Sec. 3. Sense of Congress
653 words·~3 min read·
/bill/114/s/269/is/section-3·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
It is the sense of Congress that— it is the policy of the United States that the Government of Iran will not be allowed to develop or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon capability; all instruments of power and influence of the United States should remain on the table to prevent the Government of Iran from developing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon capability; a long-term comprehensive solution with Iran will be most sustainable over the long term if the President consults and coordinates closely with Congress to implement a strategy that decisively ends any nuclear threat from Iran; the Government of Iran does not have an absolute or inherent right to enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and technologies under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly referred to as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ); the goal of international negotiations with Iran, led by the United States, should be to conclude a long-term comprehensive solution with parameters that will— reverse the development of Iran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure, including enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and facilities, the heavy water reactor and production plant at Arak, and any nuclear weapon components and technology, such that Iran is precluded from a nuclear breakout capability and prevented from pursuing both uranium and plutonium pathways to a nuclear weapon; bring Iran into compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear program, including Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010), with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the Security Council’s consideration of matters relating to the nuclear program of Iran; resolve all issues of past and present concern with the International Atomic Energy Agency, including possible military dimensions of the nuclear program of Iran, and give inspectors access to personnel, documents, and facilities involved, at any point, with nuclear or nuclear weapons-related activities of Iran; permit on-site and short-notice inspection, verification, and monitoring of all declared and suspect facilities in Iran, including installation and use of any compliance verification equipment requested by the International Atomic Energy Agency, such that any effort by Iran to produce a nuclear weapon will be quickly detected; require that Iran fully implement and comply with— the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement ); modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and ratification and implementation of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna December 18, 2003 (commonly referred to as the Additional Protocol ); and require that Iran implement measures in addition to the Additional Protocol that include verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency of Iran’s centrifuge research, development, and manufacturing facilities, including raw materials and components, and Iran’s uranium mines, mills, and processing facilities; the United States should continue to impose sanctions on the Government of Iran and its proxies for their continuing sponsorship of terrorism; the United States should continue to impose sanctions on the Government of Iran and Iranian persons for— ongoing abuses of human rights; and actions in support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria; and the United States should continue to impose sanctions on the Government of Iran and other governments and persons for the procurement, sale, or transfer of technology, services, or goods that support the development or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or the means of delivery of those weapons.