Sec. 1671. Measures in response to violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by the Russian Federation
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Congress makes the following findings: On July 31, 2014, the Department of State released its annual report entitled Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments , which included the finding that [t]he United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile
(GLCM)with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles . The United States has undertaken diplomatic efforts to address with the Russian Federation its violations of the INF Treaty since 2013, and the Russian Federation has failed to respond to those efforts in any way. The Commander of the United States European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, General Philip Breedlove stated that [a] weapon capability that violates the I.N.F., that is introduced into the greater European land mass, is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with and [i]t can’t go unanswered . The Secretary of Defense has informed Congress that the range of options in response to the violation by the Russian Federation of the INF Treaty could include active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles; counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces . It is the sense of Congress that— the development and deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile by the Russian Federation in violation of the INF Treaty would pose a dangerous threat to the United States and its allies; the Russian Federation has established an increasing role for nuclear weapons in its military strategy; efforts taken by the President to compel the Russian Federation to return to compliance with the INF Treaty must be persistent and are in the best interests of the United States, but cannot be open-ended; and efforts by the United States to develop military and nonmilitary options for responding to violations of the INF Treaty could encourage the Russian Federation to return to compliance with the INF Treaty. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees with respect to whether the Russian Federation— has flight-tested, has deployed, or possesses a military system that has achieved an initial operating capability that is either a ground-launched ballistic missile or ground-launched cruise missile with a flight-tested range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers; or has begun taking measures to return to full compliance with the INF Treaty, including verification measures necessary to achieve high confidence that any missile described in paragraph
(1)will be eliminated. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes— the status of updates provided to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other allies of the United States on the Russian Federation’s flight testing, operating capability, and deployment of ground-launched ballistic missiles or ground-launched cruise missiles with a flight-tested range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers; and efforts to develop, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and such allies, collective responses, including economic and military responses, to arms control violations by the Russian Federation, including violations of the INF Treaty. If, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the Russian Federation has not begun taking measures to return to full compliance with the INF Treaty, including by agreeing to verification measures necessary to achieve high confidence that any ground-launched ballistic missile or ground-launched cruise missile with a flight-tested range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers will be eliminated, the Secretary of Defense shall, not later than 120 days after such date of enactment, submit to Congress a plan with respect to developing the following military capabilities: Counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile and cruise missile attacks, whether or not such capabilities are in compliance with the INF Treaty and including capabilities that may be acquired from allies of the United States. Countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the forces of the United States or allies of the United States, whether or not such capabilities are in compliance with the INF Treaty and including capabilities that may be acquired from allies of the United States. Active defenses to defend against intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks. The Secretary shall include, in the plan required by subparagraph (A), with respect to each military capability described in clauses (i), (ii), and
(iii)of that subparagraph, an estimate of cost and the approximate time for achieving a Milestone A decision, if such a decision is required. The Secretary may use funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2016 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense-wide, as specified in the funding table in section 4201, to carry out the development of capabilities pursuant to subparagraph
(A)that are recommended by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet military requirements and current capability gaps. In making such a recommendation, the Chairman shall give priority to such capabilities that the Chairman determines could be tested and fielded most expediently, with the most priority given to capabilities that the Chairman determines could be fielded in two years. The President shall include in the plan required by paragraph (1)(A) such other options as the President considers useful to encourage the Russian Federation to return to full compliance with the INF Treaty or necessary to respond to the failure of the Russian Federation to return to full compliance with the INF Treaty. In this section: The term appropriate congressional committees means— the congressional defense committees; the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. The term INF Treaty means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or INF Treaty ).