Sec. 6102. Findings
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/bill/114/hr/636/eas/section-6102A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
Congress makes the following findings: A number of recent airport security breaches in the United States have involved the use of Secure Identification Display Area (referred to in this section as SIDA ) badges, the credentials used by airport and airline workers to access the secure areas of an airport. In December 2014, a Delta ramp agent at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport was charged with using his SIDA badge to bypass airport security checkpoints and facilitate an interstate gun smuggling operation over a number of months via commercial aircraft.
In January 2015, an Atlanta-based Aviation Safety Inspector of the Federal Aviation Administration used his SIDA badge to bypass airport security checkpoints and transport a firearm in his carry-on luggage. In February 2015, a local news investigation found that over 1,000 SIDA badges at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport were lost or missing. In March 2015, and again in May 2015, Transportation Security Administration contractors were indicted for participating in a drug smuggling ring using luggage passed through the secure area of the San Francisco International Airport.
The Administration has indicated that it does not maintain a list of lost or missing SIDA badges, and instead relies on airport operators to track airport worker credentials. The Administration rarely uses its enforcement authority to fine airport operators that reach a certain threshold of missing SIDA badges. In April 2015, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee issued 28 recommendations for improvements to airport access control. In June 2015, the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security reported that the Administration did not have all relevant information regarding 73 airport workers who had records in United States intelligence-related databases because the Administration was not authorized to receive all terrorism-related information under current interagency watchlisting policy.
The Inspector General also found that the Administration did not have appropriate checks in place to reject incomplete or inaccurate airport worker employment investigations, including criminal history record checks and work authorization verifications, and had limited oversight over the airport operators that the Administration relies on to perform criminal history and work authorization checks for airport workers. There is growing concern about the potential insider threat at airports in light of recent terrorist activities.