as Camp Mihail Kogalniceanu in Romania and Novo Selo Training Area in Bulgaria; examine the implications of Russian military activity in the Arctic region for United States military capability, capacity, and force posture; conduct exercises focused on demonstrating the capability to flow United States forces from the continental United States and surge forces from central to eastern Europe in a nonpermissive environment— to test and improve strategic and operational logistics and transportation capabilities; to identify capability gaps, capacity shortfalls, or other limiting factors in the execution of operational plans; and to identify appropriate corrective action; consider incorporating cyber protection teams, to the extent practicable, with rotational forces in Europe with a focus on training United States and allied forces to operate against adversary cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations capabilities; support robust security assistance for Ukraine, including defensive lethal assistance, while promoting necessary defense institutional reforms; support robust security assistance for Georgia, including defensive lethal assistance, to strengthen the defense capabilities and readiness of Georgia, and improve interoperability with NATO forces; promote enhanced military-to-military engagement between the United States and the militaries of the countries of the Western Balkans to promote interoperability with NATO, civilian control of the military, procurement reforms, and regional security cooperation; develop and implement a comprehensive security cooperation strategy that rationalizes and prioritizes support for allies and partners in Europe, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia; consider the merit and feasibility of a defense lending initiative to support allies and partners in Europe, especially allies and partners that are most vulnerable to Russian aggression, to supplement and fill gaps in existing United States security assistance and arms sales mechanisms; and in NATO or through other multilateral formats— promote reforms to accelerate the speed of decision and deployability within NATO, including delegation to the Secretary General and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) of the authority to deploy the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force to any location within the territory of NATO allies in response to a security crisis; promote a more robust NATO defense planning process that— defines clear, stable chains-of-command responsible for the execution of graduated response plans; generates realistic military requirements; and provides a basis for assigning allies specific responsibilities as force providers in contingency plans; pursue planning agreements with allies and partners in Europe on rules of engagement and arrangements for command and control, access, transit, and support in crisis situations, which occur prior to an invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty by the North Atlantic Council; promote operational readiness of major combat units as a key element of alliance burden sharing alongside spending commitments made at the 2014 Wales Summit, including through— the establishment of 30-day readiness targets for NATO kinetic air squadrons, major naval combatants, and mechanized maneuver battalions; emphasis on allies maintaining fully manned units, improving readiness of key logistics units, increasing lift capacity, and maintaining sufficient stocks of equipment and munitions; and the conduct of NATO exercises with a focus on rapid mobilization and deployment of allied forces; explore transitioning the Baltic air policing mission of NATO to a Baltic air defense mission that would— be fully integrated with the Integrated Air and Missile Defense of NATO and other regional short- and medium-range air defense systems; and include the participation of NATO and regional partners such as Sweden and Finland; and support multilateral efforts to improve maritime domain awareness in the Baltic Sea, including— integrating subsurface sensors and anti-submarine warfare platforms of NATO and other regional partners into a shared maritime domain awareness framework; coordinating the development, procurement, and employment of aerial, surface, and subsurface unmanned vehicles as well as mobile air surveillance radars; expanding the scope of Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) information sharing to include sensitive or classified data with the goal of creating a common operating picture; and encouraging civil-military collaboration on maritime domain awareness; promote alignment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, European Defense Fund, and Coordinated Annual Review on Defense of the European Union
(EU)with the NATO defense planning process; support NATO–EU cooperation to ensure that— EU capability development is coherent, complementary, and interoperable with NATO; EU-generated capabilities are available to NATO; and EU defense activities are conducted with appropriate transparency and participation of non-EU states; support coordinated NATO and EU actions on expediting or waiving diplomatic clearances for the movement of United States and allied forces during contingencies; support cooperative investment frameworks that promote increased military mobility in Europe; explore enhancing the role of NATO Force Integration Units to more centrally coordinate exercises and training by de-conflicting training engagements, identifying opportunities for combined activities, and ensuring exercise design and delivery are responsive to the dynamic security environment; support cooperative efforts to improve the cyber resiliency of commercial systems in Europe, especially port and rail infrastructure essential for military mobility; support NATO procurement and training efforts to expand the use of secure and interoperable communications at the operational level, especially in the militaries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria; expand cooperation and joint planning with allies and partners on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), including— exercises related to border security and crisis command and control; and electronic warfare, anti-air, and anti-surface capabilities; promote efforts to improve the capability and readiness of NATO Standing Maritime Groups; encourage regular review and update of the Alliance Maritime Strategy of NATO to reflect the changing military balance in the Black Sea with a particular focus on ISR, cyber, electronic warfare, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities as well as defense of ports, airfields, military bases, and other critical infrastructure; explore increasing the frequency, scale, and scope of NATO and other multilateral exercises in the Black Sea with the participation of Ukraine and Georgia; promote integration of United States Marines in Norway with the United Kingdom-led Joint Expeditionary Force to increase multilateral cooperation and interoperability between NATO and regional partners such as Sweden and Finland; affirm support for the Open Door policy of NATO, including the eventual membership of Georgia in NATO; and promote the contribution of sufficient resources by NATO allies for the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package, and encourage NATO allies to make full use of the NATO–Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation Center.