Sec. 1636. Certification that the Nuclear Posture Review addresses deterrent effect and operation of United States nuclear forces in current and future security environments
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Congress finds that, between the publication of the Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 and the date of the enactment of this Act— North Korea has— conducted at least three nuclear tests; tested missiles that may be capable of reaching United States territory in the Pacific Ocean; and continued to develop a missile that could strike targets in the United States homeland; the Russian Federation has— not complied with either the spirit or the letter of bilateral treaties with the United States related to nuclear weapons; continued to expand and diversify its arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons; threatened to add allies of the United States hosting missile defense shields to its list of nuclear targets; and demonstrated willful disregard for the sovereign territory of a neighboring country;
Iran has— according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, exceeded limits on sensitive materials under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, agreed to at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran and by the People’s Republic of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and continued to advance a ballistic missile program that has been condemned by the United Nations; the People's Republic of China has— built up military outposts on artificial islands in the South China Sea; mass-produced missiles capable of striking United States aircraft carriers and military installations in the Pacific; expanded its delivery systems to include ballistic missile submarines, which can hold the United States homeland at risk and potentially can destabilize the strategic stability of Southeast Asia; and continued to test anti-satellite weapons, according to the Department of State; and advances in technology and capabilities related to the cyber domain, applications of artificial intelligence, and space have further complicated the delicate balance of deterrence that has been in place since the Cold War.
It is the sense of Congress that— given the developments in the international security environment described in subsection (a), it is critical to the national security of the United States to maintain a nuclear force that is effective for both deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies of the United States; an effective force for deterrence and assurance should be flexible, in order to respond to different contingencies, as well as resilient, to operate as planned under stress; and in order to do so, the United States should continue to pursue the timely modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon, tactical nuclear capabilities, and nuclear command and control systems, as well as weapons and infrastructure maintained by the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Not later than 30 days after completing the first Nuclear Posture Review after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a certification that the Nuclear Posture Review accounts for— with respect to the nuclear capabilities of the United States as of such date of enactment— the ability of such capabilities to deter adversaries of the United States that possess nuclear weapons or may possess such weapons in the future; the ability of the United States to operate in a major regional conflict that involves nuclear weapons; the ability and preparedness of forward-deployed members of the Armed Forces to operate in a nuclear environment; and weapons, equipment, and training or conduct that would improve the abilities described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C); with respect to the nuclear capabilities of the United States projected over the 10-year period beginning on such date of enactment— the projected ability of such capabilities to deter adversaries of the United States that possess nuclear weapons or may possess such weapons in the future; the projected ability of the United States to operate in a major regional conflict that involves nuclear weapons; the projected ability and preparedness of forward-deployed members of the Armed Forces to operate in a nuclear environment; and weapons, equipment, and training or conduct that would improve the abilities described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C); and any actions that could be taken by the Secretary of Defense or the Administrator for Nuclear Security in the near and medium terms to decrease the risk posed by possible additional changes to the security environment related to nuclear weapons in the future.
The certification required by subsection
(c)may be submitted to the congressional defense committees in classified form.