Sec. 5. Actions to ensure Israel is prepared for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon after expiration of certain provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
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Subject to the preliminary conditions described in subsection (b), the President is authorized to take the actions described in subsection (c), upon the request of the Government of Israel, to ensure Israel is prepared for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon after expiration of provisions in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and
(C)of section 2(1). The President may exercise the authority of subsection
(a)only if the President first determines and certifies to Congress that— it is consistent with the results of the study and report required under section 4 to do so; and it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to do so. The actions described in this subsection are the following: To provide for the construction of infrastructure in Israel to accommodate large ordnance systems that are designed to destroy underground nuclear infrastructure, including— construction of extended runways for aircraft that carry the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP); basing options for such aircraft; and munition storage facilities. Not earlier than January 1, 2026, to store in the territory of Israel the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph (1), to be used by the United States except as provided in subparagraph (B). Not earlier than January 1, 2026, to transfer the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph
(1)to Israeli custody if the President determines and certifies to Congress that— Iran— is in noncompliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement on or after January 1, 2026; has withdrawn from provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; has modified its implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement (including modified Code 3.1); or as determined by the President in consultation with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has reduced access of inspectors of the Agency in such a manner so as to be prejudicial to the Agency’s ability to provide confidence as to the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and absence of undeclared nuclear activities; it is vital to the national security of the United States to do so; Israel has no other means to achieve a mutual national security objective of destroying Iran’s underground nuclear infrastructure or facilities; and a dual key control system is in place requiring approval by the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense (which may not be further delegated) for deployment of the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph
(1)prior to Israeli deployment of such munitions. To provide for training of Israeli personnel with respect to the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph (1). To conduct joint research and development with Israel to— enhance United States ordnance; and develop Israeli capability for ordnance to destroy underground infrastructure, including Hezbollah rocket storage and manufacturing facilities and underground Iranian nuclear facilities.